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Chapter 1: Why care about new political parties? 
 
“That is why the plan was hatched to form the Party for the Animals in 2002. 
A party that in the first place would act as a 'pacer in the marathon' and 
remind established parties of the many good intentions in their election 
manifesto.” - Marianne Thieme, leader of the Party for the Animals (2006, 83 
translation SO). 
 
1.1 Why care about new political parties? 
New political parties may have a special role in party politics. They may 
influence the attention that established political parties devote to certain issues and the 
positions that these parties take on these issues. This idea can be found in both 
theories of prominent political scientists and the statements of the leaders of actual 
new political parties. Marianne Thieme, leader of the Dutch PvdD (Partij voor de 
Dieren/Party for the Animals), states that her party was formed specifically to try and 
change the policies of established parties in parliament, as is evident from the quote 
above. The party does not seek to implement its policy goals directly but instead 
hopes that its participation in the parliamentary arena will force established parties to 
take over its policy priorities. In the 1990’s, the founders of the pensioners’ party 
U55+ (Unie 55+/Union 55+) shared Thieme’s goal of influencing policy indirectly 
through their influence on the established parties. They stated that they realised they 
would remain a small party but that they would force established parties to take over 
their policy positions (Politieke Unie 55+ 1994, 14). The founders of D66 
(Democraten '66/Democraten '66) had greater ambitions, but these were still put in 
terms of influencing the existing political system: in D66’s first election campaign 
party leader Hans van Mierlo stated that “D66 will disappear when we have helped 
the existing political system explode” (Van der Land 2003, 36; Rogmans 1991, 54). 
There is a whole range of effects that founders of new political parties have sought to 
provoke: from bringing new issues on the political agenda, via forcing established 
parties to change their positions, to changing the main patterns of the political system.  
Off course, founders of new political parties often have greater expectations: 
on one occasion, Pim Fortuyn, the founder of the eponymous party LPF (Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn/List Pim Fortuyn), announced: "I will become the next prime-minister, make 
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no mistake!"1 New political parties can influence government policies in two ways: 
new political parties may use motions, parliamentary initiatives or amendments to 
steer government policy. If they participate in government, ministers may themselves 
propose policies that were included in the coalition agreement by the new party. In 
doing so, parties are able to influence policy directly (Minkenberg 2001, 14; Rydgren 
2004; Van den Brink 2006, 153; Hainsworth 2008; Deschouwer 2007). 
New parties can also influence government policy indirectly: they may 
influence the positions that established parties take or change the priority they give to 
issues. This means that new parties can also have an indirect effect on policy: they 
influence policy through their effect on established parties. There are good theoretical 
reasons to examine the indirect effects of new political parties, eventhough the direct 
effects of new political parties may also be interesting. Classical studies in political 
science have proposed that new political parties have a special role to play in politics 
(Downs 1957; Daalder 1966; Lijphart 1968). Downs, Daalder and Lijphart each 
recognise the role that new (and often small) parties can play in influencing the 
positions of established parties. This effect has however not been studied extensively: 
it is the goal of this thesis to examine these claims.2 According to Downs, some 
political parties may be formed with the explicit goal to “influence already existing 
parties to change their policies or not to change them” (Downs 1957, 127 emphases 
removed SO). Daalder and Lijphart have attributed this function to small political 
parties. According to Daalder (1966, 226) the small political parties in the Dutch 
system "have served as gadflies, forcing the larger parties not to stray too far from 
their ideological positions lest they lose votes." Lijphart (1968, 175-176) has used a 
similar metaphor: the fact that small political parties can easily enter the Dutch 
parliamentary arena means that they can operate as a pressure valve in the political 
system: leaders of established parties can use the support for small parties to get an 
indication of the political dissatisfaction in their constituencies and change their 
course accordingly. In the Belgian political context scholars often speak of whip 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pels, D. (2009) "Pim Leeft! Zeven jaar na de moord op Pim Fortuyn" De Groene 
Amsterdammer 6/5/2009 
2 There are also theoretical reasons: As many new political parties disappear from 
parliament after a few years, remain very small, and are confined to the opposition, 
focusing only on these direct effects would mean that one neglects many smaller new 
parties. 
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parties (zweeppartijen): They put established parties under electoral pressure to 
change their policies (Lucardie 2004; Coffé 2005).  
Political parties are, in general, conservative organisations unlikely to change 
their political positions unless electoral incentives force them to: every vote that the 
new party gains, is lost by an established party (Janda 1990). So even when these new 
parties remain small and stay out of government, they can still influence the positions 
of established parties and therefore their cabinet policies: rather than seeking to 
implement their own policy positions directly from parliament or government office, 
new parties may seek to influence the policy positions of established parties in order 
to see their policy goals realised - albeit indirectly. 
New political parties may not only influence established political parties 
through electoral incentives. In parliament, different mechanisms may play a role 
(Bardi & Mair 2008). Decision-making in parliament tends to be fixed: the nature of 
conflict is defined, the lines of conflict are drawn, therefore the majorities are 
determined and therefore the policy outcomes are set. On the one hand the 
institutionalised, structured decision-making in parliament may marginalise new 
political parties. But on the other hand, if new political parties are able to exploit these 
mechanisms they may have a very strong effect on the patterns of political decision-
making. New political parties may form an external shock to the institutionalised 
decision-making in parliament. They may bring new issues to the agenda, influence 
the policy positions of established political parties and may even redefine the political 
conflict. In this way the entry of new political parties may have a marked effect on the 
way politics is conducted in parliament.  
According to Mair (1997a, 1997b), new political parties play a special role in 
political competition. Mair follows Schattschneider (1960) and proposes that political 
competition is as much between the established parties on the established lines of 
conflict, as it is between those parties that have an interest in maintaining the 
established lines of conflict and those outsiders that have an interest in changing the 
lines of conflict. The major parties on the left and right compete on the existing left-
right dimension. They owe their position to the fact that this conflict exists. New 
parties have an interest in introducing new lines of conflict and displacing the political 
conflict. This may, however, also mean that established parties have a particular 
interest in co-opting new political parties into political alliances. Mair (2001) and 
following his lead, Bale (2003), propose that the co-optation of new political parties 
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into political alliances of the left or the right reinforces tendencies towards bipolar 
cooperation already visible in West-European party systems. In those cases the entry 
of a new party may actually cause a reduction in the number of lines of conflict. 
New political parties may be important forces of change. There is considerable 
reason to look at the effect of new political parties: some new parties explicitly set out 
to influence established political parties and established parties may have a good 
reason to monitor the development of new political parties. New political parties may 
influence the patterns of electoral competition or patterns of parliamentary 
cooperation. According to Harmel (1985), there is only a limited number of studies 
into this subject. Norris (2005, 264) cited the case study of Harmel and Svåsand 
(1997), as the most systematic study of the effects of new parties. Since then a number 
of studies of specific cases (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der 
Meer 2007; Gauja 2010; Slagter & Loewenberg 2009) or on specific party families 
have been published (Van Spanje 2010; Meguid 2007).3  
One may ask the question: why care about political parties at all? At the end of 
the previous century the idea that political parties had lost their traditional function, 
had taken root in political science (for an overview of this debate see Koole 2002). 
Scholars argued that political parties had lost their traditional functions of aggregating 
public interests and articulating the public's claims. They argued that political parties 
are relics of the past, not agents of change. The rise of new political parties such as the 
Dutch List Pim Fortuyn has muted these voices somewhat and has reinvigorated the 
study of party politics. This study is an attempt to provide an answer to the question 
whether political parties have lost relevance in the political process, by examining 
whether new political parties can be agents of political change. 
 
1.2 Main claim of this study 
This study will attempt to bring new insight into the study of the reactions of 
established political parties to new political parties. The main research question of this 
study is to what extent and under what conditions new political parties influence 
established political parties and party systems. This study will take a broad look: it 
will examine reactions of established parties both in terms of attention that established 
parties devote to certain issues and in terms of the positions that they take on these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The only study cited in the literature that looks at new parties in general is Huibregts 
(2006, cited in Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). 
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issues. It will examine the reactions of established parties in both the electoral arena 
and the parliamentary arena. Finally, this study will take a close look at the effects of 
new parties at the level of both the individual established parties and the party system. 
This study will look exclusively at the indirect effect of new parties on policy. Their 
direct effect on government policy through their participation in parliamentary and 
governmental decision-making may be considerable, but is not the focus of this study.  
This study will define new political parties as organisations that have elected 
representatives in parliament for the first time, except those organisations that were 
formed as a transformation or a merger of one or more parties that had representatives 
in parliament.  
The study will focus on the reactions of all established parties on all new 
parties entering parliament in a single country, the Netherlands, since the Second 
World War. The study will focus on a single country because this way systemic 
factors that may influence to what extent established parties react to new parties, are 
kept constant. Because the Netherlands has such an open political system, especially 
in terms of the electoral system (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008), there is a considerable 
number of new and established parties to study. The study concerns the effect of 
nineteen new parties on, on average, nine established parties. This includes "flash 
parties" like the NMP (Nederlandse Middenstandspartij/Dutch Business Party), which 
was in parliament for little more than a year (Converse & Dupeux 1962), as well as 
parties that became a vital part of the party system like D66, a party that has been in 
parliament for over forty years. 
The fact that this study focuses on a single country does not mean that its 
results do not have meaning beyond the borders of that country. The Netherlands has 
been selected as a likely case to observe the effects of new political parties. With the 
high number and the great diversity of new political parties, it is likely that if new 
political parties have an effect on established political parties, one can observe it here. 
The goal of the study is to test the established theories about new political parties. If 
one does not find marked reactions of established parties on new parties here, it is 
unlikely that new parties have a marked effect elsewhere. 
The main finding of this study is that, when looking at the effects of new 
parties on established parties, there is a marked difference between the effect found in 
the parliamentary arena on the one hand and in the electoral arena on the other hand. 
While in the parliamentary arena the entry of a new party in general leads to a marked 
	   15	  
change in established parties’ policy priorities, the effect in the electoral arena is 
much less clear: while it is possible to identify patterns for individual new parties, it 
seems impossible to identify patterns in general. On the whole, new parties have more 
effect on the established parties in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena. 
The different natures of these two arenas might be a decisive factor here: in the 
parliamentary arena there is a “party-system agenda” which parties have to follow 
(Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010), while in the electoral arena established parties 
have an incentive to focus on their own issues and not discuss issues that other parties 
raise. The effect of new political parties in the parliamentary arena is linked to the 
activity and nature of these parties. In the electoral arena, however, one finds that - for 
as far as there are mechanisms behind the weak and unstructured responses - electoral 
considerations prevail: if established parties lose seats, they are (marginally but 
significantly) more likely to imitate new political parties.  
The effects of new parties on the party system are studied only within 
parliament, because if new parties are able to influence the interaction between parties 
it is most likely that one can observe it there. The new political parties that are studied 
are not associated with the introduction of new lines of conflict, for as far as changes 
in the dimensionality of party systems can be attributed to the entry of new political 
parties, new political parties tend to be associated with a reduction of the number of 
lines of conflict. This can be explained by two mechanisms: these new parties tend to 
introduce issues on which parties are positioned in a left-right fashion; and because 
new parties are co-opted into leftwing or rightwing political alliances, they reinforce 
the existing left-right division.  
 
1.3 What this study offers 
As stated in section 1.1, the number of studies on the effect of new political 
parties in the existing literature is very limited. Compared to the publications at hand, 
this study is innovative in three respects: first and foremost, most previous studies of 
the effects of new parties have been single or comparative case studies or they have 
focused on a particular subset of new parties, such as niche parties or radical 
rightwing parties (Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Gauja 2010; Meguid 2005, 2007; 
Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007; Van Spanje 2010). Several studies have 
selected only those new parties that were particularly successful in electoral terms, 
which makes it impossible to observe the effects of new parties in general: one can 
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only test whether indeed the size of a new party matters for the response of 
established parties, which is assumed in many studies, by comparing the effect of new 
political parties that remained at the electoral margins to the effect of those parties 
that have become major players themselves. To say something about new political 
parties in general, one must observe niche parties that focus on new political issues 
and challenger parties that seek to revive established ideologies. 
The second innovative characteristic of this study is that it includes all 
established parties, whether they are mainstream or not. Many studies of new political 
parties have neglected certain established parties. They have focused on those two 
parties that are seen as important system parties, often the main party of the left and 
the main party of the right (Huijbrechts 2006; Meguid 2005, 2007). However, some 
new political parties may have an effect outside of those mainstream parties: for 
instance, this study examines how the Dutch leftwing green party GL 
(GroenLinks/GreenLeft) responded to the entry of the PvdD. It may be interesting to 
see how this green party responded to the entry of a party that is greener than itself 
and which claimed that the other established parties, including said green party, had 
neglected the environment. Moreover, the assumption that many of these studies 
make, namely that there are only two main parties in every system, does not hold in 
many Western European party systems (Otjes 2011). With, on average, nine 
established political parties responding to the entry of each new political party, there 
is considerable variance in the characteristics of established political parties and in 
their reactions. 
The third innovation that this study makes is that it focuses on both the 
electoral and the parliamentary arena. Previous studies have almost exclusively 
focused on the electoral arena (with Gauja (2010) and Slagter and Loewenberg (2009) 
as exceptions). This study proposes that there is a difference in the way that 
established parties respond to the entry of a new political party in the parliamentary 
arena and the electoral arena. As this study will show, the specific characteristics of 
the different arenas make it much more likely for new parties to influence established 
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1.4 Plan of the study 
The study will set out to show the reactions of established political parties in 
eight chapters. After this first introductory chapter, the second chapter will introduce a 
number of theoretical distinctions that will help to understand the nature of new 
political parties, their effect and the conditions under which they are more or less 
likely to influence established political parties. Chapter 3, the methodological chapter, 
will translate these theoretical notions into observable variables. This chapter will also 
elaborate on the research strategy and case selection. The fourth chapter will introduce 
the dramatis personae: the nineteen new parties that will be the focus of this study. 
The chapter will put the nineteen individual cases in their historical context and 
discuss their development. These nineteen parties will be classified in terms of how 
they were founded, which goals their founders had and what their distinctive issues 
were. This chapter will be purely descriptive and will serve as a preliminary to the 
empirical, explanatory chapters.  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are three empirical chapters that will examine the effects 
of the new political parties. Chapter 5 will focus on the effect of new political parties 
on the positions that political parties take and the attention that they devote to certain 
issues in parliament. Chapter 6, which examines the electoral arena, will focus 
primarily on reactions, but will also examine the possibility of anticipation. The 
choice to study parliament first is informed by methodological concerns: one would 
expect that the first chance established parties have to respond to the entry of a new 
political party is in parliament. Established parties can only change their manifestos in 
reaction to the entry of a new political party in parliament at the end of the new 
party’s first parliamentary period. Therefore, it seems reasonable to study the effect of 
new parties within parliament before studying their effects on the electoral arena and 
on the party system. Chapter 7 examines the effect of new political parties on the 
parliamentary party system. The concluding chapter (chapter 8) will evaluate the 
tenability of the hypotheses, examine the generalisability of the results and consider 
perspectives for further research.  
	   18	  
Chapter 2: Theorising about new political parties 
 
Josh Lyman: "I gave up everything for this and you are not even in this to 
win." 
Matthew Santos: "Maybe we have a different definition of winning." 
- Dialogue from The West Wing, episode Opposition Research (Misiano 2005)  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In a scene in the American political drama The West Wing, a presidential 
candidate, Matthew Santos, and his campaign leader Josh Lyman have a heated 
discussion. The candidate makes clear that he does not expect to win the election and 
that he is in the race to put education higher on the political agenda. The campaign 
manager says: "I gave up everything for this and you are not even in this to win!” The 
candidate responds: "Maybe we have a different definition of winning." The 
difference in opinion between Lyman and Santos is not just a difference between two 
fictional characters in a political drama. In political reality, too, some candidates do 
not run to get elected, but because they want to put an issue on the political agenda. 
Some new political parties may be formed in order to change the policies of 
established political parties, or bring new issues to the agenda, or change the way 
politics is done instead of winning office and implementing policies directly. In the 
literature on new political parties, many studies take the perspective of Joshua Lyman, 
while only a few take the perspective of Matthew Santos.  
Major theorists of political science, like Downs (1957), Lijphart (1968), 
Daalder (1966) and Mair (1997b, 1997a, 2001), have written about the ability of new 
political parties to influence the policies of established political parties. They use 
metaphors such as gadflies, thermometers or pressure valves to describe new political 
parties: their presence prevents established political parties from straying too far from 
their ideology, and they can point them towards social problems that they have 
neglected. Their entry into the political system may form an important shock that 
forces established political parties to reconsider their policies (Harmel & Svåsand 
1997). The entry of a new political party may force established parties to change their 
positions on certain policies or to find solutions for new problems that the new 
political parties bring to the table. If established parties change their positions 
sufficiently, this may lead to a change in the party system: new parties may be able to 
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introduce a new line of conflict into the political arena, upsetting the balance in 
politics. It is also possible that the entry of a new political party causes the number of 
dimensions in the political system to decrease because the new party's entry reinforces 
competition along the left-right dimension. As Janda (1990) hypothesises, established 
parties are conservative organisations, unlikely to change their policies unless external 
factors force them to. Therefore, the patterns of interaction, the lines of conflict and 
thus also the party system is likely to “freeze” (Schattschneider 1960; Lipset & 
Rokkan 1967). This means that established political parties might be competing with 
each other on issues that have lost all relevance to voters. By bringing in new issues 
and influencing political party positions, new political parties may influence the lines 
of conflict that structure interaction between political parties. New political parties 
may have an important role in ensuring that the conflicts between established political 
parties are salient in society. 
According to Harmel (1985, 416) and Norris (2005, 264), the ability of new 
political parties to influence the policies of established political parties has been 
discussed often. However, there has only been limited systematic research into it. The 
case study of Harmel and Svåsand (1997) provides “the most systematic evidence” 
according to Norris (2005, 264). There has been a small number of studies that 
attempted to contribute to the understanding of the way new political parties influence 
established political parties in general (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007; 
Huijbrechts 2006; Harmel & Svåsand 1997). It is the goal of this research to chart 
more precisely the effect new political parties have on established political parties and 
the party system. Moreover, this study seeks to determine why some political parties 
were successful at changing the established political parties and the party systems, 
whereas others failed. 
This chapter will outline a number of theoretical distinctions that may help to 
understand how established parties respond to new political parties, under what 
conditions this may happen, and how individual reactions can lead to changes in the 
party system. This chapter will be divided into four sections. In the first section, the 
state of the art in the study of new political parties will be discussed. Scholars of new 
political parties appear to be interested in the ability of new political parties to change 
party systems, but they have almost exclusively focused on the new parties’ ability to 
win representation. In the second section, the term new political party will be defined. 
The third section will outline a typology of how established parties can respond to 
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new political parties. Specific hypotheses will be formulated here about the conditions 
under which established parties are more or less likely to respond to new political 
parties. In the fourth and final section, these individual developments will be linked to 
a notion of party system change.  
 
2.2 New political party success 
Since the 1970s, new political parties have been the subject of intensive study 
in political science. Political scientists began to study why some new political parties 
were successful, while others failed. Most of these studies focused on explaining the 
electoral success of new political parties: they took the perspective of Joshua Lyman 
from the quote above. New parties seek to win elections, occupy public office and 
implement their policy directly. The idea that new political parties could also be 
successful in other ways played a major role in explaining the significance of their 
studies. Ever since Downs (1957, 127), scholars have claimed that new political 
parties could influence established parties to change their policies. New political 
parties could not just have electoral success; they could also have programmatic 
success by influencing the policies of established political parties. This was the goal 
of Santos in the quote. In this way, new political parties could influence the policies of 
existing political parties, which could in some cases even lead to changes in the party 
system.  
Since the 1960s, more and more new political parties have entered West 
European parliaments (Hug 1997, 81). Political science picked up on this trend in the 
1970s. Scholars of new parties often use the notions of success and failure. Most of 
the research has focused on identifying those characteristics of new political parties 
that explain why some political parties are successful, while others fail. The question 
rises how one defines success or failure. The success or failure that authors appear to 
be interested in is the extent to which a new political party changes the party system. 
One can see this in the title of Hug’s (1997) book Altering party systems or the title of 
Tavits (2006) article “Party system change. Testing a model of new party entry”.  
How one defines success and failure depends on one's definition of the party 
system. In most studies, success has been defined as obtaining (or maintaining) a 
(relevant) number of seats in parliament (Hauss & Rayside 1978, 36-39; Harmel 
1985, 411-421; Rochon 1985, 432; Hug 1997; Mair 1999, 210; Lucardie 2000, 133-
134; Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 288; Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 305). Authors 
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implicitly define a party system in numerical terms: if the entry of a new political 
party into parliament changes a two party system into a three party system, the party 
system has been altered. 
A large number of characteristics have been identified that contribute to the 
electoral success of new political parties. Hug (1997, 44) categorises these in four 
groups: the presence of untapped issues, on which new political parties can campaign; 
the requirements for forming a political party, such as a required number of signatures 
to gain ballot access; the importance of the central government, as this would make 
running for the national parliament more attractive; and requirements for winning a 
seat, such as electoral thresholds. Other factors that have been identified relate to the 
new political parties’ organisation and leadership and levels of societal diversity, in 
religious, ethnic and linguistic terms (Hauss & Rayside 1978; Lucardie 2000; Harmel 
& Robertson 1985; Lowery et al. forthcoming). Hug’s (1997) and Lowery et aliorum 
(forthcoming) longitudinal studies show that the electoral system and the presence of 
new, untapped issues are the most important factors in determining the new political 
party’s formation and their (initial) electoral performance.  
Political parties may define success in another way. Some follow Lyman and 
seek to win a substantial number of votes, enter political office and become a relevant 
player in government formation. Many minor new parties, however, may run because 
they believe that they can influence the positions of the more promising candidates 
and therefore the positions that these candidates take in office. They may take Santos' 
perspective. New political parties may have the ability to bring new issues into the 
political arena (Harmel 1985, 405). They may force established parties to reconsider 
their political positions (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 313). As Downs (1957, 127) 
claimed, some new parties may only set out to force established political parties to 
adopt different stances on particular issues. In this way they may be able to influence 
the way established political parties interact with each other (Harmel & Robertson 
1985, 414). Even when they never gain enough support to be a relevant political party 
in the terminology of Sartori (1976), new political parties can have a lasting impact on 
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2.3 Conceptualising new political parties  
There is no standard definition of what a new political party is. How one 
defines a new party depends on one's research question (Barnea & Rahat 2011; 
Deschouwer 2007). There are two elements that form the definition of a new political 
party: 'new' and 'political party'. To start with the latter element: a political party can 
be defined as “an organization that appoints candidates at general elections to the 
system’s representative assembly”, as Sjöblom (1968, 12) formulated it. To define 
'new', it is necessary to look at the way political parties are formed. Two perspectives 
are helpful here: Mair’s (1999) and Pedersen’s (1982). 
Mair (1999, 216) made a distinction between the origins of political parties in 
terms of birth, marriage, divorce, and transformation. Parties that are formed by birth 
are new parties that are formed by homines novi, people without a background in 
other political parties. An example of a party formed by birth would be the Flemish 
green party Agalev (Anders Gaan Leven/To Live Differently). Previously apolitical 
people who were inspired by a green/progressive Catholic social movement founded 
this party. Parties that are formed by marriage, are formed by the merger of two or 
more existing parties. The Italian PD (Democratic Party/Partito Democratico) is an 
example of such a new party: the social democratic DS (Democrats of the Left/ 
Democratici di Sinistra), the social-liberal party la Margherita (The Daisy) and 
several other smaller parties form the PD. Parties that are formed by divorce are splits 
from pre-existing parties. The British SDP (Social democratic Party) that was formed 
by former Labour ministers is an example of this. Transformations are established 
parties that undergo a significant change (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 279-280) by 
altering their name, their leadership and sometimes even their official ideology. 
Examples of recent transformations can be found in Belgium where between 1990 and 
2008 every Flemish party in parliament changed its name at least once. These changes 
in name were often accompanied by the claim that the party had undergone a major 
transformation.4  
As Barnea and Rahat (2011, 308 emphases removed SO) argue, "new-ness is a 
non-dichotomous quality": it is a matter of gradation. Parties that are formed by birth 
are most new, as they have no connection to any established party. Parties that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The PVV was renamed VLD in 1992, the SP was renamed SP.a in 2001, the CVP 
became CD&V in 2001, AGaLev was renamed Groen! in 2004 and the Vlaams Blok 
became Vlaams Belang in 2004. 
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formed by divorce are less new, because they are related to an established party. 
Parties that are formed by transformation and marriage are least new: in essence they 
still are established parties. In order to get a workable definition, it is necessary to 
draw a line: in this study political parties that are formed by marriage or 
transformation of established parties are not seen as new but rather as a re-formation 
of one or more established political parties, formed to maintain their current position 
within the party system.5 Parties formed by divorce may not necessarily be new in the 
sense that some of their members have been MP in the past, but they are new in the 
sense that they have formed a new party organisation. 
Pedersen (1982) recognises different life phases that a newly formed party 
goes through. These phases are declaration (the public expression of the intention to 
form a new party); authorisation (the recognition by the authorities that they are a 
party); representation (winning the first seats in parliament); and finally relevance 
(becoming a relevant party in government formation). The point at which a party 
moves from being a new party to becoming an established party depends on the 
research question (see Deschouwer 2007). The moment studied here, following 
Huijbregts (2006, 19) and Rochon (1985, 437 n.6, n.10), is the representation phase. 
In summary, this study will define new political parties as organisations that 
have elected representatives in parliament for the first time, except those organisations 
that were formed as a transformation or a merger of one or more parties that had 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This definition differs from Rahat and Barnea (2011) in two ways: they define a new 
party as "a party that has a new label and that has no more than half of its top 
candidates (top candidates or safe districts) originate from a single party" (Rahat and 
Barnea 2011, 7, emphasis removed SO). In their definition, a merger of three equally 
sized parties becomes a new party, because not all top candidates originate from a 
single established party. If all their top candidates originate from established parties is 
it truly a new party? Moreover, the definition excludes parties formed by divorce. For 
the purpose of this study, party divorces are interesting because the established party 
from which the new party was formed, has good reasons to respond to the new party.  
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Table 2.1: types of reactions of established parties 
Reaction Attention Position 




Differentiation Differentiating policy 
priorities 
Taking stand against 
policy positions 
 
2.4 Responding to new political parties 
Established parties can respond in different ways to the entry of new political 
parties. This study will only examine the reactions to new political parties in terms of 
party positions and the saliency of issues. It will not look at changes in campaign 
style, rhetoric or internal party organisation. These organisational, rhetorical and 
campaign-related changes may be interesting, but the focus here is on the more 
substantially significant change in party positions. Several distinctions will be 
outlined that can help to understand the different reactions. These distinctions and 
reactions are summarised in table 2.1. 
The first distinction is the one between imitation and differentiation. In 
reaction to a new party, an established party can imitate the new party, or they can 
distinguish themselves from the new party by decreasing similarities. Different 
authors have also made the distinction between reactions that increase and reactions 
that decrease similarities. Downs (2001), for instance, divides these reactions into two 
categories: the first category he calls disengagement. Established political parties seek 
to distance themselves from the new political party. The second he calls engagement: 
established political parties address the issues that the new party brings to the table 
and cooperate with them. Imitation is an example of an engaging reaction (Downs 
2001, 27). The same distinction is caught in the division between increasing and 
decreasing similarity. The established party can imitate different aspects of the new 
party. It can take over (parts of) the program of the new political party. It can also 
address the same issues as the new political party; this is the basic difference between 
saliency and position. This study differentiates between four kinds of reactions: two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 One may question to what extent imitation is the correct term, because it refers to 
consciously increasing similarity. This study focuses on increasing similarity between 
political parties. The reasons why they do so are discussed in this theoretical chapter. 
These theories are all based on conscious, strategic action. Imitation is present where 
there is increasing similarity and there are theoretical reasons to assume that this 
action was conscious, exactly as is studied here. 
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are differentiating, two are imitating reactions; and two are reactions in terms of 
position and two are reactions in terms of saliency.7 
Attention imitation: an established political party can devote more attention 
to the issues that the new political party introduces. It can do so in its election 
manifesto or in its parliamentary work. This does not necessarily mean that the 
established political party takes over the specific proposals of the new political party. 
The established party may emphasise its own proposals concerning the newly 
introduced issues more than before. For instance, the competition of an animal rights 
party may force a green party to emphasise its own positions more than before. This 
strategy seems especially applicable when the new political party is a niche party that 
prioritises a set of issues that were previously outside of party competition (Meguid 
2005, 347-348). By devoting more attention to the issue, the established party may 
attempt to take over the ownership of the issue from the new party (Meguid 2005, 
2007). 
Attention differentiation: established political parties can also ignore new 
parties and their issues (Downs 2001, 26). They remain silent on the issues that the 
new political party brings to the table (Meguid 2005, 347-349) or, if the issue is 
already on the agenda, they may actually decrease levels of attention to the issue of 
the new party (Huijbrechts 2006). This strategy seems especially applicable if the new 
political party focuses on a particular issue: that is, if the party has a specific single 
issue, single interest or niche issue that it advocates and that was outside the range of 
party competition before. By disregarding the issue that the new party raises, the 
established parties may seek to prevent this issue from becoming the object of party 
competition. Moreover, the established parties may attempt to deprive the newcomers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Meguid (2005, 2007) uses this difference between saliency and position to introduce 
a three-fold classification: accommodative reactions, dismissive reactions and 
adversarial reactions. Established political parties can deal in different ways with the 
issues a new political party brings to the table. They can take over the issue that the 
new party raises, as well as its position. Meguid calls this an accommodative reaction. 
Established parties can also distinguish themselves from the new party by 
downplaying the new party’s issues. Meguid calls this a dismissive reaction. Or they 
can distinguish themselves from the new party by taking the opposite position on the 
issues it brings to the table. Meguid calls this an adversarial reaction. This scheme 
excludes the possibility that a party keeps a low level of saliency on the issue of the 
new party, but takes over its specific policy proposals. Huijbregts (2006) has 
attempted to make a more parsimonious taxonomy by only looking at issue attention 
only. These taxonomies are not used here because they are either inflexible (for 
Meguid) or attribute to much change to a new party (for Huijbregts). 
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of political legitimacy. The established political parties may be hoping that the new 
political party will wither and fade if they ignore it. This strategy seems particularly 
applicable in cases where the new political party poses no (electoral) threat to the 
established political parties (Kitschelt 1995, 256; Huijbrechts 2006). There are some 
dangers to this strategy: the failure to address the new political party and its issues 
may actually do little to prevent the defection of voters from the established political 
parties (Downs 2001, 26). 
Position imitation: established political parties may take over the policies that 
the new political party proposes (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Donavan & Broughton 
1999, 267; Downs 2001, 27; Schain 2002, 237-238; Heinisch 2003, 103-109; Bale 
2003; Van Spanje 2010; Wilson 1998). For instance, the entry of a green party into 
the political arena may force a social democratic party to reconsider its position on 
nuclear energy, or the entry of radical rightwing parties may force established parties 
to pursue tougher immigration, integration and law and order policies than they 
otherwise would have done (Wilson 1998, 257). 
Position differentiation: established political parties take a stand against the 
policies of a new political party: the established party moves away from the new 
party. This strategy seems especially applicable if the new political party takes 
extreme positions on some issues: for instance, in many countries green or social-
liberal parties take a stand against the radical right. They move to more multicultural 
and cosmopolitan policy position instead. 
The idea of policy differentiation has been studied by Meguid (2005, 2007). 
She identified a political strategy by which established political parties both increase 
their attention to the new party’s issue and emphasise policy differences between 
themselves and the new party. She called this an adversarial strategy. In this way 
established political parties legitimise the newcomer by picking a fight with them. 
Established political parties are likely to pursue this strategy in order to weaken the 
position of their established competitors. A mainstream rightwing party can lend 
legitimacy to a green party by focusing more on their pro-growth positions. In this 
way they force a political conflict with this green party, which then becomes a serious 
option for those voters who seek a green alternative for the mainstream rightwing 
party. As the green party is an electoral competitor of the mainstream leftwing party, 
it is the mainstream rightwing party that benefits here: it is voters of the left who 
switch parties to the green. This is a way to force a mainstream established political 
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competitor to lose votes, or, as Meguid (2007, 33) put it: “the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend”. Different authors have developed different hypotheses for different arenas 
and for different types of change (for instance in position or in attention). This study 
will attempt to extend some of the theories somewhat by applying them to different 
arenas and to different types of change. 
 
2.5 Interacting with new political parties 
In addition to adapting their policy positions or policy priorities, established 
political parties may actively engage with a new party by cooperating with it, for 
instance in governing coalitions, or they may actually disengage from it by isolating it 
politically. Though it is not the subject of this study, this form of political engagement 
or disengagement may be important in determining to what extent new political 
parties can influence the patterns of political competition in a political system.  
Political cooperation: political cooperation is a way in which established 
political parties engage with a new political party (Downs 2001, 27). The entry of a 
new party in parliament can increase the number of potential legislative majorities 
(Donavan & Broughton 1999, 267), which might influence cooperation both in the 
legislative arena and in cabinet formation. Cooperation in the legislative arena can 
occur on an ad hoc basis. In some countries, minority cabinets rely on more structured 
support from the MPs of (relatively) new radical right-wing parties. One example can 
be found in Denmark where various centre-right minority cabinets since the 1980s 
have been supported by the radical right (Kitschelt 1995, 157; Hainsworth 2008, 111). 
In other countries, established political parties and new radical right-wing parties have 
formed coalition cabinets. Research by De Lange (2008) has shown that especially the 
ideological similarity between new radical rightwing and centre-rightwing parties 
opens up the possibility of cabinet formation between them. If a new political party 
becomes part of a governing majority, it can have an impact on government policy 
(Minkenberg 2001, 14; Rydgren 2004; Van den Brink 2006, 153; Hainsworth 2008). 
In the case of radical right-wing parties, governments have adopted tougher 
legislation on immigration and the integration of immigrants, supported by established 
parties. Becoming part of a governing majority is not necessarily a success for new 
political parties, whether in programmatic or electoral terms. If the new political party 
has an anti-establishment, populist message, this may be difficult to credibly combine 
with government responsibility in cabinets. Many radical right-wing parties have 
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performed poorly after a period of government responsibility (Kitschelt 1995, 200; 
Hainsworth 2008, 115; Heinisch 2003). As will be further discussed in section 2.9, 
integrating new political parties in political alliances or governing coalitions may limit 
the new parties’ ability to create a new line of conflict, and may actually contribute to 
a reduction in the number of lines of conflict.  
Political isolation: a clear strategy of disengagement is political isolation or 
containment (Downs 2001). This is the case when political parties make an agreement 
not to cooperate with the new political party. This may happen in the formation of 
coalition cabinets or even in the legislature. This strategy is likely to be pursued if the 
new political party is seen as anti-democratic, for instance if it is a radical right-wing, 
a radical left-wing party or if it is a political arm of a paramilitary organisation. The 
most prominent example of a political isolation strategy can be seen in Belgium, 
where all established political parties have formed a cordon sanitaire to keep the 
radical VB (Vlaams Blok/Flemish Bloc) out of power (Hainsworth 2008). 
 
2.6 Political attention 
Attention plays a role in different studies of the electoral arena and the 
parliamentary arena. There are different theories on electoral competition. In one of 
these theories, the saliency theory of competition, attention plays a major role. This 
theory was pioneered by Robertson (1976) and extended by Budge (2001). These 
scholars claimed that parties tend to compete which each other by emphasising 
different issues. Party positions can best be understood in terms of differences in 
saliency (Budge 2001, 78-85): parties do not compete by offering different solutions 
for particular issues, but they compete by emphasising different issues. Some issues 
belong to the left and some are owned by rightwing parties (Budge 2001, 78, 82). In 
this view, the left prefers talking about social welfare and the right prefers talking 
about law and order. A candidate is understood to own an issue when he or she is seen 
by the electorate to be better able at handling that particular national problem than 
their opponent (Petrocik 1996, 828). Electoral competition concerns the definition of 
the conflict: the issue that is salient in the eyes of the voter decides the election 
(Bélanger & Meguid 2008). In essence, a party seeks to make the elections a 
referendum about an issue on which voters trust their candidates more than the other 
parties’. Forcing a candidate to address an issue he or she does not own can be seen as 
an important step to reframe the elections. In multiparty systems, which issues voters 
	   29	  
see as owned by particular parties depends (among other factors) on the 
communication of the party (Walgrave & De Swert 2007). Walgrave and De Swert 
(2007, 64-65) find a relationship between the issues that parties emphasise in their 
manifestos and long-term patterns of issue ownership. New political parties may own 
issues that lie outside the scope of issue competition. They may be niche parties that 
focus on new issues such as green parties, anti-immigrant parties or ethno-territorial 
parties (Meguid 2005, 2007). Established political parties may attempt to halt or 
prevent the rise of a new party by emphasising the issues that new parties own 
(Meguid 2005, 2007). As will be described in section 2.9, saliency also plays a role in 
the work of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a). 
In the study of the parliamentary arena, issue attention plays a major role and 
new political parties may have a special role in changing it. Attention is an important 
issue in parliamentary politics (2005, 32). Many real social problems exist and 
political attention is scarce (Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 34-35; Baumgartner & Jones 
1993, 10). The issues that parties decide to focus on are the issues on which political 
action is taken (Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 37; Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 47). The 
parliamentary agenda is a particular political construct. Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen (2010, 260-261) propose that there is a two-way relationship between 
attention individual parties devote to issues and the parliamentary agenda.8 Parties 
must engage in the agenda of the party system while at the same time competing over 
the formulation of the new agenda (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 260). By 
dominating the party system agenda, some parties may be able to force other parties to 
focus on the issues that they own (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 273).  
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) propose that the parliamentary agenda goes 
through two phases: long periods of stability on the one hand and sudden changes on 
the other. In the stable periods, the parliamentary agenda is more or less fixed 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 6). These periods of stability are interrupted by sudden 
changes: these changes are the result of external influences, such as real world events, 
media attention or public protests (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 10; Walgrave, Varone 
& Dumont 2006; Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006). In addition to these external 
influences, factors inside parliament may also matter. Elections can cause shifts in 
attention, because they upset the balance of power between parties (Baumgartner & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) use the term “party system agenda”. 
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Jones 1993, 22). Changes in the formation of parliamentary committees can even lead 
to a change in that committee’s agenda (Alder 2002, 223). New parties like these 
other factors may cause a change in the policy agenda. Changes in the parliamentary 
agenda are often sudden and quick, what Baumgartner and Jones (1993) call a 
punctuation of the equilibrium. Dutch research has indicated that change is more 
incremental and less punctuated in the Netherlands than in the United States, because 
of the consensual nature of Dutch politics (Breeman, Lowery, et al. 2009, 20). 
 
2.7 Political positions 
In addition to devoting attention to certain issues, parties also take position on 
these issues. Different parties may offer different solutions for the same problem. 
There are two ways in which one can think about political positions: first, one can 
consider policy positions in an isolated way. Parties may approve or oppose the death 
penalty, and they may approve or oppose nuclear energy. The entry of a new political 
party may cause established parties to reconsider their policy priorities and to change 
position on a certain issue. The entry of a new party may also cause parties to take a 
position on an issue that they were silent or neutral about before. After the entry of 
D66 in the Tweede Kamer (the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament) for 
instance, parties had to take position on the question of electoral system reform, on 
which they had been silent before. This is the most basic way in which one can 
conceive of party positions: an unstructured set of policy demands, which may to a 
certain extent resemble a new party’s positions. One can also aggregate policy 
positions into a dimensional structure. Policy dimensions are more than an 
aggregation of party positions on policy issues that share a thematic basis (pace De 
Lange 2008). This means that one works under the testable assumption that there is 
some structure in the party positions on issues. One can put party positions on a 
dimension. One can then conceive of party positions and parties as rightwing or 
leftwing, because there is clustering or an order of parties and positions.  
Decision making in different arenas can be more or less structured. According 
to Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 19) parliamentary politics tends to be concentrated 
on one interpretation of the political conflict. It matters which conflict will become 
significant (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 19; Schattschneider 1960, 63-64; Green-
Pedersen 2007). The significant lines of conflict determine the possible majorities and 
therefore it fixes the outcomes of political decision-making. By redefining an issue, 
	   31	  
one can change the outcomes of political decision-making. Here again, Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) propose that policy changes go through phases of stability and 
sudden change. In the periods of stability, political actors may monopolise the 
formulation of policy: the median legislator has considerable control over what 
policies will be pursued (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 4). If the balance of power 
between the parties is fixed, the definition of the conflict is fixed as well and therefore 
the outcomes of political decision-making are pre-determined as well (Green-
Pedersen & Mortensen 2010). These periods of stability are interrupted by sudden 
changes: external events, elections and the entry of new political parties. Newcomers 
and outsiders may explicitly seek to redefine the conflict to their advantage. This view 
fits the perspective of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a) who propose that the 
main conflict of politics is between those parties that have an interest in maintaining 
the current lines of conflict of politics, and new political parties that seek to redefine 
the political conflict, by introducing a new line of conflict.9 Consider the issue of the 
welfare state: there are two different ways to frame a conflict. On the one hand, one 
may understand a conflict in terms of left and right. Leftwing parties favour measures 
that extend social solidarity while rightwing parties favour measures that are based on 
individual responsibility (Claassen 2011). One can also redefine the issue in terms of 
progressive and conservative: between parties that favour welfare state reform and 
parties that want to maintain the current welfare state. The same issue still dominates 
the political agenda, but by redefining the issue, new questions are posed and new 
majorities may be formed. The entry of a new party may also raise the political profile 
of an issue. The political conflict on that issue can become more polarised. Instead of 
redefining the conflict, the entry of a new party may reinforce the existing lines of 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) refer to Schattschneider (1960), but only in the 
context of the contagiousness of the political conflict. For the outcome of political 
decision-making, it matters which groups are included. Therefore minorities have an 
interest in expanding the number of participants in a conflict, thus spreading the 
conflict. 
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2.8 Hypotheses 
The central notion of this study is that the entry of a new party may cause 
established parties to take more or less similar party positions to the new party or 
change the focus of their attention. The simplest hypothesis is that the entry of a new 
political party may in general cause established parties to imitate it:10 
 
1. New party presence hypothesis: new parties will elicit imitation of their 
 policies (whether conceptualised in terms of attention or position) by the 
 established parties. 
 
Different new parties may influence different established parties in different 
ways. Specific conditions and characteristics of both the new and the established 
parties may have an influence on the way established political parties respond to the 
proposals made by a new party. Here several factors will be discussed that may 
influence how established political parties respond to the policy proposals of new 
parties. These factors relate to the characteristics of the new party, the established 
party, the relationship between these two and the political arena.  
 
2.8.1 Political arenas 
In different political arenas, the effect of a new political party entering the 
political arena may be different. Bardi and Mair (2008) differentiate between two 
political arenas: the parliamentary arena and the electoral arena. The electoral arena is 
formed by electoral campaign. The parliamentary arena refers to parliament, where 
MPs participate in the policy-making process and hold the government accountable. 
Political parties have different incentives in different arenas and work under different 
constraints. The goal that parties have in the electoral arena is clear: win as many 
votes as possible (Bardi & Mair 2008, 158). In the parliamentary arena, however, the 
goals parties have may be more contingent: for opposition parties the parliamentary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For reasons of parsimony, all these hypotheses are formulated in terms of imitation. 
Established parties will imitate new parties under certain conditions. While examining 
this relationship, one also examines the conditions under which established parties are 
likely to distinguish themselves from new parties: namely when these conditions are 
not present. Finally, if the relationships are reversed, because established parties are 
likely to differentiate themselves from new parties under the specified conditions, this 
will also show in the analyses of these hypotheses: the relationships will go against 
the expected direction.  
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arena may only be a platform that they can use to appeal to the electorate, while for 
coalition parties, parliament may be a place where policy or office goals can be 
pursued. In the electoral arena, parties may be more responsive to the electorate, while 
in the parliamentary arena office-seeking incentives can cause moderation (Bardi & 
Mair 2008, 157). 
The characteristics of the different political arenas pull our expectations about 
the effects of new parties in two different directions. Following Bardi and Mair, one 
would expect parties to be more responsive to signals from the voters in the electoral 
arena: here electoral considerations play a major role. Voting for a new party may be 
a way for voters to express their concerns. Therefore, parties may feel more inclined 
to respond to new political parties in the electoral arena than in the parliamentary 
arena. Moreover, it is easier to respond to a new party during an electoral campaign: 
initiating a new bill takes more work than writing a line in an election manifesto. 
However, established political parties can more easily ignore new parties during 
election campaigns than they can in parliament. Political parties will focus on their 
own issues in the electoral arena in order to frame the elections in terms of issues that 
are beneficial to them (Budge 2001). This means that they will be inclined to ignore 
issues of which other parties, including new parties, have ownership. 
In the parliamentary arena, similar concerns pull our expectations about the 
effects of new parties into different directions: in the parliamentary arena, parties are 
constrained by the parliamentary agenda. At the same time they participate in creating 
the agenda. As Jones and Baumgartner (2005) have shown, the parliamentary agenda 
is path-dependent. It is difficult to change the parliamentary agenda. It is not likely to 
change when a new political party (often with little experience in the parliamentary 
handiwork) enters the arena. This is, however, only one side of the story, because the 
parliamentary agenda is a peculiar political construct. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 
(2010, 260-261) propose that a two-way relationship exists between the attention that 
individual parties devote to issues and the parliamentary agenda. Parties must engage 
in the parliamentary agenda while at the same time competing over the new agenda 
(Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 260). Parties have to deal with those issues on 
the parliamentary agenda. Parliamentary parties are expected by the media and by 
other parties to have an opinion about issues that are on the agenda (Green-Pedersen 
& Mortensen 2010, 261). If a party does not talk about an issue when other parties 
raise it, it leaves the definition of that issue to other parties. This creates a situation of 
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dependency that parties will usually try to avoid. It may be possible that, by setting 
the parliamentary agenda, a new party can force other parties to focus on its issues 
(Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, 261). 
These mechanisms pull our expectations in different directions. Still one 
testable expectation needs to be formulated here: the determining factor is the strength 
of the agenda control by the established parties and the government. In the case 
studied (the Netherlands), agenda control is relatively weak (Döring 1995, see also 
section 3.4.1): the agenda is set by parliament. Therefore new parties are likely to 
have a more marked effect in parliament in the Netherlands than in another country, 
while for the electoral arena there is no reason to hypothesise a particularly marked 
effect. Political parties will also be influenced by different incentives in different 
arenas. It is likely that electoral considerations will play a larger role in the electoral 
arena than in the parliamentary arena. In the parliamentary arena, control over the 
parliamentary agenda (exercised through new party activity or government 
participation) will influence the extent to which established parties will have to deal 
with those new issues. 
 
2. Political arena hypothesis: a new party will elicit more imitation in 
 established parties’ policies in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral 
 arena. 
3. New party activity hypothesis: the more active a new party is on its own 
 issue, the more imitation it will elicit in the attention that established parties 
 devote to that issue. 
4. Electoral considerations hypothesis: factors related to the electoral 
performance of established political parties will have more effect on the 
imitation by established parties in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary 
arena.  
 
2.8.2 Relationship between the new and the established party 
It may not necessarily be the case that all new parties influence the policies of 
all established parties. Rather, specific new parties may elicit reactions from specific 
established parties that they threaten. In the following section, three relationships 
between new and established parties will be examined: the relationship between 
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challenged and challenger parties, between ideological proximate new and established 
parties and between mobiliser new parties and established parties.  
An important typology for understanding the goals of new parties is the 
difference between mobilisers and challengers (Rochon 1985).11 Challengers seek to 
challenge established political parties “on their own turf” (Rochon 1985, 421); they 
challenge the legitimacy of a particular established political party by claiming that 
they have abandoned the ideology or the interest that the party used to stand for 
(Rochon 1985, 421). In the terminology of this study: they seek to compete with the 
established political parties on the established lines of conflict. An example could be 
the new leftwing populist parties such as Die Linke (The Left), which attack the social 
democrats on their weak social agenda and their cooperation with economically 
conservative parties. Mobilisers seek to mobilise voters on a new issue, emphasising 
how their new politics differs from the politics of the established political parties 
(Rochon 1985, 421). An example of such a political party is Die Grünen (The 
Greens), which mobilised voters along new cleavages (Bürklin 1985). Lucardie (2000, 
176-177; Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 284) further distinguishes between three types of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The distinction is similar to the typology proposed by Daalder (1965), which was 
elaborated by Lucardie (1986) for the period of depillarisation and by Vossen (2003) 
for the Interbellum. Daalder recognised six types of parties. Integralist parties, which 
seek to “adhere as perfectionistically as possible to a particular dogmatic teaching” 
(Daalder 1965, 192 translation SO). Integralist parties can be found among religious 
parties and socialist parties. Ecumenical parties, contrariwise, seek to overcome 
religious and ideological divides (Daalder 195, 192). The next two types come in a 
pair: special interest parties (Daalder 1965, 193) and socially dissident parties, which 
represent the labour or the employers’ wing of a particular political family (Daalder 
1965, 193). Finally, Daalder (1965, 194) distinguishes between centripetal and 
centrifugal anti-system parties. These are parties that seek to emphasise national unity 
and break through all existing divides. It can also occur in a centrifugal fashion, when 
parties seek revolutionary change of the economic system (Daalder 1965, 194). 
Vossen (2003, 139-141) only recognises the latter of the two and emphasises that 
these groups rely on revolutionary means to achieve their goals. Vossen (2003) and 
Daalder (1965) stress that this characterisation is not exclusive, but that an individual 
party can be both an integralist party and emphasise the interests of particular groups, 
for instance. Vossen (2003) adds a personalist party category: with the rise of mass 
parties and the proportional electoral system, established parties became less open to 
prominent individuals, who could operate much more freely and independently in the 
majoritarian electoral system with limited suffrage, and in the elite-parties. They 
represented a different kind of politics based on trust between voters and 
parliamentarians, not a defined political program (Vossen 2003, 64-66). Rochon 
(1985, 424) likewise considers several new parties of the Interbellum period to be 
“personal vehicles” of their founders. 
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mobilisers: prolocutors, prophets and purifiers. Prolocutors seek to represent a 
particular social group that has been neglected by the established political parties, 
without explicit reference to a political ideology. Prophetic parties seek to mobilise 
voters on a new political issue with a new political ideology. Purifiers seek to change 
the political system or the political culture.  
Mobilisers are likely to seek to change the attention that established political 
parties devote to issues, because they mobilise voters on a new issue. By focusing on 
new issues mobilisers cut through established lines of conflict: therefore, they are 
likely to influence all parties. On the whole one would expected that mobilisers 
influence more parties than challengers. Challengers are likely to influence the policy 
positions or issue attention of the specific established political parties that it 
challenged. Moreover, the entry of a mobiliser is more likely to result in change in the 
nature of the political conflict on an issue, than the entry of a challenger would be. 
The entry of a challenger is more likely to reinforce the existing conflict than the entry 
of a mobiliser. 
In a similar line of argument, one may argue that established parties, which 
already stand close to a new party on the issue that it raises, might be more likely to 
respond to a new party than parties that take a different position on the issue. A party 
may feel challenged by the new party “on its own turf” in this way as well. If a new 
party enters parliament while it campaigned on the same side of an issue that the 
established party considers its own, this may be seen by the established party’s 
leadership as a sign that the party has lost credibility on the issue in the eyes of the 
voter. Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317), Van Spanje (2010, 567), and Huijbregts 
(2006, 9), propose that ideologically proximate established parties may respond more 
to a new party, than ideologically distant parties. Note that Harmel and Svåsand 
(1997) only examine this hypothesis in the electoral arena, here this hypothesis is 
examined for both the electoral and the parliamentary arena. Different studies have 
looked at both ideologically distant and proximate parties and have found reactions 
from both (Bale 2008; Bale et al. 2010; Van Kersbergen & Krouwel 2008; Van den 
Brink 2006). There is likely to be more room for improvement in dissimilar parties 
than in similar parties: if two parties already have similar programs, there are less 
points they can change to become more similar. As this is most in line with the 
hypothesis about challengers, this hypothesis will be tested here. One should note, 
however, that there are good reasons for new parties to try and influence established 
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political parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum. The entry of a new 
political party is likely to reinforce the existing political conflict. Meguid (2005, 
2007) has taken up this notion: she proposes that, when a new issue is raised, parties 
that are on opposite sides of the political spectrum may have good reason to raise the 
political profile of the issue, while at the same time moving away from the established 
party in terms of positions. By picking a fight with the new party on this issue, the 
established party may seek to reinforce the ownership of the new party on the issue. 
The voters of the ideologically opposite new political party are unlikely to switch to 
the new party, but the voters of ideologically proximate parties are. The underlying 
reasoning is that “the enemy of the enemy is a friend”: by reacting in an 
accommodating way to a niche party competing electorally with another mainstream 
party, an established party can seek to increase its relative electoral position. 
Moreover, if parties are dissimilar, there is more room for improvement. These 
different notions are tested in hypothesis 7. The ideological similarity formulation is 
pursued here, but testing that will also yield information for the possibility that 
ideological dissimilarity matters. 
 
5. Challenger hypothesis: a challenger new party will elicit more imitation in 
 the policies of the established party that it challenged, than in the policies of 
 other parties. 
6. Mobiliser hypothesis: a mobiliser new party will elicit imitation in the 
 policies of more established parties than a challenger new party. 
7. Ideological similarity hypothesis: the more similar a new party is to an 
 established party, the more imitation that new party will elicit from that 
 established party. 
 
2.8.3 Characteristics of the new party 
There are three characteristics of new parties that may influence the extent to 
which it is seen as a threat by the established political parties. Harmel and Svåsand 
(1997, 317) claim that parties will only respond to a new party if it “wins enough 
votes and/or seats to get noticed.” If a new party offers a credible threat to the 
established parties, they are more likely to imitate it than if it is seen as merely a 
nuisance. Electoral success of the new party is often used as an explanation for 
established parties reactions in other studies (Van Spanje 2010, 567; Huijbrechts 
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2006, 8). One can explain this mechanism in two ways: first, electorally successful 
new parties may be seen as threats to established parties. Second, it may also be the 
case that established parties attempt to jump on the "bandwagon" of a successful party 
(Ceci & Kain 1982; Gray et al. 2010).12 Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only examine the 
new party size hypothesis in the electoral arena, here this hypothesis is tested in both 
the electoral and the parliamentary arena. As stated in paragraph 2.8.1 the hypothesis 
is that electoral considerations matter more in the electoral arena, than in the 
parliamentary arena. 
The extent to which a new political party is seen as a credible threat may 
depend on its support in the electorate, as Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317) propose, 
but also on its level of organisation: if the new political party is not organised, the 
established political parties may be more likely to consider the new competitor a 
nuisance or a flash party instead of a real threat. It may, finally, also depend on its 
participation in government. If a new political party participates in government, it is a 
sign that established parties consider it a relevant political player (Sartori 1976). 
Government participation may also be related to agenda control, as discussed in 
section 2.8.1: these new parties have control over the parliamentary agenda by their 
participation in the governing majority, through the legislative agenda of the cabinet. 
One should note, however, that the participation of new (radical rightwing) parties in 
a cabinet is often preceded by a growing similarity between the policy positions of the 
centre-right and the new radical rightwing parties (De Lange 2008; Bale 2003). This 
relationship reinforces itself: ideological similarity between the new and the 
established party is likely to be both a cause and result of their political cooperation. 
What is the case for patterns in attention, is also likely to be the case for the 
redefinition of the political conflict: new political parties that enter the political arena 
with a larger number of votes or a stronger party organisation, or those new parties 
that actually enter government, are more likely to redefine the nature of the political 
conflict than other new political parties.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ceci and Kain (1982) and Gray et al. (2010) do not use the notion of the bandwagon 
in the context of parties imitating each other: Ceci and Kain (1982) look at voters 
voting for candidates that are doing well in the polls and Gray et al. (2010) look at 
policy makers imitating successful policies.  
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8. New party performance hypothesis: the more votes a new party gets in 
 the election, the more imitation it will elicit from established parties. 
9. New party organisation hypothesis: the better organised a new party is, 
 the more imitation it will elicit from established parties. 
10. New party government hypothesis: a new party that enters government 
 in its first parliamentary period will elicit more imitation from established 
 parties than a new party that does not enter government in its first 
 parliamentary period. 
 
2.8.4 Characteristics of the established party  
Some political parties are more “adaptable” than others (Mair 1983, 414): they 
are more likely to change due to some external shock, in this case a new political 
party entering the political arena. In explaining why established parties imitate new 
parties, most authors emphasise the role of electoral considerations. Political parties 
might take the entry of a new party that focuses on a new issue as an opportunity to 
expand its own electorate by taking over the issues of a successful new political party. 
Parties may seek to prevent their electorate from switching parties by responding to 
the positions their electorate takes on these new issues (Demker 1997; Norris & 
Lovenduski 2004). Moreover, established parties may seek to re-gain the votes they 
lost to the new political party by taking over its positions (Harmel & Svåsand 1997). 
Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317, citing Janda 1990) include this element into their 
theory as well, hypothesising that “parties are conservative organisations, changing 
only in response to bad elections”. In times of instability and insecurity, organisations 
tend to imitate the behaviour of successful examples (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). If a 
party has lost in the election in which a new party has entered, it is likely to consider 
this party to be an electoral competitor.13 Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only apply this 
hypothesis in the electoral arena. In this study this hypothesis is also applied in the 
parliamentary arena. The assumption (discussed in paragraph 2.8.1) is that electoral 
considerations matter more in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In preliminary research several other specifications of adaptability were tested: such 
as stability of the internal organisation of the established party, its total electoral result 
or its participation in government. These factors did not lead to significant results. For 
reasons of model parsimony, these factors are not tested here.  
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By taking over the new party’s positions, established parties offer the voter of 
the new political party a better deal: the same policies, but now in the hands of a 
political party that, because of its experience in the parliamentary and governmental 
arena, is also able to deliver (Meguid 2005, 349). Thus there can be a relationship 
between programmatic and electoral success: if a political party is successful in 
programmatic terms, this may actually undermine its electoral perspectives (Meguid 
2005). This may not necessarily be the case: voters may instead stay with the “real 
thing” instead of some copy made by opportunistic established politicians (Van den 
Brink 2006, 117). Moreover, if established political parties attempt to deal with the 
issue that the new political party brings to the agenda but are unable to tackle the issue 
successfully, the new political party can actually profit from this in electoral terms. By 
devoting attention to the issue, the established political parties focus media and public 
attention to the issue and make the issue a legitimate problem in the eyes of the voter 
(Perlmutter 2002, 213-216; Kitschelt 1995, 272-282). Another problem is that if a 
new political party enters the political arena, and some political parties choose a 
strategy of differentiation, other political parties are put in a particularly difficult 
position: if they differentiate themselves from the new political party, they may lose 
voters to the new political party, but if they imitate the new political party on its 
issues, they may lose voters to the political parties that respond in an adversarial way 
(Kitschelt 1995, 235). This dilemma is particularly clear in Denmark. Here, after the 
rise of the radical right-wing DF (Dansk Folkeparti/Danish People’s Party), the social 
democratic SD (Socialdemokraterne/Social democrats) copied the policies of the DF 
on a number of issues such as immigration. This however did not lead to gains in the 
following elections: the votes the SD may have won from the radical right were lost 
again to political parties that voiced opposition against the radical right such as the SF 
(Socialistik Folkeparti/Socialist People’s Party) (Van den Brink 2006, 167). In other 
European countries the politics of immigration in particular also poses a similar 
dilemma for both the left and the right (Zaslove 2006).  
 
11. Established party performance hypothesis: the worse an established 
 party performed in the elections in which a new party entered, compared to its 
 performance in the previous election, the more it will imitate that new party. 
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2.8.5 Complications 
These relationships may be complicated by interaction effects, by time effects 
and by characteristics of the political system. Harmel and Svåsand (1997, 317) bring 
several of these factors together by proposing that “a nearby, established party is 
likely to change its positions in a new party’s direction only (or at least, most 
dramatically) when (a) the new party is winning a significant number of votes and/or 
seats and (b) the established party itself is concurrently experiencing what it considers 
to be bad elections.” They propose that only when these three factors are present 
should one see a “dramatic” reaction. This means that one expects an interaction 
relationship between these variables. Harmel and Svåsand (1997) only examine this 
hypothesis in the electoral arena. This hypothesis is tested here in both the electoral 
and the parliamentary arena, with the qualification that it is hypothesised that electoral 
considerations matter more in the electoral arena, than in the parliamentary arena. 
Additionally, parties may respond to the (possible) entry of a new party at 
different points in time. They can react after the entry of a new party into parliament, 
when it is clear how much support the new party has. But they can also act before a 
new party enters parliament: anticipating the entry of a new party into the 
parliamentary arena. If a party is expected to enter parliament, because of opinion 
polling, it may very well be the case that other parties anticipate its entry in 
parliament, in the elections in which it enters parliament. This idea of anticipation has 
not been discussed or theorised extensively. In this context the extent to which a party 
could be reasonably anticipated becomes an important explanation. In addition to the 
(anticipated) electoral performance of the new party, the history of the party becomes 
an important explanation: parties formed by divorce are more likely to be anticipated 
than parties formed by birth, because the divorce is unlikely to have been a quiet 
affair. One key complication may be that it becomes difficult to distinguish cause and 
effect, because they are observed at the same point in time: it may be that in 
anticipation to the entry of a new party, established parties increase attention to an 
issue, but also that if established parties increase attention to an issue, new parties 
may benefit from this. 
Finally, Norris (2005, 269) hypothesises that the electoral system plays an 
important role in influencing the relationship between the share of votes a radical right 
party has and its effect on the positions of established parties. In a system with 
proportional representation, where new parties can enter parliament more easily, 
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established parties are more likely to change their policies. In a country with 
majoritarian electoral system, where it is difficult for parties to enter parliament, 
established parties are less likely to see new parties as threats, because they are 
unlikely to enter parliament. These new parties do not fit the definition of new party 
used in this chapter, which looks at new parties only when they enter the 
parliamentary arena. The reasoning of Norris can be explicated: high entry barriers 
prevent new parties from entering parliament. This means that until they enter 
parliament, parties, even if they perform well electorally, will not be seen as a threat 
(Norris 2005, 269). However, once these parties do cross the electoral threshold, they 
immediately form a sizeable parliamentary group, a real threat. 
 
“The substitution of conflicts is the most devastating kind of political strategy. 
 Alliances are formed and re-formed; fortresses, positions, alignments and 
 combinations are destroyed or abandoned in a tremendous shuffle of forces 
 redeployed to defend new positions or to take new strong points.” 
 Schattschneider (1960, 74 - emphases removed SO). 
 
2.9 Changing the party system 
As Schattschneider described in his The semi-sovereign people, the 
substitution of conflict is the most devastating kind of political strategy. If new 
political parties are able to change the nature of the political conflict they have a 
profound effect on the party system. The effect on the party systems appears to be the 
object of so many studies of new political parties. As discussed in section 2.2, these 
studies have focused on the electoral performance of new parties and have implicitly 
worked from a numerical definition of new party. This section will propose to 
understand a party system in terms of the significant lines of conflict and will propose 
to understand the effect of a new party from this perspective. Two mechanisms will be 
discussed which explain how the entry of a new political party may change the 
significant lines of conflict in a political system. Such a change, as will be argued 
here, is a form of party system change. Because the link between party system change 
and change in the political space may not be apparent and the study of (the 
dimensionality of the) political space is in my view complex and is riddled with 
empirical problems and theoretical misconceptualisations, these mechanisms require 
more explanation than the previous hypotheses.  
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The central notion of this section is that a change in the lines of conflict ought 
to be understood as a form of party system change. Terms like party system and party 
system change appear to defy definition (Mair 1997b, 48; Bardi & Mair 2008, 150). 
There is no consensus between political scientists about what the constitutive 
elements of a party system are, and the extent to which these elements need to change 
to qualify as a change of the party system. The typologies developed by Duverger 
(1954), Blondel (1968) and others still inform the current research on party systems 
(Bardi & Mair 2008, 150). These all focus on numerical characteristics of party 
systems (Bardi & Mair 2008, 152): specifically the number of political parties and 
their relative sizes (Mair 1997b, 202).  
Mair (1997b, 6), following Sartori (1976, 42-47) dismisses the strictly 
numerical approach to party systems. He emphasises that a party system is more than 
the sum of its parts. What sets a party system apart from a group of individual 
political parties is the patterned interactions between them: a party system is 
characterised by a structure that determines the behaviour of political parties (Sartori 
1976, 131-216; Mair 1997b, 21; Bardi & Mair 2008, 153). Authors have added many 
different criteria concerning the interaction between parties to their typologies of party 
systems. Sartori (1976) included criteria that concerned the interaction between 
government and opposition and electoral competition in his typology of party 
systems. In his own typology of party systems, Mair (1997b) focused on the 
difference between open and closed patterns of party competition and government 
formation. This notion of patterned interaction between political parties as the 
constitutive element of a party system plays a role in another approach to party 
systems. The spatial approach to party systems sees “party systems mainly through 
the competitive interaction drives among parties, and parties and voters in ideological 
space(s)” (Bartolini 1998, 40). Adapting Bartolini’s description of the spatial 
approach to party systems slightly, one could propose that the spatial approach to 
party systems sees party systems as the patterned interaction among political parties in 
a political space structured by a number of significant lines of conflict. The lines of 
conflict that underlie the patterned interaction between political parties would in this 
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view constitute a party system. Therefore, a change in those lines of conflict would 
constitute a change in the party system.14  
Given that one can conceive of party system change in terms of change in the 
lines of conflict that structure political conflict, it may be useful to ask what these 
lines of conflict actually are. The concept 'significant line of conflict' has two 
components: the line of conflict and its significance. A line of conflict is a set of 
patterned differences and similarities in opinion between political parties on a set of 
issues (Bovens, Pellikaan & Trappenburg 1998, 11). This is also referred to as an 
issue divide (Deegan-Krause 2007, 539). So for instance, in Western democracies, 
leftwing parties tend to agree with each other on many political issues and disagree 
with rightwing parties on those issues.15 Schattschneider (1960) proposes to see a line 
of conflict as a line dividing political parties in two groups: for instance those who 
stand on the left side of that line and those who stand on the right. This conception of 
a line of conflict works great in a two-party system, but in a system with more than 
two parties it becomes too restrictive. 
A line of conflict is significant in the sense that it dominates other lines of 
conflict (Schattschneider 1960, 64). Two kinds of domination can occur: 
marginalisation (Schattschneider 1960, 65) and absorption (Pellikaan, De Lange & 
Van der Meer 2007, 283; Mair 2007). Marginalisation means that other issues (related 
to other lines of conflict) are excluded from the political debate. Marginalisation is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This is not an odd notion of a party system. The interactive patterns between 
political parties are often put in spatial terms (Smith 1989). Like the numerical 
approach to party systems this view goes back to first theorists of party system in the 
mid 20th century, such as Schattschneider (1960). Even Duverger (1954), who 
proposed the numerical conception of party systems, describes the patterns of 
interaction between political parties in the French party systems in spatial terms. 
15 It is conceptually important to distinguish a significant line of conflict from a 
political disagreement, a position divide and a political cleavage. A political 
disagreement (Bovens, Pellikaan & Trappenburg 1998, 11) is on a lower level than 
the significant line of conflict. A political disagreement occurs when two groups of 
parties disagree on a particular policy. Only when the same pattern of differences 
occurs regularly, can one use the term line of conflict. A position divide occurs in a 
different realm than a line of conflict. A position divide is difference in interests and 
identity between particular social groups. It is a division in the electorate. A political 
cleavage is a fusion of a position divide and a significant line of conflict. When there 
is both a patterned difference in voting behaviour between social groups with 
opposing interests and different identities, and a patterned difference in political 
opinions between the political parties for whom they vote, one can speak of political 
alignment (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 215; Deegan-Krause 2008, 539). 
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effect of the significant line of conflict on the saliency of other lines of conflict. The 
dominance of the left-right dimension in Denmark, for instance, has prevented the 
politicisation of moral issues (Green-Pedersen 2007). Absorption means that other 
party positions on other issues are “forced” into the significant line of conflict, even 
though they are not an “intrinsic element” of that line of conflict (Mair 2007, 214). An 
example of how absorption works can be seen in the materialist/post-materialist 
divide in the electorate. Inglehart (1984) observed how during the 1980s the post-
materialist political divide changed. During the 1980s this divide stood perpendicular 
to the left-right divide. In the 1990s, post-materialist divide coincided with left-right 
divide. The post-materialist line of conflict was, according to Inglehart, absorbed into 
the left-right line of conflict. Absorption is an effect of the significant line of conflict 
on the positions of parties on other lines of conflict. Although well researched on the 
electoral level (Mair 2007, 212), this phenomenon has not been studied on the party-
level. In summary, a significant line of conflict is a set of patterned differences in 
opinion between political parties that marginalises or absorbs other lines of conflict in 
a polity. As long as the issues related to both lines of conflict are salient and the party 
positions on those issues are perpendicular, there are two lines of conflict. 
It is important to differentiate this approach from a model of politics in which 
one assumes that one dimension, for instance the left-right dimension, matters most. 
One may then, as De Vries et al. (2011, 2-3) have done, look at how the meaning of 
this left-right dimension changes over time. De Vries et al. (2011) identify two 
mechanisms similar to those observed here: issue bundling and issue crowding out. 
By issue bundling they mean that new issues are integrated into the left-right line of 
conflict, and by issue crowding out they mean that old issues may be pushed out of 
the left-right line of conflict. Similarly, this study looks at how new issues are 
integrated or pushed out of the significant lines of conflict. This study, however, is not 
based on a priori assumptions of the dimensionality of the political space. Whether 
this is one-, two- or three-dimensional depends on how party positions on salient 
issues relate to each other.  
The significant lines of conflict are an important aspect of a political system. 
These determine political outcomes (Schattschneider 1960, 60). If a particular line of 
conflict is significant, a particular group may be part of the majority and in control of 
the political process. If other lines of conflict become significant, this group may lose 
its allies and find itself in the minority. The question which line of conflict is 
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significant in politics determines which groups are in the centre of the political arena 
and which are forced to stay in the margins. The line of conflict also determines the 
outcome of political decision making because it determines the majorities and 
therefore it decides also which policies a polity will pursue.  
There are two ways in which a new party is able to influence the established 
lines of conflict: first its entry may introduce a new, significant line of conflict which 
replaces one of the existing lines of conflict; and second, its entry may cause a 
reduction in the number of lines of conflict. Following Schattschneider’s lead, Mair 
proposes that the established parties have a shared interest in maintaining the "frozen" 
lines of conflict (Mair 1997a, 953, 1997b, 16; Schattschneider 1960, 68). By 
maintaining the existing lines of conflict, established parties maintain their own 
position in the party system: by making sure that the voters believe that the election is 
about either a liberal or a socialist future for the country, they exclude those voices 
that believe that the future of the country should be religious, green or feminist. New 
parties may explicitly seek to change the lines of conflict: that is, to introduce a new 
line of conflict in addition to or instead of the existing lines of conflict and so to 
displace the existing lines of conflict. This is the essence of what Schattschneider has 
called the conflict of conflicts (Mair 1997a, 951; Schattschneider 1960, 63). 
Pellikaan et al. (2007) apply this notion to the effect of the LPF (Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn/List Pim Fortuyn) on the Dutch party system in the electoral arena: before the 
entry of the LPF, the Netherlands was structured by a triangular pattern of 
competition and cooperation with a religious-secular, individualist-communitarian 
and a social-economic line of conflict (Pellikaan, Van der Meer & De Lange 2003b). 
The religious-secular line of conflict had lost its relevance after the legalisation of gay 
marriage and euthanasia. The LPF replaced the individualist-communitarian 
dimension by a monocultural-multicultural dimension concerning immigration and 
integration (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007, 298). Kriesi and Frey (2008, 
179) have argued that the entry of the LPF into the Dutch political system caused a 
“disturbance of the dimensionality of the Dutch political space”. In their eyes, the 
entry of the LPF into the political arena accentuated an on-going transformation of the 
cultural line of conflict into a line that divides cosmopolitan parties from nationalist 
parties (Kriesi & Frey 2008, 180). Several other scholars have echoed the idea that 
new political parties may be able to introduce new lines of conflict. Meguid (2005, 
2007), for instance, proposes that when political parties react in an adversarial way to 
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the issues that a new political party brings to the table, they take position on a new 
issue dimension that may cut through the established lines of conflict (Meguid 2005, 
357). By taking a dismissive strategy, by decreasing attention for the issue that the 
new party raises, an established political party may attempt to downplay the new issue 
and its crosscutting line of conflict, which could upset the patterned interaction 
between political parties.  
However, as Mair (2001) has pointed out in a study of Die Grünen (The 
Greens), and as Bale (2003) has elaborated, the entry of a new political party into the 
political arena may also have another effect. It may upset the balance of power that 
has fostered a particular constellation of lines of conflict and cause a reduction in the 
lines of conflict. If a new political party forms a political alliance with a political party 
that has traditionally been on the losing side of a line of conflict, they may shift the 
balance in favour of that political party (Mair 2001, 111). By emphasising this line of 
conflict, the new political alliance finds itself in the majority. Therefore they force 
other lines of conflicts to the margins of the polity. Instead of multidimensional 
patterns of competition and cooperation, the pattern is brought down to a one-
dimensional conflict. In this way, even parties who seek to introduce a new line of 
conflict may actually cause a reduction of the lines of conflict. The case of the 
German Die Grünen is especially illustrative: before the 1980s the patterns of 
cooperation between German political parties was “triangular” (Smith 1989). There 
were three parliamentary parties in the German Bundestag: the social democratic SPD 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands/Social democratic Party of Germany), the 
Christian-democratic CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christian Democratic 
Union) and the liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei/Free Democratic Party). 
Cabinet cooperation varied between FDP/SPD, SPD/CDU and CDU/FDP. Two lines 
of conflict played a major role in cabinet: one social-economic line of conflict and one 
religious line of conflict. A centrist coalition of SPD and CDU, a centre-right coalition 
of CDU and FDP, or a secular coalition of SPD and FDP were all possible. After Die 
Grünen became a significant political force during the 1990s, the patterns of 
cooperation changed. Political parties are now structured in two blocks: a cabinet 
formed by the leftwing block of Die Grünen and SPD replaced a cabinet formed by 
the rightwing block of CDU/FDP in 1998. Although Die Grünen had attempted to 
introduce a new line of conflict concerning the environment into the German political 
space, their entry into the political arena has actually flattened the political space. This 
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changed the cabinet formation space from a two-dimensional space into a one-
dimensional space. Bale (2003) extended this analysis to radical rightwing parties. He 
hypothesises that after the entry of the LPF into the Dutch political arena, the pattern 
of political cooperation flattened: it essentially became one-dimensional. In the 
Netherlands, as in several other West-European countries, rightwing populist parties 
were integrated into governing coalitions and/or electoral alliances with political 
parties of the centre-right. This further reinforced a trend towards a bimodal pattern of 
political cooperation, already set in motion by the incorporation of green parties into 
leftwing coalitions (Mair 2001). In those systems where political cooperation was 
structured by multiple lines of conflict, the co-optation of radical rightwing parties 
into rightwing alliances has caused a reduction of the number of lines of conflict. The 
significant conflict is now between a bloc of the left and a bloc of the right. The 
Netherlands is a prime example of this phenomenon, given the formation of a centre-
right cabinet of the CDA (Christen-Democratisch Appel/Christian Democratic 
Appeal), the conservative-liberal VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie/People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the LPF. The fact that 
the established parties imitated the issues of the new political parties made cabinet 
formation easier (Bale 2003, 75). 
On the basis of the work of Mair, two different effects of the entry of a new 
party may be distinguished: sometimes parties are able to introduce their own line of 
conflict into a political system. Sometimes the entry of a new political party into a 
political arena can lead to a decrease in the number of lines of conflict. New parties 
can have a marked effect on the lines of conflict even when their electoral success is 
limited (as in the case of many green parties) or short-lived (in the case of the LPF). 
New parties are able to change “the nature of the debate” in a polity (Donavan & 
Broughton 1999, 267).16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 There appears to be a tension between Bale and Pellikaan, because they come to 
different claims about the single case that they study. When Pellikaan et al. (2007) 
applied the Schattschneider-Mair thesis on the Dutch case, this led them to conclude 
that, due to the participation of the LPF in the Dutch elections, the nature of the 
significant lines of conflict changed, but the system remained multidimensional. The 
claim Bale (2003) makes that is also based on Mair’s work, is radically different. Due 
to the participation of the LPF in government, the dimensionality of the Dutch system 
changed: from a two-dimensional system to a one-dimensional one. The claims of 
Pellikaan et al. (2007) however are not an outright contradiction of Bale (2003). 
Bale’s claims specifically concern the patterns of cabinet cooperation, while Pellikaan 
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The question may rise how the systemic and individual level effects of new 
political parties cohere. In other words, how the claim that new parties can change the 
lines of conflict relates to the effects new political parties can have on individual 
established political parties. A line of conflict is a complex political phenomenon, 
which is the result of both the saliency of issues and the position of parties on those 
issues. If parties are differently ordered on two different issues and both these issues 
are salient, there are two lines of conflict. If, however, there is only one salient issue, 
or all parties are ordered in the same way on all issues, there is only one line of 
conflict. A change in the lines of conflict therefore is constituted by a change in the 
significance of issues or the positions of parties on issues.  
There are three ways in which the lines of conflict can change: a new line of 
conflict can be added to the existing ones (Meguid 2005), a new line of conflict can 
replace one of the current lines of conflict (Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 
2007, 117-118; Kriesi & Frey 2008; Poole & Rosenthal 2009), or the number of lines 
of conflict can decrease (Mair 2001; Bale 2003). A change in the lines of conflict may 
be the result of a change in the saliency of issues: some issues may become more 
significant and others may become less significant. If party positions on this new issue 
are markedly different from their positions on the issues related to the established 
lines of conflict, a new line of conflict might arise. Contrariwise, if the new issue 
crowds out an issue on which parties positioned themselves markedly different than 
on the other issues, including the new one, the number of lines of conflict may 
decrease. If one wants to attribute a change in the significant lines of conflict to a new 
party, it must be the issue that this new party brings to the table that becomes more 
salient. The saliency of issues at the level of the party system is a result of the 
attention individual parties devote to issues.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
focuses on the patterns of electoral competition. It may be that in two different arenas 
there are different lines of conflict, unless one claims that the lines of conflict that 
structure interaction in one arena apply to the other arena as well. Pellikaan et al. 
(2007, 297) actually does claim that his model can explain the patterns of cabinet 
formation. This contradicts Bale’s claim is that the pattern of cabinet formation 
became more one-dimensional. The configuration of the parties in Pellikaan's et 
alliorum (2007, 296) two-dimensional spatial model for 2002 indicates that there is a 
significant relationship between the two dimensions, something which can hardly be 
said for his model of the pre-2002 space (Pellikaan 2003). One could therefore 
certainly claim that the space after 2002 is less multidimensional than the space 
before. 
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A change in the dimensionality of the party system may, however, also be the 
result of a change of the positions of political parties on some issues. If, because of 
the entry of a new party, parties change their position on a significant issue so that it is 
different from the order on other issues, this constitutes the introduction of a new 
significant line of conflict. If, because of the entry of a new political party, parties 
change their position on a significant issue so that it is the same as the order on the 
other issues, this constitutes a reduction of the significant lines of conflict. If both 
these things happen at the same time, the nature of significant lines of conflict may 
change, while their number stays the same.  
Political cooperation between parties may also influence the number of 
established lines of conflict. Parties can cooperate in formal political alliances, in 
parliament or in cabinet. The entry of a new political party will open up the question 
of how to deal with this new party as established political party. If parties cooperate, 
they will behave in a similar way, supporting proposals of their allies and opposing 
proposals because their allies oppose them. If this cooperation takes place on parties 
that have a similar position on one of the established significant lines of conflict, it 
may actually focus the political conflict on less lines of conflict. If the cooperation 
breaks through the established lines of conflict, this may increase the number of lines 
of conflict.  
In summary, a new party may influence the significant lines of conflict by 
changing the positions of established parties and the attention of parties on their issue. 
That is, it may change the significance of some lines of conflict (by influencing their 
saliency) or it may cause some lines of conflict to be absorbed (or ejected) from the 
existing lines of conflict. On the basis of this account, one can formulate these 
hypotheses: 
  
 12. New line of conflict formation hypothesis: a new line of conflict will 
 come into existence: 
a. if the saliency of the issue that a new party campaigns on increases after its 
entry into parliament and the party positions on this issue diverge from party 
positions on the established lines of conflict; 
b. if the positions of parties on the issue that the new party campaigns on, 
change in such a way that they are different from those on existing significant 
lines of conflict, and the issue remains significant; 
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c. if, through cooperation, party positions of some parties that are divided on 
one of the established lines of conflict, become more similar. 
13. Line of conflict disappearance hypothesis: the number of lines of 
conflict decreases: 
a. if the saliency of the issue that a new party campaigns on increases after its 
entry into parliament, and the relative positions on this issue are similar to the 
party positions on one of two dominant lines of conflict; 
b. if the positions of parties on the issue that the new party campaigns on 
change in such a way that they are similar to the existing lines of conflict and 
the issue remains significant; 
c. if, through cooperation, party positions of some parties that already held 
similar positions on the established lines of conflict, become more similar. 
 
2.10 What this study does not claim 
The central claim in the previous sections was that new political parties could 
influence established parties. One needs to differentiate this claim from two other 
effects on public policy: the direct effect of new political parties on policies through 
their own activity, and the effect of external events on policy 
This study does not claim that new parties can only influence public policy 
indirectly. Like established political parties, new political parties have a range of tools 
to influence policy directly: they can use parliamentary initiatives, amendments or 
motions to influence government policy directly. Moreover, when they participate in 
government, the cabinet may itself propose policies that the new party favoured. This 
study looks at the indirect effect of new parties on policy: the effect new parties have 
on established parties, which may in turn influence public policies. Therefore, this 
study is not a complete survey of the policy success of new political parties. 
 The claim of this research is not that only new political parties can influence 
the established political parties and the party system. Groundbreaking work in the 
analysis of the agenda of political actors has been done by Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993). They analysed the change in the agenda of the United States government, 
especially within Congress. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) relate the changes in the 
legislative agenda of the United States Congress to objective social problems such as 
crime levels or levels of environmental pollution. They also show that, while 
politicians may seek to address these pressing social issues because they want to solve 
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real social problems, they may also address them because in the subjective view of 
citizens these issues are important. One important informant about what citizens find 
important may be found in the media (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006, 89). 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) stress the role that “policy punctuations” play 
in maintaining the link between public and political priorities. In this view, periods of 
stability in the political agendas are interrupted by external events that direct the 
attention of politicians to social issues. External events can be anything: specific 
events (think of disasters, such as the Fukushima nuclear meltdown after the 2011 
Tsunami in Japan) that get considerable attention from the media (Walgrave & Van 
Aelst 2006) but also by the formation of social movements (Rohrschneider 1993). 
Applying this framework to a European context, Walgrave et al. (2006, 1035) see a 
close link between the (stable) priorities of legislatures and the priorities set by 
political parties in their manifestos. Changes to these priorities, however, are more 
difficult to predict on the basis of the manifestos of political parties. Walgrave et al. 
relate this to smaller and larger external shocks. 
One distinction that can be drawn from these studies is the one between 
antecedent causes and immediate causes. While the objective social problems and the 
perceptions of citizens of these problems may be important antecedent causes of the 
agendas of political or parliamentary parties, these can only enter into the political 
arena through policy punctuations. This study focuses on a particular type of these 
immediate causes: new political parties. These may serve as external shocks, catalysts 
bringing the political agenda closer to the priorities of the public. If the public feels 
that a problem is not addressed in the political arena, it will support a political party 
that does address that issue.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
About cases, political arenas and analytical strategies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This research offers three methodological innovations from the existing 
literature on the effects of new political parties: the cases that are studied, the arenas 
that are examined and the combination of case-by-case study and statistical analysis. 
First, this study focuses on all new political parties that entered one political system 
over an extended period in time. Previous studies of new political parties were either 
single case studies or they studied one group of new political parties, but limited their 
research on the basis of either explanatory variables, such as new party size, or on the 
basis of arbitrary factors, such as party family. Case selection choices will be 
discussed in the section 3.2. 
The second methodological innovation that this study offers, is that in addition 
to examining the electoral arena, this study also looks at the parliamentary arena. 
Sound theoretical reasons exist to assume that in different political arenas the effects 
of new political parties may be different. These were discussed in chapter 2. This 
chapter will devote special attention to the methods of data collection for party 
positions and political attention in both the parliamentary and electoral arena. In 
addition to bringing new insights by examining new political arenas, this study also 
uses new methods to measure positions and attention.  
The final methodological innovation of this study is that it is not limited to 
either the contextual sensitivity of a case study or the abstractness of statistical 
analysis. In analysing the effect of new parties this study uses both case-by-case 
comparisons and statistical analysis. The statistical analysis allows us to control for 
the possibility of external circumstances by comparing those changes where a new 
party is present to those changes where no new party is present. This chapter will give 
an in-depth discussion of the methods of data analysis for the case-by-case and the 
statistical approaches. 
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 3.2 Case selection 
This study builds on two kinds of studies. On the one side, there is a limited 
number of studies that have tried to find general patterns in the reaction of established 
parties to new parties on the basis of a large number of cases (Meguid 2005, 2007; 
Huijbrechts 2006; Van Spanje 2010). These studies examine 'all' new parties in 
established democracies. On the other side, there is a range of case studies or 
comparative studies that have identified different effects of new political parties for 
specific cases (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007). 
These two different groups of studies pull the orientation of further research into two 
different directions. The conclusion of the large N-studies is that multiple types of 
effects on the basis of multiple sources of data need to be studied. A case study is best 
suited for this kind of research, because the case study provides the best possibility to 
integrate different types of data (Yin 2009). The different effects that have been 
uncovered in all the case studies could be put to the test for a larger sample, to test 
their external validity (Gerring 2007, 197; Yin 2009, 3). This research will combine 
intensive, context-sensitive study of individual cases in order to find out what effect 
each new party has had, using a large-N statistical analysis, in order to understand 
under what conditions which effects will occur. 17 
The study will focus on a political system with institutional stability in which a 
large number of parties enter. The reason that only one country, which is 
institutionally stable, is selected is to keep the other causes that could influence the 
programmatic success of new parties constant. In table 3.1 one can see a list of how 
many new parties entered the parliaments in all European states that have been a 
democracy since the Second World War. The first two countries on the list combine a 
higher number of new political parties with considerable institutional instability, 
making over time comparison of new party effects problematic. Italy tops the list: 
with 29 new political parties, it has seen most new parties. One explanation for this is 
the change in the party system after the collapse of DC (Democrazia 
Cristiana/Christian Democracy) and the rise of Forza Italia (Go Italy) in the early 
1990s. These developments were followed by a major revision of the institutional 
structure of Italian democracy. These specific events make it difficult to test general 
theories about new political parties in Italy. The rise of Forza Italia may be an  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Although this not a study of a large number of countries (or even new political 
parties), it does study a large number of new/established party pairs. 
	   55	  
Table 3.1: number of new parties in parliament since first elections since 1945 
















a Excluding parties labelled "diverse left" and "diverse right" by electoral authorities; 
b 13 of which are parties from Northern Ireland; 
c Including the mainstream parties that were split because of the linguistic tensions in the 
1960s and 1970s; excluding party cartels; 
d 19 before the disintegration of the party system in 1994 and 10 in the period 1994-2009. 
 
interesting case study of the effects of a new political party. The institutional 
instability in Italy, however, makes it difficult to compare the effects of say the small 
communist split-off PD (Democrazia Proletaria/Proletarian Democracy), which 
entered parliament in 1983 to the effects of the anti-corruption party IdV (Italia 
deiValori/Italy of Values), which entered parliament in 2001. Between 1983 and 2001 
the institutional context changed too much to allow for a systematic comparison. 
Belgium is the second country on the list. Its high number can be explained by 
country-specific factors as well: due to the split of all established parties between 
1960 and 1980 into a French-speaking and a Dutch speaking party, six new parties 
entered during the period 1960-1980. This was followed by a major decentralisation 
of the political system. Again the institutional stability prevents systematic 
comparison. The Netherlands is the third on the list with 19 new parties. Here, the 
number of new political parties is not the result of a political crisis, but of the open 
political system. The low electoral threshold is one of the most important features of 
the openness of the political system. This feature has remained stable during the entire 
research period. The Netherlands has one of the lowest electoral thresholds in the 
world (Lowery et al. 2010, forthcoming): it had a de facto threshold of 1% before 
1956 and after 1956 it had a threshold of 0.67% of the vote. This is the only relevant 
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change to occur in the electoral system in Netherlands during this period and it is a 
relatively minor change. Other features that induce the entry of new political parties is 
the relative ease by which new political parties can register. The registration law has 
changed marginally over the research period, but not in such a way that it affected the 
entry of new parties (Lowery et al. forthcoming). 
Because of its combination of a high number of new parties with institutional 
stability, the Dutch party system was selected for this study. The relative weakness of 
institutional barriers against new parties makes the Netherlands an attractive case to 
study the effect of new parties: high barriers prevent new parties from entering 
parliament. This means that parties that perform well electorally and do not enter 
parliament are not seen as a threat (Norris 2005, 269). But once parties cross the 
electoral threshold, they immediately form a sizeable parliamentary group. And 
therefore they form a large threat. Because of the low electoral threshold a 
considerable number of new parties entered parliament. There are considerable 
differences in the number of seats these parties had when they entered parliament. 
Countries with higher electoral thresholds have only had large parties enter their 
parliaments. This would mean that one cannot test whether the size of the party on 
entry in parliament influences the effect the party has on the party system. 
Another factor that can influence the extent to which new parties can influence 
the established parties, are the parliamentary rules and procedures. In some countries, 
like the United Kingdom and France, the government exerts considerable control over 
the agenda of parliament. In other countries, government control is weaker and MPs 
have more influence on the parliamentary agenda. The less government control, the 
more likely new parties are to have an effect on the established parties. In systems 
with greater government control, the parties in government can prevent new parties 
from bringing new issues to the parliamentary agenda. In comparative studies of 
agenda control, the Netherlands quite consistently scores as one of the systems where 
parliament has most control over its own agenda: the Dutch parliament sets its own 
agenda, the government does not have tools to pressure parliament to speed up or 
prioritise its bills and MPs are relatively free in terms of private member bills or 
amendments (Döring 2001, 1995). The parliamentary rules and procedures are 
relatively lenient towards new parties. 
A final factor is cabinet formation: if cabinet formation is closed to new 
parties, because of a tradition of one-party government or the existence of pre-
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electoral coalitions, new parties are likely to remain marginalised. If cabinet formation 
is open to unusual coalitions and new parties, it is more likely that established parties 
might respond to new parties, because they soon can become relevant players in 
cabinet formation. The Netherlands is characterised by comparatively open 
procedures of cabinet formation (Mair 1997b).  
These factors combined appear to make the Netherlands a likely case for new 
parties to have a range of effects on established parties. One could say that this makes 
the Netherlands a “crucial case” to study new parties (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 
279). As one is likely to find effects of new parties on established parties in this 
country, one could argue that it is “a most likely case study” (Gerring 2007, 120). In 
terms of the external validity of this study, the Netherlands is a likely case. From the 
perspective of Popper’s (1959) critical rationalism, which emphasises falsification, 
this kind of case study can be used to disprove the validity of a (deterministic) theory. 
If a particular relationship does not appear in the system it is likely to occur in, it is 
likely not to occur in any system (Gerring 2007, 120). This does mean, however, that 
when one finds that the relationship is proven to hold in this case, it will not 
necessarily hold for all new political parties. If it proves the theory true, the study says 
little about the external validity of the theory for less likely cases. Such a 
characterisation is not without qualification: because of the low electoral threshold, a 
large number of small flash parties have participated in Dutch elections. These parties 
gain a small number of seats and often disappear from parliament after one election.18 
It would be easy for established parties to ignore new parties under these conditions, 
as they are just irrelevant and fleeting phenomena. The Dutch established parties 
might have developed a kind of immunity to new parties. In a country where a much 
lower number of new parties enter the political scene, established parties may be more 
easily shocked by their entry. 
This study differs from previous studies about the effect of new political 
parties in that it looks at all the new parties that have entered the political system 
instead of a selection of relevant parties. Most studies of new parties have focused on 
the effect of one particular party or a particular family of parties on the party system. 
The larger N-studies have selected only 'relevant' political parties, in the case of 
Meguid (2005, 2007) and Huijbregts (2006) on the basis of the criteria used by the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Of the nineteen parties studied, eight gain only one seat and seven do not return in 
parliament after their first period in parliament. 
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Table 3.2: new parties in the Tweede Kamer between 1946 and 2006 
New Party 
Dutch English Abb. 
Elected Ideology 
Katholieke Nationale Partij Catholic National Party KNP 1948 Rightwing Catholicism 
Pacifistisch-Socialistische 
Partij 
Pacifist Socialist Party PSP 1959 Leftwing 
Socialism 
Boerenpartij Farmers’ Party BP 1963 Conservatism 
Gereformeerd Politiek 
Verbond 
Reformed Political League GPV 1963 Orthodox Protestantism 
Democraten ‘66 Democrats ‘66 D66 1967 Pragmatism 
Radical Democracy 
Politieke Partij Radicalen Political Party Radicals PPR 1971 Progressive Christianity 
Democratisch Socialisten ‘70 Democratic Socialists ‘70 DS’70 1971 Social-democracy 
Nederlandse 
Middenstandspartij 
Dutch Middle Class Party NMP 1971 Anti-Tax Populism 
Rooms Katholieke Partij 
Nederland 
Roman Catholic Party 
Netherlands 





RPF 1981 Orthodox Protestantism 
Evangelische Volkspartij Evangelical People’s Party EVP 1982 Progressive Christianity 
Centrumpartij Centre Party CP 1982 Radical Nationalism 
Algemeen Ouderen Verbond General Elderly League AOV 1994 Pensioners’ Interest 
Politieke Unie 55+ Political Union 55+ U55+ 1994 Pensioners’ Interest 
Socialistische Partij Socialist Party SP 1994 Socialism 
Leefbaar Nederland Liveable Netherlands LN 2002 Democratic Populism 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn LPF 2002 Liberal Nationalism 
Partij voor de Dieren Animals Party PvdD 2006 Green Politics 
Partij voor de Vrijheid Freedom Party PVV 2006 Liberal Nationalism 
 
manifesto research group, which only include parties with significant, long-term 
representation in parliament and/or participation in cabinets into their data set. This 
means that these studies cannot reveal whether size (or relevance) can explain the 
effects new that parties have on the party system. 
This study focuses on all new political parties to enter the Dutch parliament 
since 1946. The Second World War formed a major rupture in Dutch politics, 
especially in terms of the party system - less so in terms of voting behaviour. Many  
studies of new political parties put the boundary much more recently: in the 1970s for 
instance (Huijbrechts 2006; Mair 1999). By examining a number of political parties 
from before 1970, one can also examine the effects of political parties in the much 
less dynamic political situation of pillarisation and consensus politics (Andeweg & 
Irwin 2009, 39). This does, however, have its drawbacks: political documentation 
becomes worse if one goes back in time: election manifestos and parliamentary 
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records are smaller and less informative. Before the Second World War, even less 
data is available. 
The new parties studied are selected on the basis of the criteria proposed: those 
parties are under study that win seats in the lower house of the Dutch Parliament, the 
Tweede Kamer for the first time, and have not been formed by transformation or a 
merger in which one or more parties participated that previously held seats in 
parliament. This means that these cases are selected from all parties that have 
attempted to enter parliament. Between 1946 and 2006, 165 parties, which had not 
been represented before, attempted to enter the Tweede Kamer. Only 29 of them have 
been successful in gaining representation. Of these 29, four parties were mergers: 
PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid/Labour Party), CU (ChristenUnie/ChristianUnion), GL 
and CDA (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303).19 These mergers are excluded on 
the basis of the definition of a new political party. Almost all merging parties were 
established parties: on average, a merging party had been in parliament for 44 years 
before merging. Six parties can be seen as transformations of established parties: KVP 
(Katholieke Volkspartij/Catholic People's Party), PvdV (Partij van de Vrijheid/Party 
of Freedom), KNP (Katholieke Nationale Partij/Catholic National Party), CD 
(Centrum-Democraten/Centre Democrats) and VVD.20 The KVP, PvdV and VVD 
were among "big five" Dutch parties and therefore they were the most established of 
established parties (Daalder 1965, 172). The KNP is included because of a legal 
technicality.21 The CD is the only problematic case. It was formed when Janmaat, the 
sole Member of Parliament (MP) for the CP, left his party. Because for parties with 
parliamentary representation the focus in the definition is on their political 
representatives and on not their party organisation (see 4.2.1), the CD can best be seen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 PvdA was a merger of the SDAP, VDB and CDU (see section 4.3); CDA: CHU, 
ARP and KVP entered with a common list in 1977 (see section 4.4.7); GL: PSP, PPR, 
CPN and EVP entered with a common list in 1989 (see section 4.4.7); CU: RPF and 
GPV entered with a common list in 2002 (see section 4.4.10). 
20 KVP entered parliament in 1946 as a transformation of the RKSP (see section 4.3); 
PvdV entered parliament in 1946 as a transformation of the LSP (see section 4.3); 
VVD entered parliament in 1948 as a transformation of PvdV (see section 4.3); KNP 
entered parliament in 1952 as a transformation of Lijst-Welter (see section 4.4.1); CD 
entered parliament in 1989 as a transformation of CP (see section 4.4.12). 
21 Because the party was not registered with the Electoral Council the KNP could not 
run under the name KNP in the 1946 election. Instead it was a nameless list, lead by 
Welter. In the 1948 election the party did run under the name KNP. Still, the name 
KNP is used here, because this name was generally used to describe the party. 
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as a transformation of the CP. This leaves a total of 19 parties. These parties are listed 
in table 3.2 and are discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
 
3.3 Analytical strategy 
This study seeks to determine whether a marked change in attention or in the 
position of established parties in either the electoral or the parliamentary arena can be 
attributed to the entry of the new party. To be able to determine whether this is indeed 
the case, three conditions have to be met: first, there must be a marked difference in 
the positions or attention between the period before the new party entered the 
parliamentary arena and the period after it did. Second, alternative explanations for 
the change must be eliminated. And third, the change must be attributed to the new 
party.  
In order to determine whether all three conditions are met, three different 
research strategies are used. The first is based on a comparative case study research 
approach, which analyses case-by-case; the second approach analyses the result of the 
case studies statistically to assess the significance of the patterns found in the case-by-
case analyses. The primary purpose of these two analyses is to assess the extent to 
which changes in attention of established parties could be attributed to the entry of the 
new party, whether the change cannot be attributed to alternative explanations, and 
which factors are at work in every individual case. The third approach, which is only 
applied for the analysis of attention, compares those changes in attention for 
established parties, where a new party is present, to those changes in attention where 
no new party is present. The goal of this expanded statistical analysis is to assess the 
extent to which the entry of a new party leads to a marked change in attention 
compared to all changes in attention and which, if any, general patterns can be 
identified. 
In the case-by-case analysis, the goal is to ensure that changes in attention and 
position can be attributed to the entry of a new political party when looking at 
contextual factors. The goal is to eliminate alternative explanations for changes in 
attention and position. The logic applied here is one of process tracing or pattern 
matching (Gerring 2007): the changes in the levels of attention are charted and 
validity of different explanations for this development are evaluated. The goal of these 
analyses is three-fold: first, to determine whether the elections in which the new party 
entered, interrupted the developments in position and attention markedly; second, to 
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eliminate alternative explanations for the developments. The combined goal here is to 
determine whether the new party can be identified as the cause of the change in 
attention and position. The third goal is to determine which of the explanations can 
best explain differences in the pattern of attention. In other words, the goal is to 
determine by comparing the patterns in attention whether for instance larger parties 
react differently than small parties. The strength and significance of these patterns is 
further tested in a statistical analysis. 
In the analysis of attention, the analysis is expanded to include all changes in 
attention. The goal of this analysis is to assess whether the entry of a new political 
party has a significant effect on attention. For the analysis of attention, the analysis is 
taken one level further. In this analysis, all changes in attention are studied. That is, 
the changes are studied in attention in all parties’ parliamentary activity, in all 
parliamentary periods and on all issues. By comparing the developments in the 
attention that parties devote to the issues new parties own to all other changes, one 
can see whether the presence of new parties causes significantly different patterns in 
attention compared to the situation when they were not present. All kinds of changes 
in attention occur, caused by all kinds of factors inside and outside of established 
parties. By comparing these natural patterns to those patterns that occur just after the 
entry of a new party into parliament on the specific issue that it owns, one can control 
for alternative explanations. One can attribute the changes in attention devoted to a 
specific issue to the presence of a new party if these changes in attention are 
significantly different from all other changes when this new party is not present. If the 
developments in the attention to the issue that is owned by the new party are caused 
by other external factors, then they should not be significantly different from the rest 
of the cases. If external developments cause changes in attention, they do so 
independently of whether a new party is present or not, and therefore there will be no 
significant effect of the new party on the attention that established parties devote to 
issues in those cases. The question is whether new parties caused a significant change 
in attention, and therefore the focus in the regression analyses is on the levels of 
significance, and less so on other measures of the explanatory strength of the 
relationship, such as the R-squared.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In the case of the r-squared, the variance one can explain by these analyses is small 
because in only a fraction of the changes in the attention, a new party is present. 
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This study also does not examine the follow-up effects of new political parties. 
That is: the entry of a new political party A may cause a change in party B, which in 
turn elicits change in party C. The approach is temporal: the positions of parties 
before and after the entry of a new political party are examined. The possibility that 
the interaction of established parties causes the changes after this point in time which 
may be attributed to the the new party, because the further one moves from the entry 
of the new party, the less likely it is that the entry of the new party is the actual cause. 
This combination of research strategies allows one to isolate the effects of new 
political parties. It allows one to assess whether changes in established parties can 
really be attributed to the new political parties, by separating the effects of new parties 
from the effects of specific events and determining whether these changes are 
significantly different from general patterns in attention.  
 
3.4 Data collection and data analysis in the parliamentary arena 
Chapter 5 will examine the effects of new political parties on established 
parties in the parliamentary arena, in terms of attention and positions. The first is 
operationalised in terms of the issues that parties talk about in parliament and the 
second in terms of the positions that they take in parliamentary voting. For both 
position and attention, the reasons for these specific operationalisation and 
measurement choices are discussed here.  
3.4.1 Attention in parliament 
There are two research strategies to measure the differences between the issue 
priorities of parliamentary parties (Louwerse & Otjes 2011): one can look at what 
parties say or at what parties do. Issues are put on the parliamentary agenda for 
discussion, but this does not necessarily lead to parliamentary action. MPs have a 
wide array of actions at their disposal: written questions, motions, amendments and 
private member bills. MPs are only likely to act when they find government action on 
the issue lacking or when they want to get media attention. This means that analysing 
actions to understand issue saliency in parliament has one big drawback (Louwerse 
2011, 66): it only measures the actions of dissatisfied MPs. Satisfied MPs who 
support the government may use their speaking time to praise the government without 
proposing motions, amendments or bills. A minister can prevent proposals from being 
tabled or being voted on by making commitments to MPs. Ministers are more likely to 
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make promises to MPs of the governing coalition than to those of the opposition. 
Therefore, one would expect government MPs to be far more passive in terms of 
parliamentary actions than opposition MPs. Looking at action means that one only 
sees half of parliament, looking at speech means that one sees the whole.  
There are two other advantages of examining speech as opposed to motions or 
other parliamentary actions. First, small parties are limited by the parliamentary rules 
from tabling motions and amendments. An MP needs the consent of four of his 
colleagues to propose a motion. While this rule has not been applied rigorously or 
consistently, it has limited the ability of some small parties to propose motions. 
Almost all parties that entered parliament with one or two seats have proposed less  
than 10 motions during their first term in parliament.23 If one wants to use the 
parliamentary activity of new parties as an explanatory variable and if many new 
parties are small, one has to look at parliamentary speech. 
Finally, as one can see in figure 3.1, there has been an explosion in the use of 
motions in the 1970s.24 Before 1967, the number of motions per parliamentary period 
in the database does not exceed 100. In 1967-1971, the number of motions increases 
sharply to 384. In the 1977-1981 period, the number of motions exceeds 1000 for the 
first time. From that moment on, the number of motions per parliamentary period 
exceeds 1000 (except for parliamentary periods that end early due to snap elections). 
Between 1982-1986 and 1986-1989 there is a decrease in the number of motions,25 
but since then the number has grown during every full parliamentary term. In the 
period 2006-2009, the number of motions exceeds 2000 for the first time. This poses 
considerable constraints on which cases one can study: there is little data on the cases 
before 1967. Parliamentary speech on the other hand stays relatively stable: there is 
no marked decrease or increase in this.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The only exceptions are the PPR and the PvdD. 
24 This marked increase is visible for legislatives initiatives as well, but less so for 
amendments (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 154). 
25 This is probably best explained by stricter rules on when motions can be tabled. 
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3.4.2 Talking in the Dutch parliament 
One of the major activities of MPs is to speak on issues that are on the 
agenda.26 Part of the work of MPs takes place in committees and part of it takes place 
in plenary sessions. The decisions that are made in plenary sessions are prepared in 
committee. In committees, MPs can engage in a dialogue with the cabinet and they 
can inform themselves about issues. No substantive decision-making takes place in 
the committees.27 This means that a plenary meeting must follow every committee 
meeting that prepares a decision.28 
The plenary meetings occur within time constraints: they are held for three 
days in every week in which the parliament is not in recess. Therefore, the agenda of 
parliament is tightly controlled. The speaker proposes the agenda to parliament.29 
Parliament follows the policy agenda of the government in some cases: it discusses 
the bills, policy papers or budgets proposed by the government. In some cases, 
however, laws or policy papers are tabled by the government in response to a request 
by an MP. MPs can also set the parliamentary agenda themselves: by private member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The term 'parliament' itself (from the French 'parlement' which is in turn derived 
from 'parler' 'to speak') is a sign of this. 
27 Reglement van orde van de Tweede Kamer. 2010. Den Haag. p.14. 
28 Ibid. 18. 
29 Ibid. 20. 
	   65	  
bills, which are rare; in the form of parliamentary studies or inquiries, which are rare 
as well; in the form of interpellations or emergency debates with cabinet members, 
which are increasing in use; or in the form of an oral question to ministers during the 
weekly question hour. While any MP has the right to propose a bill or ask oral 
questions, a parliamentary majority is needed to start a parliamentary study or an 
inquiry.30 
No one can speak unless the speaker has given him or her the right to do so.31 
The speaker also determines the speaking time. The time is allotted among 
parliamentary parties, which appoint one spokesperson per debate. In longer debates, 
parties are allotted speaking time according to the size of the parliamentary party.32 
MPs can interrupt other MPs and cabinet members to ask a question, if the speaker 
allows them to.33 Parliamentary parties can decide not to participate in a debate; this is 
often the case in busier periods in parliament, for smaller parliamentary parties and 
politically less important debates. Within each debate, MPs have considerable leeway 
to address the issue as they see fit. The Speaker can take away an MP’s right to speak, 
but this only occurs in extreme cases.34 In those cases, the Speaker also has the right 
to strike the words of that MP from the proceedings (Bootsma & Hoetink 2006).35  
In summary, parliamentary parties are constrained by the parliamentary 
agenda on the one hand, which means that they will focus on the issues that the 
cabinet, other parliamentary parties or they themselves put on the agenda. On the 
other hand, parliamentary parties enjoy considerable liberty: they themselves 
participate in setting the parliamentary agenda; they can decide not to participate in 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 37-38. 
31 Ibid. 20-21. 
32 Ibid. 21. 
33 Ibid. 21.  
34 Ibid. 21-22. 
35 Ibid. 22. This includes cases such as personal insults or breaches of confidentiality. 
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3.4.3 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary speech 
The data presented here was collected and categorised by Louwerse (2011). 
The study uses the digitalised proceedings of the Dutch parliament.36 The texts are 
categorised into the policy categories of the Comparative Agendas Project (Breeman, 
Lowery et al. 2009, Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006). The method used here has 
been developed by Louwerse (2011): the parliamentary speeches are divided into 
paragraphs. These paragraphs are subsequently assigned to these categories in a two-
step process. First, the paragraphs were assigned to categories on the basis of a 
dictionary of signal words (Louwerse 2011, 80). The basic reasoning is that if a word 
like ‘refugee’ (vluchteling) is included in a piece of text, one can be reasonably sure 
that it should be categorised as pertaining to the issue of immigration, especially when 
words like ‘asylum’ (asiel) are included as well (Louwerse 2011, 80). Each paragraph 
was assigned to the category in which it had most words, relative to the logged 
number of words in the word list of each category (Louwerse 2011). For each 
category, between 20 and 50 words were selected on the basis of a reading of relevant 
documents: parliamentary debates, election manifestos, parliamentary motions and the 
categorisation instructions of the Flemish branch of the Comparative Agendas Project 
(Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006). 
Those paragraphs that could not be assigned to a category on the basis of the 
dictionary approach, because they included no word from the dictionary or an equal 
number of words from two or more categories, were assigned using an automatic 
classification algorithm (Louwerse 2011, 214). In these cases a Linear Support Vector 
Machine was employed: these assign the paragraphs that are not coded to categories 
based on similarity in word use to paragraphs that were already coded.37 Because of 
issues with computer processing, the entire period could not be analysed in a single 
analysis. Therefore, the entire period was cut into shorter periods preceding or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The digitalised parliamentary speeches were collected from parlando for the period 
1995-2010 and from statengeneraaldigitaal-websites for the period 1952-1995 
(Louwerse 2011, 206). The texts, especially those before 1995, were heavily 
processed. 
37 A Linear Support Vector Machine treats each paragraph as a point in a high-
dimensional space, where each word forms a dimension (Louwerse, 2010, 214). For 
those paragraphs for which the categories are known, the SVM will calculate a hyper-
plane, which is best able to separate the different categories (Louwerse, 2010, 214). 
This can in turn be used to assign the paragraphs to the categories to which they are, 
in terms of word use, most similar.  
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following each election.38 The Louwerse approach has shown itself to be quite valid 
when compared to the results of hand coding (Louwerse 2011, 81). The results of the 
validity: Louwerse’s results have a Krippendorf’s Alpha of 0.723 for Dutch-language 
election manifestos compared to hand coding (Louwerse 2011, 81). The results are 
similar to the results of Breeman et al. (2009), who also used a computerised 
technique to process parliamentary documents. This method does not produce perfect 
correspondence between human and computer coding, but for the purposes of this 
enterprise the method suffices (Louwerse 2011, 83). The policy issue categorisation 
scheme of the Dutch Policy Agendas Project was used (Breeman, Lowery, et al. 
2009). This scheme was amended in order to better differentiate between the specific 
appeals of specific new parties. These categories are also used in the other analyses. 
For the analyses of parliamentary speech a separate category was created for speech 
concerning procedure. The substantive categories are listed in appendix 1. 
 
3.4.4 Case-by-case analysis of attention in parliament 
This data will be analysed in a three-step analysis: in a case-by-case context-
sensitive analysis, in a statistical analysis and in an expanded statistical analysis. In 
chapter 4, the new parties will be linked to specific issues. These issues are selected 
on the basis of an analysis of the election manifesto of the party and the assessment of 
scholars in secondary works as to what the unique appeal of the party was.  
In the case-by-case analysis, the developments in the attention that established 
parties devote to the issue of the new party are followed closely. Trend lines are 
calculated for the period before and after the elections in order to determine whether 
the elections constitute an interruption in the development of attention. These are 
made by means of a regression analysis between the year and the level of attention in 
that year. Examples of patterns in which the elections lead to a marked interruption 
and do not lead to a marked interruption of the patterns of attention, are shown in 
figure 3.2 and 3.3. In these figures hypothetical examples of trend lines in attention 
can be seen. As figure 3.2 shows, the interruption can occur in the form of a 
difference in the value (pattern A) and in a difference in the slope (pattern B and C) of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The periods that were studied were 1952-1959, 1956-1963, 1959-1967, 1967-1977, 
1972-1981, 1977-1986, 1982-1989, 1986-1994, 1989-1994, 1994-2002 and 1998-
2010. To obtain the figures for section 5.12, a special analysis was made for the 
period 1963-1977. 
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the trend lines. Figure 3.3 shows that, even when attention increases (as in pattern E), 
if the elections do not lead to an interruption in the pattern of attention, one cannot 
attribute this to the new party, because an autonomous development continued. 
The next step is to consider alternative explanations for the patterns that are 
found. Alternative explanations may be found in two different realms: first, social, 
economic or international developments may force an issue to the table. An exploding 
nuclear reactor in Fukushima may force energy policy onto the parliamentary agenda 
in the Netherlands. To this end (where possible) data on social, economic or 
international developments are presented that may constitute an explanation to these 
developments. Second, the legislative cycle may influence when parliament devotes 
attention to an issue: processes of depoliticisation (advisory committees, moving 
decision-making to another level, postponing decision-making) may remove an issue 
from the parliamentary agenda, while processes of politicisation (legislative 
proposals, government policy papers) may bring an issue to the foreground. In some 
cases, the budgetary cycle, which concentrates activity on financial matters in the last 
months of the year may affect the patterns is also evaluated as an alternative 
explanation.  
The third step is to compare different individual patterns of non-reaction and 
reaction in order to understand these patterns. One of the most striking outcomes of 
these analyses is that, while there are considerable differences in the way that new 
political parties influence established parties, when responding to a new party, the 
reactions of established parties are uniform. All parties show a similar pattern of 
increasing attention, decreasing attention or stability in attention. Therefore, the 
attention of all established parties is presented, instead of the attention of individual 
parties. The focus in the discussions of these individual cases is on whether the 
change in attention can be understood in terms of a collective response of all 
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3.4.5 Statistical analysis of attention in parliament 
Two different statistical analyses are made: one which concerns only the cases 
of change where a new political party is present and one which concerns all cases of 
changes. While these analyses are based on different assumptions about 
attributability, these are based on similar measures. 
In the first statistical analysis, only those cases of change are included where a 
new party is present. In essence, we analyse the results of the case-by-case analyses 
statistically to see where the patterns found there hold up to statistical scrutiny. In the 
second, expanded, statistical analysis the cases are expanded to include all changes in 
attention. These analyses seek to determine the extent to which the presence of a new 
party matters significantly for the issues that established parties devote attention to, 
compared to all fluctuations of attention. In the analyses presented, all changes in 
attention are studied. That is, the changes are studied in attention in all parties’ 
parliamentary activity, in all parliamentary periods and on all issues. The goal is to 
determine whether the presence of a new political party leads to a significantly 
different pattern in attention. 
In both analyses the developments in attention will be analysed in a two-
parliamentary term-period: in order to see the effect of a party that entered parliament 
in a particular year (for example 1994), the attention devoted to issues in the period 
before the new party entered parliament (1989-1994) will be compared to the 
attention devoted to issues in the period after the new party entered parliament (1994-
1998).39 This study employs a measure of relative change in attention. The basic logic 
is that going to 2 percentage points from 1 percentage point is treated the same as 
going from 10 percentage points to 20 percentage points: in both cases, attention 
doubles. In order to avoid divisions by zero, the relative change is calculated in terms 
of the absolute change in attention divided by the sum of attention in the 
parliamentary period before and after the entry of a new party. This limits the data 
between the values -1 and +1.40 This method is chosen because of its intuitive 
appeal.41  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For those elections that followed or that were snap elections, the periods were 
extended in order to avoid outliers. This applies to the elections in 1971, 1972, 1981, 
1982, 2002 and 2003.  
40 This method has clear advantages over other methods of measuring change, such as 
the Percentage Change Method of Jones and Baumgartner (2005:178-180), which is 
leptokurtic. This is a logical result of a division by the level of previous attention, 
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These values will then be analysed in regression analyses. In these analyses, 
the focus is on determining whether the entry of a new party (under specific 
conditions) leads to significant change in attention compared to the existing natural  
changes in attention (when no new party was present). In the expanded statistical 
analyses, the data set consists of a lot of cases in which no new party is present. 
Therefore the variables used to evaluate the different explanations in this analysis are 
highly collinear. Multiple regression is therefore inappropriate. Out of the total of 
3045 established party/parliamentary period/issue combinations in the expanded 
statistical analysis, a new party was present in only 159 cases. Therefore, the strength 
of the explanations (in terms of the R-squared for instance) is less important than the 
significance. The key question is not what share of the variance the presence of a new 
party can explain, because in only 159 of the 3045 established party-year-issue triads 
a new party is present. The key question is the extent to which the patterns for the 
cases where new parties are present are significantly different from all cases.  
An example can help to illustrate how the measure of relative change in attention 
score is calculated. In table 3.3, one can see what percentage of words established 
parties devoted to the issue of immigration in the parliamentary periods 1998-2002 
and 2002-2006. This is the issue owned by the LPF, which entered parliament in the 
2002 elections. The absolute change in attention is the difference between the 
percentages of before and after the entry of the LPF. In 1998-2002, D66 devoted 
3.8% of what they said in parliament to immigration. In the period 2002-2006, D66 
devoted 4.7% of what they said to this issue: an increase of almost one percentage 
point. To calculate the relative measure of change in attention score, the absolute 
change will be divided by the sum of the attention before and after. The relative 
measure of change in attention score is +0.108 for D66. These developments in the 
attention devoted to the issue owned by the LPF in the parliamentary period after it  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
because the data is limited at a 100% decrease in attention. This method limits the 
data by both the level of attention at t=-1 and t=+1. Within these boundaries, the data 
is roughly normally distributed.  
41 Robustness test were run for different operationalisations. For each analysis, four 
different models were used: a long-term and a short-term model (where the period 
was and was not extended following snap elections) and a model looking at relative 
and absolute changes in attention. This leads to four models (long-term absolute, 
long-term relative, short-term absolute, short-term relative). Where there are 
deviances between the tests and the models that are presented, this will be noted. 
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CDA 3.52 3.13 -0.39 -0.059 
CU 2.44 3.10 +1.66 +0.254 
D66 3.81 4.73 +0.92 +0.108 
GL 3.69 5.27 +1.56 +0.174 
PvdA 2.82 4.76 +0.94 +0.143 
SGP 2.92 3.81 +0.89 +0.132 
SP 2.25 3.61 +1.36 +0.232 
VVD 3.47 3.84 +0.47 +0.063 
 
Table 3.4: relationship between change and levels of attention 
































R-square 0.104 0.071 0.265 0.155 
N 3360 3360 2898 2898 
 
entered parliament, will be compared to all developments in the attention to all issues 
(not included in table 3.3).  
When studying developments in attention in this way, there is a problem. 
Under any specification, there is a negative relationship between the amount of 
attention a party has devoted to an issue and the change in attention afterwards. As 
one can see in table 3.4, this relationship is quite robust. Whether one calculates a 
relationship between the absolute change and the previous level of attention, or 
between the relative change and the previous level of attention, this relationship is 
significant and explains a fair share of the variance. The relationship is present in the 
data for the electoral and the parliamentary arena. For the absolute change in 
attention, this may be the result of the fact that the larger the previous level of 
attention is, the greater the decreases in attention can be: if the previous level of 
attention is 1% the maximum decrease is 1%, if it is 10% the maximum decrease is 
10%. However, a relative measure of change in attention would not have this 
problem, because the maximum decrease (or increase) is always 1. In contrast to the 
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pattern in the absolute data, the pattern here appears to be of a substantive nature. It 
appears to imply that there is a natural maximum to how much attention a party can 
devote to an issue: the more attention it has already devoted to an issue, the smaller 
the (relative) change in attention will be. It appears that developments in attention do 
not continue linearly until 100% is reached. There is a saturation level of attention, 
beyond which not many parties extend. Only a few outliers extend beyond the level 
of 30% attention.42 This makes the analysis considerably more complicated. There is 
no way to avoid this phenomenon, because it is a substantive phenomenon. 
Therefore, all statistical analyses will be constructed as control relationships, using 
the relationship with this phenomenon as a robustness check.  
 
3.4.6 Party positions in parliament 
There are two research strategies available to measure the differences in 
position in parliament (Louwerse & Otjes 2011): on the one hand one can look at 
what parties say, and on the other hand one can look at what parties do. The core 
question here is how parties position themselves on the dominant line of conflict. The 
two methods available are a word-based approach, which analyses parliamentary 
speeches, or a vote-based approach, which analyses parliamentary voting. A vote-
based strategy is pursued here for three reasons: first, the focus is on the significant 
line or lines of conflict on an issue. During their parliamentary speeches, any party 
can address any aspect related to the issue on the agenda. This means that there is 
considerable variance in the issues that are addressed. It is more likely that party 
positions conform to the significant line of conflict on that issue, because the motions 
that are voted on are a non-random sample of all possible motions on that issue. 
Which motions are voted on, is regulated by parties’ strategic considerations.  
In a word-based approach, differences in word use may in part be motivated 
by ideological differences. They may however also be the result of differences in the 
vernacular of the period or the style, regional background and whether civil servants 
wrote a speech. All these differences can be picked up in a word-scaling technique 
(Louwerse 2011, 210-223). A vote-based technique has fewer drawbacks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Note that this relationship does not exist in this data set, nor in similar data sets 
such as the data of the Comparative Manifestos Project: for the absolute data, the 
relationship is strong and significant (b-value of -0.48 significant at the 0.01-level). 
For the relative model, the relationship is weaker, but still significant (b-value of -
0.04, significant at the 0.01-level). These analyses concern 82,264 cases.  
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Table 3.5: voting in the Tweede Kamer 







Finally, the measurement of party positions in parliament through 
parliamentary voting is a tried and tested method. The application of these methods to 
the Dutch parliament goes back to the 1970s (Van Tijn-Koekebakker, Brinkman & 
Koomen 1971; Wolters 1984; Van der Brug 1997). Since the development of these 
methods in the United States they have been applied to the Swiss Nationalrat (Hug & 
Schulz 2007), the Danish Folketing (Hansen 2008), the Irish Dáil (Hansen 2009), the 
Korean National Assembly (Jun & Hix 2009), the French Assemblée Nationale 
(Rosenthal & Voeten 2004), the British House of Commons (Spirling & McLean 
2007), and the European Parliament (Hix 2001; Hix, Noury & Roland 2006). 
 
3.4.7 Voting in the Dutch Parliament 
The Dutch parliament votes on a range of different propositions. The major 
categories are bills, amendments to bills and motions. Parliament can vote on other 
matters, such as proposals of the speaker or of MPs, the appointment of people to 
specific posts, citizens' initiatives, articles of bills and recommendations of 
parliamentary research committees. More than half of the 45,316 votes between 1963 
and 2010 are motions. About a third concern amendments and a tenth are bills. The 
other propositions are only a small share of votes. More precise figures are listed in 
table 3.5. The problem observed in section 3.4.1 that only a limited number of votes 
is available for the period before 1977, is (partially) solved by including votes on 
motions, amendments and laws. The problem of too few votes is not definitively 
solved in this way, but the extent of these problems is decreased: there are not enough 
votes before 1963 to analyse the results per issue category. 
A motion is the expression of a judgment or wish of parliament, mainly 
concerning government policy (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 342; Visscher 
1994, 98). The political significance of motions differs (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 
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2010, 350). In a motion, MPs can express their wishes without having to back these 
financially (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 350). Some motions are only proposed 
for political purposes. Small parties or opposition parties can use a motion to make 
their own views public or force other parties to take position (Bovend'Eert & 
Kummeling 2010, 352). The cabinet does not need to implement motions 
(Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 350-351; Visscher 1994, 98). The only motion 
that cannot be ignored is a motion of no confidence; if such a motion is accepted the 
minister or the cabinet, as a whole, must resign (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 
347). Motions are used to change existing policy. If the Tweede Kamer agrees with 
the cabinet, no need exists to express this with a motion (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 
2010, 347). A motion need not come to a vote, if a minister takes over the intention of 
the motion and promises to implement the proposed policies (Visscher 1994, 100). 
Motions play an important role in the policy making process: motions often ask the 
cabinet to propose legislation and when proposing a bill, ministers often refer to 
adopted motions (Visscher 1994, 118-120). MPs make frequent use of motions, 
because they are not labour-intensive (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 343; 
compare Jones & Baumgartner 2005, 176). As discussed above MPs need the support 
of at least four other MPs to propose motions (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 
343). Between 1967 and 1985, the number of motions that were proposed increased 
markedly. This coincided with a revision of parliamentary procedure and increasing 
responsibilities of government (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 352-353). In light 
of its increasing use, Bovend’Eert and Kummeling (2010, 353) speak of the 
devaluation of the motion as a parliamentary instrument. In 1985, the parliament 
made it more difficult to propose motions. MPs need to use their own speaking time 
to read motions into the parliamentary proceedings and motions could only be 
proposed during the second term of parliamentary discussions.  
In addition to motions, MPs can vote on bills (Visscher 1994, 80). Unless the 
constitution requires a larger majority, a simple majority suffices (Bovend'Eert & 
Kummeling 2010, 203). 43 Both parliament and the cabinet can take the initiative for 
legislation. Private member bills are rare and cabinet takes almost all the initiatives 
(Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 214). Legal restrictions also exist: MPs cannot 
propose general spending bills (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 212). Finally, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 As is the case for bills that amend the constitution. 
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are practical restrictions: MPs lack the specialist knowledge needed to write bills, 
although since 1985 they can get support from the civil service (Bovend'Eert & 
Kummeling 2010, 216; Visscher 1994, 83). MPs of the governing coalition can often 
expect or persuade their own cabinet to propose legislation that they prefer 
(Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216). When MPs take an initiative, they do so to 
seek publicity, to break through the division between coalition and opposition or to 
overcome the passivity of the government (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 216) 
Sometimes MPs take initiatives for political purposes only, that is: parties use it to 
express political differences (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 215-216). Parties tend 
to vote dominantly in favour of bills proposed by the government (Visscher 1994, 
391). 
Only members of the Tweede Kamer have the right of amendment 
(Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 218-219). As with motions, an amendment needs 
the support of at least four MPs (Visscher 1994, 85). Not all amendments need to 
come to a vote. Amendments that seek to pervert the goal of a bill are not allowed 
(Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 219). Opposition parties tend to propose more 
amendments, as they disagree more with the proposed bills (Visscher 1994, 256-257). 
Moreover, within the coalition, MPs tend to propose amendments on bills proposed 
by ministers who are not a member of their own party (Visscher 1994, 259). 
Until the 1970s, it was common practice for bills to be accepted without a 
vote and for MPs to ask the speaker to note that they opposed the bill or specific 
articles of the bill (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 2010, 525). Since 1983, it is common 
practice for MPs to vote by show of hands. Roll calls are rare and decreasing in use. 
MPs cannot officially abstain, but they can be absent from a vote (Bovend'Eert & 
Kummeling 2010, 526). If parliament votes by show of hands, the speaker counts the 
votes per party unless an MP does not vote in line with his party. Parliamentary 
parties are expected to be on full strength during a vote (Bovend'Eert & Kummeling 
2010, 526). This means that party unity is high (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011). 
Effectively, the Tweede Kamer has only between nine and ten legislators of which 
ideal points can be estimated.  
Three things are important to note: first, voting on bills tends to be 
unanimous, but when voting on amendments and motions, considerable differences 
between parties occur. Second, almost all voting is registered per parliamentary party. 
This will be the unit of analysis. Third, votes do not concern a random selection of all 
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proposals. Specific rules restrict specific kinds of proposals to come to a vote. 
Especially small radical parties will have problems in putting their proposals to a 
vote; they can still however show their position by voting against proposals of other 
parties.  
 
3.4.8 Collection and categorisation of parliamentary votes 
This study looks at votes on amendments, motions and bills. The votes are 
collected in different ways. The core of the dataset is formed by votes on motions 
between 1977 and 2008. These are drawn from PoliDocs, a digitalised database of 
parliamentary activity (Marx & Schuth 2010). This database includes a refined 
system of categories, voting results, bibliographic information and co-sponsors with 
party affiliation. All other votes (motions before 1977 and after 2008, and votes on 
amendments, articles and bills) are drawn from the Louwerse and Otjes (2011) 
database. Using a regular expression program, the records of the Tweede Kamer were 
parsed to obtain every instance of a vote and collect the voting results, the co-
sponsors and bibliographic information of the votes. Additional information on these 
votes was obtained manually. Only those motions, amendments and bills for which 
full bibliographical information and a complete voting result were found are used. 
The same categorisation scheme was used here as was used for the 
parliamentary speeches. The motions from the PoliDocs database are labelled with 
2,940 separate keywords. These were assigned by the clerk’s office of the Tweede 
Kamer. On the basis of these keywords, each motion has been categorised into 21 
substantive categories. A motion was assigned to a category if it had the most 
keywords in that category (relatively to the total number of key words in that 
category). There were proposals that had no tags in any category. These were 
excluded.44 For those bills, amendments and motions where no category was 
available (that is votes before 1977 and after 2010), a two-step procedure was used. 
First, they were put in the same category as most motions in the same parliamentary 
dossier. For those dossiers of which no motions with categories were available, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This includes all motions and amendments concerning only the budget of a 
ministry, because these motions, proposed during the parliamentary discussion of the 
budget, concern (often, but not always) budgetary matters and all the (often multiple) 
issue area’s of the ministry. Because only one ambiguous key word is present, no 
basis exists for the decision. 305 motions were placed into this category for this 
reason for the entire period. 
	   78	  
motions, amendments and bills were assigned manually on the basis of the subject of 
their dossier.  
3.4.9 Models of parliamentary voting 
The voting behaviour of parties can be used to develop spatial representations 
of voting behaviour. This study employs Optimal Classification (OC). This is a 
method specifically developed by Poole (2005) to uncover the dimensional structure 
underlying votes in parliament. It treats each vote as cutting point dividing parties 
that vote “yea” from parties that vote “nay”. If one does this for a large number of 
votes, OC groups parties that vote similarly are on one side of a dimension, and 
parties that vote differently from them are on the other side. For a given number of 
dimensions, OC gives a spatial representation of voting behaviour. Cutting points 
become cutting lines or cutting (hyper)planes as dimensionality increases. In essence, 
OC is similar to Mokken scaling (Niemöller & Van Schuur 1983; Mokken & Lewis 
1982).  
In chapter 5, the goal will be to analyse single-dimensional models of 
parliamentary voting on specific issues; multidimensional models will only be used if 
the single-dimensional models fail to provide useful insights. In chapter 7 however, 
the goal will be to analyse models of parliamentary voting on all issues in order to 
assess whether new political parties cause systemic changes. Here, the specific goal is 
to assess whether the entry of a new political party leads to a change in the 
dimensionality of the party system. To achieve this, all parliamentary periods 
between 1963 and 2010 were analysed.45 
The question of when a particular constellation of parties has a particular 
number of dimensions depends upon one’s assumptions about dimensionality. For 
instance, Pellikaan et al. (2007, 296-297) maintain a two-dimensional political space 
because of the analytical value of the second dimension if one wants to study 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The shorter parliamentary periods (1971-1972, 1981-1982 and 2002-2003) are all 
included in other parliamentary periods, because too few votes occurred in these 
periods. They are included in those analyses that can help to understand as many new 
parties; therefore 1971-1972 is included in 1972-1977, 1981-1982 in 1982-1986 and 
2002-2003 in 2003-2006. The only problem that this presented was that it was 
impossible to estimate the position of both the PVV and LN, because they are now in 
the same parliamentary period (2002-2006) without once voting on the same issue. 
This creates a temporal dimension in the voting behaviour, which distorts the 
analyses. Therefore, no positions of the PVV were measured before it won its first 
seats in 2006.  
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electoral competition or government formation. In contrast, most authors like Van der 
Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Kriesi and Frey (2008) use a more inductive 
approach. Their justification of the dimensionality of the political space is based on 
the goodness of fit of a solution with a particular number of dimensions. That is: the 
extent to which a solution with a certain number of dimensions fits the data. These 
researchers emphasise that they “find” solutions with a particular number of 
dimensions (Kriesi & Frey 2008, 281) or “reveal” particular structures (Van der Brug 
& Van Spanje 2009, 327). These authors see the dimensionality of the space as an 
empirical outcome, and not as a matter of analytical utility. One can, however, not 
completely rely on statistics to answer this substantive question (Poole 2005, 141). 
For a given number of dimensions, Optimal Classification gives a spatial 
representation of the voting behaviour. The goodness of fit of these models is 
measured in terms of the Aggregate Proportional Reduction in Error (APRE) (Poole 
2005, 129). This is the percentage of correctly classified choices corrected for the fact 
that votes can be lopsided. The APRE expresses the extent to which the estimate 
performs better than a random assignment of the parties based on the distribution of 
the votes. If division in the legislature was 10 versus 90%, one would get a 90% 
correct rate if one assigned all MPs to the majority side: a random spatial map of 
legislators would also correctly classify 90% of the choices. Therefore, a non-random 
placement can only improve the estimate by 10% (Poole 2005, 129). The APRE 
looks at the improvements given this baseline of random assignment. The APRE has 
a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0. If a one-dimensional solution has an APRE of 
over 0.5, the data can be interpreted in terms of one dimension. 
By comparing the levels of fit for different years, one can see whether the 
extent to which the differences between political parties can be represented in a one- 
or a two-dimensional space, has changed. In this way, the question about the true 
dimensionality of the space can be shelved. Instead, one can assess whether the 
political space became more or less easy to model in terms of one dimension after the 
entry of a new party into the political system. Or, in other words, whether the political 
space became more or less one-dimensional due to the entry of the new party. For 
reasons of parsimony, two-dimensional models are presented in chapter 7. To 
enhance interpretation of the models, the voting behaviour on specific issues is 
plotted into the models based on all votes. This has been done by means of property 
fitting (Van der Brug 1997, 60-62). In order to see whether one can attribute the 
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formation of a new dimension to a new party, the party positions on the issues that 
the new party owns are included in the representation. If a change in the dimensions 
can be attributed to the party positions on the new party’s issue, they must relate 
significantly to the model.  
Specific problems exist when applying these methods to specific parliaments: 
institutional features may have an impact on how MPs vote. This is true for United 
States Congress (Clinton 2007) and the French Assemblée National (Rosenthal & 
Voeten 2004) but also for the Tweede Kamer: parliamentary voting in the Tweede 
Kamer is influenced by party unity and the division between opposition and coalition 
in addition to policy differences. This makes the Tweede Kamer more similar to the 
American Supreme Court (with nine legislators, the justices) than the American 
House of Representatives (with 435 legislators). This limits the methods one can use 
in the analyses of parliamentary votes: the most recent insight is that if the number of 
legislators is small, the results may only be consistent if the measurement of the ideal 
points is restricted to the ordinal level (Tahk 2010). Optimal Classification is selected 
because it gives ordinal level estimates of party positions with a minimum of 
assumptions.  
The results of a one-dimensional OC analysis must be interpreted as an 
ordinal scale.46 In order to grasp the strength of the differences, one can look at the 
number of votes dividing the parties at each cut point. In a two-dimensional analysis 
one can interpret the party-positions as quasi-interval variables (Peress 2011). In the 
analysis, each vote is translated into a cutting line, dividing the "yea"-votes from the 
"nay"-votes. If there are enough votes, the party positions in a two-dimensional space 
will be brought down to a small area. For measurement purposes the party is then 
assigned the position in the middle of that area. The extent to which this estimate is 
correct depends on the number of votes; if there is only a limited number of votes the 
areas get larger and the assignment of point estimate becomes a less acceptable 
proxy. Therefore, two-dimensional models can only be used if they are based on a 
sufficient number of votes: almost all issues have too few votes to confidently 
estimate party positions in a two-dimensional model. Here one-dimensional solutions  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The scales are ordinal with one change: if two or more parties have the same 
position, they are assigned the average position between the two parties on each of 
their sides. If two parties are placed together between the first and the fourth party, 
they are assigned position 2.5.  
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Coalition party support 85% 24% 
Opposition party support 71% 58% 
N 26882 18434 
 
Average percentage of "yea'" votes by coalition and opposition parliamentary 
parties for motions of which the first sponsor was either a member of a coalition 
party or a member of the opposition party. Data from period 1963-2010.  
 
will be used, unless they are clearly problematic. The two-dimensional solutions 
should be interpreted with great caution.47 As will be seen in chapter 7, estimates 
become much more reliable if thousands of votes are available.  
An analysis needs at least 10 votes to be processed. If the issue linked to a 
party has less than 10 votes in either the period before or after it entered parliament, 
the analyses cannot be performed and one must look at a secondary issue. If no other 
issue has enough votes, one cannot analyse the effect of the party using this method. 
Because of the low number of parliamentary votes before 1960, only parties that 
entered parliament after 1963 can be studied. The positional impact of four parties 
that entered parliament between 1946 and 1963 cannot be studied.48 
Another problem was identified by Laver (2006, 137). In parliamentary 
systems like the Netherlands, the division between opposition and coalition parties 
may dominate policy-based patterns of voting. Hix and Noury (2007) have observed 
this phenomenon for several parliamentary systems. In the Dutch parliament the 
voting behaviour of political parties in government and opposition differs in a 
particular way. In table 3.6, one can see how coalition and opposition parties vote on 
motions that were introduced by coalition and opposition parties. A party favours a 
proposal in around three-quarters of votes, independent of who proposed it and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The recent insights of Tahk (2010) also imply that one needs a large number of 
votes to obtain consistent results. This study looks at the policy dimensions for 
specific issues (such as education, agriculture), which causes the number of votes to 
be limited. This means that the OC solutions may not always be consistent. For one-
dimensional solutions, the model with the highest level of APRE is selected. If there 
are solutions with equal levels of APRE, this is often caused by a few parties that 
differ marginally in terms of votes; these parties will be assigned a common position. 
For multidimensional solutions, the results are even less consistent. One should 
therefore only use multidimensional solutions if it is absolutely necessary. Because 
these results are inconsistent, the mean position of 1000 analyses is calculated, 
approximating a bootstrapping procedure. 
48 These are the GPV, the BP, the KNP and the PSP. 
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whether that party was part of the coalition or the opposition. One exception exists: 
coalition parties favour proposals that are proposed by the opposition in only a 
quarter of the votes. This may be explained by the different considerations that 
coalition and opposition MPs have when proposing and voting on motions. MPs from 
coalition parties have two different considerations: on the one hand they wish to see 
their policies realised; and on the other hand they want the coalition government to 
continue. Whether the coalition breaks down depends on the coalition partners. A 
coalition partner will certainly not accept another coalition partner sponsoring 
motions or favouring a motion that goes against the coalition agreement (Holzhacker 
2002, 472). On issues not included in the coalition agreement, parties have more 
liberty to pursue their own policy goals (Holzhacker 2002, 472). MPs from 
opposition parties do not need to consider the coalition agreement or the positions of 
the coalition parties: they can sponsor and favour any proposal they see fit. One may 
hypothesise that opposition parties will vote against every proposal of the coalition. 
This is however simply not the case in the Netherlands: if one looks at the voting 
behaviour of opposition parties on coalition proposals one can see support in over 
70% of the votes. In countries like France there is evidence for a coalition-opposition 
division induced by opposition voting (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004), but this is not 
the case for the Netherlands. Therefore, in order to obtain estimates of party’s 
positions in parliament without interference from the coalition-opposition division, 
this study looks at voting on coalition proposals only.  
 
3.4.10 Analysis of positions in parliament 
The goal of this study is to analyse the effects of new parties on policy 
positions. Two methods will be used to analyse this: first, the effect of each new 
political party will be studied individually and comparatively and second, the effect 
of all new political parties will be studied in a statistical analysis. 
The individual case studies examine the effects of each new political party on 
the pattern of voting on its own issue.49 Three possible outcomes exist: first, parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 One may wonder to what extent it is useful to analyse the effect of a challenger 
party on positions on its own issue. A mobiliser introduces a new own issue, while a 
challenger party takes position on traditional issues thereby challenging established 
parties on their own turf. The issues that are assigned to challengers tend to be 
traditional left-right or religious/secular issues. These are issues that established 
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may not react; second, in response to the entry of a new party, individual parties may 
shift positions on the issue of the new party, and third, the nature of the line of 
conflict on that issue may change due to the entry of the new party. The first case (no 
change) is easy to identify. One needs a criterion to differentiate between the situation 
where the positions of individual parties change and the nature of the line of conflict 
changes. Ordinal correlation between the party positions before and after the entry of 
a new party is employed here. The basic assumption is that, if an ordinal correlation 
is significant, it is the changes of individual parties on a stable line of conflict. If the 
correlation is insignificant, two dimensions cannot be compared: the differences are 
not the result of individual shifts, but of a redefinition of the line of conflict. The 
ordinal correlation between individual party positions before and after the entry of a 
new party must be significant. Correlations can work for one-dimensional analyses, 
but for multidimensional analyses a more complex method is necessary to compare 
the solutions. Procrustean analysis, which rotates solutions to compare the two-
dimensional solutions over time, is employed (Gower & Dijksterhuis 2004). One can 
evaluate the goodness of fit by looking at the root of the squared errors and by 
looking at the correlation between the two horizontal and two vertical dimensions. 
In the one-dimensional spaces, one can look at shifts of parties over time. 
These shifts are operationalised as changes in the (ordinal) distance between the new 
and the established party. To this end, the distance between the new party and the 
established party is compared before and after the entry of the new party. In order to 
compare changes in party positions over time one must make a number of 
assumptions. The OC analyses of parliamentary votes provide party positions relative 
to eachother. That is they order parties from one extreme to another. Two different 
analyses based on two different data sets will lead to two ordinal orderings, but these 
are not necessarily on the same scale. One ordering may tap into the economic left-
right dimension while another taps into a foreign policy dimensions (pro-European-
Euroskeptic, for instance). Moreover even if two orderings tap into the same 
dimension the positions are not necessarily the same: the second to left position in the 
1994-1998 Tweede Kamer is not necessarily identical to the second to left position in 
the 1998-2002 Dutch parliament. It may be the case that one party retained the same 
position on some absolute scale and all other parties changed position in the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
parties also consider their own. Therefore here one can see how established parties 
react when challenged on their own turf.  
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direction. Therefore it may the case that an ordering goes from PSP-PPR-PvdA-D66 
to PPR-PvdA-D66-PSP. It may see, that the PSP moved but 'actually' all the other 
parties moved. Even if we compare changes over time, it is not necessarily clear if 
lets the CDA and the SGP switch places in the rank ordering if this is because the 
CDA changed position and the SGP stayed in the same place or vice versa. Finally, 
because new parties have no position in the previous parliament one cannot know 
whether parties moved towards or away from the new party.  
Therefore one needs to make four assumptions: first, as said above, if there is 
a significant correlation between the ordering before and after the entry of a new 
party, the assumption is that the orderings tap into the same substantive dimension. 
Second, we assume that largest changes are substantially meaningful changes. In a 
rank ordering a change of one party will always cause other parties to change: if one 
party moves one position to the left, another must move one position to the right. 
Therefore, one can never see the movement of a single party. It becomes difficult to 
assess which changes are the result of the entry of a new party and which changes are 
the result of parties making room for other parties that have changed their position.50 
We work under the assumption that larger changes are the substantively meaningful 
changes, which require explanation. As the new party had no position before it 
entered, one needs to assign it a hypothetical position. This is based on its position in 
the rank ordering after it entered. Because the one-dimensional solutions are ordinal, 
the only changes that can be observed are changes in the rank ordering of parties over 
time. This means that one cannot assess systematic changes over time in this way: 
one cannot see whether party systems become more polarised or move in a particular 
direction as a whole.  
In addition to these analyses of party positions, one also needs to look at 
systemic changes: as discussed above, the extent to which the change on the new 
party’s issue is systemic will be assessed by means of correlation analyses. In order to 
measure the reinforcement of conflict, the level of politicisation on the new party’s 
issue is used. One can compare the change in the level of unanimous votes over time.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The policy dimensions before and after the entry of a new party will be analysed 
with all parties that were in parliament at the time (including parties that have entered 
and disappeared). This is the best way to get an insight into the full patterns of 
competition before and after the entry of a new party, but only those parties are 
included in the analysis and the graphical representations, which are present in both 
periods in parliament. The full data is presented in appendix 3. 
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BP 1.5 1 -0.5 0.5 
SGP 2.5 2 +0.5 0.5 
GPV 3 3 0 0 
ARP 4 4 0 0 
KVP 5 7 +2 2 
CHU 6 5 -1 1 
VVD 7 6 -1 1 
PvdA 8 10 +2 2 
CPN 9 8 -1 1 
PSP 10 9 -1 1 
 
The less unanimous parliament is over time, the higher the level of politicisation. The 
level of unanimity in the voting of established parties is used, excluding new parties 
The statistical analyses look at the changes in the individual party positions. 
One should note that, in contrast to the analysis of attention, only those cases are 
analysed together here that were also discussed in the individual case-by-case 
analysis. No additional models of parliamentary voting were introduced to compare 
for attributability. In the analysis of attention the other attention measures are 
produced as a by-product of the data necessary for the case studies. No additional 
models were made, because constructing spatial models is complex. Those cases 
where there was a systemic change (a change in the pattern of voting) have to be 
excluded: here one cannot measure individual parties changing position over time. 
As before, the developments will be analysed in a two-parliamentary term-
period. Absolute values will be employed rather than both positive and negative 
values. All the analyses are based on ordinal positions in one dimension, and 
therefore for every positive shift there will be an equal negative shift. They would 
cancel each other out if they were added together: no change would ever be visible. 
By taking the absolute values this problem is avoided. This does mean that one 
cannot say anything about the direction of the change in the political positions.  
An example may help to illustrate how the change in position is calculated. In 
table 3.7, one can see the party positions of established parties on governance in the 
parliamentary periods in the parliamentary periods 1963-1967 and 1967-1971. This is 
the issue owned by D66, which entered parliament in 1967. The change in position is 
the absolute difference between the positions in 1963-1967 and 1967-1971. In 1963-
1967 KVP took the fifth position from the conservative side between the ARP and the 
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CHU. In 1967-1971, the party shifted to the seventh position. Two movements to the 
progressive side: a change of two positions. 
 
3.5 Data collection and data analysis in the electoral arena 
Chapter 6 will examine the effects of new political parties on the position that 
established parties take on issues and the attention that established parties devote to 
issues in the electoral arena. For both these variables, this study will look at election 
manifestos of parties, which are still the most authoritative statement of parties' 
electoral promises (Bara 2006), following Meguid (2005; 2007) and Huibregts 
(2006). The relationship between election manifestos and electoral campaigns is not 
simple. What a party says during an election campaign is not necessarily the same as 
what it says in its election manifesto. The best evidence that is available about 
election campaigns in the Netherlands (Brants and Van Praag 2007) shows that 
parties following a party-selling approach. Parties are oriented at selling their own 
program to the electorate. Public opinion matters in selecting which part of their 
message will be put on the display (Lees-Marshment, 2001). Parties choose to 
campaign on those positions from their own program on which they agreed with 
public and which the public feels strongly about. Public opinion serves as an arbiter, 
deciding which issues from the party program to focus on during the campaign 
(Wring, 1996). Therefore election manifestos seem the best sources to assess the 
positions of political parties. They provide the the most comprehensive collection of 
party positions on a wide-range of policy issues - far more comprehensive than other 
expressions used in the election campaigns, such as folders, posters or pamphlets. 
One can have more doubts about using election manifestos to assess the saliency of 
issues in the electoral campaign: focus on specific issues is an important part of 
election campaign. Election manifestos often attempt to be comprehensive and cover 
all issues. Still there are three good reasons to use election manifestos: first, the 
division of attention in an election manifesto is a sign of what a party focuses on. An 
environmentalist party will spend considerably more attention to the environment 
than other parties. Second, they are the only resource that is available for the entire 
period (television spots were used much later) and that provides enough data for 
quantitative analysis. It is not necessarily quantifiable which issues a particular poster 
addresses. Media data should not be used because it does not reflect what a party 
focuses on, but what it is forced to react to. Therefore election manifestos are the best 
	   87	  
available data to assess the attention devoted to issues by parties in the electoral 
arena. 
As explained above, different notions of attributability will be used in 
different phases of the study. The focus in the study of position is on those changes in 
those positions of which one can be most certain that they were unique to the new 
party. The idea is that, if new political parties had any effect, one must be able to 
observe it here. For electoral attention, the study again compares patterns of change 
in a three approaches: a context-sensitive case-by-case approach, a statistical analysis 
of those patterns and an expanded statistical analysis. The last analysis includes all 
changes in attention, not just those cases where a new party is present.  
Special attention will be devoted to the possibility of anticipatory and reactive 
behaviour. It may be possible that new parties respond to an established party in the 
election in which it enters parliament and in the first election after it has entered 
parliament. Therefore this chapter will look at changes in position and attention in 
both two- and three-election periods. One should note, however, that for both the 
study of positions and attention, anticipatory behaviour is difficult to attribute to the 
new party. For the study of positions the notion of uniqueness has to be interpreted in 
a less strict way so that the chance of false positives is enlarged. For the study of 
attention, it is difficult to say whether the increased attention to the issue of the new 
party was a result of its anticipated entry or whether it led to its entry. It may be the 
case that, by increasing attention to the issue of the new party, established parties 
created issue space for the new party to exploit. Because cause and effect are 
observed simultaneously, they cannot be separated. The results of the study of 
anticipatory behaviour must therefore be interpreted with caution. 
3.5.1 Issue saliency in the electoral arena 
The standard method to measure party positions in the electoral arena is 
through the attention that they devote to issues in their election manifestos. The 
method of the manifesto research group, built on the saliency theory of competition, 
is often used in this field (Budge et al. 2001). This research distinguishes these effects 
in a more specific way. One has to distinguish the electoral positions that parties take 
from the issues that they devote attention to. One could still have employed the 
standard data set from the manifesto research group: the group has assigned every 
sentence in every election manifesto of every relevant party in every election since 
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the Second World War to one of 56 categories ranging from anti-imperialism to 
Marxist analysis. The categorisation scheme and the parties that are selected pose a 
problem. The parties selected by the manifesto research group are only the relevant 
parties in parliament. Parties that are too small and play no role in government 
formation are neglected. Moreover, the publicly available data set is limited to the 
period 1946-2003. This has two downsides: first it limits the number of new parties 
that can be studied. Out of the nineteen new parties in this study, only six are 
included.51 The limited number of cases also means that there are considerably fewer 
parties of which one can examine the reactions: on average 5.5 parties are in the data 
set, out of 8.9 established parties that are in parliament. Instead of the 169 new 
party/established party pairs under study here, only 33 of these pairs could be 
examined with the manifesto research group data. That is better than the two 
established parties that previous studies have focused on (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; 
Huijbrechts 2006; Meguid 2005, 2007). It is, however, this study’s goal to study all 
established parties. 
Another drawback is the coding scheme, which was developed in the 1980s, 
and which clearly reflects the politics of that period. There are no good categories for 
new political issues such as immigration, which is the key issue of three new parties 
studied here. The coding scheme hinges on two ideas: the measurement of positions 
and the measurement of attention. Therefore, many categories are divided into two: 
military positive and military negative, for instance. Some issues are, however, only 
coded from one side: anti-imperialism, for instance. This makes it difficult to measure 
changes in attention (independent of direction) for every party. The KNP, a pro-
colonisation party, can only be linked to increasing attention for anti-imperialism, 
because there is no pro-imperialism category. The categories seem ill adapted to 
study political attention independent of position. Therefore, another measure of 
attention in the electoral arena needs to be developed here. 
 
3.5.2 From election manifestos to measures of attention change 
In order to measure changes in attention, the same computer-assisted measure, 
developed by Louwerse (2011), as discussed above was used. The Louwerse method 
divides the manifesto text into paragraphs and assigns every paragraph to one of 21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The LPF, LN, SP, D66, DS’70 and PPR There are some curiosities here: the 
estimate for the SP in 1994 is based on the 1998 election manifesto.  
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categories on the basis of a dictionary approach and support vector machine. All 
election manifestos of all parties in the Dutch parliament between 1946 and 2010 
were collected. Most of these are collected and archived by the Documentation 
Centre Dutch Political Parties. Several manifestos were not in its collection. These 
were collected from secondary sources.52  
Levels of attention at different points in time will be compared: for instance, if 
a party entered parliament in 1963 (t=0), the level of attention in the elections before 
the new party entered (t=-1, in this example 1959) will be used as the pre-measure. 
The pre-measure is a measure of attention before the new party can have had an 
effect. The post-measure can be dependent on the operationalisation, the election 
after the election in which the new party entered (t=+1, in this example 1967), or the 
election in which it did (t=0).  
For the case-by-case analyses, the trend lines of the development between t=-
1, and t=+1 are studied to see what, if any, effect the new party had on the attention 
that established parties devote to issues. In contrast to the study of parliamentary 
attention, it is a question of seeing change or not. There are no patterns of change that 
could not be attributed to the entry of the new party, due to the possibility of 
anticipatory behaviour. The changes in attention are then compared to possible other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For several specific election manifestos, some problems existed: The SGP did not 
publish a full election manifesto before 1971. In 1967, they published a 24-point 
program. Before 1967 they only published a manifesto of principles, which was 
amended infrequently to keep up with current events. Still, these manifestos reflected 
the best knowledge of the positions and issue-attention of the party. For the CPN, no 
election manifestos are in the database of the DNPP (Documentatiecentrum 
Nederlandse Politieke Partijen/Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties) for the 
period 1959-1963, nor are there full election manifestos in the database of the IISG 
(Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis/International Institute for Social 
History). Therefore, different sources were employed: in this case several short 
leaflets that were in the IISG database. Three elections pose particular problems: the 
ones in 1972, 1982 and 2003. These were snap elections called within a year of the 
1971, 1981 and 2002 elections. In 1972, no party published a new election manifesto. 
Therefore, the 1977 election manifestos are used as the post-measurement. In 1982, 
most parties published full manifestos, and so therefore these were used. In 2003, 
most parties published small election pamphlets, in addition to the 2002 election 
manifestos. Therefore, the 2002 and 2003 election manifestos are used where 
appropriate as post-measurement. Two new parties pose some problems: for the CP 
the small ‘ten point program’ (with 48 individual policy proposals) is used instead of 
the longer elaboration of the program. For the measurement of position for the LPF, 
the lists of policy positions at the end of each chapter in Pim Fortuyn’s book (2002) 
were also included. 
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explanations: social, economic, or international developments may better explain the 
developments in attention. The final step is to assess which factors from those 
hypothesised above may be at play here. 
Both statistical analyses look at both the possibility of reactive and 
anticipatory behaviour. Changes are analysed in a three- and a two-election period: in 
order to see the reactive behaviour in response to a new party that entered parliament 
in t=0, the elections before the entry of a new party into parliament (t=-1) will be 
compared to the election after a new party entered parliament (t=+1). In order to see 
anticipatory behaviour, one can compare the level of attention in t=-1 to the level of 
attention in t=0. 
This part of the study uses two measures of change in attention: a relative 
measure of reactive change in electoral attention, and a relative measure of 
anticipatory change in electoral attention. These two measures are based on the same 
logic as the measures presented in the study of parliamentary attention: to measure 
the relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, the difference between 
the levels of attention before and after the new party entered, is divided by the sum of 
attention in the manifestos before and after the new party entered; and to measure the 
relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention, the difference between 
the levels of attention from the election before and in which the new party entered, is 
divided by the sum of attention in the manifestos from the elections before and in 
which the new party entered. 
As was done for the study of parliamentary attention, two different statistical 
analyses are run, one including only those changes in attention where a new party is 
present and one expanded statistical analysis in which every change in attention is 
included. In other words, the changes in attention of every established party’s 
manifesto, in every election year and on every issue were included in order to 
determine whether a new party focusing on its own issue causes a significant change 
in attention: one can attribute the changes in attention for a specific issue to the rise of 
a new party if the changes in attention differ significantly from those changes on 
other issues. 
An example can help to illustrate how the different measures are calculated. 
Table 3.8 presents the different levels of attention for the issue of immigration, the 
issue that the LPF owned, in the manifestos of 1998, 2002 and 2003. Looking at the  
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Table 3.8: attention on migration 1998-2002 

















CDA 2,1 4,8 4,5 +2,4 +0,4 +2.7 +0.4 
CU 4,4b 3,1 2,2 -2,2 -0,3 -1.3 -0.2 
D66 3,3 3,5 4,5 +1,2 +0,2 +0.2 +0.0 
GL 3,7 6,9 7,8 +4,1 +0,4 +3.2 +0.3 
PvdA 2,5 1,9 2,8 +0,3 +0,1 -0.6 -0.1 
SGP 2,1 3,9 3,9 +1,8 +0,3 +1.8 +0.3 
SP 6,3 4,5 5,5 -0,8 -0,1 -1.8 -0.2 
VVD 2,5 4,2 4,5 +2.0 +0,3 +1.7 +0.3 
Average 3,4 4,1 4,5 +1,1 +0,1 +0.7 +0.1 
a In 2003 many parties printed a short pamphlet and maintained their 2002 manifestos. 
In those cases the value for the 2002 is based on textual analysis of a combination of 
the 2002 and 2003 manifestos. 
b In 1998 the GPV and the RPF, which merged to form the CU in 2000, competed 
separately. The figure for 2002 is based on a textual analysis of a combination of the 
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relative measure of reactive change in electoral attention, one finds that most parties 
increase attention to this issue between 1998 and 2003. On average, the attention 
increases from 3.4 to 4.5%. The increase of the GL and the CDA are different in 
absolute terms (+4.1% and +2.4% respectively), but, in terms of the relative change 
in attention, the increases are exactly the same (+0.4). This is in relative terms, quite a 
sizeable increase. The relative measure of anticipatory change in electoral attention is 
calculated in the same way: most parties increased their attention between 1998 and 
2002 as well. One exception is the PvdA: it decreased attention by 0.6% (from 2.5 to 
1.9). This is a decrease of 0.1 in terms of the relative measure of anticipatory change 
in electoral attention. 
  There are two factors that complicate the study of election manifestos: the 
first problem (which was discussed above) is the analysis of parliamentary attention: 
as seen in section 3.4.5, there is a saturation effect. Second, the length of election 
manifestos has increased markedly over the years: as one can see in figure 3.4, the 
average length of election manifestos did not exceed 5,086 words before 1971. After 
1981, the average program was 24,030 words long: between 1967 and 1981 the 
length of the average manifesto has quintupled. A correlation analysis indicates that 
the relationship between the length of the manifesto and the publication year is 
significant (0.625 - significant at the 0.01-level). Koole (1992, 332-335) observed a 
major change in the way election manifestos were produced between 1946 and 1989. 
He mentions the increase in government responsibilities as one possible explanation 
for this pattern, and furthermore, the increase also coincided with a democratisation 
of the process of composing election manifestos (Koole 1992, 332-335). When 
interpreting results from small election manifestos, one should be cautious. One may 
observe larger shifts in attention for smaller manifestos, because in smaller 
manifestos a change of one paragraph has a much larger effect on the share of 
attention than in larger manifestos. Because manifesto size is related to election year, 
this pattern has an effect on the estimates for new parties entering parliament earlier, 
but not on new parties entering later. These shifts might be the result of a less fine-
grained measurement. In order to deal with this problem, the length of the two 
manifestos that are used, weights the cases in subsequent analyses. In this case, the 
sum of the square roots of the two manifestos is used in order to approximate a 
standard pattern of error. 
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 3.5.3 Measuring positions in the electoral arena 
There is a host of methods to measure changes in position. One can look at 
expert surveys, hand coding and computer assisted analyses of political texts based 
on different notions of how positions can be understood (Budge et al. 2001; Harmel 
& Svåsand 1997; Laver & Garry 2000; Slapin 2008; Pellikaan 2004). These 
measures are all based on a shared notion of political position; they all focus on a 
notion of political positions in terms of a position in a political space. All party 
positions on a particular issue can be reduced to a single (or several) line(s) of 
conflict, and parties move along that dimension.  
The goal of the measure that is developed here is to be as sure as possible 
that the observed change can be attributed to the entry of the new party. To achieve 
this, one has to look at individual party positions on specific policies and not party 
positions on issue dimensions. The question should not be “did the PvdA move to 
the right in response to the entry of the LPF?” but “did the PvdA take over specific 
policies?”. Many scholars of radical rightwing political parties have looked at these 
kinds of reactions (Downs 2001, 127; Schain 2002, 237-238; Heinisch 2003, 103-
109), but it has not been applied yet to new parties in a more general study. 
 
3.5.4 From election manifestos to measures of position change 
The study of party positions in election manifestos focuses on changes in the 
party positions on those proposals that are unique to a new party. This study 
employs an adaptation of Pellikaan’s (2003; 2004; 2007; extended by Otjes 2008) 
confrontational method.53 The method is based on hand coding of election 
manifestos. Two notions play a central role in measuring position change: 
uniqueness and agreement. The measures that will be presented here are based on 
programmatic agreement and disagreement between political parties. The central 
question is “do parties tend to take the same policy positions as the new party or do 
they oppose the policies of the new party?” For each of the unique policy proposals 
that a new party makes in their election manifesto, one can determine whether the 
established parties agree or disagree with it, and whether they changed their opinion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Pellikaan measures party positions on a range of issue dimensions by looking at 
whether particular pre-conceived statements appear in the election programme of a 
particular party, or are directly contradicted. Pellikaan formulates these statements on 
the basis of an expert assessment of which issues were controversial in the party 
manifestos and the campaign. 
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on that proposal over time. One can aggregate these measures to see whether parties 
move to agree or to disagree with a new party in general.  
The measures focus on proposals that are unique to the new political party. 
This is done in order to ensure that it is possible to attribute the changes in the 
positions of the established party to the new party. Only those policies are selected 
for coding that the new party was the sole advocate of before it entered parliament. 
These are the statements for which one can be most sure that changes in established 
parties’ positions are attributable to the new party. In this way, type-I errors are 
minimised: a change in an election manifesto of an established party is only 
attributed to a new party if it is as certain as possible that the specific issue was not 
in any manifesto of an established party. Due to this cautious approach, however, 
there may be a large number of type-II errors: statements may be excluded because 
they may have been based on another manifesto, while actually they were copied 
from the new party’s manifesto. 
This measure is different from the measure used in the parliamentary arena, 
which focuses on the positions of established parties on the policy issue of the new 
party. The method that is used here allows one to focus on changes on those 
positions that are truly unique to the new party. Tracing the effect of a new party 
with such precision is not possible in the parliamentary arena.54  
 The coding process consists of three steps: first, the unitisation of the new 
party’s manifesto into separate proposals. The basic rule of thumb is that if a 
manifesto consists of bullet points every bullet point is a separate item. If two 
distinct points are made in the same bullet point, these two are divided into separate 
statements. If a manifesto does not consist of bullet points the different proposals 
made in one section are identified as separate items. Earlier research has shown that 
there can be considerable variance between coders in a unitisation process of 
election manifestos, indicating that in terms of replicability unitisation may be a key 
weakness of hand coded research (Mikhaylov, Laver & Benoit 2008), therefore the 
explicit rules mentioned above were followed.  
Next, the manifestos of the old parties from before the first election before 
the entry of the new party into parliament (t=-1) and from the election in which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 One could study how established parties vote on the proposals of the new party, but 
if the new party is in opposition, voting patterns on its proposals are structured by the 
difference between the opposition and the coalition.  
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new party entered parliament (t=0) are coded to identify whether the proposals of 
the new party are mentioned here; this was done in order to determine whether 
proposals were unique to the new party. For each of the established parties, three 
codes are possible per policy proposal of the new party: agreement (+1), neutral (0) 
or disagreement (-1).  
And third, the manifestos of the old parties from the first election after the 
entry of a new party (t=+1) are coded on the unique proposals. This was done to see 
how established parties responded to the policies of the new party. Again, codes 
could be agreement (+1), neutral (0) or disagreement (-1). In the coding process, 
agreement means that a party expresses its support for the same policy or a similar 
policy. When the PVV proposed a temporary ban on building mosques for five 
years, any measure that was supposed to limit the building of mosques was scored 
as a positive statement. The SGP wrote that it would not support policies that 
promoted the building of mosques and opposed building large-scale mosques. This 
is counted as a positive code. A negative code is any opposition to a policy or 
proposing the opposite policy: a number of parties have proposed closing the 
European Parliament. If any party proposed extending this parliament's powers this 
was coded positively.  
This is a rather 'liberal' interpretation of a party's manifesto, which has two 
effects: first, this method may overestimate the effect of new political parties. Some 
changes may be attributed to the new party while they, because of the liberal 
interpretation, have nothing to do with the new party. Second, a larger number of 
proposals may be eliminated as non-unique, while they are unique to the new party, 
because the items were scored in such a liberal fashion. This can have an effect in 
both directions: on the one hand, this may underestimate the effects of new parties 
(because they have less unique proposals to be scored on). On the other hand, if 
there is a change on a unique proposal, its effect will be larger, because the number 
of unique proposals is smaller.  
The analysis will be conducted in three ways: the individual case studies 
examine the data in-depth, while statistical analyses are used to find general patterns 
both in terms of anticipation and reaction. The individual case-by-case analyses 
look at the development of the summed measures of agreement. The goal of these 
individual case-by-case analyses is to ensure that the observed developments in 
unique proposals can be attributed to the entry of the new party. Therefore, for each 
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individual new party, these analyses focus on whether there are consistent patterns 
in the reactions of the established parties. To achieve this, the measures of 
agreement will be examined and their development will be traced over time. These 
measures of agreement are calculated in the following way: the first step is the 
elimination of non-unique proposals. All proposals made by the new party, which 
had a positive code at t=-1 or t=0 in at least one manifesto of an established party 
are eliminated; the second step is to calculate the measure of agreement per 
established party for t=-1 and t = +1. This is the sum of the positive and negative 
codes divided by the number of unique proposals. In other words, this is the extent 
to which this established party agreed or disagreed with the unique proposals of the 
new party. In this measure positive and negative codes cancel eachother out: if a 
party agreed with twenty and disagreed with twenty unique proposals of a new party 
the value of the measure of agreement is zero, which would have been the same if it 
agreed and disagreed with no unique proposal.55 Since these proposals are unique to 
the new party, change in this agreement can be attributed to the entry of the new 
party. 
Two measures are used in the statistical analysis: a measure of anticipatory 
change in electoral position and a measure of reactive change in electoral position. 
The measure of reactive change in electoral position compares the measures of 
agreement (calculated above) over time: the measure of reactive change in electoral 
position-score is the difference between the measures of agreement at t=-1 and 
t=+1.  
The measure of anticipatory change in electoral position is calculated in a 
similar way, but with a more 'liberal' notion of uniqueness: the first step is the 
elimination of non-unique proposals. Only those proposals, which had a positive 
code at t=-1, as opposed to either t=-1 or t=0, are eliminated; next the average 
position per established party at t = 0 is calculated. This is the sum of the positive 
and negative codes divided by the number of unique proposals. In other words, this 
is the extent to which this party agreed or disagreed with the unique proposals of the 
new party. Since these proposals are unique to the new party, this agreement is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This cancelling out is a feature of the confrontiational method (Pellikaan et al. 
2003; 2004; 2007), but that is no excuse. Alternative measures which treated negative 
and positive codes equally did not yield significantly more meaningful results that the 
measure employed here. 
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Table 3.9: a fictional example LPF and VVD 1998-2003 
VVD # LPF 
1998 2002 2003 a 
1 Limit migration because of family reunification. +1 +1 +1 
2 Abolish the European Parliament. -1 -1 -1 
3 Re-introduce the municipal police. -1 0 0 
4 Keep police to performance targets. 0 0 +1 
5 Scan all containers that enter the Netherlands for 
drugs. 
0 0 0 
a 2003 is the t=+1 –year, because the VVD only published a short pamphlet in 
this year. Therefore, the codes of 2002 and 2003 are taken together for the t=+1. 
Because of the definition of uniqueness, however, every proposal that has a 
positive code for 2002 is eliminated. 
 
attributed to the entry of the new party. The measure of anticipatory change in 
electoral position-score is the difference between the average positions at t=-1 and 
t=0. 
 In this case, too, an example may help to illustrate how the coding process 
works. Table 3.9 lists five policy proposals made by the LPF in its 2002 election 
manifesto and published in Fortuyn’s book Puinhopen van Acht Jaar Paars 
(Fortuyn 2002). These five policy proposals are only a fraction of the 139 proposals 
made by the LPF in both the manifesto and the book, so this is a reduced example. 
Table 3.9 also shows the positions of the VVD on the selected policy proposals in 
its 1998 election manifesto, in its 2002 manifesto and in its 2003 election pamphlet. 
The particular policy proposals were selected to show the diversity of possible 
codes and coding configurations. Three kinds of codes are possible: a positive code 
(+1) indicates that the VVD made a similar proposal as the LPF did in 2002. For 
instance, the LPF proposed to try and limit immigration from family formation; the 
VVD did the same in 1998, 2002 and 2003. However, a negative code (-1) might be 
assigned as well: this would indicate that the VVD made a proposal that ran counter 
to the LPF’s proposal, or that they said that no changes should be made in particular 
policy fields. The VVD, for example, sought to expand the powers of the European 
Parliament in both the 1998, 2002 and 2003 manifestos in opposition to the LPF’s 
proposal to abolish it. A neutral code (0) indicates that the VVD said nothing on the 
subject, or was vague or ambiguous. In 2002 and 2003 for instance, the VVD made 
no mention of moving the responsibility for the police to the municipal level.  
 In the individual case-by-case analysis, the focus is on the measures of agreement. 
The first step is to eliminate all proposals that have a positive code for 1998 and 
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2002. These are not unique to the LPF: the VVD made these proposals itself. In this 
case that would be only proposal #1. In reality, 80% of the LPF manifesto was 
eliminated because one or more of the other parties made a similar proposal in 1998 
or 2002. The remaining proposals are used to calculate the measures of reactive and 
anticipatory change. In 1998, the VVD disagreed with the LPF on two issues (-0.5). 
In 2002, it changed its position on one issue (-0.25), and in 2003 the VVD agreed 
on one position and disagreed on one: an average position of zero. To calculate the 
measure of reactive change in electoral position, these scores are then subtracted 
from each other: this means that the VVD has a value of +0.5. The measure of 
anticipatory change in electoral position-score uses a similar procedure: one out of 
five positions is eliminated because it is not unique (#1) and then the difference is 
calculated between the average position in 1998 (-0.5) and 2002 (-0.25). This is an 
increase of +0.25. 
Finally, one specific problem needs to be examined: the relationship 
between the number of unique proposals and the extent to which established parties 
react. In table 3.10, one can see data on the length of election manifestos (in terms 
of numbers of proposals) and the extent to which new parties' proposals are unique. 
One can see that election manifestos of new parties are relatively short: on average 
they contain only 113 proposals. On average, less than 29% of a new party’s 
programme policy proposals were unique (if one includes both t=-1 and t=0). No 
party exceeds a level of uniqueness of 54% of the manifesto.56 Several outliers exist 
on the other side of the scale: parties with a limited number of unique proposals. A 
weak, insignificant relationship exists between the number of unique proposals and 
the extent to which established parties respond to a new party (Pearson's r of -0.10 - 
not significant).57 Parties that propose a small number of unique proposals can elicit 
all kinds of reactions: from imitation to differentiation. The more unique proposals a 
party proposes, the less extreme the reactions become: long programmes elicit less  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This is the uniqueness of the BP. 
57 Only if one treats imitation and differentiation in the same way (i.e. count any 
reaction to a new party's policies whether positive or negative equally), can one see a 
significant relationship (Pearson's r of -0.14 - significant at the 0.1-level). The 
relationship between the SMOG and this measure which treats imitation and 
differentiation in the same way is stronger and more significant (Pearson's r of -0.17 - 
significant at the 0.05-level). 
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Table 3.10: proposals per new party 
Unique New Party Total 
t=-1 t=0 and t=-1 
KNP 37 16 43% 14 38% 
PSP 23 14 61% 9 39% 
GPV 62 34 54% 31 50% 
BP 22 14 64% 12 54% 
D66 92 64 70% 31 34% 
PPR 78 36 46% 12 15% 
DS70 90 44 49% 22 24% 
NMP 23 5 22% 2 9% 
RKPN 73 - - 18 25% 
RPF 295 143 49% 98 33% 
EVP 366 92 25% 84 23% 
CP 48 13 27% 12 25% 
AOV 141 54 38% 31 22% 
SP 117 44 38% 31 27% 
U55+ 117 31 27% 14 12% 
LN 101 19 19% 11 11% 
LPF 139 61 43% 33 24% 
PvdD 227 127 56% 107 47% 
PVV 107 43 40% 29 27% 
Total is the total number of proposals; unique gives the number of policy proposals 
that were unique, when comparing the new party's manifesto to the established 
parties' manifestos of the election before entry of the new party (t=-1) and the election 
the new party entered (t=0).  
 
imitation and differentiation. Both a mathematical and a substantive explanation 
exist for this phenomenon: mathematically, parties with a longer programme have a 
larger divisor, and therefore the values of the measures of change become lower. 
Substantively, parties with more unique proposals have a more detailed programme, 
and the more detailed a party’s proposals are, the smaller the chance that another 
party copies them in their own manifesto. This means that the level of detail of a 
program may matter. As a proxy for the level of detail the complexity of the 
language is used (the more complex the language, the more detailed the program): 
this is measured by the SMOG (McLaughlin 1969).58 There is a weak negative 
relationship between the level of complexity and reactions (-0.06 - not significant). 
Given the weakness of these relationships, there is no reason to believe that this 
phenomenon biases the results directly. Still, to err on the side of caution, it may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The Simple Measure of Gobbledygook: 
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prudent to see whether relationships found are not the result of parties that have 
only a limited number of unique proposals. This number of proposals gives a very 
limited empirical basis for conclusions. For these parties, one may find 
comparatively high or low scores, which are due to the length of the programme 
instead of the number of reactions. This problem is addressed by running the 
analyses with and without these outliers to test the robustness of the relation.59  
 
3.6 Measuring independent variables 
There are two clusters of independent variables that need to be 
distinguished: independent variables that serve to examine the formulated 
hypothesis, and independent variables that serve to examine alternative explanations 
of development in attention. The latter will be used in case-by-case analyses. 
The new party activity hypothesis explains patterns in attention of 
established parties by the patterns in attention of new parties. For the parliamentary 
arena, one can look at the percentage of the new party’s speech that concerned their 
own issue, and for the electoral arena, one can look at the percentage of the party's 
own election manifesto that concerned the party’s own issue.  
In order to examine the challenger hypothesis and the mobiliser hypothesis, 
all new parties will be divided into mobilisers and challengers. This will be the 
subject of chapter 4, where each new party will be classified on the basis of the new 
parties' histories, with a particular interest in key characteristics of challenger 
parties, such as orientation towards a particular party in electoral campaigns, similar 
electoral appeal, and similar political ideology. Moreover, the challenged parties 
were identified for each challenger in chapter 4 as well. 
The ideological proximity hypothesis explains patterns in reactions by 
reference to the distance between two parties. Different measures will be used in the 
parliamentary arena and in the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena, the 
distance between the new and the established party on the line of conflict on the 
issue of the new party will be employed.60 In the electoral arena, the similarities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 These outliers are the NMP and PSP. 
60 For some parties, no comparison could be made between the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ 
spatial models. Here, a higher level (systemic) model was used: this is the case for the 
GPV, BP, KNP, PSP, AOV/U55+, LN and CP. For the RKPN, there was too little 
information to place DS’70 and the PPR: these are also inferred from systemic 
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between the entire programme of the new party and the established party, before the 
entry of the new party, is used: the sum of all positive and negative codes at t=-1. 
The new party size hypothesis is examined by using the percentage of votes 
that the new party has obtained in the election in which it entered parliament. This 
means that for each period party size is treated equally: one may argue that in the 
1960s the entry of a party with seven seats was much more significant than in the 
1990s: the shift of a view seats was seen as important. However one may also 
propose that as electoral markets become more volatile parties need to become more 
responsive. The relative stability of the 1940s required less responsiveness than the 
instability of the 1990s. Therefore this variable is operationalised in terms of the 
percentage of votes and not made relative to electoral performance. It is also 
important to note that both in the anticipatory and the reactive models in the 
electoral arena, the percentage of the vote of the new party that the new party won 
in the first election in which it won seats in parliament is used. This is counter-
intuitive for the anticipatory analysis, because the temporal order of causality is 
violated: the election results came after the anticipatory behaviour. The assumption 
here is that the best estimate of anticipated size of the new party is its actual size.61 
Still, when interpreting these results for anticipatory behaviour, caution is 
warranted.  
The new party organisation hypothesis looks at the internal organisation of 
the new party. Party organisation cannot be measured directly, and therefore a proxy 
is used. Different proxies are used for the two different arenas. In the parliamentary 
arena, the level of organisation of the new party is specified by the extent to which a 
new party has organised their own MPs: the percentage of the new party’s MPs that 
is still a member of the party after four years. This is the stability of the 
parliametnary party. In the electoral arena, this is measured in terms of the extent to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
models. Because there are no votes from before 1952, the data for the KNP is based 
on a model of the period 1952-1956. 
61 There is a significant correlation between expected, polled party size two months 
before the election and a new party's share of the votes in the election. One should 
note, however, that this could only be examined for the four parties for which polling 
data is available (PVV, PvdD, LPF and LN). This does not mean, however, that these 
polls correctly predict the size of the new parties. These polls are on average 3% off, 
but they do predict correctly which parties are larger and which are smaller. The 
relationship is mainly caused by the fact that the LPF scores considerably better than 
the other three. 
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Table 3.11: sociological and economic alternative explanations 
New Party Measure Notes 
BP Importance of agriculture Agriculture as percentage of GDP 
NMP Inflation Inflation of consumer prices 
CP Migration Non-Dutch migration 
SP Unemployment Registered unemployment May/June 
LPF/PVV Migration Non-Western migration 
PvdD Importance of agriculture Agriculture, forestry and fishery as 
percentage of GDP 
PvdD Extent of Q-Fever Number of sheep in agriculture 
 
which new parties have organised their own voters: the member/electorate ratio. 
This ratio is often used to express in how far parties are able to organise their 
electorate (Scarrow 2000).62 Again, the same measure is used for anticipatory and 
reactive behaviour and the same interpretative caution is warranted as above. The 
new party government hypothesis is tested by a simple dichotomous variable: in 
government or in opposition during the first parliamentary term after the new party 
entered parliament. This cannot be anticipated before a new party enters parliament, 
so this variable is not tested for the model examining anticipation. 
The established party performance hypothesis requires special attention: 
established party performance is examined by looking at the percentage of votes an 
established party lost in the election in which a new party entered, as compared to 
the votes it had in the previous election: if a party, which has 4 percent of the votes 
loses 2 percentage points of the votes, it will react in the same way as a party that 
loses 20 percentage points of its 40 percent of the votes, because both parties lose 
half of their votes. This reflects the fact that the relative electoral position of an 
established party determines its reaction. In the statistical analyses, these 
relationships are examined as an interaction relationship, in the way specified by 
(Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006). The question is: does the presence of a new party 
significantly influence the general effects of electoral performance? These general 
effects are recalculated for the analysis of anticipatory behaviour, so that when one 
looks at the established parties’ electoral performance, one looks at their 
performance in the elections before the new party entered. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The membership data is taken from the DNPP. Note that the DNPP does not have 
membership figures for the NMP, BP, CP, KNP, and RKPN. Therefore, these parties 
are excluded from this analysis, leaving only twelve new parties and 101 new-
established party pairs. Parties report membership data to the DNPP. 
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As for the second cluster of variables (the alternative explanations, which 
will be used in the case-by-case analyses), relevant social and economic indicators 
will be employed, as well as historical information about international and national 
political developments. Only the former are real variables in the canonical sense of 
the word. All of the variables are economic or social statistics obtained from the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). They are listed in table 3.11.  
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Chapter 4: Introducing new parties 
 
“In the beautiful month of May each bird lays an egg and each Dutchman 




The Dutch political system is known for its openness. The liberal journalist 
Doe Hans wrote before the Second World War that in May every Dutchman founds 
his own political party, just like birds lay eggs. While not entirely true, the 
Netherlands has seen a large number of new parties running in elections: between 
1918 and 1940, 125 parties participated in elections, and after 1946, 173 individual 
parties attempted to enter the Dutch parliament (Kiesraad 2012): from the 
conservative liberal VVD, one of the big five Dutch political parties, the CDA, 
which has been in government for more than two decades since its foundation in 
1977, to the LPF of the maverick politician Fortuyn and the sectarian IKB 
(Internationale Communistenbond/International Communist League). Not all of 
these parties will be studied here; this study will focus on nineteen new parties that 
are selected because they form truly new parties (as defined in section 3.2). A full 
list of parties that ran in elections since 1946 can be found in appendix 6. 
This chapter has three goals: it will introduce each of the new political 
parties, it will discuss the context of their developments, and it will classify each of 
the new political parties in terms of three categorisation schemes. These schemes 
categorise new parties in terms of by whom they are formed, what new parties are 
formed to accomplish, and on which issues new parties focus. Moreover, this 
chapter will briefly introduce the Dutch party system and those established parties 
that already existed in 1946.  
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Table 4.1: typology of new party formations 
Type Definition Example 
Transformation A party formed by transformation is a party that has been founded 
by (nearly) all individuals who had leading, national political 
offices in one established party.  
Groen! 
Marriage A party formed by marriage is a party that has been founded by 
the merger of at least two established parties. 
CU 
Divorce A party formed by divorce is a party that has been founded in 
either one of two ways: first if it is founded by at least one 
individual who had a leading, national political office in one 
established party with parliamentary representation. Or second, if 
it is founded by an organised group, which took a major role in 
the internal debate in one established political party.  
PVV 




4.2 Three typologies 
This section will introduce the three categorisation schemes in which new 
parties will be classified in this chapter. 
 
4.2.1 Party formation 
Section 2.3 already gave a definition of what a new political party is and 
when they would be included in this study. Following Mair (1999), this study 
distinguishes between parties formed by birth, by divorce, by transformation and by 
marriage. This study focuses on the effects of political parties in the first period they 
have MPs in parliament, but only when these new parties are neither a 
transformation of a party that was already in parliament, nor a merger of parties that 
were in parliament before. It may prove prudent to provide rigorous definitions of 
these categories. These definitions are listed in table 4.1. In order to be formed by 
divorce, transformation, or merger, there must be a link in the personnel of the 
established party and the new party. This study follows Barnea and Rahat (2011) in 
operationalising the link between the new and established parties in terms of their 
personnel. The definition of established party flows naturally from the definition of 
the new party: any party that has been in parliament for more than one session is an 
established party. This means that many of the new parties studied here become 
established parties in later parts of this study. The GPV (Gereformeerd Politiek 
Verbond/Reformed Political League) entered parliament in 1963 and merged into 
the CU (ChristenUnie/ChristianUnion) in 2000. This party is a new party in one part  
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of the study, but it becomes one of the established parties in the study of twelve 
other new parties. Previous studies selected particular established parties for their 
study (see paragraph 3.2). 
 
4.2.2 Party goals 
A second measure that has to be operationalised is the difference between 
challengers and mobilisers described in section 2.8.2, a distinction drawn from 
Rochon (1985). This study seeks to systematically integrate, elaborate and further 
develop this approach by classifying all new Dutch political parties into a single 
classification scheme. The study attempts to contribute by using more rigid 
definitions and classification conditions than previous studies. In order to categorise 
these new parties, table 4.2 offers a scheme with three conditions. The conditions 
are drawn from Rochon’s description of challengers, which he defines as follows: a 
challenger is a new party that attacks an established party for abandoning the 
ideology that it used to have, or the interests that it used to represent. The distinction 
between challenger and mobiliser can be divided into three aspects. The first aspect 
is the political communication of the new party: is it oriented towards one party 
(challenger) or not (mobiliser)? The second aspect is the ideology of the new party: 
is it similar to another party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? And the third aspect is 
the electoral appeal of the new party: is it oriented towards the same social group as 
another party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? If a party meets two of the three 
requirements, it should be considered a challenger. Any other party would be a 
mobiliser party. It is important to note that there is an assumption that in addition to 
having a new ideology, mobilisers will make new proposals. As seen in paragraph 
3.5.4 the extent to which these new parties really offered new proposals should not 
Table 4.2: Rochon’s typology of new party goals operationalised 
Characteristic Challenger Mobiliser 
Political 
Communication 
Oriented at one established political party. Oriented at no particular 
party. 
Political Ideology Similar to an ideology one established party 
has or used to have. 
Not similar to an ideology of 
an established party. 
Electoral Appeal Same social group as one established party 
used target or targets. 
Appeals to no social group or 
to a social group that is not 
appealed to by established 
parties. 
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be overestimated. In the case-by-case discussion, the classification for every party is 
discussed, and the scores of all parties on all these characteristics are shown in table 
4.2 and discussed in section 4.5. 
 
4.2.3 Party’s issue 
As this study seeks to determine the effects new parties have on the attention 
that established parties devote to their issue, it is necessary to assess which new 
parties have ownership of which issues. Most current research on issue ownership 
looks at which issues parties are active or competent on in the eyes of the voter 
(Van der Brug 2004; Walgrave & De Swert 2007). This method cannot be applied 
here, because such questions were not asked for all new parties included in this 
study. Even if there is an electoral study available for the year in which the new 
party entered parliament, these parties are often neglected by electoral researchers, 
because they only include relevant parties in their studies.  
Four measures will be used to triangulate the issues that new parties 'own': 
the election manifesto of the new party, the motions that it proposed, its 
parliamentary speeches, and the historical background of the party. The most basic 
notion is that, if a new party owns an issue, this issue will feature prominently in its 
election manifesto. Research shows that there is a relationship between the issue a 
party owns and the main issues in their election manifestos (Walgrave & De Swert 
2007). It may, however, be that for strategic reasons, parties talk about different 
issues in their election manifesto than they actually do in the campaign. So, in order 
to avoid misassignment, in some cases different issues were selected on basis of 
their parliamentary work, both in terms of motions and parliamentary speech, and 
historical descriptions of the party's focus. The precise measurement of these 
variables is discussed in sections 3.4.3, 3.4.8 and 3.5.2. 
 
4.3 The parties and party system in 1946: the baseline 
In the 1946 elections, one can see which parties existed before the entry of 
new parties into the system. The 1946 elections were the first parliamentary 
elections after the Second World War. Several parties had been re-founded or 
reorganised after the war, but the basic pre-war party system and their social 
organisation in terms of pillars remained. The parties that took part in the 1946  
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Table 4.3: established parties 1946 
Name 
Dutch English Abb. 
Ideology Seats 
(1946) 





CPN Communism 10 
Christelijk-Historische Unie Christian Historical Union CHU Protestant conservatism 8 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde 
Partij 
Reformed Political Party SGP Orthodox Protestantism 2 
Partij van de Vrijheid Freedom Party PvdV Conservative liberalism 6 
Katholieke Volkspartij Catholic People’s Party KVP Catholic 
Christian-democracy 
32 
Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party PvdA Social-democracy 29 
 
elections are listed in table 4.3. This parapgraph offers a brief description of the 
parties that were established parties in 1946 
The ARP (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij/Anti-Revolutionary Party) was formed 
in 1879 (Koole 1995, 172). The ARP’s ideology can be described as conservative 
Protestantism, which combines conservative positions such as support for the 
monarchy and opposition to decolonisation with a Protestant interpretation of moral 
issues. It was the first mass party in the Netherlands with a membership base, a 
manifesto, parliamentary discipline and an extra-parliamentary organisation (Koole 
1995, 17). The ARP was also the first party to be part of a network of societal 
organisations. In the post-war period, all Dutch parties had this kind of societal 
network, known as “zuilen” or pillars (Koole 1995, 34-35). The ARP-pillar included 
the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands). 
The party drew its support from this base (Lijphart 1968, 36). Although the party 
never received more than 20% of the votes, it had a major influence on Dutch 
politics, both in pioneering models of societal organisations, such as pillarisation 
and the mass party model, and in playing a major role in Dutch governments before 
the Second World War. 
The CHU (Christelijk-Historische Unie/Christian Historical Union) was 
formed in 1908 as a merger of several parties which had split away from the ARP or 
which had formed independently as local support bases of conservative Protestant 
MPs (Koole 1995, 114; Van Spanning 2001, 115-119). These parties had split from 
the ARP because of ideological, personal, religious and organisational reasons 
(Koole 1995, 100, 113). The CHU drew its voters from Nederlands Hervormde 
Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church), the main Protestant Church (Lijphart 1968, 36). 
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Like the ARP, the CHU was a medium-sized party, which participated in most 
coalition cabinets between 1908 and 1977. 
Individuals who were aligned with the Gereformeerde Gemeenten 
(Reformed Congregations), a conservative split from the Nederlands Hervormde 
Kerk formed the SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij/Reformed Political Party) 
in 1918. The party was open to orthodox Christians from different churches. The 
SGP adhered to an orthodox Protestant ideology: 63 the right to govern was granted 
to the Dutch King by God, policy should be based on Biblical commandments, and 
women and men have different social roles, which should also be reflected in their 
political rights (Koole 1995, 128-129). The SGP has a small but consistent social 
base of around 2% of the Dutch population (Koole 1995, 129). 
The KVP (Katholieke Volkspartij/Catholic People’s Party) was formed in 
1946. Its founders had been member of the RKSP (Rooms Katholieke 
Staatspartij/Roman Catholic Political Party) before the Second World War (Koole 
1995, 165). Catholics form a large religious minority in the Netherlands that had 
faced formal and social discrimination (Koole 1995, 152). During the late 1800s and 
the early 1900s, the Catholics began to organise politically. When the Catholic party 
was re-launched after the Second World War, the founders sought to renew its 
ideological profile (Koole 1995, 164-166). Still, the party remained a party for 
Catholic voters (Lijphart 1968, 36; Jong, Van der Kolk & Voerman 2011). In terms 
of the classification employed above, the move from RKSP to KVP can be 
understood as a transformation (Lipschits 1982, 44). The ideological profile of the 
KVP was Christian-democratic, based on Catholic social principles. It supported the 
formation of a welfare state and corporatist economic management. This was 
combined with an emphasis on moral and religious issues. After the 1946 elections, 
the KVP formed a coalition cabinet with the social democrats in order to implement 
these social-economic reforms. 
The PvdV (Partij van de Vrijheid/Freedom Party) was formed in 1946. It 
had personal and organisational ties to the conservative liberal LSP (Liberale 
Staatspartij/Liberal Political Party) that existed before the Second World War 
(Lipschits 1982, 43). The PvdV had a conservative liberal ideology, emphasising 
individual liberty and limited government. The conservative liberals were part of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The term orthodox is used here to refer to a bibliocratic political ideology, which 
holds that government policy should be based on a strict interpretation of scripture. 
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looser network of neutral organisations. These did not truly constitute a pillar. The 
electoral support of the liberals fluctuated over time. Its voters belonged to the 
middle class voters and to latitudinarian currents within the Nederlands Hervormde 
Kerk. In 1948, the PvdV had merged with a liberal split from the PvdA to form the 
VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie/People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy). The new formation retained the same ideological orientation and 
social base (Koole 1995, 292).  
The PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid/Labour Party) was formed in 1946 as a 
merger of three parties: the socialist SDAP (Sociaal-Democratische 
Arbeiderspartij/Social democratic Workers' Party), the progressive Christian CDU 
(Christelijk-Democratische Unie/Christian-Democratic Union) and the progressive 
liberal VDB (Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond/Freethinking Democratic League), as 
well as individuals from the Catholic resistance movement Christofoor and the 
CHU (Lipschits 1982, 44). The founders of the PvdA sought to break through the 
pillarised societal organisation (Koole 1995, 48). The party anticipated an electoral 
breakthrough in 1946, by uniting progressives from all pillars, but instead, the PvdA 
won less than its predecessors had done in 1937. The party itself maintained ties 
with the organisations of the social democratic pillar. It was supported by working 
class voters from latitudinarian currents within the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk 
(Koole 1995, 224). Ideologically, the party is social democratic, emphasising the 
welfare state and government control over economic development. After the 1946 
elections, the PvdA became the junior partner in a coalition cabinet with the 
Christian-democratic KVP. 
The CPN (Communistische Partij Nederland/Communist Party of the 
Netherlands) was formed in 1909 as a leftwing split from the main social 
democratic party SDAP (Koole 1995, 254). It was originally named Social 
Democratic Party. After the Russian Revolution, it aligned with the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and adopted the name Communist Party. During the 
interwar period the party was small and isolated. During the German occupation, 
(after initial hesitation) it played a major role in the resistance movement (Koole 
1995, 261-262), and after the War, the party was rewarded for this electorally, 
although it remained politically isolated (Koole 1995, 263; Verrips 1995). 
At the level of the party system, three elements must be recognised: first, in 
terms of electoral competition, the Netherlands of 1946 was a typical case of closed 
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competition. Each party had its own social base: Catholics voted for the KVP, 
Protestant voters aligned themselves with the CHU, ARP and SGP, depending on 
their particular religious persuasion. The secular working class supported the PvdA 
or the CPN and the secular middle class supported the VVD.  
Second, in terms of the patterns of cabinet formation, there had been 
alternating governments formed by either the religious parties (RKSP, CHU and 
ARP) or the liberals between 1900 and 1918. As suffrage was extended, the liberal 
parties needed the support of the social democrats to obtain parliamentary 
majorities.64 After 1918, there was a permanent religious majority. Therefore RKSP, 
CHU and ARP formed the core of every governing coalition (Koole 1995, 40). 
During the economic crisis of the 1930s, the cabinet was extended with liberal 
parties (Koole 1995, 37), and in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War cabinet 
cooperation also included the social democrats. After the Second World War the 
pattern of cabinet formation changed: social democratic and Christian-democratic 
parties formed a coalition cabinet. Those two parties formed the main core of all 
cabinets between 1946 and 1959; combinations of the ARP, CHU or VVD joined 
them. 
And third, in terms of the dimensionality of the political space, there were 
two major divisions in Dutch politics: between religious and secular parties, and 
between parties that favoured government planning and parties that favoured a free 
market. Both these dimensions concern the extent to which government should 
interfere with social life: the religious parties favoured a moral state, which 
intervened into people’s personal lives, and the secular parties favoured a neutral 
state, which did not intervene into the private sphere. The economically leftwing 
parties supported government intervention in the economy and the economically 
rightwing parties oppose government intervention in the economy.65 The 
constellation of parties in this space has been characterised as the Dutch triangle (De 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 This was also reflected in voting patterns in the two-round electoral system for 
parliament. At that time the Netherlands had an electoral system akin to the current 
French system. In the second round, the main divide often was between secular and 
religious parties (Jong, Van der Kolk and Voerman 2011). 
65 Both these divisions were related to the terms left and right. In the early twentieth 
century the terms left and right were tied to the division between secular (left) and 
religious (right), but by the 1950s, these terms would change their meaning to those 
who favoured limited government (right) and an interventionist government (left) in 
economic matters (Koole 1995). 
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Beus, van Doorn & de Rooy 1993): the PvdA and the CPN were secular and 
leftwing on both issues. The PvdV was secular and rightwing. The SGP was 
religious and rightwing. The KVP was a religious party with centrist positions on 
the economic dimension. The CHU and the ARP were religious parties with 
traditionally more rightwing positions on economic issues.66  
 
4.4 Nineteen new parties 
The following sections will sketch the history of several individual new 
parties and categorise them in the schemes proposed above. 
 
4.4.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics 
The KNP (Katholieke Nationale Partij/Catholic National Party) was the first 
new party that entered parliament after the Second World War. It is a classical 
example of a challenger and a party formed by divorce, in this case from the KVP.  
The KNP was formed in 1948 as the list-Welter (Koole 1995, 185). The 
KNP was founded by Charles Welter, who had been minister of Colonial Affairs 
two times in 1925 and between 1937 and 1941 for the Catholic RKSP (Tomassen 
2003, 51). Until 1946, he had been a senator for the KVP. The issue that split 
Welter from the KVP was the independence of Indonesia, one of the most important 
issues in Dutch politics after the Second World War (Tomassen 2003, 51). The KVP 
supported greater autonomy for Indonesia, under pressure of the PvdA. In the view 
of Welter, this could not be united with the Dutch constitutional order (Tomassen 
2003, 53). In addition to Indonesian independence, Welter was also uneasy about 
the KVP’s cooperation with the PvdA, specifically on economic matters (Koole 
1995, 185; Tomassen 2003, 54). Welter led the internal opposition against 
Indonesian independence within the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 54). His participation in 
this opposition was a reason for the KVP’s national executive committee to remove 
Welter from the list of candidates for the 1948 elections (Tomassen 2003, 55, 57). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The CHU and the ARP tended to change over time in their exact ideological 
relationship to each other. The ARP oscillated between rightwing and leftwing over 
the course of its post-war existence. It was outside of the first broad coalition cabinets 
because of its opposition to Indonesian independence, and it moved to the left over 
the course of the late 1960s, embracing what was called evangelical radicalism. The 
CHU, characterised by a much less coherent position, tended to move in the opposite 
direction: from a pragmatic cooperative stance towards the social democrats in the 
1950s, to a more conservative position in the 1970s.  
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Welter and the other members of the internal opposition formed a separate list for 
those elections. This move had been anticipated by the leadership of the KVP 
(Tomassen 2003, 58). In the 1948 elections, the KNP won a single seat. KVP leader 
Romme stated that he did not see the KNP as a major threat (Lipschits 1982, 47). 
The KNP drew support from the Catholic middle class but also from people with a 
Dutch-Indian background, including non-Catholics (Tomassen 2003, 64).  
The KNP saw itself as a Catholic party and it explicitly agreed with the KVP 
on moral matters (Tomassen 2003, 62). On other issues, it combined a more 
conservative and economically liberal outlook (Van Bergen 1996, 45). It was 
opposed to autonomy or independence of Indonesia and sought to maintain the 
constitutional order, even after Indonesia had become an independent state 
(Tomassen 2003, 63). In the election manifesto of the KNP, colonial affairs are a 
main issue. The party was opposed to extending government intervention on social 
and economic matters (Tomassen 2003, 63). On matters of economic governance 
and colonial politics, the KNP saw the PvdA as its main opponent, and the KVP as a 
“sheep” that was led astray by a “red shepherd” (Tomassen 2003, 63 translation 
SO). In parliament the KNP pursued the KVP as a “rightwing botfly”, which 
reinforced the existing conflict between left and right within the KVP (Koole 1995, 
186 translation SO). The KNP has also been characterised as "splinter in the flesh of 
the KVP" (Van Bergen 1996, translation SO). Over time, the KNP focused less on 
Indonesia (which had become independent) and more on the economic policy of the 
government (Tomassen 2003, 65). In 1955 the KNP returned to the KVP under 
pressure from the episcopate (Lipschits 1982, 48; Koole 1995, 186). Welter 
remained a KVP MP until 1963. 
Rochon (1985, 429) considers the KNP a challenger. The KNP considered 
the KVP to have strayed from the right path because of a “red shepherd”; it adhered 
to the more rightwing brand of political Catholicism of the RKSP, which the KVP 
had abandoned after the war, and it appealed specifically to Catholic voters (the 
base of the KVP). The KNP can be seen as a direct split from the KVP (Van Kessel 
& Krouwel 2011, 302-303): its leader had been a minister and senator for the 
Catholic party and he was a candidate for their party list. Given that the colonial 
issue was the reason for the KNP to split, and that this is the main issue in their 
election manifesto, colonial affairs and development cooperation is assigned as the 
issue owned by the KNP. 
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Table 4.4: profile of the KNP 
Party Profile KNP 
Full name Katholieke Nationale Partij 
English name Catholic National Party 
Founded 1948 
First elected 1952 
First succesful election result 1 
(1.2%) 
Membership in year of first MPs unknown 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Divorce (from KVP) 
Party goal Challenger (KVP) 
Ideology Rightwing Catholicism 
in election manifesto Colonial Affairs (22.5%) 
in parliamentary speech Colonial Affairs (17.9%) 
in motions None 
in literature Opposition to decolonization of Indonesia 
Owned 
issue 
assigned Colonial Affairs 
Unique proposals 37.8% 
(14) 
In parliament 1948-1955 
Reason dissolution Merged into KVP 
 
Table 4.5: profile of the PSP 
Party Profile PSP 
Full name Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij 
English name Pacifist-Socialist Party 
Founded 1957 
First elected 1959 
First succesful election result 2 
(1.8%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 2497 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Birth 
Party goal Challenger (PvdA) 
Ideology Leftwing socialism 
in election manifesto Defence (49.4%) 
in parliamentary speech Defence (17.2%) 
in motions None 






Unique proposals 39.1% 
(9) 
In parliament 1959-1989 
Reason dissolution Merged into GL 
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4.4.2 PSP: dissenting socialists 
The PSP (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij/Pacifist Socialist Party) was the 
second new party to enter parliament after the Second World War. Like the KNP, it 
traces its background to events within the international realm, namely the Cold War 
and Dutch coalition politics.  
Individuals from the peace movement formed the PSP in 1957. They were 
united in their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons and the Cold War mentality 
(Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 33). Most of them had been involved in a 
peace movement called The Third Way, which sought a political course between the 
Soviet Union and the United States (Denekamp et al. 1982, 34-37). Between 1955 
and 1957, people from The Third Way organised themselves in a movement of 
politically homeless individuals (Daklozenberaad), which sought to cooperate with 
the PvdA in order to see a pacifist elected to parliament, but the PvdA refused (Van 
der Land 1962, 16-18; Koole 1995, 247). After this refusal, they formed their own 
party. The founding members had different backgrounds: leftwing socialists, 
dissident communists and pacifist Christians (Van der Land 1962, 89; Lucardie, 
Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 33; Denekamp et al. 1987). A large number of 
founders had been a member of the social democratic PvdA and had left the party 
because of its support for the Dutch military presence in the Dutch Indies in the 
1950s (Van der Land 1962, 93).67 A sizeable minority of the party’s founders had 
been a member of the pre-War progressive Christian and pacifist CDU, which had 
merged into the social democratic PvdA (Van der Land 1962, 89). Only a small 
percentage of the party’s founders had a background in the Communist CPN (Van 
der Land 1962, 89).68 Many founders had been active in the SU (Socialistische 
Unie/Socialist Union), a short-lived leftwing-socialist party that existed in the early 
1950s (Van der Land 1962, 89; Lipschits 1982, 64). In 1958 the PSP won its first 
seats in the North Holland Provincial Council, and in 1959 it won two seats in the 
Tweede Kamer. The PSP entered parliament at the cost of the PvdA (Van Kessel & 
Krouwel 2011, 306).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The most prominent of them had been Slotemaker-De Bruïne who had been head of 
the WBS, the PvdA think tank, between 1945 and 1947 (Denekamp et al. 1987). 
68 In 1967, the PSP was joined by a group of dissident Communists called the 
“Bruggroep”, led by former CPN-parliamentary party chair Gortzak. 
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The ideology of the PSP contained two elements: pacifism and socialism. 
Like the Third Way, the PSP sought a third way between the Eastern (communist) 
and the Western (capitalist) blocs. Within the Dutch left, the division between East 
and West was reflected politically: the pro-American PvdA and the pro-Russian 
CPN were divided politically. In its first election manifesto and in its parliamentary 
speeches the PSP focused on defence. Like the PvdA and the CPN, the PSP had a 
leftwing economic programme: it was committed to socialisation of the means of 
production. 
After the formation of the PSP, the media wrote about them as a minor 
nuisance for the PvdA (Van der Land 1962, 53-54). One newspaper wrote: “[w]e do 
not believe that this split will cost the PvdA many votes” (de Volkskrant cited in 
Van der Land 1962, 54 translation SO). One social democratic author characterised 
the PSP as a “botfly on the leg of the horse that has to pull socialism forward” 
(Schurer cited in Van der Land 1962, 60 translation SO). In its early 
communication, the PSP agitated against both the CPN and the PvdA (Denekamp et 
al. 1982, 55). The party considered both the CPN and the PvdA militaristic. The 
success of the PSP in the provincial elections of 1958 took the PvdA by surprise 
(Denekamp et al. 1982, 57), and after these elections, the PvdA began to warn 
against the PSP: a vote for the PSP would benefit the VVD or the KVP because the 
PvdA would become relatively smaller (Denekamp et al. 1982, 61). The early 
reactions of the CPN appear to have been much more positive: they supported the 
commitment of PSP against (American) nuclear weapons and sought cooperation 
between the PSP and CPN in the peace movement, but after the PSP entered 
parliament, relations became more strained (Denekamp et al. 1982, 64-66). 
The PSP would remain in parliament for 30 years. Over time, its pacifism 
moved to the background and its leftwing socialism took over. During its history, 
the PSP was characterised by internal instability, conflicts and splits (Lucardie, Van 
Schuur & Voerman 1997). Although the party had responded positively to 
cooperation between the PvdA and other progressive parties in the early stages, it 
stood isolated from these parties during the 1970s. Over the course of the 1980s, the 
PSP began to cooperate with the CPN, the EVP and the PPR. These four parties 
eventually merged to form the leftwing green party GL (GroenLinks/GreenLeft) in 
1989.  
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Van der Land (1962, 119) argues that one cannot see the PSP as a divorce 
from the PvdA, because its members had been politically homeless before forming 
the PSP, and those who had been a member of the PvdA had been so only for a 
short time long before the PSP was formed. As the founders included no former 
MPs or ministers, and as no organised groups from within the PvdA split to join the 
PSP, it ought to be considered a party formed by birth (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 
2011, 302-303). The question whether the PSP is a challenger or a mobiliser, is 
more difficult to answer. Rochon (1985, 430) considers it a mobiliser party, even 
though he claims that the party sought to “revitalise” socialism, the ideology of the 
PvdA. The PSP adhered to the anti-militarist and socialist ideology of the pre-War 
SDAP and CDU parties, which had merged to form the PvdA. In its 
communication, the PSP attacked both the CPN and the PvdA for their militarism. 
Its support base of leftwing intellectuals, however, was not the support base of these 
two parties. The PSP shares two of the three characteristics of a challenger 
(communication and ideology), and therefore, one has to classify the party as such. 
Because of the early orientation of the PSP-founders towards the PvdA, this party is 
identified as its challenged party. Given that the defence issue is characteristic of the 
party’s parliamentary speeches and its election manifestos, and that the party’s anti-
Cold War positions distinguished it from the PvdA and the CPN, the party is linked 
to the defence issue. 
 
4.4.3 BP: farmers in protest 
The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of rightwing protest movements, 
specifically the BP (Boerenpartij/Farmers’ Party). In the eyes of Vossen (2005), 
these movements were part of a process of depillarisation, secularisation and anti-
paternalism, as the rise of new leftwing parties such as the PSP had also been: the 
party is the other face of the sixties. 
The BP was formed in 1958 by Hendrik Koekoek (Vossen 2005, 252). He 
served as party chair and later as chair of the parliamentary party, top candidate in 
every election and editor of the Vrije Boer (Free Farmer), the party’s magazine 
(Vossen 2005, 250). Koekoek had been a member of the conservative Protestant 
CHU until 1956, but had not been a prominent member, nor had he ever held 
political office for the party other than secretary of a local CHU branch (Nooij 1969, 
33; Vossen 2005, 251). Since the late 1940s, Koekoek had been organising 
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resistance against government intervention in the economy: first with his Bond voor 
Bedrijfsvrijheid in de Landbouw (League for Entrepreneurial Freedom in 
Agriculture), and later with the BP. The party resisted the formation of a corporatist 
organisation of agriculture that was favoured by the KVP and the PvdA. This 
corporatist organisation had the power to levy taxes and had limited legislative 
powers. The first public activity of the BP was participation in the 1958 elections in 
several municipalities in the province of Gelderland (Nooij 1969, 34).69 In 1959, 
they participated in the national elections unsuccessfully (Nooij 1969, 34-35; 
Vossen 2005, 252). The party was able to win a seat in the provincial council of 
Gelderland in 1962 (Nooij 1969, 35). In 1963, several farmers in the hamlet 
Hollandscheveld refused to pay taxes to the corporatist organisation for agriculture; 
the resistance degenerated into violent clashes with the police (Nooij 1969, 36; 
Koole 1995, 337; Vossen 2005, 251-252). Koekoek supported the farmers. This 
generated considerable attention for Koekoek and the BP. In the 1963 elections, the 
BP won three seats. Their electoral support was not limited to farmers. They also 
won a considerable number of votes in Amsterdam for instance (Vossen 2005, 
253).70  
The BP saw itself explicitly as a party of the (economic) right, a position, 
which had been left open by the parties committed to the free market such as the 
ARP, the CHU and the VVD (Nooij, 1969:41). It agitated against these parties for 
abandoning their positions: “[the VVD] has been compromised by years of 
cooperation with the guild of interventionist quacks, which see the economic 
straightjacket as the only means to correct the growing resistance of businesses” 
(Stam 1966, 21 translation SO). In the BP’s view, the Christian parties were 
controlled by their leftwing labour wings, and the VVD had “collaborated” with 
these parties in coalition cabinets (Stam cited in Nooij 1969, 41). In the eyes of the 
BP, the established parties had all become indistinguishable (Faas 1967, 149). The 
party also stood on the right on issues such as monarchy, the place of religion in 
politics and foreign affairs (Nooij, 1969:45). In its election manifestos and its 
parliamentary speeches, the party focused most on agriculture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The party ran under the name Vrije Boeren (Free Farmers). 
70 It is important to note that in the elections of 1966 and 1967, the support from 
urban areas is much greater than in 1963, especially in comparison to the relatively 
constant support in rural areas (Nooij 1969, 37).  
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The BP would be in parliament for the following eighteen years. In the late 
1960s, the party had become the focal point for individuals and movements to the 
right of the VVD, the ARP and the CHU (Vossen 2005, 257). The party grew in 
following elections. This growth coincided with several conflicts. The most 
prominent concerned the earlier affiliation of a BP senator with a National-Socialist 
party (Vossen 2005, 261). Koekoek supported the senator, and in response one of 
the MPs left the parliamentary party in 1966. In the 1970s, support for the BP 
petered out and the party disappeared from parliament in the 1981 elections.  
Given that the BP was not founded by a large section of the members or a 
prominent politician of an established party, it must be seen as a party formed by 
birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Lucardie (1986, 78 83) considers the 
BP to be a single interest, anti-system party. Koole (1995, 337-338), however, 
considers the party to be a protest party rather than a single-issue party. He stresses 
the comparison with the French Poujadist party, which also mobilised protest voters 
from both the urban and the rural middle class (Koole 1995, 337-338). Mudde 
(2004, 548) also describes the BP as an early populist party. Rochon (1985, 430) 
considers the party to be a mobiliser, which appealed primarily to those who 
opposed “big government”. And indeed, the party did not adhere explicitly to an 
ideology any other party had before: its conservatism mixed a kind of non-
denominational Christianity with economic liberalism. It also agitated against the 
established parties of the right for abandoning their commitment to the free market. 
The social group they sought to represent (farmers) were not the social base of these 
established parties, however. Given the party’s background, electoral orientation 
and activity, the party is linked to the issue of agriculture. 
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Table 4.6: profile of BP 
Party Profile BP 
Full name Boerenpartij  
English name Farmers' Party 
Founded 1957 
First elected 1963 
First succesful election result 3 
(2.1%) 
Membership in year of first MPs unknown 
Stability of the parliamentary party 75% 
Formation history Birth 
Party goal Mobiliser (protest party) 
Ideology Conservatism 
in election manifesto Agriculture (43.6%) 
in parliamentary speech Agriculture (15.5%) 
in motions None 




Unique proposals 54.5%  
(12) 
In parliament 1963-1981 
Reason dissolution Transformed into Rechtse Volkspartij 
 
Table 4.7: profile of the GPV 
Party Profile GPV 
Full name Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond 
English name Reformed Political League 
Founded 1948 
First elected 1963 
First succesful election result 1 
(0.7%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 7039 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Split (ARP) 
Party goal Challenger (ARP) 
Ideology Orthodox Protestantism 
in election manifesto Governance (13.5%) 
in parliamentary speech Moral issues (26.8%) 
in motions None 
in literature Moral issues, combined with economic 
and foreign policy 
Owned 
issue 
assigned Moral issues 
Unique proposals 50% 
(31) 
In parliament 1959-2000 
Reason dissolution Merged into CU 
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4.4.4 GPV: dissenting Protestants 
As discussed above, the Protestant segment of the Dutch political landscape is 
characterised by splits between different religious groups: the ARP had its support in 
the Gereformeerde Kerk, the CHU in the conservative parts of the Nederlands 
Hervormde Kerk and the SGP had its support in the smaller orthodox Protestant 
communities. The GPV (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond/Reformed Political League) 
was the fourth Protestant party to enter parliament after the Second World War. It, 
too, had its roots in a specific religious community.  
The GPV was an orthodox Protestant party. In 1948, members of the ARP 
formed the GPV (Koole 1995, 136). The reason for the split was theological (Klei 
2010, 12). The GPV was formed by members of the Gereformeerde Kerken 
(Vrijgemaakt) (Liberated Reformed Church) that had split away from the ARP-
aligned Gereformeerde Kerken in 1944 (Koole 1995, 136). 10% of the members of 
the Gereformeerde Kerken had joined the Vrijgemaakten (Harinck 2001, 224). In the 
following four years, it became clear to the Vrijgemaakten that they could not 
continue to cooperate politically with individuals with whom they had a fundamental 
religious conflict (Koole 1995, 136-137). On a local level, caucuses had been split on 
religious grounds (Harinck 2001, 225). In part, the formation of the GPV was the 
result of a conflict within the Vrijgemaakte Church: between those who wanted to 
continue within the ARP and those who wanted to form a separate party (Klei 2011, 
53). The ARP consciously attempted to prevent division, for instance by putting 
Vrijgemaakten on eligible places on the party list (Harinck 2001, 232; Klei 2011, 88). 
Between 1948 and 1950, the group that split away from the ARP operated as a loose 
Voorlopig Verband van Vrije Kiesverenigingen (Temporary League of Free Electoral 
Associations) and in 1950 they formed a separate political party (Klei 2010, 13). 
Several branches of the ARP switched allegiances (Koole 1995, 137). GPV local 
parties did not allow anyone to become a member if they were not a member of the 
Vrijgemaakte Church (Koole 1995, 138). The GPV was closely tied to the 
Vrijgemaakte Church and the Vrijgemaakte pillar (Klei 2010, 22-23). The GPV 
participated in the elections of 1952, 1956 and 1959 without winning a seat.71 The 
party had provincial councillors in Groningen since 1950. In 1959, they missed out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Already in 1948 Vrijgemaakte former ARP-voters believed that they had cost the 
ARP a seat by abstaining from voting (Klei 2011, 51). 
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on a seat in the Tweede Kamer by only twenty votes (Klei 2010, 14). Before the GPV 
entered parliament, however, the ARP had attempted to consciously ignore the party 
(Klei 2011, 64). The ARP spoke negatively of what it considered to be “an irrelevant, 
sectarian, small party” (Koole 1995, 137 translation SO). The GPV legitimated its 
own existence by referring to what it perceived as the aberrant course of the ARP 
(Klei 2011, 93). In one of its first election manifestos, the party wrote “the GPV does 
not seek to navigate a new course, but rightfully pretends to continue the old line of 
the ARP.” (Enschede Program of the GPV cited in Klei 2011, 94 translation SO). In 
1963, the GPV won a seat in parliament. From then on the party provided one or two 
MPs. In parliament the GPV MPs were highly respected for their contributions to 
parliamentary debates. They were considered the “conscience” of the Tweede Kamer 
(Klei 2011, 119). 
The GPV was an orthodox Protestant party. It was based on a specific 
interpretation of the Bible and the doctrines of Dutch Calvinism. The party combined 
conservatism on moral issues with conservative stances on the role of the government 
in the economy. The party also took conservative positions on foreign affairs: it was 
anti-communist and it opposed European integration. The GPV was opposed to the 
quick dissolution of both colonial relations and the apartheid regime in South Africa 
(Klei 2010, 26-27). For this party, however, its religious convictions were more 
important than any other issue. This is evident if one looks at the party’s election 
manifesto: moral issues are dominant. 
The GPV would remain in parliament for the following 39 years. During the 
1960s, a group of ARP-members petitioned to join the party because they felt the 
ARP drifted from its conservative positions. The GPV was internally divided over 
their support; in the end the GPV rebuked them because they were not members of 
the Vrijgemaakte Church (Klei 2011). This group became one of the components of 
the RPF (see section 4.4.10). Over the course of the 1990s, the GPV modified its 
position on non-Vrijgemaakten joining the party. This allowed for closer cooperation 
with the other orthodox Christian parties, especially the RPF. The two parties merged 
in 2000 to form the CU (ChristenUnie/ChristianUnion). 
It is clear that the GPV was formed by divorce, as the party was formed by an 
organised group of Vrijgemaakte members in the ARP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 
302-303). In terms of its goals it is much more difficult to characterise the party. 
Rochon considers them to be a mobilising party (Rochon 1985, 430), because they 
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mobilised voters on a new religious cleavage. Although some prominent GPV-
politicians had attempted to broaden the base of the party, the GPV oriented itself in 
electoral terms to Vrijgemaakten. The ARP, however, considered the Vrijgemaakten 
part of its social base. As Daalder (1965) and Lucardie (1986) recognise, the GPV did 
adhere to a perfected version of the ideology of the ARP. At the moment of the 
GPV’s foundation or the GPV’s entry into parliament, the ARP had not drifted that 
far from this position yet, as it would in the course of the 1960s. On the basis of these 
characteristics, one has to characterise the GPV as a challenger of the ARP. Given its 
religious background and prevalence of moral themes in its election manifesto, the 
party is linked to moral issues. 
 
4.4.5 D66: democratic idealists 
During the 1960s, the pillars, which had organised Dutch social life, began to 
weaken. The party system continued to reflect the pillarised society. A group of 
homines novi formed a new political party, D66 (Democraten ‘66/Democrats ’66) 72, 
to try and radically reform the Dutch political system. Soon however, they themselves 
became part of that very same party system. 
D66 was formed in 1966. The initiative for the party lay with Hans Gruijters, 
who had been a municipal councillor for the VVD in Amsterdam (Van der Land 
2003, 21; Koole 1995, 311). He had left the VVD over a conflict with the 
conservative wing of the party concerning the royal wedding of Princess Beatrix, the 
heir-apparent, and Claus von Amsberg, which Gruijters had refused to attend (Van 
der Land 2003, 21). After he left the party he was approached by different individuals 
about the formation of a new party (Van der Land 2003, 22-23). Gruijters organised a 
series of meetings with several of them. The group had a mixed background.73 A 
major concern they shared was the functioning of democracy (Van der Land 2003, 
23). The group explicitly sought to prevent becoming a Group-Gruijters, a local split 
from the VVD, and therefore Gruijters soon handed over leadership to Hans van 
Mierlo (Van der Land 2003, 24-26). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The party was founded with the acronym D’66. D66 will be used consistently, 
which is the formal spelling since the 1980s. 
73 Out of the 44 participants, 25 were member of a political party: sixteen were 
members of the VVD, seven had been members of the PvdA, one had been a member 
of the PSP and one had been a member of the CHU (Godschalk 1970). Nineteen did 
not have a background in an established political party. 
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In 1966, the group formed the initiative-committee D66 with the intention to 
form a political party (Van der Land 2003, 25). The reasoning behind this move was 
that the group had to become a threat for the established parties in order to realise its 
policy goals (Van der Land 2003, 25). The committee drafted an appeal to the Dutch 
people, and because the appeal got considerable response both from the population 
and the media (Van der Land 2003, 29), the committee formed a new party in 1966 in 
order to participate in the 1967 elections (Van der Land 2003, 30). In the electoral 
campaign of 1967, the party emphasised government reform, because that was –
according to market researchers – the unique selling point of the party (Van der Land 
2003, 27). In the 1967 elections, D66 won seven seats, which was unprecedented for 
a new party (Van der Land 2003, 37; Koole 1995, 313). Electorally, D66 drew its 
support from all over the political landscape (Van der Land 2003, 38-39). 
The party combined two political perspectives: on the one hand, the party 
presented itself as a pragmatic party unburdened by traditional ideology, and on the 
other hand, it presented itself as an ardent proponent of government reform (Koole 
1995, 309-310; Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 67). Its message of government reform 
was far-reaching: the party sought “to blow up the existing parties” (Van der Land 
2003, 36 translation SO). It advocated institutional reforms including the direct 
election of the prime minister and reform of the electoral system (Van der Land 2003, 
33; Koole 1995, 312). All these reforms were oriented at the creation of a two party 
system, which would eliminate the need for a formation process, which was not 
transparent enough in the eyes of the D66 founders. There is a discrepancy between 
the party’s profile (which focuses on government reform) and the text of the party’s 
appeal to the electorate and the first election manifesto (which focuses on foreign 
policy). This was in many ways a marketing ploy: when the first appeal was printed, 
the government reform issues were printed on the front, while the other policies were 
printed on the back “in very small print” (Van der Land 2003, 27 translation SO). 
Also, in its parliamentary motions, D66 did not focus on government reform; instead 
it was most active on economic issues. This can be explained by the fact that 
government reform is a question of long-term constitutional amendments instead of 
motions. Over time, D66 developed programmatically in a progressive liberal 
direction (Lucardie 1993). 
After 1967, D66 began to set steps towards the formation of a two-bloc 
political system. Like D66, the PvdA sought the creation of a two-bloc system, and it 
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proposed reforms similar to those of D66 (Van der Land 2003, 47-48). In the 1971 
elections, D66 and PvdA together with the KVP-Radicals (see 4.4.7) formed a 
Progressive Agreement (Progressief Akkoord) committed to the formation of a 
progressive party, which could win a majority in parliamentary elections (Van der 
Land 2003, 74-78). After the 1972 elections, the alliance won a plurality in 
parliament and formed a progressive cabinet with ministers from the KVP and the 
ARP. In the following years, D66 went through a series of dramatic electoral ups and 
downs, governed in five different cabinets and continues to exist until today.  
The position of D66 as a party formed by birth is somewhat problematic (Van 
Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303) as a larger number of founders had backgrounds in 
different parties. But because none of them played a role on the national stage, their 
backgrounds were mixed and they were joined by so many independents, D66 ought 
to be seen as a party formed by birth. The party saw itself as a pragmatic party 
without an ideology, but with a clear commitment to government reform. It did not 
attack a single party, but rather moved against all parties. It drew its support from all 
parties. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider D66 a mobiliser, and specifically a 
purifier: it advocates new politics, which it combines with a pragmatic attitude on 
other issues. This is in line with Rochon’s (1985, 431) classification of D66. Given 
this classification and its parliamentary speech, D66 is linked to the issue of 
governance. 
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Table 4.8: profile of D66 
Party Profile D'66 
Full name Democraten '66 
English name Democrats '66 
Founded 1966 
First elected 1967 
First succesful election result 7 
(4.5%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 3700 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Birth 
Party goal Mobiliser (purifier) 
Ideology Radical democracy 
Pragmatism 
in election manifesto Foreign Affairs (14.2%) 
in parliamentary speech Governance (14.0%) 
in motions Economic Affairs (16.7%) 




Unique proposals 33.7% 
(31) 
In parliament 1967-now 
Reason dissolution Still in parliament 
 
Table 4.9: profile of DS’70 
Party Profile DS'70 
Full name Democratisch Socialisten '70 
English name Democratic Socialist '70 
Founded 1970 
First elected 1971 
First succesful election result 8 
(5.3%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 3000 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Merger of divorced groups 
Party goal Challenger (PvdA) 
Ideology Social-democracy 
in election manifesto Governance (17.6%) 
in parliamentary speech Economic Affairs (16.9%) 
in motions Economic Affairs (20.2%) 




Unique proposals 24.4% 
(22) 
In parliament 1970-1981 
Reason dissolution Party death 
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 4.4.6 DS'70: democratic moderates 
The question of political cooperation was a key question for many parties in 
the late 1960s. It led to a division in the PvdA in the form of DS’70 (Democratisch 
Socialisten ‘70/Democratic Socialists ’70).  
DS’70 was founded in 1970 by former members of the PvdA (Koole 1995, 
242). The founders of DS’70 felt uneasy with the course the PvdA had pursued since 
1966. In 1966 Nieuw Links (New Left), a new generation of social democrats 
manifested itself within the party. The group advocated reform of the PvdA’s internal 
organisation, a new strategy of polarisation and a new political agenda consisting of 
social, political and economic reform, leftwing economic policies, an anti-NATO 
foreign policy (Boivin et al. 1977, 34). Between 1966 and 1969, they gradually took 
over the leadership of the PvdA (Bosscher 1994, 225). 
DS’70 was formed by three groups: a group of PvdA municipal councillors, 
an organised centrist faction within the PvdA, and group-Goedhart, which consisted 
of three PvdA MPs (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 118-120; Koole 1995, 242). The 
group of municipal councillors split from the PvdA over the formation of a local 
Progressive Agreement. The first such conflict was in Eindhoven: the local party 
meeting favoured the formation of a local Progressive Agreement, while the 
councillors did not (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 112). Therefore, these councillors 
formed their own party in the local council. The break in Eindhoven was followed in 
several other municipal councils (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 114). This group of 
councillors was joined by members of the Democratisch Appel (Democratic Appeal), 
who had unsuccessfully attempted to steer the course of the PvdA towards the centre. 
Their main concern was the new foreign policy of the PvdA, which in their view 
failed to grasp the distinction between democracies and dictatorships (Vingerling & 
Schouten 2003, 104-105). The third constituent group was the group-Goedhart, a split 
from the PvdA parliamentary party (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 115). They left the 
PvdA parliamentary party in 1970 over the PvdA’s position on the war in Indochina 
(Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 116).  
Basically, DS’70 adhered to the ideology that the PvdA adhered to in the 
1950s (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 74-75). The party was committed to a social 
order that was characterised by solidarity with the weak and an economic system in 
which production and distribution were controlled by the community (Voerman 1991, 
95). DS’70’s economic policies were centrist: it adhered to fiscal conservatism and 
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opposed nationalisation. Moreover, it was opposed to communism at home as well as 
abroad (Lipschits 1982, 70; Voerman 1991, 104-108; Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 
128-129; Lucardie 1991, 117). These two orientations were reflected in the party: it 
had two tendencies, a centrist tendency focusing on responsible social economic 
policies and an anti-communist tendency focusing on foreign policy. These two 
tendencies did not agree programmatically, which is why the party has been 
characterised as “a case of political schizophrenia” (Voerman 1991, translation SO). 
This makes it difficult to relate the party to a single issue. The most dominant issue in 
its manifesto (governance) was not one of the issues owned by one of these two 
tendencies. In its parliamentary activity (both motions and speeches), the issue of one 
of the tendencies (economic affairs) is dominant. Both the centrist and the rightwing 
tendency of the party were united in their commitment to (parliamentary) democracy: 
according to the anti-communist tendency, foreign cooperation should be oriented 
towards democracies, even if these are free market countries, and not towards 
dictatorships, even if they are socialist (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 104-105). 
Likewise, the social democratic tendency favoured parliamentary democracy over a 
socialist economy at home (Lucardie 1991, 114; De Vos 1976, 227). Thus 
governance was selected as the core issue of DS'70. 
In the 1971 election campaign, DS’70 oriented itself against the PvdA 
(Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 119). Drees junior, son of a former PvdA prime 
minister, was chosen as its leader. In the 1971 elections, DS’70 won eight seats. The 
leadership of DS’70 saw its electoral success as the vindication of their view that the 
PvdA had drifted too far from the views of its traditional electoral base (Koole 1995, 
243).74 In 1971, DS’70 joined a centre-right cabinet with the VVD, CHU, ARP and 
KVP. Within a year, however, the cabinet fell due to a difference of opinion between 
the DS’70 ministers and the rest of the cabinet about budget cuts (Koole 1995, 244). 
DS’70 continued to exist until 1981, but it declined with every election.  
DS’70 is a split from the PvdA in organisational terms (Van Kessel & 
Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed by the organised internal opposition within 
the PvdA and by people within the PvdA parliamentary party. Rochon (1985, 429) 
considers the party to be a challenger of the PvdA: DS'70 believed the PvdA had 
drifted too far from its original positions and no longer represented the interests of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In reality, the electoral support of DS’70 was drawn from the VVD, D66 and PvdA 
(Koole 1995, 243). 
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traditional electorate. The party took the positions that the PvdA took in the 1950s. 
Moreover, they agitated against the PvdA in their first election campaign. DS’70 is 
linked to governance because this issue (the largest in its election manifesto) links 
both the social democratic and anti-communist tendency.  
 
4.4.7 PPR: radicalising radicals 
In the 1960s and 1970s, cooperation between political parties was a major 
issue. This can be seen in the formation of a Progressive Agreement around the 
PvdA, as seen in section 4.4.5 and 4.4.6, but also in the formation of the CDA 
(Christen Democratisch Appel/Christian Democratic Appeal), a merger of the three 
major religious parties: the KVP, the ARP and the CHU. Within the KVP, 
cooperation with other parties was a contested issue. It divided the party between 
those who preferred a progressive alliance and those who preferred Christian-
democratic cooperation. Those who favoured progressive to Christian-democratic 
cooperation founded the PPR (Politieke Partij Radicalen/Political Party Radicals). 
The PPR was formed in 1968 as a split from the KVP (Koole 1995, 178). 
They had operated within the KVP before the split as the KVP-Radicals (KVP-
Radicalen). The key issue between the KVP-Radicals and the rest of the party 
concerned cooperation: the KVP-Radicals preferred progressive cooperation to 
Christian-democratic cooperation. The majority of the KVP preferred centrist 
Christian democratic cooperation. The KVP-Radicals favoured the formation of a 
progressive concentration, which would consist of a progressive Christian-democratic 
party, the PvdA, D66 and the PSP (Tomassen 2003, 97-103). These KVP-Radicals 
included members from the trade unionist wing of the party, former ministers and 
even a former prime minister (Koole 1995, 178; Tomassen 2003, 95; Van der Steen 
2004, 434-440). The KVP-Radicals kept close contacts with like-minded members of 
the ARP, so-called ARP-Radicals (ARP-Radicalen): a working group of Christian 
Radicals (Christen-Radicalen) was formed by members of the KVP, the ARP and the 
CHU (Tomassen 2003, 94; Waltmans 1983, 14; Klaassen 2000, 23). After the 1967 
elections, the KVP formed a cabinet with the centre-right VVD and CHU, without the 
PvdA. The KVP-Radicals attempted to change the course of their own party 
internally (Waltmans 1983, 18). When in 1968 the KVP leadership committed itself 
explicitly to centrist Christian-democratic cooperation in a televised interview, 
several of the KVP-Radicals left the party. This group included four MPs, three of 
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whom would form a separate parliamentary party (Koole 1995, 178-179; Tomassen 
2003, 115). They were joined by several members of provincial councils and 
municipal councils (Waltmans 1983, 23; Klaassen 2000, 25; Tomassen 2003, 199). 
Many prominent KVP-Radicals (including former Prime Minister Cals) remained 
within the KVP (Lipschits 1982, 52). In 1968, the KVP-Radicalen who had split away 
from the KVP formed a new party, the PPR. 79% of the founders were Catholic and 
40% had been a member of the KVP (Waltmans 1983, 30). Although many founders 
had been affiliated with political Catholicism before forming the PPR, the party was 
not explicitly religious and was open to non-Christians (Waltmans 1983, 27; Koole 
1995, 179; Tomassen 2003, 120). The PPR explicitly sought to cooperate with the 
other progressive parties, PvdA, D66 and PSP. In 1971, they were joined by a group 
of ARP-Radicals (Waltmans 1983, 33). In its early campaigns, the PPR explicitly 
sought conflict with the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 120). The party oriented itselves 
towards religious voters who doubted the radicalism of the Christian parties 
(Waltmans 1983, 35; Van Egdom 1991, 8). The PPR participated in the Progressive 
Agreement, an alliance of PvdA and D66 (Van Egdom 1991, 12). Under the 
leadership of Bas De Gaay-Fortman (a former ARP-Radical), the party did 
particularly well in the 1972 elections (Klaassen 2000, 84). Between 1973 and 1977, 
the PPR became part of the Den Uyl cabinet (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 
1997, 34). After 1977, electoral decline set in (De Gaay-Fortman & Van Egdom 
1988, 14). The PPR began to cooperate with other small leftwing parties and merged 
to form the leftwing green party GL in 1989.  
The KVP-Radicals had a progressive Christian vision, which interpreted 
Christianity as a commitment to “peace, justice, harmony, and happiness” (Tomassen 
2003, 104). The PPR, however, did not have a Christian identity, as it was a secular 
leftwing progressive party. Over time, the PPR radicalised (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 
2008, 72-73); it became more and more influenced by new politics ideas such as 
environmental protection, women’s rights, government reform and Third World 
development (Koole 1995, 180; Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 34-35). The 
party’s diffuse focus is reflected in their behaviour: in their first election manifesto, 
labour was the most prominent issue, its parliamentary speech focused on governance 
and its motions on defence. These, however, do not form the unique appeal or the 
core issue of the party. The party's unique appeal was in its emphasis on new politics 
issues: development cooperation, the environment, government reform and women's  
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Table 4.10: profile of the PPR 
Party Profile PPR 
Full name Politieke Partij Radicalen 
English name Political Party Radicals 
Founded 1968 
First elected 1971 
First succesful election result 2 
(1.8%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 4284 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Divorce (KVP) 
Party goal Challenger (KVP/CDA) 
Ideology Progressive Christianity 
in election manifesto Labour (20.6%) 
in parliamentary speech Governance (12.2%) 
in motions Defence (14.5%) 




Unique proposals 15.4% 
(12) 
In parliament 1968-1989 
Reason dissolution Merged into GL 
 
liberation. Of these four issues, the environment is the most often linked to the PPR. 
So the PPR is linked to the issue of the environment, but it is with some hesitation, 
because the party became greener after its foundation.  
The PPR was formed by a divorce from the KVP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 
2011, 302-303): it was formed as a split within the KVP parliamentary party. Rochon 
(1985, 431) considers the PPR to be a mobilising party for this new combination of 
Christian politics with redistribution and environmentalism. If one looks more 
precisely, however, the PPR meets two out of three requirements to be a challenger 
party. It oriented itself primarily against the KVP in its early campaigns. In the early 
years it oriented itself primarily to (a segment of) the Christian electorate. It did not 
represent an ideology the KVP ever had, but an ideology that the KVP-Radicals 
wanted the KVP to pursue. The PPR does not appear to fit well into the mobiliser 
category: it did not advocate a particular interest or focus exclusively on government 
reform (as a purifier would). Only in later years did the PPR begin to advocate a 
prophetic, green ideology. Therefore, it is categorised as a challenger of the KVP. For 
the purpose of some analyses however it is necessary to see the PPR as a challenger 
of the CDA, which was formed in 1977.  
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Table 4.11: profile of the NMP  
Party Profile NMP 
Full name Nederlandse Middenstandspartij 
English name New Business Party 
Founded 1970 
First elected 1971 
First succesful election result 2 
(1.5%) 
Membership in year of first MPs unknown 
Stability of the parliamentary party 50% 
Formation history Birth 
Party goal Mobiliser (protest party) 
Ideology Anti-tax populism 
in election manifesto Economic affairs (29.0%) 
in parliamentary speech Enterprise (20.2%) 
in motions Housing 
Enterprise 
Defence (33.3%) 
in literature Economic issues (e.g. taxes) 
Owned 
issue 
assigned Economic affairs 
Unique proposals 8.7% 
(2) 
In parliament 1971-1972 
Reason dissolution Party death (?) 
 
4.4.8 NMP: small business owners in protest75 
Relatively little is known about the NMP (Nieuwe Middenstandspartij/New 
Business Party). This small anti-tax, pro-business party was in parliament for less 
than two years and fell apart due to internal strife. 
The NMP was founded in 1970. The formation of the new party was 
announced in an advertisement in several newspapers.76 The advertisements of the 
NMP appealed explicitly to the “self-employed, businessmen and entrepreneurs” and 
their financial, economic and business interests.77 The established political parties had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 As there are no historical accounts of the NMP, the account provided here is based 
on newspaper reports. Three newspapers were selected for the description of the 
NMP. Het Nieuwsblad voor het Noorden, the Leeuwarder Courant and the 
Zierikzeesche Courant. These were selected on the basis of digital availability and 
because in Zeeland and Friesland (where these newspapers were based), the NMP 
won considerably more votes than in the rest of the Netherlands: 2.1% in Friesland 
and 2.7% in Zeeland compared to 1.5% nationally. 
76"Nederlandse Middenstandspartij opgericht". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden 
17/9/1970.  
77 "Ingezonden mededeling". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden 13/10/1970. Translation 
SO. 
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in the eyes of the NMP founders, neglected the interests of this group.78 These 
advertisements did not attack specific established parties, but they attacked the parties 
of the government and the opposition in general.79 The founders of the NMP were 
businessmen.80 Ab Te Pas (managing director of a wholesale trading company in 
paintings) led the party list. 
The NMP was considered a marginal party.81 And yet, during their campaign, 
the NMP announced that based on the number of self-employed people in the 
Netherlands, the party should be able to obtain at least 16 seats in parliament, and that 
it could potentially win between 20 and 25.82 When the NMP won only two seats, the 
top candidate Te Pas said he was pleased, although he had expected a better result.83 
Journalists explained the support for the NMP by the popular discontentment with the 
policies of the centre-right cabinet.84 
After the elections, internal conflict began to develop. The first conflict 
focused on a group around Te Pas, the party’s top candidate and Jacques De Jong, the 
party’s third candidate on the list. Issues were the composition of the party’s 
parliamentary party and the composition of the party’s executive board.85 Under 
pressure of the party’s advisory council, the party’s second candidate decided not to 
take his seat in parliament, but left the position to De Jong.86 De Jong was also 
elected chair of the party’s executive board.87 The party executive then attempted to 
cut ties with their MP Te Pas88 and demanded that he handed over the position of 
parliamentary party chair to De Jong,89 which Te Pas refused.90 By August 1971, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 “"Middenstanders". Leeuwarder Courant, 6/8/1971. 
79 "Ingezonden mededeling". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden 13/10/1970. 
80 "Weekbladen van week tot week". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 24/9/1970. 
81 "Nederland viel van zijn geloof". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 29/4/1971. 
82 "Middenstandspartij rekent op minstens zestien zetels". Leeuwarder Courant, 
29/4/1971. 
83 "Premier De Jong: "Verheugend dat zovelen zijn opgekomen"". Leeuwarder 
Courant, 29/4/1971. 
84 "Dus toch Willem II". Leeuwarder Courant, 29/4/1971. 
85 "Scheuring bedreigt Middenstandspartij". Leeuwarder Courant, 11/5/1971. 
86 "Spoeding Kamerdebat over monetaire situatie". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
12/5/1971. 
87 "A. te Pas treedt af als voorzitter van Middenstandspartij". Zierikzeesche 
Nieuwsbode, 19/5/1971. 
88 "Middenstandspartij wil van Kamerlid Te Pas af". Leeuwarder Courant, 30/7/1971. 
89 "Daverende ruzie in Middenstandspartij". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 30/7/1971. 
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two-man NMP parliamentary party had formally been split into two one-man 
parties.91 In September 1971 the party organisation had formally split into two:92 the 
NMP (led by Te Pas) and the DMP (Democratische Middenstandspartij/Democratic 
Business Party, led by De Jong). The two organisations then became involved in a 
legal conflict.93 Conflicts would continue within the NMP, led by Te Pas.94 Both 
parties would participate in the Dutch General election of 1972 without winning 
parliamentary representation (Lucardie 2004, 203). 
The NMP was opposed to government intervention in the economy (Lucardie 
2004, 202). Its short programme focused on taxation (Koole 1995, 340): the party 
advocated a fair distribution of burdens, especially for small businessmen (Lucardie 
2004, 202). The most characteristic issue of the NMP’s manifesto is economic affairs. 
In the eyes of the NMP, the social democrats had oriented the government towards 
the interests of the working class, neglecting the interests of small business owners 
and shopkeepers.95 Additionally, the NMP favoured more liberal policies in the 
media, specifically a legal status for radio pirate station Veronica, 96 while at the same 
time they were advocating judicial action against the counterculture movement.97 In 
parliamentary debates, the party focused more on enterprise. The party proposed only 
three motions, one of which also concerned enterprise. The second issue in its 
parliamentary speeches is economic affairs.  
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91 Ibid. 
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94 "Ruzie tussen voormannen Middenstandspartij". Leeuwarder Courant, 18/10/1972, 
"Middenstandspartij verliest 't geding". Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 7 November, 
1972. 
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Before the 1971 elections, the party held a meeting with the newly formed 
DS’70 party, which also advocated cutting government expenditures.98 Later on, the 
NMP castigated DS’70 for its lack of fiscal conservatism.99 The NMP was oriented 
towards cooperation with those parties that sought to revitalise the Dutch economy: 
these were centre-right parties including DS’70.100 Koekoek of the BP saw 
considerable programmatic similarities between his own party and the NMP;101 the 
relationship between the NMP-leader Te Pas and BP-leader Koekoek were 
amiable.102  
Given the limited academic literature on the party, it is difficult to classify it 
in terms of the different classificatory schemes. According to the information 
available, the founders of the NMP did not have a position within any established 
party. Therefore, it can be considered a new party formed by birth (Van Kessel & 
Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Rochon (1985, 430) considers the NMP to be a challenger 
of the VVD, because of its programmatic similarity to that party. Tromp (1989, 86) 
considers the NMP a Poujadist party in line with the BP. The ideological similarities 
between the VVD and the NMP are the only reason to consider the NMP a challenger 
of the VVD. In the available information on the campaign, there is no sign that the 
NMP oriented itself towards the VVD in its rhetoric or towards VVD voters. Like the 
BP, the NMP agitated against the growing influence of the government on the 
economy. It also oriented itself explicitly towards defending the position of small 
business owners. Therefore, one can best consider the party a mobiliser of small 
business owners. The party's core issue is economic affairs. 
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4.4.9 RKPN: orthodox Catholics 
As described in section 4.4.7, in 1968 part of a leftwing faction of the KVP 
left the party to form the PPR. They believed that Christian-democratic cooperation 
pulled the party too far to the right. Within the Catholic community, there were also 
those who though that this Christian-democratic cooperation would pull the KVP too 
far to the left. These people formed the RKPN (Rooms Katholieke Partij 
Nederland/Roman Catholic Party Netherlands).  
After 1968, the KVP developed in the direction of a non-denominational party 
with moderate positions on social and moral issues, especially abortion (Koole 1995, 
186; Tomassen 2003, 124-126). The conservative wing of the Catholic community, 
including the episcopate, disagreed (Tomassen 2003, 128-129). One of these 
reactions took the form of a new political party, the NRP (Nieuwe Roomse 
Partij/New Roman Party), which was founded in 1971 by a former KVP-member 
(Tomassen 2003, 130-131). The NRP failed to obtain parliamentary representation in 
the 1971 elections (Tomassen 2003, 132). Consequently, several members of the 
NRP formed a separate party, the RKPN. Klaas Beuker, who had been a member of 
the KVP until 1969 and who had been second candidate on the NRP list, led the new 
party (Tomassen 2003, 134). The RKPN (and the NRP) participated in the 1972 
elections, in which the RKPN won a single seat (Tomassen 2003, 135). The ideology 
of the RKPN was based on a strict interpretation of the Bible and Papal dogma 
(Tomassen 2003, 137). The party believed that Dutch society was undergoing moral 
decay, and tolerant policies towards abortion were seen as a prime example of this 
(Tomassen 2003, 137-138). In its election manifesto, abortion and other moral issues 
played a dominant role. These issues were also reflected in the party’s activity in 
parliament: the RKPN proposed four motions, three of which concerned moral issues. 
In parliamentary debates, however, the party focused more on education.  
The RKPN received little attention from the media or from the KVP 
(Tomassen 2003, 145), and in parliament the RKPN was not taken seriously by the 
major parties (Koole 1995, 186; Tomassen 2003, 139). In 1977 the RKPN did not 
win a single seat in parliament and it has not participated in new elections since then. 
The RKPN was formed as a split, but not as a split from a parliamentary 
party. The party was formed as a split from an extra-parliamentary party (pace 
Lipschits 1982, 53; pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303); one of its founders  
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Table 4.12: profile of the RKPN  
Party Profile RKPN 
Full name Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland 
English name Roman Catholic Party Netherlands 
Founded 1972 
First elected 1972 
First succesful election result 1 
(0.9%) 
Membership in year of first MPs unknown 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Extraparliamentary divorce 
Party goal Challenger (KVP) 
Ideology Orthodox Catholicism 
in election manifesto Moral issues (23.1%) 
in parliamentary speech Education (25.7%) 
in motions Moral issues (75.0%) 
in literature Opposition to abortion 
Owned 
issue 
assigned Moral issues 
Unique proposals 24.7% 
(18) 
In parliament 1972-1977 
Reason dissolution Party Death 
 
had been a prominent member of the extra-parliamentary NRP. The RKPN was 
formed as a challenger party of the KVP: it sought to represent the former Catholic 
ideology of the KVP and attacked the KVP for abandoning its positions (Tomassen 
2003, 148). The party adhered to a perfectionist version of political Catholicism and 
appealed specifically to conservative Catholics (Lucardie 1986). Rochon (1985, 430) 
indeed considers the RKPN a challenger of the KVP. Because KVP, ARP and CHU 
proposed a combined CDA manifesto in 1977, one has to consider the party a 
challenger of the CDA at least when studying parties in the electoral arena. The 
RKPN is linked to the moral issues category.
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Table 4.13: profile of the RPF 
Party Profile RPF 
Full name Reformatorische Politieke Federatie 
English name Political Reformed Federation 
Founded 1975 
First elected 1981 
First succesful election result 2 
(1.3%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 7000 
Stability of the parliamentary party 50% 
Formation history Merger of divorced groups 
Party goal Challenger (CDA) 
Ideology Orthodox Protestantism 
in election manifesto Moral issues (24.1%) 
in parliamentary speech Governance (11.8%) 
in motions Foreign Affairs (30.0%) 




assigned Moral Issues 
Unique proposals 33.2% 
(98) 
In parliament 1981-2000 
Reason dissolution Merged into CU 
 
4.4.10 RPF: orthodox Protestants 
Like the RKPN, which challenged the KVP for being too moderate, the RPF 
(Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie/Reformed Political Federation) split away from 
the ARP because they found the ARP had become too moderate. As the ARP 
oriented itself towards cooperation with the KVP and inclined more towards the left, 
some of its rightwing elements no longer felt at home in the party.  
Four different groups formed the RPF in 1975: the NEV (Nationaal 
Evangelisch Verband/National Evangelical League), the Conversation Group 
(Gespreksgroep), the ARJC (Anti-Revolutionair Jongerencontact/Anti-
Revolutionary Youth Contact), and the RPC (Reformatorisch Politiek 
Contact/Reformed Political Contact). The NEV was formed in 1966 by members of 
the ARP, who were not aligned with the Vrijgemaakte churches, but still felt closer 
to the parliamentary actions of the GPV than to the ARP, which had moved to the 
left during the 1960s (Koole 1995, 139; Van Mulligen 2010, 32). The NEV sought 
cooperation with the GPV, but it was rebuked because the NEV-members did not 
belong to the Church that the GPV was linked to (see section 4.4.4) (Van Mulligen 
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2010, 32-33).103 The Conversation Group was founded in 1972 by prominent, 
conservative members of the ARP (Van Mulligen, 2010:33), and the ARJC was 
founded in 1975 by young ARP-members who did not feel at home in ARJOS 
(Nationale Organisatie van Anti-Revolutionaire Jongerenstudieclubs/National 
Organisation of Anti-Revolutionary Youth Study Clubs), the youth organisation of 
the ARP (Koole 1995, 142). The RPC was a loose organisation of independent 
conservative Protestant local parties in the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel 
(Van Mulligen 2010, 33). The four groups shared three ideas: the ARP had drifted 
too far to the left, the ARP should not merge with the KVP, and politics should be 
based on Biblical principles. In 1975, these groups formed the RPF (Lipschits 1982, 
59). The RPF emphasised the importance of cooperation with the other orthodox 
Protestant parties GPV and SGP. These parties reacted in a reserved fashion (Koole 
1995, 138). The RPF shared an orthodox Protestant outlook with these parties: an 
emphasis on moral issues combined with a commitment to limited government 
intervention in the economy and opposition to European integration (Van Mulligen 
2010, 35-36). Like the GPV, the RPF focused on moral issues in its election 
manifesto, but in its parliamentary activity its issue-specific concerns about 
domestic and foreign policies shines through.  
In the 1977 elections, the RPF appeared to seek GPV-voters, and in 
particular those who left the Vrijgemaakte Church due to a religious split. The RPF 
put a former GPV-municipal councillor at the top of their list (Van Mulligen 2010, 
36). The RPF missed the de facto electoral threshold by a few thousand votes, but 
the GPV did lose one of its seats (Van Mulligen 2010, 36). The GPV saw the RPF 
as an electoral competitor and attempted to combat the RPF, before cooperating 
with it (Klei 2011, 189-191). In 1981, the RPF did enter parliament (Koole 1995, 
143). In 1985 one of the two RPF MPs, Aad Wagenaar, split to form AR'85, which 
was electorally unsuccessful. The RPF remained in parliament for 19 years. In 2000, 
the RPF formed a new, broader orthodox Protestant party together with the GPV, 
the CU. 
The RPF can be seen as a divorce from the ARP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 
2011, 302-303). Although no prominent ARP politicians were involved, several 
organised internal oppositional groups such as the ARJC and the Gespreksgroep 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 They were joined by a religious group that split from the Vrijgemaakte Church and 
the GPV (Van Mulligen 2010, 32). 
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were involved. Rochon (1985, 430) considers the early RPF to be a challenger of 
the GPV, which later developed into a mobiliser because of its commitment to unite 
the existing orthodox Protestant parties. If one looks more precisely, it appears that 
the RPF can better be seen as a challenger of the CDA: as the ARP leaned too far to 
the left and towards the Catholic KVP, a new group emerged seeking to revive the 
old ARP with its conservative Protestant orientation. This appealed to Protestant 
voters. There are, however, two complicating factors: first, the ARP ceased to exist 
in 1980 (Koole 1995, 187), and it is up for discussion whether the RPF can be seen 
as a challenger of the newly formed CDA, which had yet to define its position and 
electoral base. Second, the RPF also competed with the GPV: it offered the GPV 
electorate a party, which had the potential to become a bigger political player, 
because it was less limited in its electoral appeal, and it offered those who split from 
the Vrijgemaakte Church an orthodox Protestant party open to their ideals. One 
cannot see the RPF as a challenger of the GPV because they did not claim that the 
GPV had drifted from its original positions or appealed to its exclusively 
Vrijgemaakte electoral base. Therefore, taking these two factors into account, the 
RPF can best be considered a challenger of the CDA. Given the party’s religious 
background and the focus in its election manifesto on moral issues, the party is 
linked to this category. 
 
4.4.11 EVP: progressive Protestants 
The EVP (Evangelische Volkspartij/Evangelical People’s Party) shares 
many similarities with several of the parties in this chapter: like the RPF it was 
formed as a split from the ARP, and like the PPR it was formed by the leftwing 
tendency of a Christian-democratic party. The main difference between the two is 
that the founders of the EVP began to consider the formation of a new party after 
the ARP had merged with the CHU and the KVP to form the CDA in 1977.  
The EVP was formed in 1981. Its roots lie within the leftwing tendency 
within the ARP, the ARP-Radicalen (ARP-Radicals) (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 
150-151). Like the KVP-Radicals, this group read Scripture in a progressive way. 
Of all the religious parties, the ARP was most open to leftwing politics, and 
therefore, the ARP-Radicals had (mostly) remained within the ARP. Over the 
1970s, however, the ARP oriented itself more and more towards Christian-
democratic cooperation. After the CDA was formed, the ARP-Radicals became 
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increasingly uneasy with its centrist course. This led to the formation of two groups, 
which later merged to form the EVP. The first of the two groups was the EPV 
(Evangelische Progressive Partij/Evangelical Progressive Party) (Nieboer & 
Lucardie 1992, 152; De Bas 1999, 42). It had split from the CDA because of the 
formation of the Van Agt cabinet of liberals and Christian-democrats. The EPV 
consisted of former members of the ARP, which had favoured the leftwing course 
the party had pursued during the 1970s (Koole 1995, 150; De Bas 1999, 52-53). The 
second group was called Niet Bij Brood Alleen (Not By Bread Alone), which had 
operated within the CDA since 1978 (De Bas 1999, 68-69). This group was called 
after the first election manifesto of the CDA, which emphasised that material 
happiness was not enough. The group felt that the CDA did not live up to its 
manifesto (De Bas 1999, 74). They belonged to the left wing of the party and, again, 
most of them had their roots in the ARP (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 152). They had 
formed an unofficial opposition within the CDA, hoping to push the CDA into a 
leftwing direction. The group included CDA MPs and former ARP MPs, such as 
Bob Goudzwaard, who had authored the CDA election manifesto (De Bas 1999, 
73). In 1981, a part of the Niet Bij Brood Alleen-group merged with the EPV to 
form the EVP (Koole 1995, 150; De Bas 1999, 96-97). At the foundation congress, 
several former CDA MPs were present (De Bas 1999, 97).  
The party adhered to a radical, leftwing interpretation of Scripture. Its 
political programme is explicitly based on religious principles. Its most important 
issue was nuclear disarmament: the party was motivated by the Biblical message of 
peace. Its commitment to these foreign policy and defence issues is also reflected in 
its parliamentary activity and election manifesto: it spoke mostly about foreign 
affairs in parliament, and in its election manifesto, defence was the dominant issue. 
In the 1981 parliamentary elections the party failed to obtain representation, 
and it also failed to win its own seats in the 1982 municipal and provincial 
elections.104 In 1982, there were mass protests against the stationing of nuclear 
weapons in the Netherlands, an issue on which the CDA was divided. The EVP 
opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons. In 1982 the EVP managed to secure a 
single seat in the Dutch parliament (Koole 1995, 149; De Bas 1999, 117). Their 
motto in the election was “Christian, therefore progressive” (De Bas 1999, 116 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Electoral research shows that the party was able to decrease the vote share of the 
CDA (Nieboer and Lucardie 1992, 156). 
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translation SO). The party saw itself as the “conscience” of the CDA (Nieboer & 
Lucardie 1992, 155), but the CDA explicitly ignored the EVP (De Bas 1999, 281-
285). Relationship with the orthodox Christian parties in the Dutch parliament were 
hostile (De Bas 1999, 297), and so instead, the party cooperated with the PvdA, 
D66, the PPR and the PSP (De Bas 1999, 295). After disappearing from parliament 
in 1986, the EVP merged with three small, secular leftwing parties to form the 
leftwing green party GL in 1989 (De Bas 1999, 149). 
The EVP was a party formed by divorce (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-
303): Niet Bij Brood Alleen, out of which the EVP was formed, played a major role 
in the internal discussions in the CDA. The EVP was a challenger party: it believed 
it acted as the conscience of the CDA; its founders believed that the CDA did not 
live up to its own, progressive, election manifesto and that the EVP did. 
Additionally, the EVP was oriented explicitly at (progressive) Christian voters. De 
Bas (1999, 103) and Rochon (1985, 430) also consider the party to be a challenger. 
But while De Bas sees it as a challenger of the CDA, Rochon considers the PPR to 
be the challenged party. The relationship with the PPR posited by Rochon is less 
plausible than the one proposed by De Bas, because the EVP never stated that the 
PPR abandoned its ideology. Given its pacifist policies and the focus in its 
manifesto on defence, the EVP is linked to the issue defence. 
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Table 4.14: profile of the EVP 
Party Profile EVP 
Full name Evangelische Volkspartij 
English name Evangelical People's Party 
Founded 1981 
First elected 1982 
First succesful election result 1 
(0.8%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 1790 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Merger of divorced groups 
Party goal Challenger (CDA) 
Ideology Progressive Christianity 
in election manifesto Defence (11.5%) 
in parliamentary speech Foreign Affairs (19.2%) 
in motions None 




Unique proposals 23.0% 
(84) 
In Parliament 1982-1986 
Reason Dissolution Merged into GL 
 
Table 4.15: profile of the CP  
Party Profile CP 
Full name Centrumpartij 
English name Centre Party 
Founded 1980 
First elected 1982 
First succesful election result 1 
(0.7%) 
Membership in year of first MPs unknown 
Stability of the parliamentary party 0% 
Formation history Extraparliamentary divorce 
Party goal Mobiliser (prophet) 
Ideology Radical nationalism 
in election manifesto Education (17.9%) 
in parliamentary speech Migration (17.5%) 
in motions Justice (100%) 




Unique proposals 25.0% 
(12) 
In parliament 1982-1986 
Reason dissolution Transformed into CD 
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4.4.12 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics 
The CP (Centrumpartij/Centre Party) was the first anti-immigrant party to 
enter the Dutch parliament. It became politically isolated because of its anti-
immigration policies, and it drifted to the political extremes and fell victim to internal 
struggles.105 
The CP was formed in 1980. It was formed by Henry Brookman, who had 
previously been involved with the far right NVU (Nederlandse Volksunie/Dutch 
People’s Union) (Koole 1995, 331). Brookman had founded another party just before 
forming the CP, the NCP (Nationale Centrumpartij/National Centre Party) but after 
some of that party’s members had been involved in racist violence, he abandoned it to 
form the CP (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 35; Koole 1995, 331). After the 
formation, the leadership of the party was taken over by Hans Janmaat, who had been 
a member of the KVP and active for DS’70 before joining the CP (Van Donselaar & 
Van Praag 1983, 20-21; Lucardie 1998, 19). After unsuccessfully participating in the 
1981 elections, the CP won a single seat in the elections of 1982 (Van Donselaar & 
Van Praag 1983, 43). The CP drew most of its support from traditional working class 
neighbourhoods and a plurality of CP-voters had voted for the PvdA before 1982 
(Brants & Hogendoorn 1983, 40). 
In the social and political responses to the CP, one can see political isolation, 
direct social action and judicial persecution.106 Whenever Janmaat spoke in 
parliament, many MPs would leave the room (Van Holsteyn 1998, 51-52). In 
municipal councils, CP councillors also faced political isolation. Whether CP 
councillors should be greeted with a handshake was a serious political issue in other 
parliamentary parties (Witte 1998, 130; Schikhof 1998, 145). CP local councillors 
found it impossible to find sufficient co-sponsors for motions and amendments (Van 
Riel & Van Holsteyn 1998, 71). The media also consciously sought to ignore the CP 
(Brants & Hogendoorn 1983, 39). The party also faced direct action from anti-fascist 
protestors. Direct action took many forms, but it was most extreme in 1986: violent 
anti-racism protestors interrupted a reconciliation meeting of former CP members. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 One of the problematic elements in the relationship between the CP, the press and 
established politics (and academic research), were its alleged ties to pre-War fascism, 
a characterisation that was difficult to substantiate (Brants & Hogendoorn 1988, 131-
132). 
106 Most of the research has oriented itself towards the CD, and to a lesser extent to 
the CP. The following section assumes that these patterns also occur for the CP. 
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Their actions caused the hotel where the meeting was held to catch fire and one CP 
member lost a leg (Lucardie 1998, 24).  
The CP was considered a far right party (Koole 1995, 332). In its 1982 
election manifesto, one can see some anti-immigration and nationalist policies, but 
not the anti-system, racist and far right rhetoric that characterised its campaigns (Van 
Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 35-36; Lucardie 1998, 26). The issue that got most 
attention in the election manifesto is education and culture. The party’s parliamentary 
speech, however, focused on immigration. The only motion that the CP proposed was 
on justice. In written texts, the CP would use more moderate language and focus on 
other issues than they did in their direct electoral appeal to voters (Mudde 1995). The 
CP had good reason to be cautious: Janmaat has been persecuted for making racist 
statements (Schikhof 1998, 147). In parliament, Janmaat had less reason to worry, 
because he could not be prosecuted for what he said there.  
In 1984, Janmaat came into conflict with the extra-parliamentary party 
organisation (Lucardie 1998, 21): an ideological dispute between Janmaat and the 
party cadre escalated into a conflict between the parliamentary party and the extra-
parliamentary party organisation about who should decide the party's course. Janmaat 
left the party, but held on to his seat in parliament (Koole 1995, 332). In 1984, 
Janmaat founded the CD (Centrumdemocraten/Centre Democrats). In the 1986 
elections, both the CP and the CD entered: the CP won three times as many votes as 
the CD, but neither party won a seat. Later that year, the CP was declared bankrupt 
and it was re-launched under the name CP’86 (Koole 1995, 332). The CD would go 
on to win seats in the 1989 and 1994 parliamentary elections. 
Like the RKPN, the CP is a split but not from a parliamentary party: its 
founder Brookman had founded the NCP, but abandoned that party to form the CP. 
The CP sought to mobilise voters on a new far right ideology: the party did not attack 
a particular party for abandoning its ideology. It did, however, appeal particularly to 
working class voters, the traditional base of the PvdA. Combining these three 
arguments, one can consider the party as a mobiliser and specifically as a prophet. 
This categorisation is in line with Rochon (1985, 431). Given that the party’s 
opposition to immigration was the party’s unique appeal, the party has been linked to 
immigration. The CD can be considered both a split from the CP (Janmaat left the 
	   146	  
CP) and a transformation of the CP (the sole MP and face of the party left the CP). 
Therefore, the CD is not included in this study as a separate new party.107  
 
4.4.13 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters 
The AOV (Algemeen Ouderen Verbond/General Pensioners' League) and 
U55+ (Politieke Unie 55+/Political Union 55+) are similar parties: with similar 
programmes they entered in the same election and they both won seats. After the 
elections, they started to cooperate, and in 1998 they entered as a common list. 
Therefore they can best be discussed side-by-side. 
From 1971 onwards, one or more pensioners’ parties entered in the elections 
occasionally, albeit unsuccessfully. In 1989, two parties did: PvO (Partij voor 
Ouderen/Pensioners' Party) and BC (Bejaarden Centraal/Seniors Central). In 1992, 
members of these parties were brought together in order to form a new pensioners’ 
party, U55+. After testing their appeal in the 1994 municipal election, the party 
decided to compete in the 1994 parliamentary elections (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 
1996, 69).108 At the same time, another party was formed: the AOV was founded in 
December 1993 (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996, 132), six months before the 
1994 election. The founder had sought the support of several prominent wealthy 
industrialists in order to finance the new party. Anton Philips, former managing 
director of the electronic company Philips, was the first to support the party 
financially. The party selected the Eindhoven municipal elections as the testing 
ground for the party.109 It won 14% of the vote and became part of the municipal 
governing coalition. After this success, two provincial councillors left the Christian-
democratic CDA and joined the AOV (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 27). The 
party decided to go national and to compete in the 1994 parliamentary elections 
(Kreulen 1995, 15).  
The differences between the two pensioners’ parties were marginal. 
According to the secretary of the U55+, the U55+ was mainly supported by 
pensioners who depended on a state pension, while the pensioners of the AOV also 
had a private pension (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 12). The election 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 This goes against the classification of Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) who 
characterise the CD as a party formed by divorce. 
108 The U55+ won seats in Waddinxveen (in South Holland) and Hengelo (in 
Overijssel). 
109 Eindhoven (in North Brabant) is the fifth city of the Netherlands. 
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manifestos of both parties have similar emphases: healthcare played a major role in 
both their manifestos. The same is true for the parliamentary speech of both parties. 
In addition to healthcare, both parties also emphasised issues such as immigration and 
crime. The major difference in their manifestos is that the AOV wanted to finance the 
financial demands caused by the aging of the population by increasing labour market 
participation, while the U55+ wanted to solve this problem by reducing excessive 
government spending.  
In the 1994 elections, pensioners' issues played a major role. Due to economic 
circumstances the governing coalition of CDA and PvdA had to consider cuts on 
healthcare and social security. The social democratic minister of healthcare sought to 
reduce the budget for nursing homes, pensioners' associations and healthcare 
coverage for pensioners. She was forced to back down after major resistance from 
pensioners’ organisations, which organised mass protests against the cuts (Van 
Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996, 133-134). In 1994 the CDA, the senior partner in the 
coalition government, proposed to freeze all government income grants, including 
government pensions. The proposal also faced public resistance. The party soon 
retracted this proposal. The welfare state was one of the two major issues in 
newspaper reporting of the election campaign (Flight & Felix 1995, 103).  
The 1994 elections saw a large number of seats changing owners: the CDA 
lost 36% of its votes and the PvdA lost 24%. The AOV and U55+ both won seats in 
parliament: the AOV six and the U55+ one. After the elections the AOV was riddled 
by internal problems. At the same time the U55+ sought to cooperate with the AOV. 
Between 1994 and 1998, the conflicts in the AOV spiralled out of control. By 1998 
there were five different parliamentary groups in parliament, which had split from the 
AOV.110 Polling indicated that the AOV was unable to win any seats on its own after 
1995 (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 27). Therefore, first the AOV and later one 
of its successor groups entered into talks with the U55+ about cooperation between 
and possibly a merger of the two pensioners’ parties. The conflicts within the AOV 
stalled this process for a while, but the AOV and U55+ formed a common list for the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The MP Hendriks, which was expelled in 1994 (see Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 
1995, 28); a group of three MPs, which had been expelled from the AOV, led by 
former top candidate Nijpels (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1996, 27); the MP Van 
Wingerden was still aligned with the national executive of the AOV; the MP Verkerk 
who had split from Van Wingerden in 1998; and the senator Batenburg, who had split 
from the AOV as well (De Boer et al. 1999, 26). 
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Table 4.16: profiles of the AOV and U55+ 
Party Profile AOV U55+ 
Full name Algemeen Ouderenverbond Politieke Unie 55+ 
English name General Pensioners' League Political Union 55+ 
Founded 1993 1992 
First elected 1994 1994 




Membership in year of first MPs unknown unknown 
Stability of the parliamentary party 33.3% 100% 
Formation history Birth Extraparliamentary merger 
Party goal Mobiliser (prolocutor) Mobiliser (prolocutor) 
Ideology Pensioners' interest Pensioners' interest 
in election manifesto Healthcare (13.7%) Healthcare (58.0%) 
in parliamentary speech Healthcare (21.8%) Healthcare (27.6%) 
in motions Economic Affairs (29.2%) Healthcare 
Labour 
Transport (33.3%) 
in literature Pensioners’ issues  Pensioners’ issues  
Owned 
issue 
assigned Healthcare Healthcare 




In parliament 1994-1998 1994-1998 
Reason dissolution Merged into AOV/U55+ Merged into AOV/U55+ 
 
1998 parliamentary election (De Boer et al. 1999). In 1998 two other pensioners’ 
parties, related to the AOV, entered the election. None of these parties won a seat.111 
U55+ was formed as a merger, but not of two parliamentary parties (pace Van 
Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed by two small extra-parliamentary 
pensioners’ parties. The AOV, in contrast, was a truly new initiative, a party formed 
by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Both parties were mobilisers: they 
did not orient themselves towards any party specifically. They did not represent a 
group that was the traditional social base of a party. Nor did they adhere to an 
ideology of an established party. Rather, they emphasised traditional economic 
issues, with a particular mix of leftwing and rightwing positions, oriented at 
defending the interests of one particular group: pensioners. This categorization is in 
line with Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287). Both parties are linked to the category 
healthcare. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 The AOV/U55+, Senioren 2000 (Seniors 2000, formed by the group Nijpels) and 
the NSOV (Nieuw Solidair Ouderenverbond/New Social Pensioners' League), formed 
by AOV founder Batenburg. 
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Table 4.17: profile of the SP  
Party Profile SP 
Full name Socialistische Partij 
English name Socialist Party 
Founded 1971 
First elected 1994 
First succesful election result 2 
(1.3%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 15978 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Extraparliamentary divorce 
Party goal Challenger (PvdA) 
Ideology Socialism 
in election manifesto Foreign Affairs (11.6%) 
in parliamentary speech Housing (11.3%) 
in motions Healthcare (21.4%) 




Unique proposals 24.5% 
(31) 
In parliament 1994-now 
Reason dissolution Still in parliament 
 
4.4.14 SP: a leftwing challenger 
The SP (Socialistische Partij/Socialist Party) was formed as part of the small 
Dutch Maoist movement, which had split away from the CPN. Over time it 
developed a different profile as a leftwing protest party. 23 years after its foundation 
the SP entered parliament. 
The SP was formed in 1971 under the name KPN (Kommunistische Partij 
Nederland-Marxistisch/Leninistisch/Communist Party Netherlands-Marxist/Leninist), 
a Maoist splinter party (Koole 1995, 270). The KPN was split from the KEN 
(Kommunistische Eenheidsbeweging Nederland-Marxistisch/Leninistisch/Communist 
Unity Movement Netherlands-Marxist/Leninist), which in turn was a split from the 
CPN, the main communist party in the Netherlands (Beekers 2005, 22). The leader of 
the KPN, Daan Monjé, had also had a leading role in the KEN (Beekers 2005, 49). In 
1972 the party renamed itself Socialist Party112. In its early years, the SP followed a 
Maoist strategy: party members were expected to integrate into the masses and learn 
from them what it was that the people wanted (Voerman 1988, 133-134). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Since 1972 the party called itself Socialistiese Partij; since 1993 Socialistische 
Partij. 
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Since 1977, the SP participated in parliamentary elections. On the municipal 
level, it was particularly successful in North Brabant (one of the southern provinces 
of the Netherlands), especially in the city of Oss, where it has had seats in the 
municipal council since 1974 (Slager 2001, 138). On the national level, the party 
entered in all elections between 1977 and 1989 but without electoral success. The 
party adapted, abandoning its Maoist strategy and Marxist ideology (Voerman 1988; 
Van der Steen 1995). It took “populist” positions on issues like women’s 
emancipation and the integration of minorities. It voiced opposition to feminism and 
the multicultural positions of the small parties of the left and the social democrats 
(Koole 1995, 271). By 1994, the party had reinvented itself as a leftwing protest 
party: the party entered the election with the slogan “Vote Against, Vote SP” (Kagie 
2004, 79 translation SO). The party focused on a broad range of issues including 
social-economic policy, healthcare, education and income distribution. In the analysis 
of the manifesto, foreign policy was identified as the dominant issue and labour 
issues are a close second. The 1994 elections were preceded by major conflicts about 
social affairs cuts: in addition to the conflicts with pensioners' organisations, the 
cabinet also came into conflict with the labour unions about disability pension, which 
in turn led to conflicts within the PvdA (Lucardie, Nieboer & Noomen 1992, 47; Van 
der Zwan 2008, 227-228). In these elections the SP won two seats. Koole (1995, 271) 
explains the rise of the SP with the conflicts within the PvdA.113 In parliament, the 
SP’s two MPs soon became an important voice of opposition. The party focused on 
housing in its parliamentary speech and on healthcare in its motions. They targeted 
their critique on the social democrats, which had adopted a third way-ideology; 
therefore Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the SP as a challenger of the 
PvdA. Social democratic Prime Minister Wim Kok characterised the party as a 
“jamming station”, which SP-leader Jan Marijnissen took as a compliment (De Boer 
et al. 1999, 78 translation SO). Over time, the SP would grow considerably, doubling 
its vote share in 1998 and 2002 and more than doubling it in 2006. 
The SP was a split from the KEN, which was a split from the CPN. At the time, 
however, the KEN was not in parliament, which makes this yet another example of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Koole also points to the disappearance of the CPN: a segment of working class 
voters was no longer represented. As the CPN disappeared from parliament in 1986 
due to a lack of electoral support and the SP entered in 1994, this argument seems a 
bit strange. 
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extra-parliamentary split (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). The SP 
clearly operated as a challenger party, adhering to a stricter interpretation of socialism 
than the PvdA and seeking to represent the traditional working class electorate of the 
PvdA. On the basis of its history, one may consider the SP to be a challenger of the 
CPN. However, given that the CPN had disappeared from parliament in 1986 and that 
the SP positioned itself as a competitor of the PvdA rather than of the CPN, one has 
to consider it a challenger of the PvdA. Labour is selected as the SP's issue, as this is 
characteristic of its economic focus.  
 
4.4.15 LN and LPF: democratic populists & the return of anti-immigration 
politics 
In 2002, two new political parties entered the Dutch political arena: LN 
(Leefbaar Nederland/Liveable Netherlands), a typical case of a purifier party, 
oriented at government reform but pragmatic on other issues, and the LPF (Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn/List Pim Fortuyn), an anti-immigration party. The histories of the two parties 
are closely linked and they will therefore be discussed in one section.  
LN was formed in 1999 as “the outgrowth of a motley collection of local 
protest parties” (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23). Its founders were Jan Nagel, a former 
senator for the PvdA, who led the local party Leefbaar Hilversum (Liveable 
Hilversum), and Henk Westbroek, who led the local party Leefbaar Utrecht (Liveable 
Utrecht) (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003, 21). These were two of a growing 
number of independent local political parties. Most of them voiced opposition against 
technocratic urban renewal projects (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 75). LN favoured 
government reform, and combined this with a mix of rightwing and leftwing 
positions on other issues (Lucardie 2004, 21; Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 209): the 
party wanted to bring politics closer to the voters and rejected technocratic politics 
(Lucardie 2008b, 154). In its election manifesto, governance was the largest issue. 
None of the founders of the party wanted to lead the party in the upcoming 
election, and therefore, they decided to hold an election for the leadership. The most 
prominent candidate was Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn was known as a columnist of the 
centre-right weekly Elsevier in which he criticised the cabinet of PvdA, VVD and 
D66 for the way it managed the public sector and for the way it dealt with the 
growing immigrant, Islamic, population (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003, 22; 
Lucardie 2004, 209). Fortuyn had undergone several ideological transformations as 
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well: from a Marxist beginning, via a neo-liberal phase to a communitarian period 
(Pels 2003). The other candidates for the party’s list included many people who had 
been involved with other established parties (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 
94).114 The party was not formed by homines novi who had no background in other 
parties, but instead, it united individuals from the entire political spectrum. Fortuyn 
was endorsed by the party board and was elected by a wide margin as top candidate 
on the party’s list (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 23).  
Since the 1990s, Fortuyn had strongly emphasised the importance of culture. 
He had denounced the lack of national consciousness of Dutch politicians (Pels 2003, 
200), and he combined his communitarian and nationalist beliefs with a commitment 
to liberal values (Akkerman 2005). In Fortuyn’s view, the fact that many immigrants 
did not accept these liberal values was a threat to these values. Fortuyn’s outspoken 
positions on immigration led to a break between him and LN. The final issue was an 
interview in which Fortuyn proposed to eliminate the prohibition of discrimination 
from the Dutch constitution (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 97; Andeweg & 
Irwin 2009, 23). A former VVD member and prominent public prosecutor, Fred 
Teeven, replaced Fortuyn on the LN list (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 98). In 
February 2002, Fortuyn formed his own party: the LPF. The party was founded with 
support of several businessmen (Lucardie 2004, 213). In a matter of months a new 
party was created. The list of candidates consisted of a large number of people 
without much political experience. The most experienced people were a CDA MP 
and a prominent parliamentary journalist who had been a passive VVD member 
(Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 103). As a (first) election manifesto, the party 
used Fortuyn’s book, which combined policy proposals with autobiographical 
elements (Fortuyn 2002). The book combined populism with liberal, nationalist and 
communitarian elements. The book was followed by a shorter election manifesto. In 
both the book and the election manifesto, immigration was the main issue. Fortuyn 
dominated the following general election campaign, especially after the strong 
performance of the Fortuyn-led Leefbaar Rotterdam (Liveable Rotterdam), in the 
municipal elections in Rotterdam. He criticised all parties for neglecting the growth 
of government bureaucracy and the integration of immigrants into Dutch society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Out of the 353 candidates, 62 had a VVD-background, 21 in the PvdA, 21 in the CDA, 
18 in D66, 6 in the SP and 5 in the GL. The most experienced were a former KVP-minister 
and a senator representing provincial parties (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 2004). 
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(Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 74-75). Nine days before the election, Fortuyn was 
shot by an animal rights activist (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23).  
Andeweg and Irwin (2005, 17) claimed that, “[g]iven the extraordinary 
circumstances, the (electoral, SO) results came as no surprise, although they were 
without precedent.” The governing parties PvdA, VVD and D66 lost heavily. The 
LPF made the most “impressive début” (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 24) a new party had 
ever made in the Netherlands: from 0% to 17% of the vote. LN obtained less than 2% 
in parliament (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 99). A cabinet was formed by the 
CDA, the LPF and the VVD. The cabinet was short-lived, however: by the autumn of 
2002, the cabinet had fallen due to internal struggles within the LPF, a party that was 
left without its leader (Lucardie 2008a, 163). In the short period in which it was in 
parliament, the LPF saw three MPs leave its ranks. In the following elections, the 
LPF lost eighteen of its 26 seats, and LN lost both its seats. In the following three 
years the LPF disintegrated: by 2006 the eight men parliamentary party had divided 
into three parliamentary parties and there had been four changes in the leadership of 
the LPF parliamentary party. In the 2006 elections, three parties participated that 
were led by (former) members of the LPF.115 None of them were able to win a seat in 
parliament. During the period 2002-2006, the LPF focused on justice in its 
parliamentary speeches, but it proposed most motions on agriculture.116  
LN was as a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): 
contrary to other parties formed by birth many of its members were involved in other 
parties from the entire political spectrum. Therefore it cannot be considered a party 
formed as a split from any of the established parties. The LPF was a party formed by 
divorce, but again, not from a parliamentary party (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 
2011, 302-303): the top candidate of the LN left the party to form his own party. 
Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the LN as a mobiliser (and 
specifically a purifier): LN did not adhere to an ideology that another party 
abandoned, nor did it target a segment of the electorate a party no longer represented.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 These were Fortuyn (Lijst Vijf Fortuyn/List Five Fortuyn), the legal successor of the 
LPF, PvN (Partij voor Nederland/Party for the Netherlands), led by former LPF-minister 
Hilbrand Nawijn and the EénNL formed by former LPF-MP Joost Eerdmans and former 
Rotterdam alderman Marco Pastors for Leefbaar Rotterdam.  
116 These differences between programme and parliamentary activity can be explained by 
individual MPs in these poorly organised parties: one of the most experienced LPF MPs 
was Van den Brink, a former farmers’ leader. The LN, under the leadership of former 
public prosecutor Teeven, focused on justice, in its parliamentary speeches and motions. 
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Table 4.18: profiles of the LN and LPF 
Party Profile LN LPF 
Full name Leefbaar Nederland Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
English name Liveable Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn 
Founded 1999 2002 
First elected 2002 2002 




Membership in year of first MPs 1237 4100 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 62.5% 
Formation history Birth Extraparliamentary divorce 
Party goal Mobiliser (prophet) Mobiliser (prophet) 
Ideology Democratic Populism Liberal Nationalism 
in election manifesto Governance (17.6%) Migration (19.2%) 
in parliamentary speech Justice (32.5%) Justice (12.7%) 
in motions Justice (60%) Agriculture (11.0%) 
in literature Government reform Opposition to immigration  
Owned 
issue 
assigned Governance Migration 




In parliament 2002-2003 2002-2006 
Reason dissolution Party death Party death 
 
It sought to represent the entire population and advocate government reform, as a 
purifier. Given that LN was a purifier that focused on government reform, 
governance is the party's core issue. Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) consider the 
LPF a purifier (a subcategory of mobiliser), but acknowledge that in many ways the 
party is a personalist party, which also has elements of a prophet. Closer analysis 
however implies that the party can best be thought of as a prophet, another kind of 
mobiliser. The party introduced a new ideology of the LPF, which mixes elements of 
nationalism and liberalism. The categorisation of purifier also does not fit because the 
most important issue of the LPF was not government reform but rather immigration.
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Table 4.19: profile of the PVV  
Party Profile PVV 
Full name Partij voor de Vrijheid 
English name Party for Freedom 
Founded 2004 
First elected 2006 
First succesful election result 9 
(5.9%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 1 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Divorce 
Party goal Mobiliser (prophet) 
Ideology Liberal nationalism 
in election manifesto Justice (22.1%) 
in parliamentary speech Justice (14.1%) 
in motions Justice (14.8%) 




Unique proposals 27.1% 
(29) 
In parliament 2004-now 
Reason dissolution Still in parliament 
 
4.4.16 PVV: the persistence of anti-immigration politics 
As we saw in paragraph 4.4.16, over the course of the 2003-2006 
parliamentary term, the LPF completely collapsed. At the same time, Geert Wilders 
broke away from the VVD parliamentary party and formed a new party, the PVV 
(Partij voor de Vrijheid/Freedom Party). In the 2006 elections, the PVV replaced the 
LPF as the most rightwing party in the Dutch parliament. 
In 2004, Wilders left the VVD parliamentary party (Hippe et al. 2005, 101). 
Wilders had been an MP for the VVD since 1998. After the 2002 elections, he 
became an important voice in the debate about integration and immigration, and 
especially the place of Islam in the Netherlands and the European Union. Meanwhile, 
Wilders and the VVD grew apart. The final breaking point was the possible entry of 
Turkey into the European Union, which the VVD favoured but Wilders opposed. 
Wilders continued as an independent MP. He rebuked offers from the LPF to 
cooperate with them (Hippe et al. 2005, 102), and in 2006, he formally founded the 
PVV. The name explicitly referred to the name of the PvdV, one of the parties that 
merged into the VVD. In Wilders’ view, the VVD had abandoned the classical liberal 
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course by espousing a social liberal course (Lucardie et al. 2008, 61). The PVV did 
not only scald the VVD for abandoning its course: the party also presents itself as the 
true heir of social democracy (Bosma 2010, 38-55). In the 2006 elections, the PVV 
won nine seats. The party’s list consisted of individuals who did not have extensive 
political experience. One MP had been a member of the Rotterdam city council for 
Leefbaar Rotterdam and another had been a member of the North Holland provincial 
council for the LPF. The PVV has a limited party organisation: formally, there is only 
a Vereniging Partij voor de Vrijheid (Association Party for Freedom) of which 
Wilders and his Stichting Partij voor de Vrijheid (Foundation Party for Freedom) are 
the only members. In the 2010 general elections, the PVV nearly tripled its electoral 
support and it entered in an agreement with the CDA and VVD to support their 
cabinet without supplying ministers.  
The PVV’s manifesto advocated a more restrictive immigration policy, law 
and order policies, lower taxes, and more direct democracy, and it opposed further 
European integration (Lucardie et al. 2008, 62-63; Lucardie 2009, 177-178). The 
programme specifically advocated policies against the Islamisation of the Dutch 
culture, such as specific legislation against Islamic schools, headscarves and the 
building of mosques. Wilders agitated against the Dutch Left, which in his view was 
far too appeasing towards the growing totalitarian threat of political Islam (Vossen 
2010, 9-10). According to Vossen (2010), this combined critique of both the Dutch 
leftwing establishment and the growth of Islam has similarities to Fortuyn. There is 
considerably discussion about how to characterise the ideology of the PVV (Lucardie 
2009, 176-177). Pels (2005, 90, 2011, 43-44) considers the party to be committed to a 
kind of liberal nationalism: it seeks to defend the liberal Dutch culture against 
external threats such as Islam. On similar grounds, Lucardie (2009, 181) describes the 
party’s ideology as liberal nationalism as well. From the scholarly literature, it is 
clear that the dominant issue of the PVV is immigration, because of the party's 
opposition to the Islamisation of Dutch society. In its election manifesto, its 
parliamentary speeches and its motions, however, the PVV focuses on justice. In the 
eyes of the PVV there is a relationship between the two issues: its anti-crime 
measures are specifically oriented at fighting what they call "street terror" in which 
they link Islamic extremism to security (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2010, 9).  
Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the PVV as a challenger of the 
VVD and a party split from the VVD. While the latter is certainly the case, the former 
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is less certain. One has to consider three elements: the political communication of the 
PVV, its electoral strategy and its political programme. The electoral appeal of the 
PVV is much broader than the VVD-electorate, and their ideology is far more radical, 
especially in its opposition to the Islamisation of Dutch culture and the political 
establishment than the VVD ever was. In this sense, the PVV is more of a challenger 
of the LPF, which had collapsed, than of the VVD. Therefore, one cannot consider 
the PVV to be a challenger of the VVD, but rather a mobiliser in the tradition of the 
LPF. Thus, the PVV is linked to the issue of immigration.  
 
4.4.17 PvdD: the hobbyhorse 
The PvdD (Partij voor de Dieren/Party for the Animals) was the first animal 
rights party to win representation in a national parliament.117 The party defends the 
interest of a particular group. This group, however, is not a group that could vote for 
the party, like farmers, pensioners or small businessmen, but it is a group that cannot 
vote: animals. 	  
The PvdD was formed by birth, founded by members of the animal welfare 
movement (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 287). It was founded on October 28, 2002. 
The founders were the chair, the director and a policy advisor of the animal rights 
NGO Bont voor Dieren.118 They were concerned about the policies of the first 
Balkenende cabinet concerning animal rights, environment and agriculture (Lucardie 
2008b, 159). The founders were particularly worried about that cabinet’s plans to 
delay and reverse legislation on animal rights. In the eyes of the activists, this 
legislation was an indirect consequence of their own efforts as lobbyists and activists 
(Thieme 2006, 29).119 They decided that, in that case, they should go into politics to 
ensure that animal rights received the attention it deserved (Schaafsma 2006, 21). The 
stigmatisation that animal rights activist felt after the murder of Fortuyn by an animal 
rights activist and their timid reactions to the plans of the centre-right cabinet were 
additional reasons to enter into politics (Meeuwissen 2011, 19). Niko Koffeman, an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Misérus, M. "Wereldprimeur in het Haagse parlement; dierenpartij in de landelijke 
politiek heeft geen voorbeelden elders". Volkskrant 24 November, 2006. 
118 "Bont voor Dieren" literally means Fur for Animals, but it also sounds like League 
for Animals in Dutch. Jungmann, B. "Politieke dieren houden voeling met de 
wortels". De Volkskrant, 30/9/2006. 
119 De Bruijn, E. "Zetels voor dieren: hoe zit dat nou?" NRC Handelsblad, 
19/12/2002.  
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independent campaign advisor to the Socialist Party, had already developed the idea 
for an animal rights party back in 1992 (Meeuwissen 2011, 18).120  
The PvdD participated in the 2003 elections. In the parliamentary elections, 
the party obtained 0.5% of the votes. A year later, the party participated in the 
elections for the European Parliament. Eight Dutch authors, TV personalities and 
opinion makers endorsed the party by accepting a position on the party’s list.121 The 
party won 3.2% of the vote, half a percent short for a seat. In 2006, the party again 
took part in the national elections, and again, several Dutch celebrities endorsed the 
party.122 The party won two seats in the Tweede Kamer. In the parliamentary 
elections of 2010, the party retained its two seats and in the provincial elections of 
2011, it lost one of its eight seats in provincial councils.  
The programme of the PvdD focuses on animal welfare. The party aims to be 
the voice of the weaker and voiceless sections of society, particularly animals 
(Lucardie 2004, 208; Meeuwissen 2011, 21). Most of the PvdD attention is given to 
the position of animals in industrial agriculture, but there is also attention to the 
position of wild animals and circus animals. The environment features prominently in 
the programme, besides animal rights. The party argues that it transcends the 
traditional division between left and right and instead aims for a society based on 
sustainability and compassion. 123 Therefore, "the Party for the Animals is not a 
single-issue party. We dare to believe in and work towards a sustainable society. A 
society that aims at a more comfortable life for current and future generations" 
(Thieme 2006, 11 translation SO). 
Thieme and Koffeman give different reasons why specifically an animal 
rights party was established. Thieme, who was involved in the foundation of the 
party, demonstrates a great commitment to the welfare of animals. In her opinion, the 
other existing parties are actually single-interest parties because they focus solely on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Banning, C. "Via Sla! en Nútopia in de Eerste Kamer; Niko Koffeman wordt de 
eerste senator voor de Partij voor de Dieren en neemt afscheid van de SP". Ibid., 
29/5/2007. Kruijt, M. "'Stem tegen, stem SP' kiest voor de dieren. Interview Niko 
Koffeman". De Volkskrant, 15/3/2007 , Ter Horst, G. "Partij wil dieren terug op 
Haagse agenda". Agrarisch Dagblad, 3/12/2003. 
121 "Rudy Kousbroek lijstduwer Partij voor de Dieren". NRC Handelsblad, 8/3/2004. 
"Onderste Dieren". Het Financieele Dagblad, 10/2/2004. 
122 Jungmann, B. "Politieke dieren houden voeling met de wortels". De Volkskrant, 
30/9/2006. 
123 De Waard, M. "Profiteren van onbehagen burgers". NRC Handelsblad, 9/6/2004. 
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the financial interests of humans and neglect many other interests, particularly the 
interests of animals (Thieme 2006, 30). 124 She tries to raise the profile of animal 
rights by acting as a pacer in the marathon, which forces the other runners (the other 
parties) to run faster for animal rights. In the eyes of Thieme, animal welfare is "a 
side dish on the political menu" of the established parties (Thieme 2006, 113). Even 
when there was an animal-friendly majority in the Tweede Kamer between 1998 and 
2002, the parties did too little for animal welfare, according to Thieme (2006, 80). 
The "hot breath" of the PvdD should force the other parties to put animal rights 
higher on the political agenda (Thieme 2006, 83). Thieme wants to remind the 
existing parties of the "good intentions in their own programmes" (Thieme 2006, 74) 
and wants to be their animal-friendly conscience (Thieme 2006, 70). 
Koffeman explains the strategy of the party in a different way. He fathered of 
the idea of an animal rights party, but he became involved with the party only after it 
was formed. In his view, journalists are not interested in yet another party with a 
broad programme oriented at welfare and sustainability. By zooming in on the 
specific issue of animal rights, the party draws journalists’ attention. By doing so, the 
party can bring its message to the public: even the choice for the name 'Party for the 
Animals' was strategic in nature, according to Koffeman. The party could also have 
been called 'Party for the Environment' or 'Party for Animals and Children', but 
according to Koffeman that makes no lasting impression. By zooming in on the 
animal issue, the PvdD shows the true magnitude of the environmental problems and 
attracts media attention.125  
These arguments are partly contradictory: in the story of Koffeman, the PvdD 
has a broad green and leftwing programme and it uses animal rights to attract 
attention. In Thieme’s story, the party focuses on animal rights in order to realise 
policy change, albeit indirectly. The question arises whether animals have intrinsic 
value for the party or whether they are an instrument. In the parliamentary work of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Van Heese, R. & I. Weel. ""Wij zijn Partij voor de Duurzaamheid" PvdD-
fractievoorzitter Thieme wil verder kijken dan de belangen van de Westerse mens". 
Trouw, 21/3/2009.  
125 Van Os, P. "Dierenmanieren; portret Partij voor de Dieren". NRC Handelsblad 
17/4/2010, ""Wij worden gedomineerd" Partij voor de Dieren-senator Niko Koffeman 
gruwt van CDA "Beschaving zou los moeten staan van welvaart"". De Telegraaf, 
2/7/2007 "'Wij worden groter dan GroenLinks'". De Pers, 31/3/2008. Translations SO 
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the party, the focus of the party on agriculture and animal rights remains. This is an 
indication of the MP's intrinsic motivation.	  
The relationship between the PvdD and the other existing parties, particularly 
the GL, influences how the goal of the PvdD must be understood: is this small green 
party a challenger of the larger green party GL or does the party seek to create a new 
line of conflict that transcends the existing dimensions? In the eyes of the PvdD, all 
existing parties focus too much on the interests of human beings and neglect the 
interests of animals, although some parties are more successful in transcending the 
interests of their own species than others (Thieme 2006, 56-57). The Christian 
parties, and particularly the CDA, emphasise environmental stewardship, but 
according to Thieme, they have continually bowed to agricultural interests. They are, 
according to Thieme, the main opponents of the PvdD.126 GL, together with the SP, 
PvdA and D66 belong to the "animal-friendly majority" (Thieme 2006, 79-80), the 
parties that are better able to transcend their own species' interest. These parties did 
not devote enough attention to animal welfare in the eyes of Thieme (2006 113). The 
GL, PvdA and D66 are the parties that belong to the left in traditional socio-economic 
terms, but animal welfare, according to Thieme (2006), transcends the existing left-
right pattern. On issues other than the environment and agriculture, the PvdD takes 
similar positions as the other leftwing parties.127 
The relationship between the animal-friendly parties and the PvdD is 
complex. Thieme claims that the main conflict is not between the PvdD and the 
animal friendly parties (Thieme 2006, 113). The proponents of animal welfare within, 
for instance the GL, are unable to make the issue a priority of the party (Thieme 
2006, 84). The absence of vegetarians in the GL parliamentary party between 2006 
and 2010 was symptomatic for the lack of attention to animal welfare in that party, 
according to Thieme and Koffeman.128 During several campaigns, the PvdD focused 
on the GL: in 2005, Thieme wrote that GL’s support for the "animal-unfriendly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Eerst belachelijk dan crimineel en dan win je"; lijsttrekker Thieme ziet andere 
politici de 'grote leugen' van haar dierenpartij nu annexeren'". NRC Handelsblad, 
17/4/2010. 
127 Lucardie, P. "Links voor dieren én mensen". Trouw, 5/12/2006. 
128 Van Os, P. ""Eerst belachelijk dan crimineel en dan win je"; lijsttrekker Thieme 
ziet andere politici de 'grote leugen' van haar dierenpartij nu annexeren'". NRC 
Handelsblad, 17/4/2010, "'Wij worden groter dan GroenLinks'". De Pers, 31/3/2008. 
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European Constitution" was bad for its credibility on the animal rights issue.129 When 
several local GL councillors spoke out in favour of an industrial scale stable, Thieme, 
together with the author Kees Van Kooten, wrote: "how fast can a party that once 
called itself progressive forget its ideals when it begins to bear governmental 
responsibility."130  
 In an electoral sense, the PvdD does not focus on the constituency of a particular 
party. When Thieme (2006, 33) speaks about the electoral potential of the PvdD, she 
refers to the number of vegetarians. Also, she appeals explicitly to voters by asking 
them to voice their dissatisfaction about the treatment of animals and express their 
sympathy for animals, independent of the question of who gets into power (Thieme 
2006, 115). For what is known about the party's electoral support, the party performs 
well in constituencies with highly educated voters (which tend to vote GL and D66) 
and constituencies with lower educated voters (which tend to vote SP and PVV) (De 
Voogd 2011).  
Authors have categorised the PvdD a prolocutor, a subcategory of the 
mobiliser party (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 287; Schaafsma 2006, 5). If one looks at 
the three aspects of a mobiliser party discussed above, a more complex picture 
emerges: in the campaign strategy, one can see that the party focused on both the 
CDA, as the representative of traditional farm interests, and on the GL and the other 
animal friendly parties that have neglected the issue. This makes the PvdD difficult to 
place. The programme of the PvdD shows the same ambiguity. This programme 
differs significantly from the programmes of the existing parties in its special focus 
on animal welfare. The PvdD, however, says that it is more than a single-issue party: 
it looks at all political issues from the perspective of sustainability and compassion. 
This is reflected in positions that are similar to the ones of GL and the SP. The central 
claim of challenging parties, namely that a particular party no longer represents the 
ideology that it once did, is not consistently and continually made by the PvdD. The 
PvdD also does not focus on the electorate of the GL: indeed, by insisting that the 
animal welfare issue transcends the traditional lines of conflict, it appeals to animal 
lovers in all social groups. All in all, the party’s profile leans somewhat to the 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Thieme, M. "GroenLinks en het welzijn van dieren". NRC Handelsblad, 1/3/2005. 
130 Van Kooten, K. & M. Thieme. "Nieuw! Pluk van de Varkensflat". Trouw, 11 
November, 2006. Translation SO 
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Table 4.20: profile of the PvdD  
Party Profile PvdD 
Full name Partij voor de Dieren 
English name Party for the Animals 
Founded 2003 
First elected 2006 
First succesful election result 2 
(1.8%) 
Membership in year of first MPs 6370 
Stability of the parliamentary party 100% 
Formation history Birth 
Party goal Mobiliser (prophet) 
Ideology Green Politics 
in election manifesto Agriculture (68.5%) 
in parliamentary speech Agriculture (36.2%) 
in motions Agriculture (68.0%) 




Unique proposals 47.1% 
(107) 
In parliament 2006-now 
Reason dissolution Still in parliament 
	  
mobiliser. If one follows that profile, it can best be understood as a prophetic party 
trying to express a new ideology of animal welfare, sustainability and compassion, 
which transcends the traditional pattern between left and right. Because animals, the 
group that the PvdD wants to represent, do not have voting rights, the party cannot be 
characterised as a prolocutor. This categorisation follows Meeuwissen (2011, 65-66). 
	  
4.5 Patterns  
Three categorisation schemes were employed here: one looked at the history of 
the new party; the second looked at its goal, and the third at its unique issue. The first 
scheme differentiated between parties formed by birth or divorce. The greatest 
drawback of this scheme is that it does not take into account whether the predecessors 
of a new party - the parties that merged, or the party from which it split - are 
parliamentary or extra-parliamentary. Here the point where a party moves from old to 
new is identified as the point where it enters parliament after competing in an election 
under its own banner for the first time. Therefore, it matters whether the predecessor 
parties had successfully participated in parliamentary elections before. The definition  
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Table 4.21: new parties classified as challenger or mobiliser 
Party According to 
Literature 
Campaign Ideology Electorate Sum Verdict 
KNP Challenger + + + 3 Challenger 
PSP Mobiliser + + - 2 Challenger 
BP Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
GPV Mobiliser - + + 2 Challenger 
D66 Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
PPR Mobiliser + - + 2 Challenger 
DS’70 Challenger + + + 3 Challenger 
NMP Challenger - + - 1 Mobiliser 
RKPN Challenger + + + 3 Challenger 
RPF Challenger - + + 2 Challenger 
EVP Challenger + + + 3 Challenger 
CP Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
AOV Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
U55+ Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
SP Challenger - + + 2 Challenger 
LN Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
LPF Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
PvdD Mobiliser - - - 0 Mobiliser 
PVV Challenger + - - 1 Mobiliser 
 
employed here assumes that the new party split from a party with parliamentary 
representation. Four parties were formed as splits from extra-parliamentary parties 
(the SP, the CP, the RKPN and the LPF), however, and one was formed as a merger 
of two extra-parliamentary parties (U55+). While these parties are formally formed 
by divorce or marriage, this is a kind of embryonic divorce or marriage (if one 
continues with Mair’s typology). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, these 
parties ought to be considered as parties formed by birth. 
The second classification divided challengers from mobilisers. This typology 
was operationalised into a classificatory scheme with three criteria. It is clear that 
some parties fit better into this scheme than others. In table 4.21 one can see whether 
the particular characteristics of challenger parties were or were not present in each 
case. Twelve of the nineteen cases fit perfectly into this categorisation. Four of these 
are challengers and eight of these are mobilisers. Seven cases fit less well into this 
categorisation: five of these, PSP, GPV, PPR, RPF and SP, are imperfect challengers, 
which miss one characteristics of a challenger party. Two of these, the PVV and the 
NMP, meet one characteristic of a challenger but are still considered mobiliser. 
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Overall, this study agrees with the studies of Rochon (1985) and Krouwel and 
Lucardie (2008) in almost three quarters of the cases.131 
Finally, each party was linked to an issue: from agriculture to defence. Some 
issues are used by more than one party: only nine issue categories are used for 
nineteen parties. The most prominent issues are governance, immigration, and moral 
issues. Three new parties prioritise each of these three issues. Three issues are 
prioritised by two parties (defence, agriculture, healthcare). Two issues are prioritised 
by one party (the economic issues economic affairs and labour). Most issues lie 
outside of the socio-economic line of conflict and are more cultural (immigration, 
moral issues) or political (defence, governance) in nature. The classification fits 
poorly in six cases, because there is a discrepancy between the most emphasised issue 
in the manifesto and the distinctive issue according to the literature. Post-materialist 
parties D66 and PPR emphasised economic issues more than their distinctive post-
materialist concerns for the environment and governance. While in absolute terms 
D66 and the PPR focused more on economic issues, compared to the established 
parties these two parties were distinctive for their focus on post-materialist issues. For 
the CP one can see a clear difference between the formal documents (such as election 
manifestos) and their activity in parliament. The SP has a diffuse economic issue 
focus instead of a focus on one economic issue; therefore, foreign policy (a relatively 
large issue category) is slightly larger than economic issues such as labour. The PVV, 
however, is a different case: as could be seen for the PVV, but also for LN and LPF, 
these populist parties tend be active on justice instead of on governance or 
immigration.132 DS'70 is the most difficult case. This party focused most on 
governance in its election manifesto. This is not, however, an issue that was,  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Two cases offer an additional complication: the NMP and the BP. These parties 
are clearly not challengers, because they do not focus on a particular party, but they 
are not really mobilisers either: they do not seek to introduce a new issue or a new 
division into politics. Rather, they operate on economic issues and on the classical 
left-right dimension. Therefore one could identify a fourth category of the mobilisers, 
namely the protest parties. These parties seek to mobilise protest votes along the 
existing dimensions, challenging not just one party on the right or the left, but all 
parties on one of these dimensions.  
132 Note, however, that when analysing the patterns in attention and position, the 
patterns found for immigration and governance for these periods could better be 
explained by the presence of these new parties than the patterns on the issue of 
justice. 
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Table 4.22: new parties classified  
Category Divorce Birth Sum 
Challenger 6 3 9 
Mobiliser 1 9 10 
Sum 7 12 19 
 
according to the literature, a defining issue of either of DS’70’s tendencies (the 
foreign policy-oriented anti-communists, or the economically oriented social 
democrats). It is still selected as the distinctive issue of the DS'70 because it was the 
issue that united its two tendencies.  
Over time, several trends can be seen in the categorisation: a major change is 
that new parties before 1982 were mainly challengers of established parties, whereas 
after 1982 the new parties tended to be mobilisers. There is a significant correlation 
between the year in which a party entered parliament and whether it was a challenger 
or not (Pearson’s r is -0.52 – significant at the 0.05-level). This may be a result of 
depillarisation: the established parties did not just lose control over the voters, but 
they also became less important for the foundation of new parties. The major 
established parties lost their dominant role in politics. A similar development can be 
seen in the electoral support of new parties: there is a weak correlation between the 
support of a new party on its first entry and the year of its foundation (Pearson’s r is 
0.34). This is a sign of the same development: over time, the established parties lost 
control over their voters and elections became more volatile, providing better 
opportunities for new parties. There is a weak negative relationship between the year 
of entry and whether a party was formed by divorce or not (Pearson’s r is -0.25). 
Over time, new parties were formed more independently from the established parties. 
Another pattern, which is shown in table 4.22, is that challenger parties tend to be 
formed by divorce: all parties formed by divorce were challengers, and only three 
parties formed by birth were challengers. It seems obvious that new parties, which 
break away from established parties claim that the established party no longer 
represents the ideology a party stood for, instead of advocating new issues or 
representing underrepresented interests. Of the nine parties formed in order to 
challenge an established party, three challenged the PvdA, which followed the 
oscillation between the left and the centre that the PvdA made over time. Six 
challenger parties were oriented explicitly towards one of the Christian-democratic 
parties. Four of these were formed in the wake of the formation of the Christian-
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democratic Appeal (CDA), in which the ideologically homogenous Christian parties 
merged into one non-denominational centrist party.  
This is also reflected in their issue orientation: out of the nine challenger 
parties, three focus on moral issues; these are all challengers of a Christian-
democratic party. As one would expect, mobilisers have tended to focus on issues 
outside of traditional social-economic competition: out of the ten mobiliser parties, 
three focus on immigration, two on government reform and two on pensioners' issues. 
Three parties focus on economic issues: agriculture (BP and PvdD) and economic 
affairs (NMP). Of these three, the PvdD brings their distinctive animal rights 
approach to agriculture.  
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Chapter 5: Reinvigorating or redefining? 
How new parties influence issue politics in parliament 
 
“I am content with the intentions [of the animal-friendly established parties], I 
don’t want to create a conflict between us and them, but the fact remains that, for 
them, animal welfare is a side dish on their political menu. That should come to an 
end once and for all. And that will happen when a serious competitor is represented 
in parliament and reminds them every day of their moral duties to their voters and 
to animals.” - Marianne Thieme, leader of the PvdD (2006, 113 translation SO) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Thieme is clear about the role of her party, the PvdD: established parties have 
ignored animal welfare, the issue that the PvdD owns, for far too long. Thieme does 
not disagree with the intentions that established parties wrote in their election 
manifestos, but rather, she laments that they do not put their promises into practice 
in the Tweede Kamer. She hopes to influence the attention that established parties 
devote to issues by participating in parliament. Harmel (1985:405) has proposed 
that new political parties may have a special role in bringing new issues into the 
political arena. Even when they never gain enough support to be a relevant political 
party (in the sense used by Sartori (1976)) or when their support lasts only a single 
election, new political parties could have a lasting impact on the party system in this 
way. 
The focus in this chapter is on the parliamentary arena. Political decision-
making in parliaments tends to be fixed: the nature of the conflict has been defined, 
the lines of conflict have been drawn, the possible majorities have been determined, 
and, therefore, the policy outcomes are predictable. Only an external shock will be 
able to change this situation. Elections may provide an external shock because they 
can change the possible majorities, but also because they allow new actors to enter 
the political arena. New political parties will attempt to put new issues on the 
agenda, influence the policy positions of established parties, redefine the political 
conflict, create new majorities and therefore upset the existing balance of powers. 
The entry of a new political party may have an effect on the way politics is done in 
parliament. Just like PvdD, mobilising new parties may specifically seek to change 
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the saliency of an issue or redefine the nature of competition on this issue. 
Challenger parties may seek to bring new life to the existing lines of conflict that 
established parties let bleed to death. The goal of this chapter is to determine to 
what extent and under what conditions new parties are able to influence the 
attention that established parties devote to issues in parliament. Moreover, this 
chapter will seek to analyse how new parties influence the positions of established 
parties on issues, and the extent to which they are able to introduce new lines of 
conflict on specific issues. This chapter will also examine whether new parties are 
able to reinvigorate the conflict on particular issues in parliament. 
The results indicate that the effects of new parties on attention will be more 
marked when the new parties focus on their own issue, when new parties are larger 
and when new parties are better organised. This chapter also finds that mobiliser 
and challenger new parties influence the positions that parties take on issues 
differently: mobilisers are associated with a redefinition of significant lines of 
conflict, while challengers are associated with increasing political conflict and party 
politicisation on the issue. 
 
 5.2 Case-by-case analyses 
The following sections will present the developments in the attention that 
parties devote to the issues owned by all new parties. The goal of these discussions 
is to assess the extent to which the patterns in attention can be attributed to the entry 
of the new party and to uncover mechanisms that may underlie these developments. 
The focus, here, will lie on the question to what extent and less on the question 
under what conditions. The reason for this is that this chapter finds that there may 
be considerable differences in the way new parties influence the attention that 
established parties devote to issues, but established parties react in a uniform way to 
new parties; in most cases, all parties show a similar pattern of increasing attention, 
decreasing attention or stability in attention. This has two implications: first and 
foremost, the explanation of differences in the developments must be attributed to 
characteristics of new parties and not to characteristics of established parties or the 
link between the new and established party. And second, the focus of these case-by-
case analyses will lie on alternative explanations for the patterns in attention and 
position that were found.  
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5.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics 
The KNP split from the KVP, because of the KVP position in the debate about 
Indonesian independence. Therefore, in order to understand the patterns of reaction 
for the KNP, one must examine the history of the decolonisation of Indonesia. British 
forces liberated the Dutch-Indies from Japanese control (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 
2010, 229-230). In 1945, Indonesian republicans declared the independence of 
Indonesia. The Dutch did not accept Indonesian independence, and the British handed 
over control over Indonesia to the Dutch (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-
230). This led to an agreement between the Indonesian republicans and the Dutch, the 
Cheribon Agreement of November 1946 (Keylor 2003, 246). This agreement 
proclaimed a sovereign Indonesian state with a Dutch-Indonesian Union under the 
Dutch Crown. This required a change in the constitution. The Dutch government and 
the Indonesian republicans disagreed about the implementation of the agreement. The 
Dutch sent two so-called police missions to regain control over Indonesia (in 1947), 
but they failed to gain control over the islands. The Dutch actions led to an 
international response: the United Nations and the United States did not support the 
Dutch attempt to retain control over Indonesia. The United States suspended the 
Marshall plan. Under international pressure, the Dutch negotiated a new agreement 
with the Indonesian nationalists: the same basic agreement as in 1946 was reached in 
1949 (Keylor 2003, 246; Wielenga 2010, 229-230). The agreement did not offer a 
solution for Papua New Guinea, a region that remained under Dutch control. New 
Guinea would remain a political issue: in 1951 the Dutch cabinet fell over New 
Guinea policy. As can be seen in figure 5.1, attention to colonial affairs steadily 
declined over the period 1946-1952. The attention was high before 1948 and declined 
afterwards. The military actions and the negotiations had put the issue on the agenda 
in the period 1946-1948. Indonesian independence moved the issue from the agenda 
in the period 1948-1952. 
The presence of the KNP did not increase attention to the issue of colonial 
affairs. There is one exception, however: the KVP (figure 5.2) did not decrease its 
attention to colonial affairs after 1948. Instead, there is a (marginal) increase in this 
party’s attention to the issue. The presence of the KNP, a challenger of the KVP, may 
have caused it to retain focus on the colonial affairs. All in all, there is no proof that 
the KNP caused a systemic increase in attention to its issue, but it is likely that it 
caused a markedly different pattern in attention for the party it was oriented towards.  
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5.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists 
The PSP, a leftwing socialist party with ties to the nuclear disarmament 
movement, entered parliament in one of the hotter periods of the Cold War. One 
cannot observe the effect of the PSP without reference to the international events that 
surrounded the party’s entry. In the period before the entry of the PSP, there had been 
considerable turmoil on both sides of the Iron Curtain: on the Eastern side the 
Hungarian Revolution was violently put down by an intervention of the Soviet 
military (Keylor 2003, 71-72), and on the Western side, the French and the British 
had been involved in a coordinated attack on Egypt in order to take control of the 
Suez Canal (Keylor 2003, 156). After 1959, the Cold War began to become even 
warmer with conflict growing about the American presence in Berlin and the plan to 
create a Soviet Russian military presence in Cuba (Keylor 2003, 91, 107). 
Given these international developments, one can expect attention for defence to 
increase over time. The question thus becomes whether the entry of the PSP led to an 
identifiable interruption in this development. Figure 5.3 shows the developments in 
attention that established parties devote to defence in the period 1956-1963. In 
general, parties increase attention to defence between 1956 and 1963. The entry of 
the PSP does not seem to have caused a marked interruption of this pattern. It seems 
to be the case here that the development in attention to defence is caused by external 
circumstances. One party, the CPN, forms a clear exception. This is shown in figure 
5.4. The election year 1959 interrupted the increasing pattern of attention of the CPN 
for defence. The PSP and the CPN shared a socialist ideology, which was historically 
committed to disarmament. While the CPN was opposed to the Western nuclear 
weapon capacity, it was more tolerant of nuclear weapons on the Eastern side of the 
Cold War divide. The CPN had lost a considerable number of votes in the election in 
which the PSP entered parliament. It seems reasonable therefore to conclude that this 
change was a reaction to the entry of the PSP. 
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5.2.3 BP: farmers in protest  
The BP campaigned against the corporatist organisation of agriculture. Over 
the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, agriculture politics in the Netherlands 
was depoliticised: decision-making power was moved to the corporatist Farming 
Board (Landbouwschap) or to the European level. Meanwhile, the importance of the 
agricultural sector in the Dutch economy declined, as can be seen in figure 5.5. The 
European Economic Community was founded in 1957 and, over a ten-year period, 
agricultural policies in Europe were harmonised and decision-making was moved to 
the European level (Krajenbrink 2005, 103). By 1962, the Common Agriculture 
Policy, which set agricultural price policies, had begun to take shape (Dinan 2004, 
95-96). Disagreements about price policy that had characterised discussions about 
agriculture until the early sixties disappeared from the Dutch parliament, because the 
issue fell under European jurisdiction now (Krajenbrink 2005, 144-145).  
At the national level, decision-making was moved to the Farming Board. The 
legislation to create this body passed through parliament in 1954 (Krajenbrink 2005, 
103). This body was given the power to introduce legally binding rules on 
agricultural matters and farmers were legally required to pay a levy to the body 
(Krajenbrink 2005, 109). The body consisted of representatives of farmers' 
organisation and farm labour unions. The organisation began to function in 1955 
(Krajenbrink 2005, 110-115). The agricultural community had not welcomed the 
Farming Board with open arms: farmers had resisted paying the obligatory levy 
(Krajenbrink 2005, 115-116). Free Farmers (Vrije Boeren), the group around BP-
leader Koekoek, organised opposition against the Farming Board. The Farming Board 
took far-reaching measures against farmers who refused to pay their levies: it laid 
claim on their property and auctioned it off, something the Free Farmers attempted to 
prevent (Krajenbrink 2005, 163-164). In the province of Drenthe, the conflict 
between the Free Farmers and the Farming Board escalated (Krajenbrink 2005, 165): 
in order to get their levies the Farming Board laid claim to three farms in the hamlet 
of Hollandscheveld and evicted their inhabitants (Krajenbrink 2005, 167). This led to 
violent clashes between the police and the Free Farmers in March 1963. After the 
events of Hollandscheveld, the Farming Board reorganised and reoriented itself 
towards a smaller set of tasks (Krajenbrink 2005, 181, 199).  
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The BP did not have a marked effect on the attention that parties devoted to 
agriculture. Almost all parties follow the pattern presented in figure 5.6: levels of 
attention to agriculture decrease before 1961, in 1962 and 1963 attention sharply 
rises, and afterwards, that attention declines again. On the one hand, one may explain 
the pattern by referring to economic and political developments: the decreasing 
importance of the agricultural sector, increasing delegation of decision-making 
concerning agriculture to the European level and the corporatist agricultural bodies. 
In this perspective, the declining attention after 1963 can be explained, but the 
increasing attention just before 1963 is more problematic. This increase may be 
explained by the discussion of the Europeanisation of agricultural policies. On the 
other hand, one may explain these developments by referring to the dismissive 
strategy proposed by Meguid (2007): in reaction to the entry of a new populist party, 
established parties reduced their attention to the issue that the party owned, in order 
to reduce the saliency of the issue and therefore the electoral appeal of the party. 
Given that the BP was the political representative of a social movement that had 
clashed with the police, declining attention is not illogical. The most balanced 
explanation may combine these two approaches: for almost every party, the election 
year 1963 is a peak in a continued development of decline of the attention to 
agricultural policies. It is likely that the events of Hollandscheveld had temporarily 
turned the attention of established politicians to agriculture. But after that year the 
attention continued to decline. In this sense the activities of the Free Farmers have 
been much more successful in bringing their issues to the table (and in changing the 
actual policies of the Farming Board) than their political arm, the BP, ever was. 
 
5.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent 
Between 1963 and 1981, three parties entered the Dutch Parliament that 
focused on moral matters: the GPV in 1963, the RKPN in 1972 and the RPF in 1981. 
In order to understand the patterns in attention to moral issues, it is important to 
understand the patterns of depoliticisation and politicisation of the abortion issue. 
Before 1962, the abortion issue was in a pre-political phase. Between 1962 and 1967, 
an extra-parliamentary debate on abortion began to develop (Outshoorn 1986, 100-
133). Between 1967 and 1977, three attempts were made to change the existing 
legislation on abortion: the KVP-ministers of Health and Justice made the first 
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attempt in the Biesheuvel cabinet. This bill was abandoned when this cabinet fell in 
1972 (Outshoorn 1986, 165). During the formation of the Den Uyl cabinet, the parties 
decided that the initiative on abortion would be left to parliament instead of to the 
government. This meant that, during most of the 1972-1977 parliamentary term, MPs 
prepared a bill that would only come to a vote at the end of the term (Outshoorn 
1986, 200). In 1976, two initiatives were debated in parliament: one by VVD and 
PvdA and one by KVP and ARP. The Tweede Kamer accepted the VVD/PvdA bill 
and the KVP/ARP bill was put on hold indefinitely (Outshoorn 1986, 230). The 
Eerste Kamer did not approve of the VVD/PvdA bill (Outshoorn 1986, 233), though. 
After the 1977 elections the Christian-democratic CDA and the secular VVD agreed 
in their coalition agreement that government had until 1979 to formulate its own 
proposals on abortion. If the coalition parties could not reach an agreement, the 
initiative would return to the Tweede Kamer where the secular parties had a majority 
(Outshoorn 1986, 246). In 1980, the cabinet came with a proposal that was narrowly 
carried by both houses (Outshoorn, 1986, 262, 269). The coalition parties called for 
the necessary additional policies to implement the legislation in 1982, and the 
government finalised its policies over the course of 1983 (Outshoorn 1986, 280-281, 
286). 
If one looks at the graph of parliamentary attention to moral matters in figure 
5.7, one can clearly distinguish between three periods: relatively high levels of 
attention between 1959 and 1967, then a sharp decline in attention in the 1967 
elections, and after that, the attention that most parties devoted to moral matters was 
on a lower level but erupted in a few spikes, especially in 1971, 1977 and 1983. 
Zooming in on the period 1959-1967, one can see the following: while attention 
to moral issues increased before 1963, it decreased again after 1963. Two parties 
form a clear exception: the ARP (shown in figure 5.8) and the CHU, which went 
through a similar development. These two Protestant parties may have felt challenged 
by the entry of the GPV. They devoted a similar level of attention to moral issues 
before and after the entry of the GPV. 
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Table 5.1: party positions on moral issues 1967-1986 
Position 1967-1972 1972-1977 1977-1981 1981-1986 
1 GPV SGP GPV 













6 KVP KVP VVD D66 
7 VVD VVD D66 PPR 
8 D66 D66 PvdA VVD 
9 PSP PvdA PPR PSP 
10 PvdA CPN PSP CPN 
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In the period 1967-1977, attention was at a much lower level.133 All parties 
increased the levels of attention to moral issues before the 1972 elections. After the 
1972 elections the attention decreased, only to culminate in a shared outlier in 1976 
for almost all parties. This fits the pattern Outshoorn described: rising political 
attention to the issue between 1967 and 1972, but because the initiative was moved to 
parliament, it was removed from parliamentary decision-making until 1976 when the 
attention to moral issues peaked (Outshoorn 1986, 200). 
In the period 1977-1986, one can see a clear peak in attention in the second half 
of 1982, the last year in which abortion was debated extensively in parliament. This is 
an outlier, however, because it only concerns the period in 1982 after the September 
elections. The attention that established parties devoted to moral issues is relatively 
stable. The parliamentary discussions on the abortion bill in 1980 did not cause a 
clear peak in attention. The abortion question was settled, and after 1984 the political 
focus in terms of moral issues moved to euthanasia (Green-Pedersen 2007, 280-
281).134 
All in all, none of the three religious new parties appears to have forced 
increased attention to moral issues. The GPV’s entry was followed by stable levels of 
attention by the other Protestant parties and declining levels of attention by most 
other parties. The pattern of attention to moral issues after 1967 followed the cycle 
that the abortion legislation followed: increased attention to the issue between 1967 
and 1971. The attention increased between 1967-1972 as the abortion issue became 
more polarised. Attention to moral issues peaked in 1971, when the cabinet proposal 
was discussed. As the issue was depoliticised, the attention for moral issues was low 
between 1972 and 1976, and peaked due to the discussion of the (failed) 
parliamentary initiatives. Attention marginally increased with the 1980 discussion of 
the new government bill. After 1983, when the implementation of the law was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 The figures presented here are based on different analyses for the periods 1959-1967, 
1967-1977 and 1977-1986. Therefore, the level differences between these years should be 
interpreted with the utmost care, because they may also be artifacts of the different 
analyses. 
134 Two parties defy this general pattern, the PSP and the CPN. For them, attention to moral 
issues is high and continues on a high level after 1981. This can be explained by referring 
to their developing feminist orientation. In these parties, a generation of feminists took over 
the helm from economically oriented socialists and communists. These developments 
appear to be independent from the entry of the RPF. 
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discussed, moral issues were removed from the parliamentary agenda. None of the 
three religious parties appears to have been able to put moral issues on the agenda. 
The next step is to examine voting behaviour. As is explained in paragraph 
3.4.9, insufficient parliamentary votes are available to analyse the impact of the GPV 
on party positions, but sufficient votes are available to examine the effect of the 
RKPN and RPF on party positions. Voting on religious issues is clearly one-
dimensional in each of the four periods. Party positions, as shown in table 5.1, tend to 
follow the division between religious and secular parties.135 On the extreme one can 
find the SGP, the GPV, orthodox Christian parties, joined by the morally 
conservative agrarian party BP. The next bloc of parties is formed by the ARP, the 
CHU and the KVP, or, after 1977, the CDA. Then one can find the liberal VVD, and 
the parties of the left: D66, PSP, PvdA and CPN. The differences between these 
secular parties are marginal. The main division is between the orthodox Protestant 
parties and the others. The correlation between party positions on the dimension over 
time is significant. The level of unanimous parliamentary votes increases after the 
entry of the RKPN from 2% to 7%; it declines marginally after the entry of the RPF 
from 7% to 6%. The RKPN, not included in the figure, has the most conservative 
position of all parties in the period 1972-1977. In the period 1981-1986, the RPF 
takes the shared most conservative position.136 
Between 1967 and 1977, there is only one marked change: the PSP moves 
sharply to the most progressive position, and therefore the PvdA and CPN move to a 
more conservative position. Between 1977 and 1986, there are two major changes: 
the VVD moves sharply to the progressive side. It passes D66 (which becomes the 
most conservative of the secular parties) and the PPR. The PvdA makes a similar 
move to the progressive side of the spectrum: it moves to the most extreme position, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Given that the number of votes is small, three solutions have equal levels of fit. 
These solutions differ in the order of the SGP, GPV and BP. Each is the most extreme 
party in one of the solutions. Therefore, these three parties are taken together and are 
assigned a single position. 
136 Three additional parties entered parliament between 1968 and 1972: the PPR 
(1968), DS’70 (1970) and the NMP (1971). One can only determine positions for 
new parties for the period after 1972, because they did not participate in enough votes 
in the period before 1972. DS’70 has a moderate position between the VVD and the 
KVP. The PPR is placed on the extreme among the most progressive parties. 
Between 1981 and 1982, two additional parties entered parliament: the CP is the most 
secular party and the EVP is positioned between the more conservative of the secular 
parties.  
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passing by the PPR, PSP and CPN. The sharp move of the PSP in the opposite 
direction of the RKPN and the move of the PvdA and the VVD to the opposite side of 
the RPF could be understood as adversarial moves. The most striking result in this 
analysis is the stability in the position of the CDA and the KVP. These parties did not 
change position after two more conservative Christian parties entered parliament. 
Moreover, the division between very conservative, moderately conservative, 
moderately progressive and very progressive parties remains intact between 1967 and 
1986. The RKPN and RPF joined the SGP and the GPV on the very conservative 
side. Instead of changing the line of conflict on moral issues, the RKPN and RPF 
have been integrated into them. Both reinforced some of the conflict, as is evident by 
the movements to the progressive side of the PSP, PvdA and the VVD. 
 
5.2.5 D66 and DS’70: democratic idealists and moderates 
Between 1967 and 1977, the Dutch party system changed: five new parties 
entered parliament and three of the traditional big five established parties lost a 
considerable share of the votes and merged. Two of these new parties focused 
specifically on the Dutch political system. The first one was D66, which advocated a 
radical revision of the Dutch political system, and the second one was DS’70, which 
opposed such changes.137 D66 entered parliament in 1967 and DS’70 in 1971, and 
therefore, three periods will be examined: 1963-1967 (before the entry of D66), 1967-
1971 (after the entry of D66 but before the entry of DS’70) and 1971-1977 (after the 
entry of DS’70).  
After the 1967 elections a government advisory committee was set up: the 
Cals/Donner committee. The formation of the depoliticised committee can be 
understood as response of the established parties to the entry of D66. The committee 
consisted of representatives from the major political parties, including D66 co-
founder Gruijters (Cals et al. 1971). The committee worked on advice concerning the 
political system, the constitutional order and the electoral system. In 1971, they 
presented their final report, which included proposals to change the constitution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 DS’70 is linked to governance, although hesitantly: this is the issue that united to 
two factions within the party but is not the defining issue of either of them. Other 
choices might have been made: the focus of the social democratic faction and its own 
parliamentary party was on fiscal policies. Therefore, one may also have examined 
macro-economy and tax policies, but this is done extensively in section 4.4.7 when 
the effect of the NMP is examined.  
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reform the electoral system, and change the role of the prime minister (Cals et al. 
1971). On many issues, such as the referendum, the government formation process 
and the electoral system, the committee was divided (Cals et al. 1968, 1969, 1971). 
Its proposals to reformulate constitutional rights were much less controversial (Cals 
et al. 1971). It is not surprising that, as most proposals did not have the support of the 
entire committee, the proposals also faced a divided parliament and divided 
government coalitions (Wielenga 2010, 258). Smaller reforms were implemented 
while the committee was working on its report (such as the lowering of the voting 
age). The only major result of the committee’s activities was the 1983 constitutional 
revision, which mainly implemented the less controversial proposals on constitutional 
rights. 
In order to understand the effects of both the entry of D66 and DS’70, and of 
the depoliticised process of decision-making in the Cals/Donner committee on the 
attention that established parties devoted to governance, one can look at figure 5.9: 138 
the 1967 elections lead to a clear interruption in the development in the attention to 
the issue. Between 1967 and 1971, attention devoted to governance increased 
sharply: from less than 10% to more than 20%. There is a small decline after the 1967 
election, probably due to the depoliticization. Even though decision-making was 
depoliticised, attention to the issue increased markedly. It appears that, after the entry 
of D66, the established parties increased attention to this issue, even though decision-
making was depoliticised.139  
In 1971, the moderate DS’70 entered parliament and the Cals/Donner 
committee presented the final report. One would expect a greater increase in attention 
after the depoliticised process of advice writing had ended and the more politicised 
process of lawmaking could start, and after the entry of yet another party that focuses 
on governance. This is not the case, however: after 1971, the attention to governance 
decreased sharply. One can explain the pattern in attention by the lack of political 
consensus within the committee-Cals/Donner and in parliament concerning their  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 The data used here are based on different data then those that were used for the 
macro-level analyses. The figures are based on data from the period 1963-1977. The 
analyses are based on data for the period 1963-1971 and the period 1967-1977. These 
two data sets correlate significantly (Pearson's r of 0.997 significant at the 0.01-level).  
139 The only exception to this pattern is the PSP. This party shared D66's orientation 
towards the democratisation movement. Therefore, it may not have needed the 
impetus of the entry of D66 to orient itself towards democratic reform. 
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Table 5.2: party positions on governance 1963-1977 
Position 1963-1967 1967-1971 1971-1977 
1 BP BP 
2 
BP 
SGP SGP SGP 
3 GPV GPV GPV 
4 ARP ARP VVD 
5 KVP CHU CHU 
6 CHU VVD KVP 
7 VVD KVP ARP 
8 PvdA CPN PvdA 
9 CPN PSP PSP 
10 PSP PvdA CPN 
 
proposals. The committee did not formulate a broadly supported agenda of 
government reform, but rather showed the political divisions on the issue. Given the 
lack of consensus on the issue and the fact that most proposals would require a two-
third majority, it was not politically opportune to be active on the issue. In this sense, 
DS’70 got what it wanted: no major reforms of the Dutch constitutional order were 
implemented.  
The next step is analysing the effects of these parties on party positions. Party 
positioning on governance can be integrated into a one-dimensional model in all three 
periods. The party positions are shown in table 5.2. In each of these periods, one can 
see a division between the SGP, GPV and BP, conservative parties that tended to 
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oppose government reform; the parties of the centre-right (CHU, KVP, ARP and 
VVD), and the parties of the left (PvdA, CPN, PSP), which tended to favour 
government reform. The party positions on three dimensions correlate. Voting on 
government reform became more polarised in this period: the percentage of 
unanimous votes dropped from 12% to 7%. 
D66, which entered parliament in 1967, took a position among the leftwing 
parties, but it is not the most extreme party on the issue. DS’70, which was formed 
during this parliamentary term, also took positions between the KVP and the parties 
on the left. In the period 1971-1977, these patterns remained with limited differences: 
D66 moved to the extreme position on governance. The position of DS’70 poses 
some questions: it was a party that defended the existing parliamentary system, but it 
did not position itself between the conservative parties such as the SGP and the GPV. 
Instead, it took a position between the Christian-democratic and leftwing parties. This 
position may reflect the moderate views DS’70 had: it did not oppose all reform, but 
only radical reform.140 
Between 1963-1967 and 1967-1971, one can observe two marked movements: 
on the one hand, the KVP moved to a more reformist position, relative to the CHU 
and the VVD. The PvdA moved to the extreme on the reformist side of the 
dimension, beyond the PSP, CPN (and D66). The movements of the KVP and the 
PvdA are considerable. Between 1967-1971 and 1971-1977, one can observe three 
movements: the ARP made a marked shift towards a more reformist position. It leapt 
over the CHU and the KVP, and instead of the least progressive of the three 
Christian-democratic parties, it became the most progressive of the three. Second, the 
VVD, which had a centrist position, took a more conservative position on the issue. It 
now came close to the position of the GPV. Finally, the PvdA made a marked move 
to the centre switching positions with the CPN and skipping over the PSP. The main 
division in the period 1971-1977 is between DS’70 and the PPR. 45% of the votes 
divide the Progressive Agreement parties (with PSP and CPN) from the rest. This 
coincided with the participation of D66 in the Progressive Agreement of PvdA, PPR 
and D66, which embraced government reform: instead of following a division 
between religious and secular parties in the period 1963-1967 (with the VVD taking a 
centrist position), the division on government reform now appears to follow the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Two other parties entered parliament during this period: the PPR took a centre-
left position, and the RKPN took a clear conservative position close to the GPV. 
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division between the traditional economic left and the right, with the Christian-
democrats in the centre and the VVD further away from the PvdA. The shifting 
positions may indicate a shift in the nature of the line of conflict: from secular-
religious to left-right. 
If the two patterns are combined, the following pattern emerges: between 1963 
and 1967, there was little attention to governance and the issue was incorporated in 
the religious-secular pattern. After the entry of D66 in 1967, the issue received more 
attention, voting became less unanimous and the KVP and the PvdA moved to a more 
progressive position. After the entry of DS'70 in 1971, the issue received less 
attention and voting on the issue was incorporated in the left-right dimension. The 
increasing politicisation of the issue can certainly be ascribed to the entry of D66. 
The same goes for its incorporation in the left-right pattern: by joining the 
Progressive Agreement and making government reform a core issue of the alliance, 
the issue became part of the left-right pattern.  
 
5.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals 
Over the course of the 1970s, the PPR became a greener party (Lucardie & 
Ghillebaert 2008). During the same period, environmental issues became much more 
important, societally: the political effect of this was the formation of a ministry of 
Public Health and the Environment was founded in the 1971 cabinet formation. The 
first real environmental bill from this ministry came in the Den Uyl cabinet.141 The 
cabinet created the legal tools for environmental policies: the 1976 General Law on 
the Environment (Wet Algemene Bepalingen Milieuhygiene) is the most prominent 
example (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst 1977, 103). The question of this section is whether 
the pattern in attention can be explained by the formation of the ministry or by the 
entry of the PPR. 
The entry of the PPR and the creation of the ministry of Public Health and the 
Environment closely followed each other and can both be expected to have led to 
increased attention for environmental issues. Therefore, a more precise prediction 
about the expected pattern is necessary. If the increase in attention was caused by the 
PPR, one would expect the PPR to lead the development in attention. Contrariwise,  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Due to the short period in which this cabinet was in office (it fell in 1972), no 
environmental policy was proposed during the period 1971-1972. 
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Table 5.3: party positions on the environmental issues 1967-1977 











6 GPV ARP 
7 ARP KVP 
8 D66 D66 
9 PvdA PvdA 
10 CPN PSP 
11 PSP CPN 
 
if the increase in attention was caused by external circumstance, one would expect 
the PPR to follow the pattern of attention of the other established parties. And this 
would be a pattern of continual increase, as the ministry began to produce bills. 
In figure 5.10, one can see the level of attention that the PPR devoted to the 
environment: low levels of attention to environmental issues before 1972, and then 
an increase in attention over the period 1972-1977. Looking at the development of 
attention of established parties to the environment (in figure 5.11), one can see a 
similar pattern: before the 1971 elections, attention to the environment increases, 
and after the 1971 elections, the level of increase is much more marked.142 The 
pattern of attention makes the formation of the ministry a much more likely cause 
than the entry of the PPR. If one can draw any conclusion about the relationship 
between the entry of the PPR into the political system and the attention to the 
environment, it has to be that both the PPR and the other parties became greener, 
more oriented towards the environment, over the period 1972-1977.  
This increase in attention also influences the analysis of positions. In order 
to allow for a comparison of party positions over time, one must have a sufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 There are to exceptions: the PSP and KVP increased their attention to the 
environment before 1971, and then the attention stabilised. Both parties shared strong 
similarities with the PPR: the PPR had split away from the KVP and both parties 
shared an orientation to Catholic votes, the PSP and the PPR shared a new politics 
orientation. After the PPR, a green party, entered parliament, these parties stabilised 
their attention for the environment. For both parties the PPR was a competitor, and 
both parties lost a considerable number of votes in 1971, the elections in which the 
PPR entered. It is difficult to understand this stability in terms of strategic reaction. 
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empirical basis. Therefore, a range of issues related to the environment politics is 
examined, namely environment, land management, energy and transport.143 The first 
thing that catches the eye when looking at the two distributions of parties in table 
5.3 is that parties converged in the period 1967-1971. In this period, both the BP 
and the SGP are assigned the same position as well as the CHU, KVP and the VVD. 
In the period 1971-1977, all parties are assigned a separate position. This is clearly 
the effect of the increasing absolute number of non-unanimous votes on the issue 
(allowing for a more precise division of parties). This number explodes from 13 to 
157. This increase itself may be a sign of increasing politicisation of the issue. Party 
positions on the issue appear to roughly follow the left-right division, with the 
parties of the right and centre right on the one side and the leftwing parties on the 
other. In the period 1971-1977, the main distinction is between the parties of the 
right and centre right and parties of the left. The correlation between party positions 
on this dimension over time is significant. The PPR takes a relatively 
environmentalist position, as the most environmentalist party of the Progressive 
Agreement parties.144 Two marked changes can be observed here. The VVD, KVP 
and CHU had the same position in 1967-1971, but they now differ in position. The 
VVD moves to the least environmentalist position of these three. It is followed by 
the CHU and then the KVP, which has also leapt over the ARP. The KVP is now 
the most environmentalist of the Christian-democratic parties. The second 
movement involves the GPV: while this party voted similarly to the ARP in the 
period 1967-1971, it moved to a less environmentalist position in the period 1967-
1971, close to the SGP and the VVD. The pattern that can be established for this 
period is clear: the concentration of political parties on the environmental issues 
decreased over time.  
In summary, it appears not to be the case that the entry of the PPR has put 
environmental issues on the agenda. Rather, the party and its environment became 
more environmentalist during the 1970s. The increasing attention for environmental 
issues was coupled by an increasing differentiation of established parties' positions 
on the issue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Transport can be understood in environmental terms during this period because of 
the oil shortage and the first protests against the dominance of cars. 
144 DS’70 takes a centrist position on the issue, while the RKPN joins the small 
parties of the right. 
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Table 5.4: party positions on economic affairs 1967-1977 
Position 1963-1967 1967-1971 
1 BP VVD 
2 VVD BP 









8 PvdA CPN 
9 D66 PvdA 
10 CPN D66 
11 PSP PSP 
 
5.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest 
The NMP entered the Dutch parliament in a period of growing economic 
difficulty. As can be seen in figure 5.12, between 1967 and 1971 the inflation level 
increased from 3.1% to 7.6%. The increase occurred in a period of rising 
unemployment (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 212). The NMP emphasised fiscal 
responsibility: the party proposed radical reduction of government interference in the 
Dutch economy, and a lowering of the tax level.145 The electoral success of the NMP 
was short-lived: it disappeared from parliament in the snap-elections of 1972. These 
elections were called after the fall of the centre-right Biesheuvel cabinet, which fell 
on disagreements on how to combat the economic crisis.146  
The development in attention to economic affairs that is presented in figure 
5.13 shows a clear pattern: before the 1971 elections it is declining, the period just 
before the 1971 election forms a dip. The 1971 election causes an increase in 
attention for most parties, but after that, the attention declines again. The 1971 
elections in which the NMP entered parliament have interrupted a general pattern of 
declining attention for economic affairs for almost all parties. Between the pre-
election 1971 period and the pre-election 1972 period, attention for economic affairs 
increases sharply for all parties. The entry of the NMP appears to be followed by an 
increase in attention to economic affairs. However, the peculiar development of the 
attention for economic affairs can also be explained by the policy cycle. In September 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 DS’70, which entered parliament in 1971, emphasised fiscal responsibility as well. 
146 A centre-left cabinet was formed after the 1972 elections (in which the NMP 
disappeared from the political scene). This cabinet did not take drastic budgetary 
steps after the discovery of large natural gas deposits in the North of the Netherlands. 
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the cabinet proposes the budget, which is then discussed in parliament before the 
Christmas recess. This means that in the months before the 1971 election (held in 
April), fewer economic issues would be discussed than after the elections, because 
the budget is discussed after April. Without this outlier there is no marked change in 
the attention for economic affairs.  
Voting on economic affairs roughly follows the left-right division as can be 
see in table 5.4: the BP, the VVD and NMP on the right hand side, the centre-right 
position of the Christian-democrats and orthodox Christians, and the leftwing 
position of the social democratic, socialist and communist parties. The correlation 
between party positions in the two periods is significant. The percentage of 
unanimous votes decreases during this period from 11% before the entry of the NMP 
to 5% in the period 1971-1977. The NMP takes the position furthest on the right. 147	  
The established parties move considerably. Only the PSP maintained its 
position relative to the other established parties. The pattern that one can see in the 
data is that the major parties tend to move to the left (PvdA, D66, CHU, KVP, ARP), 
while the smaller parties (CPN, SGP, GPV) move to the right. The major established 
parties appear to show adversarial reactions to the entry of a new fiscally responsible 
party. The only party that defies this pattern is the VVD, which actually moved to the 
right. The pattern may not necessarily be the result of the entry of the NMP. The 
leftwing shift of the ARP and KVP on economic issues, in particular, may be the 
result of an autonomous shift of these parties to the left, which was also observed for 
their voting on government reform issues. 
The entry of the NMP does not seem to be a good explanation of the 
development in the parties’ attention for and their positions on economic affairs 
between 1967 and 1977. Rather, it appears that the budgetary cycle has caused 
attention to sharply increase after the entry of the NMP into parliament, and that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Three other parties entered parliament during this period: the PPR and DS’70, 
which split from their mother parties during the period 1967-1971, the NMP in 1971 
and RKPN in 1972. During the entire period, DS’70 took a position between the 
parties of the left and the parties of the centre right. Even though this party 
emphasised fiscal responsibility, it did not vote with the other parties that emphasised 
fiscal responsibility such as the NMP, the VVD, and the smaller Christian parties. 
Instead, the party took a centrist position. The PPR started with a similar position as 
DS’70 in 1967-1971, but it sharply moved to the left in the period 1971-1977. The 
RKPN took a position on the right with the orthodox Christians.  
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leftwing courses of the ARP and KVP moved them to the left. The NMP appears not 
to have influenced the saliency of tax issues or parties’ positions on them. 
 
5.2.8 EVP: progressive Protestants 
In 1982, on the waves of the protest movement against the stationing of 
nuclear weapons, the Christian-pacifist EVP entered parliament. The effect of the 
EVP cannot be evaluated without reference to the international events of the late 
1970s. In response to the Soviet decision to renew its intermediate range nuclear 
missiles in 1977, NATO also decided to place a new generation of intermediate range 
missiles in several Western European countries, including the Netherlands, unless the 
Soviet Union would agree to eliminate its new intermediate range missiles (Keylor 
2003, 143). This so-called Double Track Decision posed a major problem to the first 
Van Agt cabinet, which relied on a small majority in the Dutch parliament (Wielenga 
2010, 312). The senior coalition partner, the CDA, had many dissenting MPs within 
its own ranks who opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands (Van 
Diepen 2004, 121). The peace movement and especially the Inter-Church Peace 
Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad) began to organise public opposition to 
stationing. The Dutch parliament adopted a motion not to place nuclear weapons in 
the Netherlands in the lead-up to the NATO decision (Van Diepen 2004, 131). Many 
CDA dissidents supported the motion. In its double track decision, NATO allowed 
the Dutch government to postpone the stationing of nuclear weapons for two years 
(Van Diepen 2004, 131-132). After a long parliamentary debate, parliament rejected a 
second motion, which was meant to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in the 
Netherlands ever again. The CDA dissidents had made a volte-face because they did 
not want to force a cabinet crisis (Van Diepen 2004, 136). The short-lived second 
Van Agt cabinet, which was formed after the 1981 elections, had made an agreement 
to disagree about nuclear weapons and decided to postpone stationing even longer 
(Van Diepen 2004, 155-156). Meanwhile, public attention to the issue grew: in 1981, 
1983 and 1985 major protests were organised against the stationing of nuclear 
weapons. The 1981 and 1983 protests were large public protests: in 1981, 400,000 
Dutch people attended (Van Diepen 2004, 188-189), and the 1983 protest was 
attended by 500,000 Dutch people (Van Diepen 2004, 203). In 1985, a petition was 
organised against the decision to place nuclear weapons (Van Diepen 2004, 320). The 
cabinet was not swayed by the protests and prepared the stationing of nuclear  
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Table 5.5: party positions on defence 1977-1986 
Position 1977-1982 1982-1986 
1 SGP VVD 
2 GPV GPV 
3 VVD SGP 
4 CDA CDA 
5 D66 PvdA 
6 PvdA D66 
7 PPR PPR 
8 CPN CPN 
9 PSP PSP 
 
weapons (Van Diepen 2004, 183). In 1984, the cabinet presented a compromise: the 
decision to accept American missiles was postponed for one year. The decision 
would be tied to the development in Soviet missiles, shifting the responsibility to the 
Soviet Union (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 231). The Soviets increased their missiles 
and in 1985 the government signed the treaty to accept the missiles (Van Diepen 
2004, 316). The decision was ratified by parliament in 1985 (Van Diepen 2004, 330). 
By then, international events had caught up with the Dutch political decision-making: 
the weapons were never placed because of weapon control talks between the Soviet 
Union and the United States.  
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As can be seen in figure 5.14, attention for defence peaks in 1979, the year of 
the NATO double-track decision; after that, attention increases only marginally. 
There is no sign of a major increase in attention after the entry of the EVP, certainly 
in comparison to the peak in attention in 1979. One cannot point to the entry of the 
EVP as an external shock in the attention for defence. While the social debates about 
defence policy were heated and prominent, the issue was kept from the parliamentary 
agenda because the government first postponed the decision-making and then 
controlled the debates by making small steps over the course of the 1980s. Because of 
a government strategy of postponement and incrementalism, the activities of the 
nuclear disarmament movement in the Netherlands, such as the 1985 petition, the 
1981 and 1983 demonstrations and the entry of the EVP into parliament in 1982, 
could not influence the agenda. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the EVP’s impact on other 
parties’ positions. The voting pattern follows the division between left and right, as 
can be seen in table 5.5. The anti-communist orthodox Protestant parties and the 
VVD are furthest to the right, followed by the CDA, then the more moderate leftwing 
parties PvdA and D66 and finally the PSP, PPR and CPN; these are the leftwing 
parties that opposed the pro-American defence policy of the Netherlands. The EVP 
joined the left. The EVP is not the most extreme party; rather, it stands closer to the 
centre than to CPN, PPR and PSP. The correlation between party positions on the two 
dimensions is significant. The level of unanimity increases during the period studied: 
from 6% to 10%. The increase in unanimity may be explained by the fact that several 
hot issues, in particular the presence of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil, had cooled 
because of the cabinet’s incremental strategy.148 There is only one marked change: on 
the anti-communist side of the dimension, the SGP and the VVD change position, 
leapfrogging over the GPV. The VVD takes the most extreme position in the period 
1982-1986. The difference in terms of the number of votes between the VVD and 
SGP was small. The EVP entered the political arena on an issue that was already 
politicised. Instead of changing the patterns of competition, the party joined one of 
the sides. 
The EVP is another example of a party that entered parliament as the result of 
the politicisation of an issue, instead of its entry resulting in the politicisation of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 During the period studied, two additional parties entered parliament: the RPF and 
the CP. They are placed on the anti-communist side of the spectrum. 
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issue. The EVP entered parliament on the back of social protests against the 
stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, an issue that was politicised 
especially by the NATO decision in 1979. A government strategy of postponement 
and incremental decision-making further prevented politicisation of the defence issue 
when the EVP was in parliament. 
 
5.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics 
The CP was the first anti-immigration party to enter the Dutch parliament. It 
wanted to limit migration, advocated re-migration and sought to fight what it 
perceived as discrimination of native Dutch people. Since the Second World War, 
two groups of people migrated to the Netherlands: one group from Dutch colonies, 
and another group of migrant workers from the Mediterranean (Obdeijn & Schrover 
2008, 229). The possibility of political independence of Surinam led to an increase in 
immigration to the Netherlands after 1970 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 251-254). 
Immigration levels from Surinam peaked in 1975, the year of the independence, and 
continued to be high until 1980, when it became more difficult for people from 
Surinam to migrate to the Netherlands (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 254-255; Lucassen 
and Lucassen 2011, 75). High unemployment on the Dutch Antilles led to high levels 
of immigration to the Netherlands in the period 1973-1982 (Obdeijn & Schrover 
2008, 261). Additionally, the Netherlands also opened its borders to labour 
immigration from the Mediterranean. Between 1964 and 1974, the Dutch government 
pursued an official policy of recruitment of migrant workers (Obdeijn & Schrover 
2008, 267-268). In 1974, the recruitment of migrant workers ended, but, due to 
family reunion, immigration continued (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 272). Migration 
from Morocco peaked in 1979 (Lucassen & Lucassen 1974, 66). Until the late 1970s, 
the government had worked under the assumption that migrants would return to their 
own country, and so no integration policy was pursued (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 
289). In the late 1970s, the government began to recognise that the migrant workers 
would stay permanently: in 1981 the government published a concept-government 
policy paper on minority policy and in 1983 a definitive policy paper followed 
(Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 290). In figure 5.15, one can see that levels of 
immigration increased until 1980 and fluctuated around a much lower level of 
immigration afterwards.  
 









	   196	  
Table 5.6: party positions on immigration 1977-1986 









5 CDA CPN 





9 PvdA CDA 
 
Immigration became an issue of political contestation, during the 1980s, 
which it had not been before. As can be seen in figure 5.16, attention follows a 
pattern of breaking the silence: low, stagnant or declining levels of the attention for 
immigration before the entry of the 1982 elections, which turn into markedly 
increasing levels of attention after the elections. This pattern can be observed for 
most parties.149 For many parties, the 1982 elections interrupt the pattern in attention: 
low and stable levels of attention for immigration are turned to increasing or higher 
levels of attention. The CP entered parliament in this election, which may have 
caused the rise in attention. One can eliminate several other explanations, such as the 
actual immigration levels: while actual immigration levels rose, attention was stable, 
and when the immigration levels stabilised, political attention for immigration rose.150 
The government policy paper on immigration may be another explanation. The 
concept-government policy paper was already published in 1981 and the final version 
was published in 1983. A marked difference exists in the parliamentary attention for 
the issue between 1981 and 1983. An important difference here appears to be the 
presence of the CP.  
It is difficult to characterise party positions on immigration before and even 
after the entry of the CP. These positions are shown in table 5.6. In both periods, one 
dimension suffices to show the voting patterns. In the period 1977-1982, a limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 The CDA and the CPN show signs of autonomous, independent increasing 
attention to immigration. For both parties, the 1982 elections caused an interruption 
of the increasing attention, but the growth of attention continued afterwards. Only the 
SGP shows a decline in attention to immigration after the 1981 elections. 
150 It may be the case that instead of immigration, integration of migrants was the 
problem. There is a five-year period between the peak in migration and the peak in 
attention to migration. The question is however why a five-year period would be 
crucial.  
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number of votes were held on the issue. The first position on the dimension is shared 
by the GPV and SGP, then comes a shared position of VVD and CPN, then the CDA, 
then D66, a shared position of PSP and PPR and then the PvdA. The voting appears 
to follow the left-right divide, although the CPN is placed on the right hand side.151 
After the entry of the CP into parliament, the VVD is the most extreme of the 
established parties, followed by the SGP, the GPV, then one can find the PvdA, the 
CPN, D66, the PSP, the PPR and the CDA. Positions appear to follow a rough left-
right pattern. Now the CDA is among the leftwing parties. During the 1980s, the 
CDA did indeed favour a multicultural approach to integration (Lucassen & Lucassen 
2011, p.96). The CP is placed furthest right in the period 1982-1986.152 In its voting 
behaviour the CP stood isolated from the other parties.153 After 1982, the dominant 
pattern in the voting pattern is between the CP and the other parties. The correlation 
between party positions before and after the entry of the CP is not significant. Given 
the differences between party positions before and after the entry of the CP, the shifts 
of individual parties over time cannot be identified, and neither can the dimensions be 
considered to be the same substantive dimension. Party positions shifted between the 
periods but not in a way that can be interpreted meaningfully because of the low 
number of votes. There is no sign of politicisation of the issue in terms of voting: the 
level of unanimous voting decreases only slightly during this period.154 
The entry of the CP has interrupted the low, stable and stagnating levels of 
attention accompanied by a consensual approach to the issue. It has caused 
established parties to devote more attention to immigration and to politicise the issue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 The position of the CPN is unexpected because, especially in this period, it 
emphasised anti-discrimination and appealed to migrant communities. 
152 In this period two other new parties entered parliament: the RPF and the EVP. The 
RPF is placed between the GPV and the SGP and the EVP between D66 and PSP. 
This reinforces the idea that division is between the other parties is between the left 
(including the CDA) and the right (including the orthodox Christian parties). 
153 18 votes (38% of the votes under study) separate the CP from the VVD. A large 
share of the votes in which the CP stands alone from the other parties concerns the 
naturalisation of individuals, which, until 1985, was done by law, and as such had to 
pass through parliament. In parliament, CP MP Janmaat devoted considerable 
attention to the naturalisation process (Van Holsteyn 1997). He was one of the first 
MPs to seriously scrutinise the naturalisation process. The CP was not the first to vote 
against such a naturalisation bill. Already in 1978, the BP voted against such a bill.  
154 It decreases from 17% to 15%. Note that this looks at the voting behaviour of the 
established parties, excluding the votes of the CP. With the voting behaviour of the 
CP, the level of unanimity falls back from 17 to 3%. 
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Established parties were united in their negative response to the CP. After the entry of 
the CP, criticism of immigration was seen as support for the extreme right. The 
political left began to treat immigrants with more consideration (Tinnemans 1995). 
Some observers propose that it was after the entry of the CP that the PvdA became 
more supportive of multiculturalism (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011, 94). The political 
and social developments diverge: before the entry of the CP, levels of immigration 
were high and increasing, political attention however was low and stable. After the 
CP entered, political attention to immigration was rising, while immigration levels 
were stabilising at a level lower than before. It may be the case that the opposition to 
immigration grew as immigration increased during the 1970s, which may have sowed 
the seeds for support for the CP. Even though immigration levels had already dropped 
by 1982, the issue became politically salient because of the entry of the CP. In this 
sense, the CP may have been the link between the societal saliency of immigration 
and its political saliency. 
 
5.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters 
The AOV and the U55+ were both founded shortly before the 1994 elections 
(Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996; Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1995, 27, 69). 
The issue of social security began to play a prominent role on the public agenda 
because economic circumstances had forced the governing parties to consider 
controversial budget cuts on social security, pensions and health care, this included an 
ill-fated proposal of the CDA to freeze the government pensions, which was retracted 
quickly (Flight & Felix 1995, 103).  
When one looks at the developments in the attention for healthcare in figure 
5.17, one thing stands out: in the first months of 1994 (before the 1994 elections) 
attention to healthcare peaks. After 1994, attention is much more stable and shows a 
slight increase. Only the CD, GL and the CDA increase their attention to the issue 
after 1994.155 This effect is marginal compared to the increases in attention before the 
entry of the AOV and U55+. There is a clear pattern in the data: attention to 
pensioners' affairs peaks before the entry of the U55+ and AOV. The AOV and U55+ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 The CDA and GL may have attempted to profit from the pensioners' issues that the 
AOV and U55+ brought to the table. Both parties lost votes in the 1994 elections. 
Only the CD is a real exception to this trend: this party peaks in attention to 
healthcare after the 1994 election: this interrupts a pattern of decline over the entire 
period. 
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probably profited electorally from the increased saliency of pensioners' affairs in the 
run-up to the 1994 election, which is also reflected in the parliamentary attention to 
this issue. After the 1994 election politics as usual returned.  
Voting on pensioners' affairs and healthcare combined is on the border 
between being scaled best in one or two dimensions. As is evident from table 5.7, the 
single dimensional models are not comparable. Between 1989 and 1994 the order of 
the parties on the dimension is VVD, CD, SGP, GPV RPF, CDA, PvdA, D66 and 
GL. This follows the division between left and right. Between 1994 and 1998, the 
order of the parties is different: at the extreme end one can find CD, CDA and GL, 
followed by the SGP and RPF on one position, followed by the GPV, PvdA, D66 and 
the VVD. The two orderings are different and do not correlate. The U55+ is placed 
between the CD and CDA, and the AOV stands between the GL and the shared 
position of the SGP and GPV.156 The main pattern divides the coalition parties from 
the other parties. Thisprovides no answer to the question how this pattern changes. 
One can further examine this change by modelling voting in a two-
dimensional model. This fits for the data in the period 1989-1994 in terms of stress. It 
is shown in figure 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20: in the lower left hand corner one can find the 
leftwing opposition parties (D66 and GL). In the upper right hand corner the coalition 
parties at the time (CDA and PvdA) are located, together with the small Christian 
parties (GPV, SGP and RPF). On the right side, the VVD is in the lower corner and 
the CD is in the upper corner. The horizontal dimension divides leftwing parties 
(PvdA, D66 and GL) from the parties on the right (CD and the VVD) with the 
Christian parties in the centre. The second dimension is more difficult to grasp: it 
appears to separate more secular and religious parties, with the PvdA standing close 
to the religious parties. In the period 1994-1998, the voting also best fits a two-
dimensional model. One dimension separates the CD from the other parties and on 
the other moves from VVD, via D66, PvdA, AOV, SP and the small Christian parties, 
to the GL, the CDA and the U55+. If one rotates the two solutions onto each other, 
one thing becomes apparent: in both models there appear to be two patterns. One 
divides between the CD and the other parties, and the other divides among the other 
parties. This second pattern in both cases comes close to the single dimension from 
the one-dimensional model. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 The SP stands close to the GL. 
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Table 5.7: party positions on health 1989-1998 
Position 1989-1994 1994-1998 1998-2002 
1 VVD CD * 
2 CD CDA VVD 
3 SGP GL D66 




6 CDA GPV CU 
7 PvdA PvdA PvdA 
8 D66 D66 GL 





















































In this sense, the change in both the one and the two-dimensional model is 
similar. Given the division between the CD and the rest of the parties on the 
horizontal dimension in figure 5.20, most of the variance between the other parties is 
concentrated on the vertical dimension. This vertical dimension roughly coincides 
with the one-dimensional solution. Differences exist between the two one-
dimensional solutions. One cannot compare the changes of the party positions in 
terms of changes of position. Rather, there appears to be a change in the dominant 
dimension of the issue of healthcare. Instead of the socio-economic left-right division 
between conservative liberals on the right, Christian-democrats in the centre and 
social democrats on the left, the dominant division appears to be between the CDA, 
U55+ and GL on the one side, the AOV, the PvdA, the SP and the small Christian 
parties in the centre and D66 and VVD on the other extreme. The division may be 
between those who seek to reform the healthcare system and those who seek to 
maintain it. The entry of the pensioners' parties may have caused this new division to 
come to life.  
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The pattern, however, opens up another possibility: on one side of the new 
dimension one can find the parties that formed the cabinet, and on the other side one 
can find the parties that formed the opposition. It may be possible that this new 
pattern is merely the effect of the formation of a government that cuts through the 
traditional left-right divide. One can examine this question in two ways: first, one may 
want to compare the pattern found here for healthcare to other issues and other time 
periods. If one finds that the pattern is not found for other issues and one finds that in 
the next parliamentary period (when PvdA, VVD and D66 formed the cabinet, but the 
pensioners' parties were not in parliament) the pattern is different, the pattern found 
may be more reasonably related to the specificities of this issue (specifically the entry 
of the pensioners’ parties), rather than to the formation of new cabinet. A useful issue 
to examine may be labour and social affairs, because like healthcare this issue 
concerns the protection of weaker members of society, insurance against major risks 
and the material needs of citizens. Labour and social affairs are analysed in section 
5.2.11. A striking stability is found in the pattern of party positions between 1989-
1994 and 1994-1998. In both cases the left-right pattern was dominant. This appears 
to falsify the notion that the change in the pattern for healthcare is caused by a change 
in cabinets. The next step would be to look at voting in the following parliamentary 
period (1998-2002). For this purpose, this period has also been included in figures 
5.19 and 5.20. In this period, PvdA, VVD and D66 also formed the cabinet. If one 
finds the persistence of a pattern that separates the PvdA, VVD and D66 from the 
CDA and the GL, one may find reason to attribute the pattern found in the period 
1994-1998 to the formation of the PvdA, VVD and D66 cabinet rather than to the 
participation of the U55+ and AOV in the parliamentary arena. The data is on the 
border between a one and a two-dimensional solution. In the one-dimensional model 
of voting behaviour, one can observe the following pattern: the VVD is the furthest 
party on the right, followed by D66, the CDA, the SGP, the CU, the GL and the SP. 
Certainly the dominant pattern in this model is not between government and 
opposition parties, but rather between the socio-economic left and the right, as was 
also observed for all votes concerning pensioners' affairs and healthcare in the period 
1989-1994. 157 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 The two-dimensional solution shows two dimensions: one between socio-economic 
left and right, and one between religious and secular parties. The PvdA, VVD and 
D66 stand close to each other on the second dimension. 
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In both these comparative analyses the peculiar voting patterns on healthcare 
in the period 1994-1998 appear to be specific to voting on that issue in that period, 
rather than a phenomenon that is caused by a division of government and opposition. 
These patterns, however, do not appear to be related to the political priorities of 
elderly parties in a consistent way: the AOV and the U55+ vote very differently. 
If one compares the results of the two analyses of voting and attention, one 
particular finding stands out: the CDA, GL and CD are the only parties to respond to 
the U55+ and AOV; they show a change in terms of saliency and they also sit closely 
together on the new healthcare dimension. The CDA and GL both lost in the 1994 
elections, in which the CD won seats (but not as many as was polled). It appears that 
these three parties may have attempted to take over some of the momentum of the 
pensioners' parties. 
 
5.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger  
In addition to the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+, another party entered 
parliament in the 1994 elections: the Socialist Party. The SP opposed the cuts on 
social spending proposed and implemented by the CDA/PvdA cabinet. The leftwing 
party opposed the centrist course of the PvdA across the line but particularly on 
healthcare, labour market and social policies. As an example of this, the labour issue 
is selected.158 To understand the effects of the SP, two things need to be taken into 
consideration: the political events during the Lubbers cabinet (discussed in section 
5.2.10) and the actual economic circumstances. Figure 5.21 shows the levels of 
unemployment in the Netherlands. As one can see this follows a zigzag pattern of 
decreasing unemployment in the period 1989-1992, followed by an increase in 
unemployment in the period 1992-1994. After that, unemployment decreased again.  
The patterns in the attention that established parties devote to this issue, shown 
in figure 5.22, are similar: for all parties the pattern follows a zigzag pattern. Attention 
to labour issues declined before the 1994 election. It peaked after the 1994 election 
but then declined again. One may propose that the entry of the SP interrupted the 
decreasing levels of attention to labour market policies, and that this effect was only 
short term, given the subsequent decline. The levels of attention for labour market 
issues also show a clear similarity to the actual levels of unemployment. This pattern  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 This includes the labour market, labour market reintegration, and disability and 
unemployment insurance. 
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Table 5.8: party positions on labour and social affairs 1989-1998 
Position 1989-1994 1994-1998 
1 CD CD 
2 VVD VVD 
3 SGP CDA 
4 RPF SGP 
5 GPV GPV 
6 CDA RPF 
7 D66 PvdA 
8 PvdA D66 
9 GL GL 
 
does not only explain the rise in attention between 1993 and 1995, but also the decline 
in attention before 1994 and the decline in attention after 1994. A significant 
correlation exists between the levels of attention for labour market affairs and 
unemployment (Pearson’s r is 0.84 – significant at the 0.01-level). Given this 
correlation, the entry of the SP has to be dismissed as a likely explanation for the 
increase in attention to labour policies. During the entire period the level of 
unemployment appears to be a better explanation for the level of attention for labour 
market policies than the entry of the SP. While the entry of the SP could explain the 
change in the level of attention before and after the 1994 election, the level of 
unemployment can also explain the developments before and after the 1994 election. 
Table 5.8 presents voting in parliament on labour and social affairs.159 The 
Centre-Democrats stand furthest to the right; followed by the VVD, then the 
Christian-democratic CDA and the smaller orthodox Christian parties, at the furthest 
left on the dimension one can find D66, the PvdA and the GL. The party positions 
correlate significantly over time. The SP takes a position on the far left.160 Party 
positions on labour and social affairs remain remarkably stable over time. Only two 
parties change position over time: between 1989 and 1994, the CDA was the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 In both cases the level of error is slightly lower than the threshold for a one-
dimensional interpretation. However, given the strong consistency in the voting 
patterns over time and their confirmation of pre-established dimensions, a one-
dimensional solution is used. The second dimension in both cases separate more 
religious from more secular parties, an this is not related to the positions of the SP. 
160 Three other parties entered parliament during this period: the socialist SP and the 
pensioners' parties AOV and U55+. The AOV and U55+ take a position in the 
political centre, between D66 and the RPF. 
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leftwing of the Christian parties, but it moved to the most rightwing position between 
1994 and 1998. The move of the CDA can be interpreted as an adversarial move, 
which has also been observed in the other cases: larger parties seem to move further to 
the flanks after the entry of a new party. The RPF finally moves to the most leftwing 
position of the Christian parties. It skips over the position of the GPV. The level of 
unanimity remains remarkably stable over time: 15%. Like many other new parties, 
the SP appears not to have influenced the basic structure of competition, and instead, 
it joined one of the sides of the conflict. 
Given all of these results, one has to conclude that the SP did not influence the 
attention that parties devoted to issues or the positions that they took on issues during 
the new party’s first period in parliament. 
 
5.2.12 LN: democratic populists 
In 1999, members of local protest parties founded the Liveable Netherlands. 
The party agreed on a platform of government reform. Both in the period before and 
in the period after LN was in parliament, several consitutional reforms were discussed 
in parliament. An overview of these is presented in table 5.9. Between 1998 and 2002 
the reform party D66, the conservative liberal VVD and social democratic PvdA 
formed a cabinet. The cabinet proposed a set of government reforms: some of these 
were accepted by parliament, but some were voted down. Several proposals required a 
second reading. After the 2003 elections,161 several government reforms were 
discussed for the second time; some because they required a second reading, and 
some because they were proposed again by the D66-minister for government reform. 
Almost all major proposals were voted down, all others were withdrawn. The minister 
for government reform stepped down; a new D66-minister took over his portfolio and 
asked several committees to advise him on the issue of government reform. These 
committees presented their reports just before the 2006 elections, but none of the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In the short parliamentary period between 2002 and 200,3 no major democratic 
reforms were discussed. 
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Table 5.9: government reforms discussed in the Tweede Kamer 1998-2006 
Year Reform Notes 
1999 Bill on Corrective Referendum Constitutional amendment (second reading) 
Voted down by Eerste Kamer 
2001 Bill on Temporary Referendum  
1999 Advise of the Elzinga Committee Major advice on local democracy 
2001 Bill on Municipal Government  
2002 Bill on Elected Mayor  Constitutional amendment (first reading) 
2004 Bill on Corrective Referendum Constitutional amendment (first reading) 
2004 Bill on Temporary Referendum Reintroduction by opposition parties 
2004 Bill on Elected Mayor Constitutional amendment (second reading) 
2005 Bill on Change of the Electoral 
System 
Did not come to a final vote 
2005 Bill on Referendum on the European 
Constitution 
 
2006 Advice of the Citizens Forum on 
Electoral Change 
Major advice on electoral change 
2006 Advice of the National Convention Major advice on government reform 
 
The overview in table 5.9 shows that issues on government reforms were 
discussed before and after the entry of LN into the parliamentary arena, and so it may 
have been the case that the entry of LN gave a special impetus to these discussions. In 
figure 5.22, one can see the developments in attention that established parties devoted 
to government reform. Attention increased before 2002 and decreased after the entry 
of LN. Even though more bills on government reform were proposed after 2002, this 
did not lead to more parliamentary activity. Many proposals on government reform 
that were discussed in the period 2003-2004 were not particularly new: they were bills 
that were reintroduced or that came up for a second reading. Therefore, the 
parliamentary discussions may have been less intensive.  
The voting patterns on government reform between 1998 and 2002 and 2002 
and 2006 are difficult to compare and understand. In both periods the voting pattern is 
on the border between one- and two-dimensional. The one-dimensional 
representations of voting behaviour, shown in table 5.10, are not comparable. When 
modelling the voting in the period 1998-2002 in terms of one dimension, the 
following pattern occurs: the models separate the religious parties (CU, SGP and 
CDA) from the coalition parties (VVD, PvdA and D66). In the centre, one can find 
the parties of the leftwing opposition (SP and GL). The largest difference is between 
the coalition parties and the rest. The pattern appears to follow the division between 
secular and religious parties, where the secular parties in the Tweede Kamer and in  
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Table 5.10: party positions on governance 1998-2006 
Position 1998-2002 2002-2006 
1 SGP VVD 
2 CU CDA 
3 CDA CU 
4 SP SGP 
5 GL PvdA 
6 D66 GL 
7 PvdA D66 
8 VVD SP 
 
particular those in the coalition tend to favour government reform, and the religious 
parties tend to be more conservative. The coalition parties stand closely together on 
one extreme of the dimension. In the period 2002-2006, a different pattern can be 
observed in the voting behaviour: the SP and the LPF are on the far end of the 
spectrum, followed by D66 and the GL. In the centre, one can find the PvdA, 
followed by the CDA, the SGP, the CU and the VVD. The largest difference is 
between the VVD and the other parties, the smallest difference is that between the CU 
and SGP. The level of unanimous voting decreases over time: from 26% in the period 
1998-2002, to 20% in the period 2002-2006. The ordering of parties for the period 
1998-2002 and 2002-2006 correlates only weakly, and therefore, it is impossible to 
compare the party positions over time. 
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Perhaps, a two-dimensional solution provides more insight. However, as 
discussed above, two-dimensional solutions with such a low number of votes are 
unstable. In terms of the reduction of errors, both models can comfortably be 
modelled in terms of two dimensions. The models are shown in figure 5.22, 5.23 and 
5.24. The model for the period 1998-2002 shows the following structure: there 
appears to be a division between government and opposition parties, and between 
parties that are progressive and conservative on the government reform issue. In the 
upper right hand corner one can find the CU and the SGP, which are conservative 
opposition parties that tend to oppose government reform. In the upper left hand 
corner, the coalition parties VVD, PvdA and D66 can be found. These parties agreed 
on an agenda of government reform. In the lower half of the figure, one can find 
CDA, SP and GL.  
In the model of voting on governance between 2002 and 2006, as shown in 
figure 4.29, one can also observe two divides: the first divide is between CU, SGP, 
CDA and VVD that tend to oppose government reform on the one side, and the PvdA, 
GL, D66 and SP that tend to favour government reform on the other side. It is difficult 
to explain the variance on the second dimension: this includes both government and 
opposition parties and parties that tend to favour government reform (SP, LPF, D66), 
as well as parties that tend to be more conservative (CDA and VVD). One can use 
Procrustean Analysis to superimpose the one model on the other. If one does so, an 
interesting pattern emerges. Political parties move considerably, but most of these 
movements occur on the vertical dimension. The correlation between party positions 
on the horizontal dimension is significant, while the correlation on the vertical 
dimension is not. 
The following may be the case: party positions on governance can best be 
modelled in terms of two dimensions in both periods. One dimension stays the same 
in both periods: this is the government reform dimension with the SGP and CU on the 
one side, and D66 and the SP on the other. Shifts along this dimension may be 
understood in terms of changes in position. On the vertical dimension, party positions 
change considerably. It is, however, difficult to interpret party positions on this 
dimension without referring to government formation: while in the period 1998-2002 
the VVD, the PvdA and D66 stand together, the PvdA has shifted away in the period  
 
 










2002-2006, while the CDA and the VVD take a rather similar position in this 
period.162  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Because voting on democratic reform includes several changes of the constitution, 
several votes are held in both periods. Constitutional changes are voted on two times. 
For two issues, multiple votes have taken place: for the constitutional change of the 
legislative procedure to allow for referenda and the deconstitutionalisation of the 
appointment of the mayor and the Queen’s commissioner. Both issues were priority 
reforms of LN (and D66). In the vote on the elected mayor, the following pattern 
emerges: in 1998 the CDA, the CU and the SGP voted against the 
deconstitutionalisation of the appointment. When the issue returned to parliament in 
2004, the CDA had made volte-face. The LPF also voted in favour. Only the CU and 
the SGP retained their opposition against the reform. In both the 1998-2002 and the 
2003-2006 coalition agreements, the cabinet had committed itself to the elected 
mayor. While the support for the directly elected mayor expanded over time, the 
support for the referendum decreased. In 1999, the same majority that had favoured 
the elected mayor also voted in favour of the referendum. In 2004 the VVD voted 
against the referendum, while the LPF voted in favour. While the referendum had 
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In both these discussions, LN does not play a role at all: the party emphasised an 
issue that had already seen parliamentary and government activity before it entered 
parliament. After LN entered parliament and disappeared from it again, the D66 
minister of government reform proposed a set of reforms, the majority of which had 
already been discussed in the previous parliamentary period. The entry of LN did not 
reinvigorate the parliamentary debate on government reform or consistently influence 
party positions on the issue.  
 
5.2.13 LPF and PVV: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics 
The LPF and PVV are two parties that focused on immigration. Over the course 
of the 1990s, a new group of migrants came to the Netherlands. After migrants from 
(former) Dutch colonies and migrant workers from the Mediterranean, refugees came 
to the Netherlands from conflict areas such as the Western Balkan and Iraq (Obdeijn 
& Schrover 2008, 328). The number of asylum seekers more than doubled between 
1992 and 1998 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 328). Between 1998 and 2010 the levels of 
immigration into the Netherlands fluctuated, as can be seen in figure 5.27: while 
rising marginally in the period 1998 and 2001, the level of non-Western immigration 
sharply dropped in the period 2001-2005. After 2005, immigration levels increased 
again. Before 2002, immigration was the subject of political debate: in 2000, a new, 
more restrictive bill on aliens was accepted by parliament (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 
316). In the period 2002-2006, the cabinet focused on more restrictive legislation on 
integration, while strictly applying the 2000 bill on aliens (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 
316-318).163 After the 2006 parliamentary elections, parliament did not debate major 
changes in legislation, except for a general pardon that was accepted for asylum-
seekers that had lived in the Netherlands for longer than five years (Obdeijn & 
Schrover 2008, 318).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
been agreed upon by the parties in the coalition agreement, the Second Balkenende 
government had deferred judgment to the Tweede Kamer. From this it becomes clear 
that the CDA and the VVD did not move unambiguously to more democratisation. 
Instead, the positions on democratic reform cannot be separated from the position of 
D66 in coalition politics. While D66 had been able to get the support of PvdA and the 
VVD for the elected mayor and the referendum in the 1998 coalition talks, it had been 
able to win the CDA and VVD for the elected mayor, but not for the referendum in 
2003. 
163 The law on aliens was also made slightly more restrictive. 
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The development in the attention for immigration is presented in figure 5.28: 
between 1998 and 2002 the attention that most parties devoted to immigration was 
low. After the 2002 elections, the attention to immigration increased. The entry of the 
LPF may have caused a reversion in the attention for immigration with most parties. 
The 2006 election reverses the trend: in the months after the 2006 elections, 
established parties devoted considerable attention to immigration. This is the period in 
which the new leftwing majority voted in favour of the general pardon for asylum-
seekers. The attention to immigration dropped after this peak, and the base level is 
now lower than in the period 2002-2006.164 Established parties did not devote more 
attention to integration and immigration in response to rising levels of immigration: 
between 1998 and 2001, the levels of immigration were high, while the levels of 
attention for immigration were low; between 2001 and 2005 the level of immigration 
decreased drastically, while the level of attention for immigration increased. After 
2006, the attention to immigration decreased, while the actual level of immigration 
increased. The incongruence between political attention to immigration and actual 
levels of immigration in the Netherlands since 2000 has also been observed by 
Lucassen and Lucassen (2011, 39). It may be that the rising levels of attention for 
immigration can be understood in strategic terms: that the entry of the LPF caused a 
change in the attention that established parties devoted to immigration. For most 
parties, a marked change in attention after the 2002 elections is visible. After the entry 
of the LPF, established parties may have followed its successful example and devoted 
more attention to immigration, in order to regain lost votes. 
The entry of the PVV did not cause an increase in attention: even with the 
extreme outlier after the 2006 elections, established parties devote less attention to 
immigration after the entry of the PVV. Established parties may not have been 
impressed by their nine seats (only one more than the LPF’s eight in the 2003 
election) and reduced their attention to immigration. The low levels of attention for 
immigration after 2006 can also be understood because no new policy or legislation 
was needed: legislation that was intended to restrict the level of asylum requests and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Only the CDA defies this pattern: it devotes less attention to immigration after the 
entry of the LPF in 2002, and, in the period before and after the election, the attention 
is relatively stable. The pattern in attention of the CDA to immigration may imply that 
there is a relationship between electoral performance and attention to the LPF's issue: 
it performed particularly well in the 2002 and 2003 elections and therefore could 
(marginally) reduce its attention for immigration. 
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Table 5.11: party positions on immigration 1998-2010 
Position 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 
1 VVD VVD VVD 
2 CDA CDA CDA 
3 SGP SGP SGP 
4 CU CU CU 
5 D66 D66 PvdA 
6 PvdA PvdA SP 
7 SP SP GL 
8 GL GL D66 
 
make the civic integration process stricter had been accepted. No new legislation was 
needed after 2006. 
Voting on immigration can be modelled in terms of one dimension during the 
entire period. Party positions on the dimension, as shown in table 5.11, follow the 
traditional division between the social-economic left and right. Of the established 
parties, the VVD is furthest to the right, followed by the CDA, the SGP and the CU. 
The traditional parties of the left can be found D66, PvdA, SP and GL. The LPF, 
which was the most conservative party on immigration during the election campaign 
(Pellikaan, De Lange & Van der Meer 2007), is placed between the CDA and the 
SGP. The VVD is the most extreme party on immigration in the period 1998-2006. 
This may be a result of the fact that the LPF was leaderless and increasingly divided 
in the period 2002-2006. But the PVV, too, is more moderate on immigration than the 
VVD. The differences between the PVV and the VVD are minimal, however. In the 
period 2006-2010, the PVV is the most extreme party on immigration. In this period 
most votes (23%) divide the PVV from the other parties. Between 1998-2002 and 
2002-2006, the party positions are identical. For the periods 2002-2006 and 2006-
2010, the correlation is significant. Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the level of 
unanimous voting increases slightly, while it falls sharply in the period 2006-2010: 
the LPF put the issue of immigration on the political agenda, the PVV subsequently 
polarised the issue.165 
Between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, the relative positioning of established 
parties does not change. The parties retain their position relative to each other: rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 LN participated in too few votes to be included in the study. The PvdD joins the 
progressive parties on the left. 
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than introduce a new line of conflict, the immigration issue remained part of the 
traditional social-economic division. Rather than changing the lines of conflict, the 
LPF became incorporated into the right, as is evident from its participation in the first 
Balkenende cabinet (Bale 2003). While the leaderless, internally divided LPF 
parliamentary party was easily incorporated into the existing system, the entry of the 
PVV did lead to a change of party positions: a change occurred on the leftwing side of 
the political spectrum. D66 moved from the most conservative of the parties of the 
left, it became the most progressive on the issue of immigration. The PvdA, the SP 
and the GL all moved to a slightly more conservative position. This is a clear example 
of an adversarial move of D66 against the PVV: D66 chose to oppose the PVV. As a 
conservative competitor entered the parliament, D66 became more progressive.  
The most striking thing about the data is the difference between the effects of 
the LPF and the PVV: the LPF has had a consistent effect on the attention that all 
parties devote to immigration. It did not influence the party positions on the issue.166 
After the PVV replaced the LPF, the parliamentary attention to the issue decreases, 
but there is a change in party positions and the level of unanimous voting. It appears 
that the politicisation of the immigration issue went through two stages: after 2002 all 
parties agreed that something had to be done after the public expression of discontent 
with immigration policies. Attention and unanimous voting on the issue increased. 
After 2006 this was then transformed into an increasing political difference on the 
issue: after the process of consensual law making, the parties politicised the issue. 
 
5.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse 
The PvdD has said that since it has started to take part in parliamentary 
decision-making, every day is "World Animal Day".167 The party was active on its 
own subject in parliament.168 In order to deal with the high number of questions from 
the PvdD, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food appointed additional civil 
servants.169 Marianne Thieme, the chair of the PvdD parliamentary party, concludes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 This does not exclude the possibility of systemic shift to the right. 
167 Misérus, M. "Dierenliefde bindt links en rechts; diervriendelijk blok in de Tweede 
Kamer laat zich in moties duidelijk horen". De Volkskrant 13/12/2006. 
168 Stokmans, D. "Dierenpartij maakt zich over mensen geen zorgen. Nieuwe partijen 
in Tweede Kamer schenken vooral aandacht aan 'hun' onderwerpen". NRC 
Handelsblad, 26/1/2007. 
169 Douwes, D. "Vragen Partij voor de Dieren dagtaak". De Volkskrant, 30/10/2007. 
	   218	  
all of her contributions to the plenary debate with the words "And I am also of the 
opinion that industrial agriculture must be ended", echoing Cato the Elder (translation 
SO).170 The special focus of the PvdD has sometimes led to visible irritation of other 
MPs. When the PvdD attempted to propose sixty motions during the discussion of the 
agriculture budget, D66 MP Boris van der Ham announced loudly that he was going 
home, because, according to him, this was meaningless.171  
It may be possible that not the entry of the PvdD, but the developments in the 
agricultural sector influenced the attention for agriculture. Over time the share of the 
GDP constituted by agricultural activities steadily fell from 2.6% to 2.4%, as can be 
seen in figure 5.29. One major animal disease in the Netherlands broke out in the 
period: Q-fever. Between 2003 and 2009, this affected the number of sheep: the 
growth in the number of sheep stagnated after 2006 and the number of sheep declined 
after 2007, as can be seen in figure 5.30. During the period 2006-2010, there were 
also two policy initiatives on agriculture: a government policy paper on animal 
welfare was sent to parliament in the end of 2007 and the discussions were brought to 
close during the beginning of 2008. Moreover, the environmental organisation 
Environmental Defence (MilieuDefensie), the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth, 
brought the environmental impact of livestock to the table by means of the citizens' 
initiative. The initiative was discussed in parliament in 2007.  
When looking at the attention that established parties devote to agriculture 
(shown in figure 5.31), one can see that the 2006 elections interrupted the 
development: the levels of attention were low and stagnant, before the 2006 elections. 
After the 2006 elections, the level of attention for agriculture increased sharply, and 
afterwards, the growth stagnated. Outliers cause the decrease in the trend lines.172 
These patterns clearly do not conform to the actual developments in agriculture. The 
economic activity declined before 2006 and stabilised afterwards, while in terms of 
attention the period before 2006 is stable and the period after shows an increase. The 
events of 2007 and 2008 (Q-fever, the two major policy proposals) amplified a trend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Middendorp, P. "Cato". De Pers, 26/10/2009. 
171 "Record aan moties PvdD". De Telegraaf 5/2/2008. 
172 Two parties defy this trend. The VVD shows a less pronounced but similar pattern: 
for this party attention was low and declining before the 2006 elections. After this the 
level of attention increased, but it does not exceed the level of attention before the 
entry of these elections. The SGP appears not to have been affected by the entry of the 
2006 elections: for this party, attention for agriculture increased constantly in the 
period 2003-2010. 
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Table 5.12: party positions on agriculture 2003-2010 
Position 2003-2006 2006-2010 





4 CU CU 
5 D66 PvdA 
6 PvdA D66 
7 GL GL 
8 SP SP 
 
 
towards more attention for agriculture that already started at the end of 2006. For most 
parties, the 2006 elections interrupted the stable levels of attention and increased 
attention. 
Voting on agriculture can be modelled in terms of one dimension in both 
periods. The distribution of parties, as shown in table 5.12, follows the division 
between left and right. Furthest to the right, one can find the VVD, the CDA, then the 
small Christian parties SGP and CU, followed by the traditional parties of the left 
(D66, PvdA, SP and GL). Voting on agriculture in both periods correlates 
significantly. The level of unanimous voting drops sharply from 19% to 3%. The 
PvdD joined the parties on the left and became the most extreme party on 
agriculture.173 Two clear movements are visible: on the one side the CDA and the 
SGP, which held the same position between 2003 and 2006, and which now hold two 
separate positions next to each other. Still, only 4% of the votes on agriculture divide 
the two parties. The second change is a switch in positions of the PvdA and D66. D66 
takes the more environmentalist position, while the PvdA moves to the other side. All 
in all, the PvdD did affect the attention to agricultural issues: this sharply increased 
after the 2006 elections. The PvdD did not influence party positions and instead 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 The PVV started as a separate party in 2004. In the period 2004-2006, the party 
took a moderate position on the less environmentalist side of the CU. In the period 
2006-2010, the party took the least environmentalist position on the spectrum. 
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5.3 Analysing the case-by-case results 
In the previous sections, the effects of individual new parties on the attention 
that established parties devote to issues and the positions that they take on these issues 
were studied. These will now be compared and analysed statistically. 
 
5.3.1 Party positions in parliament 
The most remarkable outcome of the case-by-case analysis of party positions is 
that for three cases (CP, AOV/U55+ and LN) changes in party positions before and 
after the entry of the new party could not be understood as changes on a stable 
dimension because the nature of the conflict on the issue changed. These cases were 
analysed in detail, and inconclusive results were found each time. For immigration, 
the issue of the CP, the difference between the two periods may be a consequence of 
the low number of votes. This led to poor results in both cases. Because of the divided 
position of the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ on the issue, one cannot attribute 
the change in position of established parties on healthcare to them directly. If one 
models the changes in the voting patterns for governance, the issue of LN in two 
dimensions, it becomes clear that the line of conflict between pro- and anti-reform 
parties has remained stable, and that any change in position is caused by a changing 
government composition. In none of the cases can the changes be easily attributed to 
the entry of the new parties. However, in each of these elections, more than one new 
party entered parliament: the lines of conflict on the issues of these second new 
parties (the EVP, SP and the LPF) remained stable.  
The CP, AOV, U55+ and LN may have played some role in the perturbation of 
the political space. One thing stands out about these cases: they are all mobilisers. The 
pattern found fits the formulated hypothesis: mobiliser parties are associated with a 
change in dimensionality.174 In table 5.13 one can see that for the remaining parties 
there is no difference in the size of the changes between mobilisers and challengers. 
There is a significant difference, however, between mobilisers and challengers in the 
levels of unanimity in voting on their issue, as can be seen in table 5.13. On average  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Moreover, two of these three parties were internally unstable. LN was also 
internally unstable, but not in terms of its parliamentary party. Again, internal 
instability is not sufficient condition for change in the lines of conflict on an issue. 
The internally unstable parties such LPF, NMP and RPF are associated with stability 
in the lines of conflict. Here the relationship may be reversed: the instability of voting 
patterns on the issue resulted in instability within the party. 
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Table 5.13: Comparing mean effects on parliamentary positions 
Change in party positions Change in unanimity Characteristic 
µ σ  N ε  µ ε  
Challenged 0.067 0.096 5 
Unchallenged 0.089 0.082 33 
0.058 - - 
Mobiliser 0.066 0.086 69 -0.08 




Government 0.064 0.099 30 0.03 




µ: average value 
σ: standard deviation 
N: number of cases 
ε: eta 
 
there is a small decrease in the level of unanimity. While for challengers there is a 
small increase in unanimity, the entry of mobiliser is associated with a marked 
decrease in unanimity. This difference between challengers and mobilisers is 
significant. 
Seven of the eleven cases in which individual party positions could be 
compared, saw large movements of one or more large established parties away from 
the centre (D66, the NMP, the PPR, DS'70, the RPF, the EVP and the SP).175 Five of 
these seven parties are challengers: 83% of challengers are associated with large 
parties making large movements to the extremes, while only 25% of mobilisers have 
this effect. These results are summarised in table 5.14. Only in one case did the 
challenged party react most (KVP to PPR). In three cases the value for the challenged 
party is zero, meaning that there was no reaction. For the other challengers, a party on 
the opposite side of the political spectrum moved away from the new party. While the 
challenged party tended to ignore its challenger, the other established parties have 
moved to the extreme, augmenting the problem for the challenged party.176 All in all, 
the average reaction from challenged parties is not significantly different from those  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 This may be a result of measurement uncertainty: the four cases where this does 
not occur are the RKPN, LPF, PVV and PvdD. This is not the case, however: if one 
looks at the combined number of votes in both the pre and the post-analysis, the top-
six of number votes is the LPF (immigration, 1998-2006), the SP (labour and social 
affairs 1989-1998), the PVV (immigration 2002-2010), the PPR (a bloc of 
environmental issues 1967-1977), LN (governance 1998-2006) and NMP (economic 
affairs 1967-1977). Four are associated with  changes in positions and two are not. 
176 Marked accommodative reactions are found after the entry of PPR (from the 
KVP), D66 (from the KVP) and the NMP (from the VVD) and marked adversarial 
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Table 5.14: challengers’ effects on parliamentary positions 
Party PPR DS'70 RKPN RPF EVP SP 
ARP -0.08 0.25 -0.09    
CHU -0.08 0 0.14    
KVP 0.25 -0.08 0    
SGP 0.04 0 0 -0.11 0.18 0.1 
PvdA 0 0.17 0.09 -0.33 -0.09 -0.1 
VVD 0 -0.17 0 -0.22 -0.18 0 
CPN 0 -0.33 -0.09 0.11 0  
PSP 0 0 -0.18 0.11 0  
BP -0.04 0 -0.13    
GPV -0.25 0 0.09 0.11 0 0 
D66 0 0 0 0.11 0.09 0.1 
CDA    0 0 -0.3 
DS'70   0    
PPR   0 0.22 0  
RPF      0.2 
GL      0 
CD      0 
Hypo. Yes No No No No No 
Challenged parties in bold 
Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction 
No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction 
 
Table 5.15: mobilisers’ effects on parliamentary positions 
Party D66 NMP CP AOV/U55+ LPF LN PVV PvdD 
ARP 0 -0.33       
CHU -0.09 -0.04       
KVP 0.18 0.04       
SGP 0.05 0.04 n/a n/a 0 n/a 0 0.06 
PvdA 0.18 -0.08 n/a n/a 0 n/a 0.13 -0.11 
VVD -0.09 0.08 n/a n/a 0 n/a 0 0 
CPN -0.09 0.17 n/a      
PSP -0.09 0 n/a      
BP -0.05 -0.08       
GPV 0 0.21 n/a n/a     
D66  -0.08 n/a n/a 0 n/a -0.38 +0.11 
CDA   n/a n/a 0 n/a 0 0.06 
PPR  n/a n/a      
RPF   n/a n/a     
GL    n/a 0 n/a 0.13 0 
CD     0 n/a   
SP     0 n/a 0.13 0 
CU     0 n/a 0  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reactions after the entry of the NMP (from the PvdA and the ARP), the EVP (from the 
VVD), the RPF (from the VVD and the CDA), and the SP (for the CDA). 
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of unchallenged parties, as can be seen in table 5.13.177  
The new party government hypothesis proposes that new parties that enter 
government will have a larger impact on the positions of established parties, than new 
parties that remain in opposition. In table 5.13 one can see that governing new parties 
are associated with less change in party positions than opposition parties. This 
difference is not significant. Governing new parties do have a larger impact on the 
levels of unanimity, than new parties in opposition. This difference, however, is not 
significant, either. 
If one looks at the overall correlation in table 5.16, there is a significant negative 
relationship between the size of the new party and the reactions of established parties: 
larger parties elicit less reaction. The entry of the largest party that is studied here, 
LPF, was not followed by any change in the relative party positions. Without the LPF 
the relationship becomes insignificant, changes sign and becomes much weaker: both 
smaller parties such as the RPF and larger parties such as DS'70 elicit marked 
reactions.  
Table 5.17 provides an overview of the results concerning the new party 
organisation hypothesis. Here one can see that both poorly organised parties such as 
the RPF and well-organised parties such as DS'70 elicit marked reactions. The overall 
relationship implies that weakly organised parties elicit more reactions than well-
organised parties. This relationship is not significant and goes in against the stated 
expectation: parties like the NMP and the RPF, which fell apart, are accompanied by 
larger parties that moved to the flanks of the political spectrum. All in all, the 
hypothesis that better organised parties elicit more reactions has to be rejected. 
In table 5.18 different correlation results are presented concerning the distance 
between the new and the established party and the size of established party responses. 
The image is mixed: for some new parties the parties that are furthest away respond 
most (in the case of DS'70 this relationship is significant). For other parties, it is the 
parties that are closest by respond most. The overall pattern is that the further two  
Table 5.16: new party size and parliamentary positions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 One should note that the measure that is used in the statistical analysis looks at the 
absolute value of the changes, because for every change a (set of) equally large 
change(s) in the other direction occurs. Therefore, one cannot take the direction of the 
movement into account. 
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LPF 17 0 0 8 
PVV 5.89 0.093 0.129 8 
DS’70 5.33 0.106 0.118 11 
D66 4.48 0.064 0.058 10 
PPR 1.84 0.068 0.095 11 
PvdD 1.83 0.042 0.049 8 
NMP 1.51 0.114 0.093 11 
SP 1.32 0.089 0.105 9 
RPF 1.25 0.148 0.096 9 
RKPN 0.92 0.063 0.066 13 
EVP 0.83 0.061 0.079 9 
Correlation -0.208** 107 
 
Table 5.17: new party organisation and parliamentary positions 







PVV 1 0.094 0.129 8 
DS’70 1 0.106 0.118 11 
D66 1 0.064 0.058 10 
PPR 1 0.068 0.096 11 
PvdD 1 0.042 0.049 8 
SP 1 0.089 0.105 9 
RKPN 1 0.063 0.066 13 
EVP 1 0.061 0.079 9 
LPF 0.625 0 0 8 
NMP 0.5 0.113 0.093 11 
RPF 0.5 0.148 0.096 9 
Correlation -0.136 107 
 
Table 5.18: party distance and 
parliamentary positions 
Table 5.19: established party 
performance and parliamentary positions 
Party Correlation N Party Correlation N 
DS’70 -0.55* 11 PvdD -0.521 8 
NMP -0.257 11 SP -0.325 9 
D66 -0.227 10 D66 -0.308 10 
SP -0.173 9 RPF -0.263 9 
PvdD 0 8 PVV -0.113 8 
PPR 0.257 11 EVP 0.109 9 
RPF 0.264 9 RKPN 0.123 13 
RKPN 0.301 13 PPR 0.22 11 
EVP 0.417 9 DS’70 0.318 11 
PVV 0.507 8 NMP 0.37 11 
Overall  0.165* 107 
 
Overall  0.070 107 
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parties are apart, the more the established party will react.178 This goes against the 
formulated expectation, but it can be understood in terms of Meguid's (2005) notion 
that established parties will polarise the issue on which their competitor is challenged.  
The analysis for the established party performance hypothesis is summarised in 
table 5.19. One can see that it is evenly split: five new parties elicit more marked 
reactions from parties that performed well in the elections and five new parties elicit 
more marked reactions from parties that performed poorly in the elections. Overall, 
the relationship is weak and insignificant. This does fit the expectation formulated 
above that electoral reasoning does not play a strong role in the parliamentary arena.  
On the whole, one can draw two conclusions from these analyses of the effect of 
new parties on parliamentary party positions. Mobiliser parties and challenger parties 
have different roles to play: mobilisers emphasise previously unpolarised issues, 
which leads to increasing levels of non-unanimous voting and, in some cases, the 
redefinition of the lines of conflict. Challengers emphasise issues that are already 
polarised and take positions that are on the extreme of the existing dimensions. These 
parties reinforce the existing lines of conflict, as large parties move sharply to the 
extremes. Parties that are far away from the new party tend to move more than parties 
that stand close to the new party. As before this can be understood in the context 
Meguid's theory (2005) that the enemy of one's enemy is one's friend.  
 
5.3.2 Analysis of attention in parliament 
The patterns in the attention that established party devote to the issue of the new 
party, are remarkably uniform. It does not appear to be the case that some parties react 
more to the entry of particular new political parties than others; instead, established 
political parties react in the same way, because the parliamentary agenda limits the 
ability of parties to pursue their own priorities. The question then is why some new 
parties were able to put an issue on the agenda while other parties were not.  
For nine cases, the KNP, BP, EVP, RKPN, EVP, LN, DS’70, AOV, U55+ and 
PVV, generally declining levels of attention were found. This could be explained by 
external circumstances. In most cases processes of politicisation and depoliticisation 
explained these patterns. The KNP was formed in opposition to Indonesian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 One should note that in the multivariate analysis, this relationship is not 
significant. 
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independence, which was realised anyway. Agricultural issues had been moved from 
the parliamentary agenda before the BP entered parliament. In many cases the new 
political parties contested a decision-making process that had already been set in 
motion: the RPF and the RKPN entered parliament after the first attempts to liberalise 
the abortion law had already been made. The EVP could hardly contest the stationing 
of nuclear weapons because the decision to place these weapons were made in small 
steps by a cautious government. LN and DS’70 entered parliament after decision-
making on their issue, governance, had already been initiated and the first initiatives 
had already faltered. The attention of established parties to healthcare, the issue that 
the AOV and U55+ focused on, peaked before these two parties entered parliament. 
The entry of the PVV was followed by a decrease in attention to immigration, because 
migration policies were revised before its entry. All these cases open up another 
possibility: that the entry of a new party does not lead to a change in the parliamentary 
agenda, but rather that a change in the parliamentary agenda facilitates the entry of a 
new party (Lowery et al. forthcoming). These parties entered parliament after their 
issue had been put on the parliamentary agenda and controversial decisions had 
already been made. Their formation and electoral success may be a result of this 
politicisation. 
The entry of the PSP, NMP, PPR and SP is followed by an increase in attention 
to their issues, but external events form a better explanation: the budget cycle (for the 
NMP), the Cold War (for the PSP), the first government environmental policy (for the 
PPR) and economic circumstances (for the SP) explain the patterns in attention better. 
This leaves four parties that may have had a clear effect: D66, CP, LPF and PvdD. 
The patterns of attention to their issues cannot be explained by referring to external 
circumstances: for instance, after D66 entered parliament, a depoliticised committee 
on government reform was set up, still the parliamentary activity on government 
reform increased. All four parties are mobilisers. These parties were indeed successful 
in introducing a new issue to the parliamentary agenda, as a mobiliser seeks to do. 
The PvdD and the CP are small new parties, they devote a more than the average 
share of parliamentary speech to their own issue; D66 and the LPF are larg, they 
devote less than the average share of parliamentary speech to their issue. It may be the 
case that D66 and the LPF changed the parliamentary agenda because their size, while 
the PvdD and the CP because of the focus on their issue. 
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In table 5.20, the effects of mobilisers are summarised. The question is whether 
mobilisers have a consistent effect on all parties. For six cases (D66, CP, AOV/U55+, 
LPF, PVV and PvdD) this appears to be the case. For the PVV a dismissive reaction is 
observed for every party. One should note that this includes the D66, CP, LPF and 
PvdD, for which no other explanation except for the presence of the new party can 
explain the patterns in attention. These individual cases lend credence to the idea that 
indeed mobilisers tend to elicit consistent reactions from their environment. In table 
5.22, one can see, however, that both in terms of the average reaction and the standard 
deviation of the reaction, there is no marked difference between mobilisers and 
challengers. In the multivariate analyses this relationship is significant. This means 
that if we control for other effects mobilisers elicit more reactions that challengers. 
One explanation for the weakness of this relationship may be that for those mobilisers 
for which fewer reactions were observed, established parties already devoted 
considerable attention to the issues that the new party attempted to put on the 
parliamentary agenda. The attention to the issue could not increased markedly, 
because it was already considerable.179  
In table 5.21, the effects of challengers are summarised. This allows one to see 
whether challengers have a more marked impact on the party that they challenge than 
on other parties. The results here are mixed. Only for three parties do challenged 
parties actually respond most (ARP to GPV, KVP to RKPN and CDA to EVP). The 
CDA shows a strong dismissive reaction to the EVP. For the other six parties the 
challenged party shows no special reaction. In table 5.22 one can see that challenged 
parties do respond more than unchallenged parties. This difference is not significant. 
The new party government hypothesis is also examined in table 5.22. It shows 
that new parties in government have more effect on attention than new parties that 
remain in opposition. As seen above, however, there are major issues with attributing 
patterns of attention to DS’70 and the PPR, two of the three new parties that entered 
government. This leaves the LPF, which was in government for less than half a year. 
For substantive reasons, it seems unlikely that their government participation per se is 
a good explanatory factor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 One can question to what extent these parties are truly mobilisers, because 
established parties already devoted considerable attention to their issue. In the 
mobiliser-challenger dichotomy however they do not necessarily fit in the challenger 
category. 
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Table 5.20: mobilisers' effects on parliamentary attention 
Party BP D66 NMP CP AOV/U55+ LPF LN PVV PvdD 
ARP -0.15 0.09 -0.05       
CHU -0.09 0.02 0.01       
KVP -0.13 0.06 -0.03       
SGP 0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.00 -0.21 0.15 
PvdA -0.00 0.15 -0.12 0.16 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -0.12 0.18 
VVD -0.04 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 
CPN -0.23 0.02 -0.07 0.47      
PSP 0.24 0.10 -0.13 0.26      
BP  0.13 -0.08       
GPV  -0.04 0.10 -0.12 0.07     
D66   -0.18 0.16 0.11 0.11 -0.02 -0.37 0.20 
CDA    0.12 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.28 
PPR    0.31      
RPF    0.01 -0.06     
GL     0.11 0.17 0.01 -0.22 0.25 
CD     0.04     
SP      0.23 -0.07 -0.22 0.26 
CU      0.25 0.03 -0.21 0.20 
Hypo. No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Opp. Yes 
Yes: General pattern of increasing attention (no more than two deviations) 
No: No consistent pattern 
Opp.: General pattern of decreasing attention 
 
Table 5.21: challengers' effects on parliamentary attention 
Party KNP PSP GPV PPR DS'70 RKPN RPF EVP SP 
ARP -0.17 0.15 0.09 0.32 0.03 0.03    
CHU -0.16 -0.16 0.01 0.24 0.01 -0.08    
KVP 0.04 0.11 -0.00 0.27 0.06 0.19    
SGP 0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 
PvdA -0.11 0.16 -0.02 0.25 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 
VVD -0.33 0.07 0.01 0.23 -0.02 -0.21 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 
CPN -0.14 0.25 0.05 0.39 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.21  
PSP    0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.31 -0.12  
BP    0.04 -0.12     
GPV    0.06 -0.07 -0.23 -0.26 -0.25 0.06 
D66    0.52 -0.03 -0.06 0.16 -0.13 0.05 
CDA       0.00 -0.01 0.03 
DS'70      -0.02    
PPR       -0.14 0.12 -0.03 
RPF        -0.10  
GL         0.12 
Hypo. No No Yes No No Yes No Opp. No 
Challenged parties in bold 
Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction 
No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction 
Opp.: Challenged party showed most marked reaction in the opposite direction 
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Table 5.22: comparing mean effects on parliamentary positions 
Change in party positions Characteristic 
µ σ  N ε  
Challenged 0.076 0.107 9 
Unchallenged 0.003 0.131 76 
0.152 
Mobiliser 0.038 0.148 79 
Challenger 0.009 0.130 85 
0.088 
Government 0.101 0.159 30 
Opposition 0.006 0.129 132 
0.253*** 
 
µ: average value 
σ: standard deviation 
N: number of cases 
ε: eta 
 
The new party attention hypothesis proposed that the extent to which new 
parties devoted attention to their own issue, mattered for the reactions of established 
parties. Table 5.23 shows that both parties that focused on their own issue like the 
PvdD, and parties that neglected their own issue like the PPR elicit marked reactions 
from established parties. While two of the four parties for which one could attribute 
change in attention devote considerable attention to their own issue, the overall 
relationship between change in attention and attention that a new party devotes to its 
issue is weak and not significant, it is however in the expected direction. 
The new party size hypothesis proposed that larger new parties would elicit 
more reactions from established parties, than smaller new parties. This hypothesis is 
examined in table 5.24. Both the largest and the smallest new party (LPF and the CP) 
elicit marked reactions from the established parties. Above it has been observed that 
two of the four parties for which change could be attributed to their entry were larger. 
The overall correlation between size and change in attention is, however, weak and 
insignificant, but in the expected direction.  
The new party organisation hypothesis proposes that better organised new 
parties would elicit more reactions from established parties, than weakly organised 
new parties. Table 5.25 delves further into this relationship. The evidence shows that 
both among poorly organised new parties, such as the NMP and the LPF and well 
organised new parties such as DS'70 and the PvdD, one can find cases of marked and 
negligible reactions. The overall correlation is weak and insignificant, but in the 
expected direction. 
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Table 5.23: new party attention and parliamentary attention 







PvdD 36.2 0.197 0.068 8 
AOV/U55+ 24.1 0.062 0.059 9 
KNP 17.9 -0.111 0.146 7 
NMP 17.7 -0.04 0.09 11 
CP 17.5 0.149 0.167 9 
PSP 17.2 0.084 0.132 7 
RKPN 16.1 -0.054 0.111 13 
LN 16 -0.023 0.038 8 
BP 15.5 -0.042 0.145 8 
D66 14 0.081 0.077 10 
EVP 13.1 -0.087 0.095 10 
PVV 12.2 -0.179 0.112 8 
DS’70 12.1 -0.028 0.056 11 
SP 11.1 0.023 0.050 9 
RPF 8.7 0.027 0.159 9 
GPV 7.9 0.03 0.041 8 
LPF 5.6 0.131 0.099 8 
PPR 3.4 0.208 0.179 11 
Correlation  0.029 164 
 
Table 5.24: new party size and parliamentary attention 





LPF 17 0.131 0.099 8 
PVV 5.89 -0.179 0.112 8 
DS’70 5.33 -0.028 0.056 11 
AOV/U55+ 4.5 0.062 0.059 9 
D66 4.48 0.081 0.077 10 
BP 2.13 -0.042 0.145 8 
PSP 1.84 0.208 0.179 7 
PPR 1.84 0.084 0.132 11 
PvdD 1.83 0.197 0.068 8 
LN 1.61 -0.023 0.038 8 
NMP 1.51 -0.04 0.09 11 
SP 1.32 0.023 0.050 9 
KNP 1.26 -0.111 0.146 7 
RPF 1.25 0.027 0.159 9 
RKPN 0.92 -0.054 0.111 13 
EVP 0.83 -0.087 0.095 10 
GPV 0.74 0.03 0.041 8 
CP 0.69 0.149 0.167 9 
Correlation 0.091 164 
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The results for the party distance hypothesis are mixed: new parties elicit both 
marked reactions from parties far away from them (such as the RKPN) as parties 
close to the them (such as the PPR). As can be seen in table 5.26, the latter group is in 
the majority. Over all, the relationship is not significant.  
The party performance hypothesis is examined in table 5.27, here one can see 
that for eight new parties, parties that perform poorly in the elections react more than 
parties that perform well. For ten parties, the relationship is reversed. Given this 
balance in the examined cases, the relationship is weak and not significant. This null-
result sustains the idea that electoral incentives do not play a major role in the 
reactions of established parties in the parliamentary arena.  
The case-by-case analyses and the regression analyses are not entirely 
consistent. They both identify mobiliser new parties as more effective in changing the 
issues that established parties devote attention to. While the case-by-case analysis also 
identified specific patterns for party size and party activity, these have not reappeared 
in the regression analysis. Finally, the regression analysis clearly points to the 
participation of new parties in government as an important explanatory factor. There 
are, however, substantive reasons to dismiss this explanation. In order to further 
scrutinise these relationships, these effects are examined in an extended statistical 
setting. 
 
5.4 Expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliament 
The previous analyses of patterns of attention unanimously pointed to one 
explanation: mobilisers elicit more reactions than challengers. For two explanations 
the results were mixed: the case-by-case analysis showed that new parties that are 
larger and new parties that focus on their own issue elicit more reactions in terms of 
positions from established parties than smaller new parties and new parties that did 
not focus on their own issue. The regression analysis, however, did not support these 
patterns. It is the goal of this section to scrutinise the same phenomenon with an 
expanded set of cases, using a different notion of attributability. In this way, one can 
consistently test the hypotheses about the conditions under which new parties 
influence established parties. In this expanded statistical analysis, all changes on all 
issues in all periods are analysed. The central question is whether, compared to all the 
developments in attention, the presence of a new party leads to a significant change in 
attention. One can test the results of the case-by-case analyses in a more robust  
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Table 5.25: new party organisation and parliamentary attention 







CP 1 0.149 0.167 9 
D66 1 0.081 0.077 10 
DS’70 1 -0.028 0.056 11 
EVP 1 -0.087 0.095 10 
GPV 1 0.03 0.041 8 
KNP 1 -0.111 0.146 7 
LN 1 -0.023 0.038 8 
PPR 1 0.208 0.179 11 
PSP 1 0.084 0.132 7 
PvdD 1 0.197 0.068 8 
PVV 1 -0.179 0.112 8 
RKPN 1 -0.054 0.111 13 
SP 1 0.023 0.050 9 
BP 0.67 -0.042 0.145 8 
LPF 0.625 0.131 0.099 8 
NMP 0.5 -0.04 0.09 11 
RPF 0.5 0.027 0.159 9 





Table 5.26: party distance and 
parliamentary attention 
Party Correlation N 
RKPN 0.747 11 
RPF 0.568 8 
LPF 0.52 8 
SP -0.200 9 
EVP -0.204 9 
DS’70 -0.314 11 
D66 -0.393 10 
NMP -0.468 11 
PVV -0.55 8 
PvdD -0.61 8 
PPR -0.636** 11 
Correlation -0.131 105 
 
Table 5.27: established party 
performance 
Party Correlation N 
PSP -0.47 7 
RKPN -0.434 13 
PVV -0.275 8 
AOV/U55+ -0.284 9 
CP -0.266 9 
KNP -0.15 7 
LPF -0.084 8 
SP -0.021 9 
D66 0.037 10 
LN 0.038 8 
PPR 0.277 11 
NMP 0.288 11 
EVP 0.293 10 
DS’70 0.334 11 
PvdD 0.37 8 
GPV 0.563 8 
BP 0.581 8 
RPF 0.857*** 9 
Correlation 0.026 164 
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fashion. The analyses will be tested in several bivariate analyses and analyses with 
control variables. Due to the highly collinear nature of the data, each hypothesis must 
be tested independently from the others; if they were combined in a single analysis the 
collinearity would prevent any relationship from manifesting itself.180  
The first hypothesis tested is the new party presence hypothesis. In general, 
the presence of a new party leads to significantly more increases in attention (as can 
be seen in model 1 in table 5.28). In all the ups and downs in attention to issues 
between 1946 and 2010, the presence of a new party makes a significant difference: if 
a new party is present, parliamentary attention on the issue that the new party owns 
increases significantly more than when no new party is present. Therefore, one can 
consider the first hypothesis corroborated.  
The next factor examined is the activity of a new party on its own issue (model 2). 
The underlying reasoning is that if the new party is particularly active on its own 
issue, it will be an important force in defining the nature of the conflict on that issue. 
In order to retain control over the definition of the issue, established parties must 
respond by also raising their attention to the issue. A positive, significant relationship 
exists: the more attention a new party devotes to its own issue, the more established 
parties react. This implies that the more new parties talk about their own issue, the 
more established parties will talk about that issue as well.181 This relationship was not 
significant in the statistical analyses presented above. This means that the conclusions 
here are only conditional: only if one compares the change in attention for new parties 
to all change in attention, does new party attention matter. 
In model 3, one can see that the presence of a challenged party leads to an 
increase in the attention of the established party, but this increase is not significant. 
This echoes results of the case-by-case analysis: only the PSP and KNP elicited 
significantly more reactions from the parties they challenged, but other challenger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 In a multivariate analysis with all variables, only the new party government 
variable is consistently significant. There are validity issues with this variable, 
however.  
181 Note that this - as all relationships discussed here - is not a relation between the 
levels of parliamentary activity of the new and established party, where it would be 
obvious that there may be similar levels of attention between parties. Rather, this is a 
relationship between the level of activity of the new party and the relative increase in 
attention of the established party. 
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Table 5.28: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (1) 





















New Party Presence 0.031** 
(0.015) 
- - - - 
New Party Attention - 0.019** 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Challenged - - 0.064 
(0.061) 
- - 
Mobiliser - - - 0.052** 
(0.021) 
- 
Party Distance - - - - 0.034 
(0.032) 
R-Squared 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.072 
n=3336      
 
Table 5.29: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (2) 

























Party Distance - - - - -0.114 
(0.073) 
New Party Size 0.006** 
(0.003) 






- - - 












R-Squared 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.075 
n=3336      
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parties tend to be ignored by the parties that they challenged. Therefore, this 
hypothesis has to be rejected. 
The analysis does support the mobiliser new party hypothesis. In model 4, the 
presence of a mobiliser new party leads to significantly more reactions in terms of 
increasing levels of attention. These results echo the results of the case-by-case 
analysis, which shows that mobilisers are associated with consistently more marked, 
attributable reactions than challengers. When a new party does not focus on a single 
party but on all parties, they elicit more reactions than when it does focus on a single 
party. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis has to be accepted. 
The party distance hypothesis is examined in model 5. The central notion here 
is that parties that stand closer to a new party react more to the new party than parties 
that stand far away from it. The insignificant relationship is positive; this indicates 
that parties that are far away from the new party react more. All in all, the parties that 
stand close to the new party do not increase their levels of attention more significantly 
than others. This echoes results of the case-by-case analysis, which show that new 
parties tend to elicit results from all parties, instead of from some. Therefore, this 
hypothesis has to be rejected. 
Model 6 concerns the new party size hypothesis (in table 5.29). The central 
idea is that larger new parties elicit significantly more reactions than smaller new 
parties. The basic reasoning for the first of these factors is that if a new party makes a 
big entry, it is more likely to be noticed than parties that make a more modest entry. 
There is a significant, positive relationship between the size of the new party and the 
reactions of established parties: larger new parties elicit more reactions from the 
established parties than parties that are smaller. The same pattern was found in the 
case-by-case analyses: D66 and the LPF tended to elicit markedly more attributable 
reactions from established parties than others. Therefore, this hypothesis is 
corroborated. 
As for the new party organisation hypothesis, the results in model 7 imply that 
well organised new parties pose a more serious threat than poorly organised new 
parties. There is a significant positive relationship between the level of organisation 
and the strength of the reactions: better organised new parties elicit more reactions 
from the established parties. This variable is not significant in every robustness test. 
The central notion for the new party government hypothesis, examined in 
model 8, is that new parties that enter government elicit significantly more reactions 
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from established parties. However, as seen in the case-by-case analysis: two of the 
new parties that were in government (the PPR and the LPF) were associated with 
markedly more changes in attention. The LPF was in government for only a short 
period, and it was difficult to attribute the change in attention for environmental issues 
to the entry of the PPR. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected, not on the basis 
of the statistical evidence but on the basis of contextual information. 
Given the case-by-case analyses, good reasons exist not to expect significant 
relationships between the reactions of individual established parties and their 
characteristics: the patterns in the development of attention were similar for most 
established parties. There is a significant relationship between the performance of the 
established party and the attention that it devotes to issues in general: if a party 
performed well in the elections, it will broaden its activities afterwards; if it 
performed poorly it will focus its activities. In figure 5.32, one can see the difference 
between the relationship with and without the presence of new parties incorporated. 
One can see that parties that win elections diffuse their issue orientation: there is a 
positive relationship. Parties increase attention to issues when they win elections. The 
interaction term pulls the relationship in a negative direction: if a new party is present, 
the parties do not increase attention when they are winning. Parties increase attention 
to this issue that the new party will own when they lose. One should note, however, 
that this relationship is not significant.  
These insignificant results are reflected in the multivariate analysis set up to 
scrutinise the expectation of Harmel and Svåsand (1997) that three factors have to be 
present at the same time: an established party will only respond when a new party 
enters that stands close to it, and that performs well, and only when the established 
party has lost. The interaction model shows three significant relations, but these are 
not related to the Harmel and Svåsand thesis: in this model, as in model 9, the 
variables for new party presence, previous attention and established party 
performance have significant effects. This sustains the interpretation that, in general, 
the presence of a new party that focuses on an issue matters for the attention that 
established parties devote to that issue, but it says nothing about the conditions under 
which this is more or less likely. 
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 These results indicate that the characteristics of established parties do not 
matter for their reactions: the characteristics of new parties are important to 
understand established party reactions. The underlying mechanism has been identified 
in the case-by-case analysis: if new parties are able to set the parliamentary agenda, 
they are able to influence the attention that all parties devote to issues. As the 
parliamentary agenda constraints political parties, their reactions will be relatively 
uniform. This means that if a new party is able to put a new issue on the parliamentary 
agenda, it will be difficult for established parties to ignore it. New parties may exert 
more control over the parliamentary agenda when they focus on their own issue, are 
larger and are better organised. Moreover, new parties may form a threat to 
established parties when they are larger and better organised. What appears to be 
important is the ability of the new party (through its own activity, cohesiveness and 
size) to set the parliamentary agenda and therefore to influence the definition of the 
political conflict. These results are quite positive about the ability of new parties to 
change their environment: given the restrictive nature of the parliamentary agenda, 
once a new party is able to put an issue on the agenda established parties must follow 
suit. 
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Table 5.30: summary of chapter 5 





1 New Party Presence + n/a n/a 
3 New Party Attention + n/a n/a 
5 Challenged 0 0 + 
6 Mobiliser + 0 + 
7 Ideological Proximity 0 - n/a 
8 New Party Size + - a 0 
9 New Party Organisation + - 0 
10 New Party in Government +a 0 0 
11 Est. Party Performance 0 0 n/a 
+: in expected direction 
0: no consistently significant relationship 
-: in opposite direction than expected 
a: statistically significant, but not substantively meaningful 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Three conclusions can be drawn here: first about the role of new political 
parties, second about the factors that were identified, and third about the nature of the 
parliamentary arena. The research shows that new political parties matter in the 
parliamentary arena. The analyses show that new parties can influence the attention 
that established parties devote to issues in parliament. The presence of new political 
parties itself matters for the attention that established parties devote to issues. 
Moreover, it is the characteristics of new political parties that influence the responses 
of established parties in terms of attention. New political parties are also associated 
with changing positions and patterns in parliamentary voting. On the whole, the entry 
of new political parties can have an effect on politics in the parliamentary arena. New 
political parties can bring new issues to the table, they can polarise unpolarised issues, 
or intensify political conflict on that issue. The role of new political parties is not so 
much in redefining pre-existing political conflicts, but in bringing new issues to the 
political agenda and polarising non-politicised issues. In this sense, new political 
parties are not agents of political change, but instead they are forces that are 
associated with re-entrenchment and reinforcement of the existing lines of conflict. 
Table 5.30 provides a summary of the hypotheses that were falsified and 
corroborated by the results. On the whole, the mobiliser-challenger dichotomy is 
useful to explain patterns: mobilisers, which mobilise voters from all social groups on 
previously non-politicised issues, are associated with change in the attention that more 
established parties devote to issues, than challengers. Mobilisers bring new issues to 
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the political agenda that established parties pick up. This is not just visible in the 
increasing levels of attention, but also because mobilisers (as opposed to challengers) 
are associated with increasing levels of politicisation. Moreover, four new parties, all  
mobilisers, are associated with a change in the pattern underlying the voting 
behaviour: the anti-immigrant CP, the pensioners' parties AOV and U55+ and the 
government reform party LN. These parties are associated with a perturbation of the 
lines of conflict, but not one that is easily interpreted in terms of being in favour or 
against the positions that the new party proposes. In each of these cases it was 
difficult to interpret the political landscape after their entry into the parliamentary 
arena. These parties upset the political space, but not in a clear or consistent way. 
Challengers take on one established party on its own issue. They are associated with 
another pattern: here one can see established parties on the other side of the political 
spectrum showing adversarial reactions to the entry of the new party. In the strategic 
perspective of Meguid (2007), established parties on the opposite side of the spectrum 
have a particular interest in invigorating the political conflict between a challenger of 
one’s electoral competitor: by moving in the opposite direction, one reinforces the 
challengers’ ownership of the issue. In this way they aggravate the problem of the 
challenged party. This evidence shows the usefulness of the challenger-mobiliser 
distinction and shows that these kinds of parties have different roles to play in the 
political competition. 
Most corroborated hypotheses concern characteristics of the new party: the 
central idea is that better organised or larger new parties and new parties that are in 
government or that devote attention to their own issue, elicit significantly more 
imitating reactions than smaller, poorly organised parties that remain in opposition 
and devote little attention to their own issue. The case-by-case analyses and the 
extended statistical analysis showed that new party attention matters. The new party 
organisation and new party size hypothesis were also supported by the data. While the 
results for new parties in government may be statistically significant, the case-by-case 
analyses indicate that it is not likely to be the governing parties that put the issue on 
the agenda. Two mechanisms may be at work here: new parties that are more cohesive 
and larger may be seen as threats to the established political parties, while smaller, 
less cohesive new parties. Second, new political parties that focus on their own issue 
and that are in government may be able to set the political agenda and force other 
parties to address their issues. The final factor examined is the established party 
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performance: there is no sign that parties that perform poorly in the elections, react 
more to new parties, than parties that perform well in those elections. This is 
reinforced by the case-by-case analyses, which show that parties tend to react in a 
uniform way to the entry of a new political party. 
The results indicate that the nature of the parliamentary arena has an effect on 
the way new parties can influence established political parties. The parliamentary 
agenda is a particular political construct. On the one hand, political parties through 
their own policy initiatives and their scrutiny of government activities set the agenda. 
The issues that parties decide to focus on are the issues that parliament focuses on. On 
the other hand, the parliamentary agenda limits the issues that parties discuss. The 
institutional nature of the parliamentary agenda means that parties will address those 
issues that are on the parliamentary agenda. By setting the parliamentary agenda, new 
political parties can influence the parliamentary activities of other parties. Because the 
interaction between political parties in the parliamentary arena is structured through 
the parliamentary agenda and one-dimensional voting patterns, new political parties 
can have an effect, especially on the level of attention that established parties devote 
to issues and the level of politicisation of issues. 
The results indicated that the attention that new parties devote to issues 
matters for the reactions of established parties: by tearing itself lose from the 
parliamentary agenda, a new parties is able to dominate it. New parties that only 
follow the parliamentary agenda will never be able to set it. By its own activity on its 
own issue, a new party can control the definition of the political conflict. Established 
parties will not leave the definition of the political conflict to other parties, and 
therefore, they must increase their own activity in order to retain control over the 
definition of the political conflict. The case-by-case analysis showed one unexpected 
result, but it is not counterintuitive. Many new parties did not influence the 
parliamentary agenda. Their entry followed a marked change in the parliamentary 
agenda, rather than that their entry changed the parliamentary agenda. Legislative 
activities, economic developments or social events brought their issues to the 
parliamentary agenda. This may have led to opposition in the electorate, which in turn 
leads to the entry of a new party. Some new parties lead the political agenda, while 
others follow it. 
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 Chapter 6: When new parties win or when established parties lose? 
When new political parties influence the election manifestos of established 
parties 
 
“Of course the Union will not obtain a majority in the Tweede Kamer, or even 
become one of the major parties in the short term, even though there are 
approximately 3.5 million potential voters of 55 and older. Yet her influence 
can be large. Every seat won will come at the expense of another party. 
Because the manifesto will appeal to the Dutch people and it can certainly not 
be conceived of as extreme, the established parties will, in order to limit the 
loss of votes, take over points from this programme, and where this is not the 
case, the Political Union 55+ will let her voice be heard and it will 
continually draw attention to points from its programme. By forcing change in 
the positions of the established parties and through its own contributions, the 
Political Union 55+ will achieve it goals.” Politieke Unie 55+ (1994, 15 
translation SO) 
 
“The issue of integration was included prominently as first issue in the 
manifesto, the theme of 'security' as the second. We wanted to show that we 
had learned lessons from the results of May 15 [2002 in which the LPF won 
26 seats and the PvdA lost 22 seats – SO].” Ruud Koole, chair of the PvdA 
2001-2005 and 2007 (2010, 213-214) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Some new parties are frank about their goals. The pensioners' party Union 55+ 
did not expect to become a major political player. It expected that it could influence 
politics by influencing the established parties. Its reasoning was that its entry into the 
political arena would cause parties to lose votes and that established parties would 
respond to that electoral incentive. The quote from Koole shows that these 
considerations do play a role when established parties write their manifestos. After the 
poor election results of the PvdA in 2002, the party leadership decided to send voters 
a signal by increasing attention to the integration of immigrants and security: the 
PvdA had learned the lesson from the elections and would no longer neglect the issues 
that the LPF brought centre stage. This chapter is going to assess whether the case of 
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the PvdA in 2002 is a single isolated case and whether the U55+ was correct in its 
assessment of electoral competition: do parties take over policies from the manifestos 
of new parties? And do electoral incentives play a role?  
Previous studies have looked at the effect of new political parties on the 
positions that established parties take in their election manifestos or the attention that 
they devote to issues in their election manifestos (Harmel & Svåsand 1997; 
Huijbrechts 2006). These studies found limited effects of new political parties on the 
programmes of established parties. The difference between the electoral and the 
parliamentary arena may influence the extent to which and the conditions under which 
established political parties respond to new political parties: in the electoral arena, 
parties have a particular incentive to focus on their own issue. Finally, there is a 
timing issue: it may be the case that established political parties respond to new 
political parties after they enter parliament. It may also be the case that they do so in 
the election in which these new parties enter. Therefore, it is prudent to look at both 
anticipatory and reactive behaviour: to study the behaviour of established political 
parties in the election in which and after which the new party enters parliament. The 
main question of this chapter is: when, under what conditions, and to what extent do 
established political parties imitate the positions that new parties take and the 
attention that new parties devote to issues?  
This chapter finds that new political parties have, under specific conditions, a 
limited effect on the attention that established political parties devote to issues and the 
positions that they take on them. The results found here are weaker, less significant 
and less consistent than the results found in chapter 5. For as far as new political 
parties do have an effect, this only becomes apparent under specific conditions, which 
mainly have to do with electoral incentives. Moreover, parties tend to anticipate the 
entry of new political parties into the parliamentary arena instead of respond to them 
after they have entered parliament.  
 
6.2 Case-by-case analyses 
The following sections will assess the effect of individual new parties on the 
programmes of individual established parties. The goal of these sections is to assess 
the extent to which change of the established parties can be attributed to the entry of 
the new party and to find which factors may play a role. This section shows that the 
specific features of every case matter greatly in understanding the exact patterns. The 
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reactions of established parties do not form a uniform pattern, nor can one identify 
clear consistent patterns between different cases. A secondary concern of these case-
by-case analyses is to see whether there is reason to expect anticipatory behaviour 
from established parties, and to see whether in terms of attention anticipatory 
behaviour can be identified in each case.182  
 
6.2.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics 
In 1948 the KNP entered parliament. During the 1948 election campaign the 
party focused on the Catholic People’s Party KVP. There is good reason to expect that 
the KVP in particular anticipated the entry of the KNP: KNP-founder Welter left the 
KVP after he was removed from that party’s list. The patterns of attention of two 
parties are shown in figure 6.1: the KVP and the VVD. Most parties followed the 
pattern of the KVP: this party increased their attention to the issue between 1946 and 
1948, but decreased their attention to the colonial affairs in their 1952 election 
manifesto. The KVP, the party from which the KNP split and which it challenged, did 
not react markedly different from the other parties. The increased attention to colonial 
affairs between 1946 and 1948 can best be explained by the developments in 
Indonesia: the 1948 elections were called in order to ratify a constitutional 
amendment about Indonesian sovereignty. After the transfer of sovereignty, many 
parties devoted less attention to colonial affairs. The small increase in the attention of 
the KVP in the 1948 elections could be interpreted in terms of anticipation, but the 
constitutional amendment is a more likely explanation. The patterns in attention in 
parliament could also best be explained by the pattern of decision-making. The 
attention that the VVD devoted to colonial affairs is different from the other parties. It 
moves from no attention in 1946 to more than 20% of its election manifesto in 1948. 
The party caused the fall of the Drees/Van Schaik cabinet over an aspect of colonial 
policy. The large increase seen in the case of the VVD is more likely the result of the 
liberals explaining why they let the cabinet fall over New Guinea than a reaction to 
the KNP. It may be the case that the KNP influenced the positions of established  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 The analyses do not look at anticipatory behaviour for positions: analysing 
anticipatory behaviour for party positions in each of these micro-analyses would be 
possible, but quite confusing because one would need to represent two patterns in 
positions because studying anticipation in this way requires a different 
conceptualisation of the notion of unicity.  
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parties. Almost all parties183 moved from a neutral to a positive or from negative to a 
neutral position on the unique proposals of the KNP. Two parties are shown in figure 
6.2: the ARP, which represents the most common development in position, and the 
KVP, which showed an extreme development in position. The KVP moved from a 
generally negative assessment of the KNP programme, to a generally positive one. 
This development consisted of four changes. This includes an item concerning the 
Catholic nature of the KVP: while the KVP had downplayed its Catholic identity 
before the entry of the KNP, it clearly stated its Catholic roots after the entry of the 
Catholic competitor. Another change concerns the support for emigration to New 
Guinea and Surinam. This is a minor colonial policy, which the KVP adopted in 1952. 
The KNP's opposition to the independence of Indonesia is not unique as both the SGP 
and the ARP also opposed decolonisation. All in all, the KNP has had a clear effect on 
the positions of the KVP, but less so on the attention it devoted to issues. 
 
  6.2.2 PSP: dissenting socialists 
 Before the PSP won its first seats in national parliament, the party had gained 
national attention when it won seats in the 1958 Provincial States elections. The PSP 
challenged the PvdA and, to a lesser extent, the CPN for accepting the Cold War 
mentality. Three patterns of attention to defence are shown in figure 6.3. The ARP 
represents the mean pattern: a small increase, which as was the case for attention in 
parliament, could be explained by the warming of the Cold War. The PvdA and CPN 
increased attention to defence markedly.184 Both parties may have felt the need to 
react to the entry of a small leftwing socialist, anti-militarist party that shared their 
historic commitment to socialism and disarmament. These parties may have 
anticipated the entry of the PSP, by markedly increasing their attention to defence 
between 1956 and 1959. In figure 6.4, three patterns in position are presented: for the 
CHU (representing the mean pattern), the PvdA and the CPN. Before the entry of the 
PSP, most parties disagreed with the party. After its entry, most parties still disagreed 
with it in general, but many had decreased their level of disagreement, like the CHU. 
The PvdA, which was challenged by the PSP, moved to disagreeing more with the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 The only exceptions are the VVD and the SGP. 
184 The CPN devoted a large portion of its manifestos on defence. This high level may 
be caused because no official CPN manifestos are available for 1959 and 1963 in the 
archives of the DNPP or the IISG. Therefore, (shorter) pamphlets were used. 
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PSP. The PvdA's 1963 programme was more supportive of the Dutch military and less 
supportive of the specific PSP-policies, such as the abolition of conscription. The 
CPN was the only one to agree more with the party than it disagreed. 
 The PvdA did anticipate the PSP, by emphasising defence, but it did not take 
over the PSP’s policies. The CPN, however, which shared the socialism and the 
opposition to nuclear weapons of the PSP, did show consistent signs of increasing 
agreement and anticipation in attention. In summary, the CPN responded to the entry 
of the PSP: its policy positions became more similar to the PSP, and it also devoted 
more attention to the issue of the PSP. For the PvdA, the party that the PSP 
challenged, the pattern is less clear: it marginally increased attention to defence, but 
moved to disagree more with the PSP’s programme.  
 
6.2.3 BP: farmers in protest 
After supporting the farmers' protests in Hollandscheveld, the farmers' party 
BP won three seats in the 1963 elections. The media attention to the actions of the 
Free Farmers makes it likely that established parties anticipated the new party. Most 
parties, like the VVD shown in figure 6.5, decreased their attention to agriculture.185 
This fits the expectation formulated for the parliamentary arena: the decreasing 
importance of the agricultural sector, combined with Europeanisation of agricultural 
policies and, to a lesser extent, the corporatist organisation of agricultural policies, 
caused decreasing political attention to agriculture. The patterns in attention show no 
sign of anticipation. In contrast to the effects on attention (where no imitation was 
observed), parties did take over policies of the BP. The parties that show the most 
marked pattern in attention are VVD and PvdA. Figure 6.6 illustrates how the VVD 
took over the BP’s opposition to high employers' premiums for social insurances and 
its opposition to government subsidies. The PvdA had supported the corporatist 
organisation of agriculture, but no longer talked about this issue in 1967. There is no 
clear effect of the BP on the attention that established parties devoted to agriculture. 
In contrast, the BP had an effect on the positions that parties took. Agriculture became 
less important, and (perhaps because of that) parties ceased talking about the 
corporatist organisation of agriculture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 The only two parties that increased their attention to agriculture were the PSP and 
the SGP. In 1959 they both had a short programme. In 1967 they had much longer 
manifestos. They moved from no to a small number proposals on agriculture. 
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6.2.4 GPV, RKPN and RPF: orthodox dissent 
Between 1963 and 1981, three small Christian parties entered parliament: the 
Vrijgemaakte GPV, the Catholic RKPN and the Gereformeerde RPF. These three 
parties shared a common focus on moral issues. Meanwhile, the religious parties from 
which these new parties split began to moderate. The GPV, RKPN and the RPF are 
likely to be anticipated by the established parties because they attempted to enter 
parliament on multiple occasions.  
The patterns of attention to moral issues are presented in figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
Seven parties are selected: the SGP and GPV, as orthodox Protestant parties. These 
parties are presented separately in figure 6.7. The GPV is selected to examine its 
reactions to the entry of the RPF and RKPN. In addition, the ARP, KVP and CDA, 
parties that were challenged by these new religious parties, and the VVD and PSP, as 
examples of secular parties, are selected as well. The GPV entered the Dutch 
parliament in 1963. The most marked change visible before and after this period is for 
the SGP: a decrease from more than 50% to less than 20%. The reason for this is that 
the SGP published its first real election manifesto in 1967. Instead of the 1918 
manifesto, which was occasionally amended to reflect political changes, the SGP 
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published a set of concrete demands in 1967. This contained less emphasis on the 
religious issues than the 1918 manifesto. After the entry in 1967 of the GPV, a new 
orthodox Protestant party, the SGP published a more concrete election manifesto. The 
entry of an equally orthodox Protestant party that had a more modern form of political 
communication, may have contributed to this decision. If one looks at the other 
developments in attention in figure 6.8, one can see the following: most parties 
increase their attention for moral issues. Some parties show marginal increases (such 
as the PSP, the ARP and the VVD), and others more marked increases (for the KVP). 
The ARP shows signs of anticipation, increasing more sharply in attention before 
1963 than after 1963. All in all, four established parties increase attention to moral 
issues and four decrease attention to moral issues.  
Except for the ARP and the SGP, the morally most conservative parties, all 
parties became more interested in moral issues in this period. The explanation does 
not lie in the entry of the GPV, however. Figure 6.8 shows what is going on: attention 
to moral issues peaks in 1971, especially for the VVD and the PSP; the increase in 
1967 appears to be only a first step in this development. After 1971, attention to moral 
issues declines, but it remains on a higher level than before 1971. These developments 
are most marked for secular parties. This appears to be rather the effect of the 
developing women’s movement than the effect of the GPV, especially given the 
marked increase in the period after the GPV’s first parliamentary period.  
The effect of the RKPN is difficult to identify because of this development: 
1967 is taken as the before year for the RKPN and 1977 as the after year. For many 
parties there is a peak in between these years (in 1971), compared to which the change 
between 1967 and 1977 seems insignificant. The CDA-in-formation, which the RKPN 
challenged, decreased its attention to the issue. Within the larger pattern however it 
appears not to be the entry of the RKPN that has influenced patterns of attention, but 
rather the pattern of politicization of women’s issues in early 1970s. The same pattern 
was found in the study of the RKPN’s effect in parliament. 
The final party examined here is the RPF: between 1977 and 1982 the SGP, 
the GPV and the PSP (and the CPN as well) increase their attention to moral issues; 
the CDA and the VVD (in addition to the PvdA, PPR and D66) decrease their 
attention. The CDA, the party that the RPF challenged, markedly decreased attention 
to the issue. After the resolution of the abortion question in 1981 the parties on the 
margins, the GPV and the SGP (anti-abortion) and the PSP (pro-women’s rights) 
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continued to focus on the question (Outshoorn 1986). Attention to these issues in 
parliament showed a similar pattern.  
Parties disagreed with the GPV in 1959, and on the whole, parties disagreed 
(slightly) less with the party in 1963. The ARP and SGP’s positional reactions to the 
GPV are presented in figure 6.9. The only exception was the SGP, which moved from 
a neutral stance to agreement. The fact that the SGP wrote a completely new 
manifesto in 1967 played a role in this process. The SGP and the ARP were most 
positive about the GPV program in 1967. These changes did not concern the morally 
conservative proposals of the GPV, but they concerned issues like land management 
and housing. One can similarly see marked increases on the religious side for the 
RKPN as well. The reactions of the CDA and GPV are shown in figure 6.10. 
Especially the GPV included many of the unique proposals of the RKPN in its 
manifesto. The GPV and the CDA parties followed the RKPN in explicitly opposing 
abortion, which they did not do in 1971. The GPV showed similarity to the RKPN on 
a range of policies from defence spending to tax reduction. The RPF also mainly 
elicited imitation from religious parties. The reactions of the CDA, SGP and GPV to 
this party are shown in figure 6.11. The GPV moved from neutrality to agreement 
with the RPF. The RPF policies to support the traditional conception of the family 
(restrictions of divorce and limiting the participation of women on the labour market) 
proved especially controversial: religious parties like the GPV copied these positions, 
while secular parties explicitly opposed them. Parties that were ideologically close to 
the RKPN and RPF responded more to them than others. 
On the whole, the effects of these new religious parties are mostly limited to 
the policy positions of the established religious parties, and to a lesser extent to the 
attention that these religious parties devote to issues.  
 
6.2.5 D66 and DS'70: democratic idealists and moderates 
In 1967 and 1971, two parties entered the Dutch parliament that shared a 
common focus on government reform. D66 was formed by homines novi, who felt 
that the political system had to be reformed. Before entering into the 1967 election, 
the group asked voters whether they felt a need for a new party, a public appeal. This 
Appeal '66 got considerable media attention. DS’70 was formed by a group of 
prominent PvdA members, who felt that the PvdA had moved too far to the left. Their 
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departure from the PvdA was well publicised. Therefore, there is good reason to 
expect that the established parties anticipated DS’70.  
Of the ten parties that were in parliament, seven increased their attention to 
governance between 1967 and 1971. In figure 6.12 one can see two examples: the 
PvdA and the KVP. The exceptions are among the small parties, such as the SGP, but 
the CPN and the GPV decreased their attention as well. There were consistent 
differences between the two groups: parties that agreed more with the positions of 
D66 tended to react more than parties that did not. Moreover, large systemic parties 
increased their attention more than the smaller marginal parties. In several of these 
larger parties there were internal movements that called for political reform, such as 
the New Left in the PvdA and the Christian Radicals in the KVP, which may also 
have contributed to their change in attention. Most parties showed a continued 
increase between 1963 and 1971, indicating that they both anticipated the entry of 
D66 in 1967 and responded to its entry after it entered. On the whole, D66 has had a 
marked effect on the attention that parties devoted to issues. After DS’70 entered 
parliament in 1971, parties tended to devote less attention to governance. Out of the 
nine parties, three increased their attention to governance, but most parties devoted 
less attention to it. Like the PvdA, these parties decreased their attention to 
governance marginally. The SGP and CDA devoted marginally more attention to 
governance. Part of these increases can actually be attributed to the peak that most 
parties show in 1971. As most parties increased attention between 1963 and 1971, it is 
more likely that this peak is an effect of D66, than anticipation of DS70. The patterns 
found here for the electoral arena is similar to the parliamentary arena. 
The positional reactions of three parties to the entry of D66 are shown in 
figure 6.13. The proposals of D66 were truly unique in the sense that parties did not 
even oppose them before the entry of the party. In the 1967 elections, one can see that 
some parties opposed the proposals of D66: the VVD especially, but its reaction is 
representative of the ARP and CHU as well. The other parties moved to sharply 
supporting the policies of D66 in 1971. The PvdA showed the most marked increase. 
The marked increase for the PvdA could in part be attributed to the formation of the 
New Left in the PvdA, which shared D66's agenda for political reform. For instance, 
no party discussed electoral system reform before 1967, but almost every party does 
so in 1971. Most parties opposed it, especially the smaller ones. This explains the 
disagreement of the SGP, which is representative of the CPN and the GPV as well.  
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Parties did not just copy D66’s proposals on government reform, on women’s 
emancipation and on education, but on the whole, the program of D66 has been taken 
over by the established parties in its entire breadth. Especially parties that already 
agreed with the D66 programme took over elements from the D66 programme.  
DS’70 is a different story. It elicited null-reactions from many of the 
established parties. Therefore it is not presented graphically. The PvdA, the party that 
the DS'70 challenged did not react visibly to it. There were some reactions from some 
parties: especially the PSP stood out. While DS’70 represented the side of the social 
democratic movement that felt that the PvdA had become too radical, the PSP 
represented the side that felt that the PvdA was not radical enough. Even though the 
PSP opposed some positions of DS’70 (military-industrial cooperation within NATO, 
for instance), it moved to agree with DS’70 on a whole range of social issues from 
orienting education towards the wishes of the youth to housing policy for singles.  
While the patterns for DS’70 are erratic and appear to be unrelated to the 
party’s entry, the pattern for D66 can be attributed to D66. In this comparison 
between D66 and DS’70, it is clear that the first had a more marked effect. For as far 
as DS’70 had an effect it was on the PSP, but D66 had effect across the board. 
  
6.2.6 PPR: radicalising radicals 
The PPR first won seats in parliament in 1971, but the party had de facto 
operated in parliament since 1968, when the group-Aarden formed a separate 
parliamentary group. Therefore, there is good reason to expect anticipation. Most 
parties increased their attention to the environment; most followed the pattern of the 
CDA that is shown in figure 6.14: a marked increase in attention to the environment. 
The entry of the PPR coincided with a greening of parties across the entire spectrum. 
In the parliamentary arena a similar pattern was found for the attention to the 
environment between 1971 and 1977, which was not attributed to the entry of the 
PPR, but to increasing environmental policies. The same explanation seems likely to 
explain these patterns here as well. The effect of the PPR on positions is presented in 
figure 6.15: most parties, as the CDA in the figure, showed no reaction. Only the 
progressive partners of the PPR (PSP, D66 and PvdA, the PvdA is shown as an 
example of them) showed an increase in agreement with the PPR’s unique proposals 
between 1967 and 1977. These parties also agreed with the PPR in 1967, while those  




that did not agree reacted less. The copying of policies by progressive partners is 
likely to be an effect of the coordinated progressive cooperation between these parties. 
The reactions did not concern the environmental concerns of the PPR, but its leftwing 
credentials: most reactions concern healthcare insurance or taxes on luxury products. 
In summary, one cannot attribute the change in attention for the environment to the 
PPR, while one can attribute the more marginal changes in the positions of the PPR’s 
allies to the PPR. 
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6.2.7 NMP: small business owners in protest 
The NMP entered parliament in 1971 and disappeared again in 1972. The 
established parties did not anticipate the entry of the NMP. To examine the NMP’s 
effect, the attention that established parties devoted to economic affairs is examined. 
Almost all parties decreased their attention to this issue, as an example the attention of 
the VVD to this issue is shown in figure 6.16. There is no clear effect of the NMP on 
the attention that established parties devoted to economic affairs. Looking at party 
positions, one should note that the NMP had only two unique proposals. The only 
reaction that is visible is from the BP and it concerns only one policy. This party first 
disagreed with raising taxes on gasoline, and moved to neutrality on this proposal. All 
in all, the NMP had almost no effect on established parties, therefore it is not 
represented graphically.  
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6.2.8 EVP: progressive Protestants 
The EVP was formed as a split from the CDA. The formation of the EVP 
followed a long and well-publicised internal debate within the CDA. Therefore, there 
is good reason to expect that parties anticipated the entry of the EVP. This small 
leftwing party focused on peace politics. The attention of two parties to defence is 
shown in figure 6.17. They are represents two developments: five parties increased 
their attention to defence; the PvdA examplifies these parties. This group includes two 
parties that favoured the stationing of nuclear weapons (GPV and SGP) and two 
parties that opposed it (PSP and PPR). The other four parties reduced their attention to 
defence (this included the D66 and CPN that also opposed the placement of nuclear 
weapons). The CDA is selected as an example of these. For both groups, one can see a 
peak in the parties’ attention in 1982. This can also be explained by the nuclear arms 
talks. When comparing 1981 to 1986, one can see a decline for the CDA and an 
increase for the PvdA. Looking at the positions shown in figure 6.18, one can see 
reactions across the board: three parties are selected to illustrate this pattern. While 
most parties (except for the PvdA and the PPR) disagreed with the unique proposals 
of the EVP before its entry, parties tended to agree with them after its entry. The PSP 
agreed most with the party. The increase in agreement is mostly on foreign policies: 
such as debt relief for developing countries. The EVP had a relatively many unique 
proposals. The increases concern a marginal number of positions: most parties moved 
from disagreeing with one or two of the more than 84 unique proposals of the EVP to 
agreeing with some of them. The EVP has not had a strong effect on party positions or 
on the attention that established parties devoted to defence.  
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6.2.9 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics 
The CP entered the Dutch parliament 1981. Its entry was not widely expected: 
rather, many parties were shocked by the entry of an anti-immigration party in 
parliament. The attention of three parties to immigration is shown in figure 6.19. 
Three parties decreased the attention that they devoted to immigration after the entry 
of the new party, as the PvdA in the figure, and five increased their attention, as the 
PSP and SGP in the figure. In addition to the SGP and the PSP, the GPV, PPR and 
D66 increased their attention to immigration. These included parties with more 
conservative positions on immigration (GPV, SGP) and parties with progressive 
stances on immigration (PSP, D66 and PPR). As far as there is any pattern, it appears 
that parties that lost votes in the 1982 election reacted more to the entry of the CP. It 
may also be the case that the small parties of the left such as the PSP and the PPR may 
have increased their attention after the entry of the CP in order to emphasise its 
opposition to the CP: these leftwing parties were opposed to what they perceived as 
the CP’s racism. The increase in attention clearly followed the entry of the CP: there 
is no sign of anticipation. In the parliamentary arena, parties also increased their 
attention to migration in reaction to the entry of the CP. In figure 6.20 one can see the 
patterns in position for two parties. One should note that the CP’s unique proposals 
did not concern its anti-immigration positions: its manifesto was relatively soft on 
immigration. It favoured remigration (as did the CDA, RPF and GPV), opposed 
voting rights for migrants (as did the VVD) and action against illegal immigrants (as 
did the VVD and the GPV). Most parties moved to disagree less with the CP. The 
movement of many parties concerned special housing policies for migrants. No party 
moved to agree with the CP that Dutch people should not be discriminated against in 
housing policies, but some parties, like the PvdA, no longer explicitly supported 
special housing policies for migrants. Parties that lost votes in the 1982 election 
tended to react more. The effect of the CP is concentrated on smaller, ideologically 
more extreme parties: the smaller parties of the left and the right had increased their 
attention to immigration in their election manifestos. The party’s effect on party 
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6.2.10 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters 
The size of the electoral support of the AOV in the 1994 election was 
unexpected, but both the AOV and the U55+ had tested their support by entering in 
the 1994 municipal election. The entry of these two elderly parties therefore could 
have been anticipated by the established parties. After the entry of the AOV and the 
U55+, almost all parties increased their attention to healthcare. The developments in 
attention of three parties are shown in figure 6.21: the CDA increased its attention by 
half a percentage point, and the PvdA by six percentage points. GL (and the RPF) 
decreased their attention to health. The AOV and U55+ had a consistent effect: after 
the entry of these two pensioners' parties most parties increased their attention to 
healthcare. This defies the patterns in the parliamentary arena, where declining 
attention to the issue after the 1994 elections was observed. In these different arenas, 
different mechanism may play a role: established parties may have sought to appeal to 
the electoral niche that the AOV left before imploding, by writing about healthcare in 
their election manifestos. Most parties increased their attention to the issue after the 
entry of the AOV and U55+ into parliament, showing no signs of anticipation. 
When one examines positions, one has to distinguish between the U55+ and 
the AOV, which had different unique proposals. The U55+ had only 14 unique 
proposals. Only the PvdA and D66 change their view on any of these issues; both 
parties agree with the U55+ that society should increase its respect for manual labour. 
One would have to conclude that parties did not react markedly to the limited number 
of unique proposals of the U55+ in their election manifestos. Therefore the effect of 
this party is not presented graphically. Turning to the AOV, presented in figure 6.22, 
one can observe more variance. Two parties are shown as an example: the CDA and 
the RPF. Most parties like the RPF started out disagreeing with some elements of the 
party’s unique proposals. In addition to the VVD and the GPV, the CDA and the RPF 
moved to agree with the AOV more than that they disagreed. That is, most parties on 
the (centre-)right, which tended to agree with the whole AOV programme already 
before 1994. They agreed with the AOV that reducing government spending and 
extending the tax base for the government pension premium was necessary.  
The pensioners' parties did have an effect on the established parties in the 
electoral arena. Almost all parties increased their attention to healthcare after the entry 
of the AOV and U55+, and especially parties on the right (which already tended to 
agree with the AOV) took over their policy positions. The U55+, whose ambitions  
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were cited in the introduction, has had a marginal effect on the established parties, 
perhaps because it only had one seat in parliament but mainly because its positions 
were so moderate that they were not unique.  
 
6.2.11 SP: a leftwing challenger 
The SP had tried to enter parliament five times before winning a seat in 1994. 
The party had already won representation in municipal and provincial councils. One 
can expect that parties anticipated the entry of the party. The SP is a radical leftwing 
party that focused on a range of social-economic issues. The party's effect on attention 
to labour issues is examined, as a prime example of its economically leftwing appeal. 
Its 31 unique proposals cover a range of issues from foreign policy to health and 
labour. Two exemplary patterns in attention are shown in figure 6.23. The VVD is one 
of only two parties that increased their attention to labour. The other one is the SGP. 
The other parties decreased their attention to the issue, though most did so only 
marginally. The PvdA, the party that the SP challenged, also shown in figure 6.23, 
showed no special reaction to this newcomer. The VVD stood on the other side of the 
electoral spectrum, far from the SP. The only explanation, related to the SP, for the 
VVD to increase their attention is that by picking a fight with the SP these parties may 
have wanted to increase the legitimacy of the SP in order to let it siphon votes away 
from the PvdA. On the whole, however, the SP did not influence attention to labour 
issues, neither in terms of anticipation, nor reaction. These marginal developments 
cannot, however, be explained by economic circumstances. The rising unemployment 
led to higher levels of attention to the labour market after 1994.  
In order to study the SP’s effect on party positions, the VVD and the PvdA are 
selected as examples and shown in figure 6.24. The first thing that is noted is that all 
parties dominantly disagree with the SP; even the PvdA (but also the GL) disagree 
with more than one of the SP’s unique proposals. The SP’s opposition to the free 
market, alternative medicine, European integration, the UN Security Council and 
environmental taxes were especially contentious. Most shifts came from parties 
becoming silent on one of these (and other) extremist positions. Parties that tended to 
disagree with the SP (such as the PvdA) showed the most reactions. These results, 
however, should be interpreted with some caution, because, on the whole, they do not 
concern parties agreeing more with the programme of the SP, but they concern parties  




	   268	  
explicitly dropping opposition to some of the policies of the SP. On the whole, the 
effect of the SP on the established parties has been limited. Only a few established 
parties increased their attention to labour, selected as the distinctive social economic 
issue of the SP. In terms of positions, parties dominantly disagreed with the unique 
proposals of the SP, whether before or after its entry. Parties that lost votes in the 
1994 elections tended to take over more positions than parties that did not. 
 
6.2.12 LN: democratic populists 
There were good reasons for the established parties to have anticipated the 
entry of LN: the party was already formed in 1999, as joint venture of members of 
several prominent local parties, whose entry into the Hilversum and Utrecht city 
council was well-publicised. The developments in attention of two exemplary parties 
are shown in figure 6.25: the PvdA and D66. Most parties like the PvdA marginally 
decreased their attention to governance. D66 (in addition to VVD and SGP) showed 
an increase in attention. The effect of D66 may be seen as a response to the entry of 
LN: D66 was itself created as a government reform party. LN advocated many 
policies that D66 had endorsed previously: elected mayors, referendums and electoral 
reform. While D66 did not speak out on these issues before the entry of the LN, it 
became more outspoken about these issues in 2003. It may have responded to the 
entry of this kindred party by re-emphasising their own solutions. The marginally 
declining levels of attention to governance reflected the parliamentary agenda, where 
attention to the issue also declined. There are no signs of anticipation. The programme 
of LN showed similarities to the manifesto of D66, which, like LN, was a centrist 
party with a historic focus on government reform. Out of the 100 proposals in the LN 
programme, only 11 are unique. Parties only changed their opinion on a single 
proposal: the LN proposal to make car taxes dependent on gasoline use. Parties 
moved from disagreeing with this proposal to becoming neutral on it. On the whole, 
LN did not influence the attention that established parties devoted to issues or the 
positions that they held on them. Therefore the effect of this party is not presented 
graphically. 
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6.2.13 PVV and LPF: the return and persistence of anti-immigration politics 
As Koole (2010) testified above, some established parties felt the need to show 
the electorate that they had learned a lesson from the election results of 2002. Since 
fall of 2001 first LN and then LPF had performed well in the polls, therefore 
established parties may have anticipated the LPF's entry. The PVV first entered in the 
2006 elections, but had already been in parliament in 2004. There were, therefore, 
good reasons for parties to have anticipated the entry of the PVV in 2006.  
 In order to examine the effect of the LPF on immigration, the 2002 and the 
2003 election manifestos will be examined. The data are presented in figure 6.26. 
Most parties increased their attention to immigration between 1998 and 2003: GL 
more than doubled its attention to the issue. Most parties that increased their attention 
to immigration did so in 2002, which is a sign of anticipation. The increase occured 
within a political context: the events of 9/11 may also, in part, have increased 
attention for immigration and integration issues. In the Netherlands, the LPF was the 
catalyst for this development. In 2006, the LPF disappeared from the scene and it was 
succeeded as the parliamentary anti-immigration party by the PVV. The PvdA, VVD 
and GL (in addition to SGP and CU) increased their attention to immigration between 
2003 and 2010. There are less signs of anticipation here: the VVD, for instance, 
markedly decreased its attention in 2006, only to increase it markedly in 2010 after 
the PVV entered parliament. The VVD devoted little attention to immigration in its 
2006 election manifesto. In this election the PVV won nine seats, while the VVD 
performed poorly. The VVD may have attributed this loss to its lack of attention to 
migration. Moreover the VVD faced competition from Trots (Trots op 
Nederland/Proud of the Netherlands) a party formed by its former #2 and former 
minister of immigration Rita Verdonk in the 2010 election. This party however did 
not obtain parliamentary representation. The fact that almost all parties increased their 
attention to immigration after the entry of the LPF corroborates the notion of an ‘LPF-
effect’ on attention to immigration. Although less strong, a similar pattern was 
identified for the parliamentary arena. The increase in the attention that parties, 
especially the VVD, devoted to immigration after the entry of the PVV also 
corroborates the notion that there was a ‘PVV-effect’ on the attention that parties 
devoted to immigration. As seen in chapter 5, the increasing attention to immigration 
after 2002 cannot be explained by the levels of immigration. 
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The many of anti-immigration proposals of the LPF were not unique and 
therefore not included in the analysis: 1998 the SP already supported preventing 
ethnic segregation of schools and neighbourhoods, and the VVD already wanted to 
limit migration for the purpose of family formation. Most policies of the LPF are not 
unique in the strictest sense because the VVD and the SGP included similar proposals 
in their 2002 manifestos. This is likely to be a form of anticipation, but in this analysis 
of positional reactions, it means that these issues are not included in the analysis. As 
shown in figure 6.27, parties tended to disagree with the unique proposals of the LPF. 
Three parties are selected as examples: the GL, the VVD and D66. Between 1998 and 
2003, however, parties became more positive about the policies of the LPF. The two 
exceptions were the GL and the CDA. The parties that reacted most to the entry of the 
LPF were those that tended to agree with the LPF, such as the VVD. They mostly 
agreed with the LPF’s market-based economic policies. These parties moved in a 
range of issues. The VVD moved to agree on several anti-immigration measures, but 
also on reducing police bureaucracy and making the police accountable for their 
results.  
Parties responded differently to the entry of the PVV (as shown in figure 
6.28): the VVD and the SP are shown as examples. These parties disagreed with the 
PVV programme in 2003, but by 2010 these two parties, together with the SGP, had 
moved to agree more with the party in general. The SP is a peculiar case: it was not 
outspoken on the unique proposals of the PVV in 2003 or 2010. In 2010 it agreed with 
one of them (limiting labour immigration from Eastern Europe) and was neutral on 
the other ones. For the VVD, this pattern can be understood by reference to the fact 
that the PVV split from the VVD, and the PVV programme and the VVD programme 
of 2003 were very similar. Most changes concerned the law and order policies of the 
PVV: the VVD, for instance, joined the PVV in calling for less community service as 
punishment for crime. The PVV elicited adversarial movements: for instance by D66, 
as shown in figure 6.28. D66 opposed the PVV explicitly on one in four of its unique 
proposals. This included PVV proposals to limit labour immigration from Eastern 
Europe and to ban the burqa. For as far as there is a pattern, parties that were already 
similar to the PVV move to agree more with it. 
The entry of the LPF has led to increasing attention to immigration, and many 
parties imitated the LPF’s positions. The PVV’s effect is concentrated in the VVD, 
from which the PVV split in 2004. The VVD lost considerably in the 2006 elections, 
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and VVD and PVV shared a large part of their programme. As discussed in section 
4.2.16, good reasons exist not to consider the PVV a challenger of the VVD, but the 
VVD clearly felt challenged by the PVV.  
 
6.2.14 PvdD: the hobbyhorse 
The PvdD entered in the 2003 elections, but was unsuccessful. In 2006 it re-
entered and won two seats. Established parties may have anticipated the entry of this 
animal rights party. When one looks at attention to this issue, the following pattern 
emerges: all parties devoted less attention to agriculture after the entry of the PvdD. 
Some parties devoted marginally less attention to agriculture (such as the GL in figure 
6.29), other parties drastically decreased their attention to the issue (such as the SP). 
The SP won votes in the elections in which the PvdD entered, while almost all the 
other parties lost votes. It appears that the SP may have felt that they could afford to 
markedly decrease attention to agriculture, while other parties felt that they could not. 
As seen in chapter 5, the declining political attention to agriculture can be explained 
by its declining economic importance. The GL programme was the only one that 
showed signs of anticipation: markedly increasing attention to agriculture between 
2003 and 2006.186 When examining positions, the patterns become clearer. Most 
parties took over at least one position of the PvdD. The most marked movements can 
be seen for GL (shown in figure 6.30). This party took over five positions from the 
PvdD: from a ban on the use of animals in circuses to a ban on foie grasse. The GL 
may have felt challenged by the PvdD: the two parties shared a similar programme 
and GL lost votes in the 2006 elections. Other scholars have also noticed this party’s 
move to more animal-friendly programmes after 2006 (Lucardie & Pennings 2010). 
All in all, the PvdD appears to have had no effect on the issue that parties talk about, 
but it has definitely had an effect on the explicit positions that parties take, especially 
the GL, the other green-left party in parliament.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 In a more qualitative analysis of attention to animal rights, Meeuwissen (2011, 40) 
emphasises that parties appear to have anticipated the entry of the PvdD in 2006, 
because they increased their attention to animal rights between 2003 and 2006.  
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Table 6.1: challengers' effects on electoral positions 
Party KNP PSP GPV PPR DS'70 RKPN RPF EVP SP 
ARP 0.07 0.22 0       
CHU 0.07 0.33 -0.04       
KVP 0.21 0.22 -0.01       
SGP 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.06 0.02 0.05 0 
PvdA 0.07 -0.22 0.07 0.08 0 0 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
VVD 0 -0.11 0 -0.08 0 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0 
CPN 0.07 0.11 0 0 0 -0.06 -0.04   
PSP   0.08 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.08   
BP    0 -0.05 0    
GPV    0 0 0.39 0.02 0.05 -0.03 
D66    0.17 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.05 -0.16 
CDA    0 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.06 
DS'70      0.06 0.01   
PPR      0 0.01 0.02  
RPF      0 0.01 0.05 0.03 
GL         -0.10 
Hypo. Yes Opp. No No No No No No Tied 
Challenged parties in bold 
Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction 
No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction 
Note that the sets of parties differs between this table and table 5.14 
 
Table 6.2: mobilisers' effects on electoral positions 
Party BP D66 NMP CP AOV U55+ LPF LN PVV PvdD 
ARP 0.08 0.13         
CHU 0 0.06         
KVP 0 0.1         
SGP 0 -0.03 0 0.08 0 0 -0.03 0 0 0.11 
PvdA 0.08 0.16 0 0.08 0 0.07 0.03 0 0 0.04 
VVD 0.08 0.06 0 0 0.04 0 0.06 0 0 0.11 
CPN 0.08 -0.03 0        
PSP 0 0.13 0 0       
BP  0.1 0.5        
GPV  -0.03 0 0 0.04 0     
D66  -0.03 0 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.12 0 0.04 -0.11 
CDA   0 0 0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.11 
PPR    0.08       
RPF    0 0.12 0     
GL     0 0 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.04 
SP       0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.11 
CU       0.09 0 0.01 -0.14 
Note that the sets of parties differs between this table and table 5.15 
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6.3 Analysing the case-by-case results 
The previous sections examined the effects of nineteen new parties 
individually; this section will compare and contrast those results.  
 
6.3.1 Analysis of party positions in the electoral arena 
The parties that elicit the most imitation in terms of position are the PSP, the 
RKPN, KNP, NMP and D66 (in that order). However, the high average reaction to the 
PSP, the RKPN, the KNP and the NMP can be explained by the effect these parties 
had on a single party187 or the limited number of unique proposals.188 D66 has had the 
most consistent effect on the electoral positions of established parties. 
In table 6.1 the different reactions in electoral positions for the nine challenger 
parties are shown. This allows us to see whether challenged parties consistently react 
more to the entry of a new party than other parties. Out of the nine challenged parties, 
six do not show the most marked reaction. Two show the strongest increase in 
similarity (KVP to KNP; PvdA to SP, but this score is tied with the CDA) and one 
shows the strongest decrease (PvdA to PSP). This shows that all in all challengers do 
not consistently elicit marked reactions from the challenged parties. As one can see in 
table 6.3, this is also supported statistically: the average reaction of a challenged party 
is slightly weaker than the reaction of an unchallenged party. 
Mobilisers may elicit imitation from more established parties, because they 
challenge all parties instead of just one. These reactions are shown in table 6.2. In no 
case can one see a consistent increase (or decrease) in similarity for all parties. As one 
can see in table 6.3 the average reaction does not differ statistically between 
mobilisers and challengers. Several mobilisers suffered (contrary to what one would 
expect for a mobiliser) from programmes that were not innovative: consider the NMP, 
BP, the CP or LN. All these parties made fewer than 15 unique proposals. Almost no 
reaction could be observed on those few proposals.189 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 The GPV for the RKPN, the KVP for the KNP and the BP for the NMP 
188 For the PSP and the NMP 
189 One can question to what extent these parties are truly mobilisers, because 
established parties already devoted much attention to their issue. In the mobiliser-
challenger dichotomy however they do not necessarily fit in the challenger category. 
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Table 6.3: comparing effects on electoral position 
Characteristic µ σ  N ε  
Challenged 0.024 0.115 9 
Unchallenged 0.036 0.087 68 
0.042 
Mobiliser 0.031 0.076 88 
Challenger 0.035 0.090 77 
0.023 
Government 0.034 0.086 26 
Opposition 0.027 0.060 135 
0.029 
µ: average value 
σ: standard deviation 
N: number of cases 
ε: eta 
 
Table 6.4: new party size and electoral positions 
Party New party size µ σ  N 
LPF 17 0.034 0.141 8 
PVV 5.89 0.034 0.177 8 
DS’70 5.33 0.021 0.173 9 
D66 4.48 0.049 0.127 10 
AOV 3.63 0.040 0.043 8 
BP 2.13 0.040 0.107 8 
PPR 1.84 0.028 0.167 9 
PSP 1.84 0.079 0.122 7 
PvdD 1.83 0.016 0.177 8 
LN 1.61 -0.011 0.141 8 
NMP 1.51 0.056 0.167 9 
SP 1.32 -0.018 0.089 8 
KNP 1.26 0.070 0.189 7 
RPF 1.25 -0.002 0.145 9 
RKPN 0.92 0.076 0.727 11 
U55+ 0.87 0.009 0.089 8 
EVP 0.83 0.049 0.263 9 
GPV 0.74 0.010 0.107 8 
CP 0.69 0.036 0.251 9 
Correlation 0.008 161 
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Table 6.5: new party organisation and electoral positions 
Party New party organisation µ σ  N 
GPV 15.2 0.019 0.107 8 
SP 13.45 -0.018 0.089 8 
RPF 5.54 -0.002 0.145 9 
PvdD 3.54 0.016 0.177 8 
PPR 3.45 0.028 0.167 9 
U55+ 3.37 0.009 0.089 8 
PSP 1.8 0.079 0.122 7 
EVP 1.51 0.049 0.263 9 
D66 1.2 0.049 0.127 10 
DS’70 0.89 0.021 0.173 9 
LN 0.81 -0.011 0.141 8 
AOV 0.58 0.049 0.043 8 
LPF 0.25 0.034 0.141 8 
PVV 0 0.034 0.177 8 
Correlation -0.176* 117 
 
For the new party government hypothesis, the question is whether new parties 
in government elicit more reaction than new parties in opposition. This is the case for 
positions in the electoral arena, but the difference, as can be seen in table 6.3 is not 
statistically significant. Opposition parties, like the RKPN, elicited, on average, more 
reactions in terms of position from established parties than the LPF did, although the 
latter was in government. 
One can examine the average reactions to the new parties ordered by size in 
table 6.4, here one can see that both the largest new party (LPF) and the smallest new 
party (CP) elicit similar increases in agreement (around +0.035). The overall 
correlation is in the expected direction but weak and not significant. It does not appear 
to be the case that larger new parties elicit more reactions. 
In order to test the new party organisation hypothesis, the new parties are 
ordered by the extent to which they organised their electorate in table 6.5. One can see 
here that well organised new parties elicit more negative reactions than less well 
organised new parties. New parties that tend to be well organised elicit less imitation 
(GPV) and more differentiation (SP and RPF), than other parties. This relationship is 
based on three parties (RPF, GPV and SP), which are well organised but elicit weak 
and negative reactions. These three parties tried to enter parliament several times but 
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were unsuccessful before.190 All three participated in municipal and provincial 
elections before entering parliament. All are challenger parties formed by a divorce. 
Instead of being unexpectedly successful well-organised new entries, these parties 
appear to be well-established parties before entering parliament, and their modest 
support did not lead to reactions from the established parties.191 
An analysis of the new party proximity hypothesis is presented in table 6.6. 
Here one can see the correlation between the distance between the new and the 
established party and the extent to which the established party reacted. The central 
notion here is that parties that are closer to the new party respond more to the new 
parties than parties that are further away from it. For some cases there is a marked 
reaction for parties that already were closer to the new party (RPF, LPF, D66), but the 
overall relationship is that parties that are further away react more. This relationship is 
not significant, however. This indicates that, as far as there is a difference between 
parties, parties that are further away from the new party respond more.192 
Finally, one can see the analyses of the effect of the performance of the 
established party in table 6.7. Even though, there are a number of cases where the 
established parties that won the most votes, reacted most, the overall trend indicates 
that, significantly, established parties that lost votes react most. It seems to be the case 
that parties that have lost votes in the election in which the new party entered, 
increase their similarity to the election manifesto of the new party. The relationship is, 
however, not significant if the analysis is replicated without the NMP and the PSP, 
outliers in terms of the number of unique proposals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 One unsuccessful try for the RPF, four for the GPV and five for the SP. In the 
election before entering parliament, they all won a significant amount of the votes.  
191 These results are not replicated in the multivariate analysis, because this variable 
has a lot of missing values. 
192 The best explanation for this may be that, even though a common measurement of 
party similarity for all parties was used (based on the codes of all items unique and 
non-unique), the similarity of new parties will cluster around three levels: some new 
parties have programmes with which established parties in general disagree (such as 
the SP), which means that on average established parties will have a negative score in 
terms of similarity. Some new parties (such as LN) may have a programme that has a 
lot of similarities with the programmes of established parties, and therefore 
established parties will have positive scores. Some new parties (such as the PvdD) 
will have long programmes with a lot of detailed points; therefore parties will in 
general score neutral. Given that in addition to patterns within parties there are also 
patterns between parties, this general pattern may cancel out the relationships found in 
the case-by-case analysis.  
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Table 6.6: party distance and 
electoral positions 
Table 6.7: established party performance 
and electoral positions 
Party Correlation N Party Correlation N 
PSP -0.624 7 NMP -0.771** 9 
SP -0.502 8 CP -0.553 9 
CP -0.496 9 D66 -0.548 10 
EVP -0.439 9 BP -0.533 8 
BP -0.341 8 SP -0.48 8 
U55+ -0.341 8 LPF -0.457 8 
KNP -0.214 7 KNP -0.286 7 
GPV 0.014 8 RKPN -0.252 11 
PvdD 0.034 8 PSP -0.216 7 
NMP 0.082 9 PvdD -0.192 8 
PVV 0.098 8 RPF -0.179 9 
LN 0.166 8 LN -0.093 8 
AOV 0.385 8 GPV -0.087 8 
RKPN 0.467 11 DS’70 -0.006 9 
DS’70 0.469 9 PVV 0.11 8 
PPR 0.564 9 PPR 0.144 9 
RPF 0.586* 9 EVP 0.198 9 
LPF 0.678* 8 U55+ 0.408 8 
D66 0.800*** 10 
 
AOV 0.414 8 
Overall -0.079 161  Overall -0.201** 161 
 
Table 6.8: correlation coefficients anticipation 
Variable Correlation N 
Challenged 0.024 150 
Mobiliser 0.115 150 
Party distance 0.245*** 150 
New party size 0.152* 150 
New party organisation -0.247*** 117 
Established party performance 0.158* 150 
 
Only one relationship is consistently significant: well-organised new parties 
elicit significantly weaker reactions from established parties, than parties that are less 
well organised. This goes against the hypothesised relationship. As discussed above in  
detail: the underlying pattern here may be that these parties are not really new. The 
most well-organised new parties had already participated in elections before. 
One explanation for the weakness of the patterns found above is that this part 
of the study examined the wrong kind of behaviour: instead of reacting to new parties, 
established parties may have anticipated new parties. Therefore, the following section 
will look at the anticipation of new parties by established parties. A range of factors 
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now show significant relationships: party distance, new party size, new party 
organisation, established party performance, established party leadership change and 
established party size all show significant relationships. Most of these relationships 
are in the expected direction. One should note, however, that, in analysing 
anticipation, it is necessary to relax the notion of uniqueness: in order to measure 
anticipation only those policies were eliminated as non-unique that were held by 
established parties in the elections before the entry of new party and not in the 
elections before and in which the new party entered. It is not strange that with such a 
relaxed notion of uniqueness more reactions by established parties are found, because 
there is more variance to ‘lash onto’. However, because of the relaxed notion of 
uniqueness used here, one cannot be sure that the changes found can actually be 
attributed to the new party. They could also be attributed to external circumstances. In 
statistical terms: the chance of type-I errors increases. Table 6.8 provides an overview. 
The single most important outcome is that new parties that will become larger 
are anticipated more. This relationship is significant and in the expected direction. As 
before, new parties that are better organised elicit less anticipation. Again the same 
explanation can be given: the well-organised parties (SP, RPF and GPV) were ignored 
by established parties because their entry was not unexpected; they had already 
participated in elections before. One should note that one cannot study these factors 
without neglecting the temporal order of causality: a new party’s size and its level of 
organisation, in which party size is a factor, are only known after that new party has 
entered parliament. What is explained now precedes the cause. In general, however, 
there is a significant relationship between pre-election polls and new party size. 
Established parties that lost votes in the elections before the new party entered show 
more anticipation than established parties that are performing well. This effect is 
significant and goes in the expected direction. The same is true for the ideological 
distance between new and established party. These two relationship are not significant 
in the multivariate analysis (presented in appendix 5), however.  
Several conclusions stand out in the interpretation of these results of 
anticipatory behaviour: when new parties are expected to be larger, when new and 
established parties have similar programmes, and when established parties are losing 
votes, there is more anticipatory behaviour than if these characteristics are not present.  
On the whole, this analysis of changes in party positions points to one factor: 
the performance of the established party explains the positional reactions of 
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established parties to new parties in almost every analysis. Established parties will 
respond to new parties when they have lost votes in the last elections (whether in the 
election in which the new party entered, or the election before the new party entered). 
Losing elections may be the only way in which the conservative organisations that 
parties often are, are forced to respond to their surroundings.  
 
6.3.2 Analysis of attention in the electoral arena 
The PPR, KNP, D66 and RKPN elicited the most marked reactions in terms of 
attention from the established parties. In the case of the PPR, RKPN and the KNP, 
external circumstances can better explain the patterns in attention than the presence of 
these new parties: therefore, again D66 appears to be the prime example of a new 
party that is successfully changing the policies of established parties.  
In table 6.9 one can compare the changes in attention for the challenger party. 
Here one can compare the patterns elicited by different challengers. Only three of the 
nine challengers elicit the most marked reactions from the parties that they challenge. 
Two of these challenged parties actually decrease attention to the issue of the 
challenger party (KVP to RKPN, CDA to EVP). Only the PvdA imitates the issue 
attention of the PSP. Challenger parties do not elicit more marked reactions from the 
parties that they challenge. In table 6.11 one can see that unchallenged parties react 
more than challenged parties (but not significantly). 
The mobiliser hypothesis poses that mobiliser new parties will elicit reactions 
from more established parties, than challengers. In table 6.10 one can see that for no 
new mobiliser party, established parties consistently increase their attention to issues. 
The only party for which any consistent pattern can be seen, is the PvdD, which 
actually elicits consistently decreasing attention. In table 6.11 one can see that there is 
a statistically significant difference between challengers and mobilisers, where 
mobilisers elicit less reactions than challengers. This relationship, however, does not 
hold in the robustness checks presented in appendix 4.  
Table 6.11 also gives an insight into the government-opposition hypothesis. 
There is a positive significant relationship between whether a new party was in 
government or not, and whether it elicited reactions from the established parties. The 
LPF and the PPR, in particular, elicit reactions from established parties. This 
relationship, however, is not significant in the multivariate analysis presented in 
appendix 4. 
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Table 6.9: challengers' effects on electoral attention 
Party KNP PSP GPV PPR DS'70 RKPN RPF EVP SP 
ARP 0.12 0.14 0.1       
CHU 1 -0.06 -0.17       
KVP 0.38 0.55 0.44       
SGP 0 0 -0.53 1 0.05 -0.14 0.05 0.16 0.19 
PvdA -0.04 0.6 0 0 -0.03 1 -0.02 0.43 -0.07 
VVD 1 -0.4 0.55 0.86 -0.12 0.3 -0.79 -0.13 0.29 
CPN 0.17 0.31 0 1 -0.69 0 1   
PSP   1 0.41 -0.21 0.24 0.46 0.05  
BP    1 0.33 1    
GPV    0.31 -0.38 0.24 0.03 0.3 -0.04 
D66    0.25 -0.08 -0.04 -0.47 -0.25 -0.15 
CDA    0.37 0.17 -0.15 -0.39 -0.37 -0.05 
PPR       -0.04 0.2  
RPF        -0.29 -0.14 
GL         -0.01 
Hypo. No Yes No No No Opp. No Opp. No 
Challenged parties in bold 
Yes: Challenged party showed most marked reaction 
No: Challenged party did not show most marked reaction 
 
Table 6.10: mobilisers' effects on electoral attention 
Party BP D66 NMP CP AOV/U55+ LPF LN PVV PvdD 
ARP -0.27 0.38        
CHU 0 1        
KVP 0 1        
SGP 1 -0.34 0.28 0.75 -0.01 0.51 -1 -0.39 -0.12 
PvdA -0.86 1 -0.67 -0.21 0.42 0.05 -0.08 -0.38 0.14 
VVD -0.18 0.19 -0.13 -0.09 0.09 0.29 0.08 -0.16 0.39 
CPN -1 -0.43 -1       
PSP  0.13 -0.01 0.53      
BP  0.15 -0.17       
GPV  -0.09 -0.73 0.03 0.15     
D66   -0.5 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.47 -0.21 -0.42 
CDA   -0.13 0.11 0.03 0.36 -0.17 -0.07 -0.25 
PPR    0.13      
RPF    -0.46 -0.12     
GL     -0.15     
SP      -0.33 -0.04 -0.25 0.52 
CU      0.35 -0.29 -0.05 0.02 
Hypo. No No No No No No No No Op.. 
Yes: Change in the nature of the lines of conflict on this issue 
No: Changes in party positions 
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Table 6.12 examines the new party attention hypothesis. Here one can see that 
the party that devoted most attention to its own issue (the PvdD) elicits a marked 
decrease in attention, while the PPR, which devoted least attention to its issue actually 
elicits one of the largest increases in attention. All in all, there is a significant, 
negative relationship between the attention a new party devotes to its issue and the 
reactions of established parties. The expectation that was formulated was quite 
complex: without stated conditions, one would expect when new parties devote a lot 
of attention to their issue, established parties increase attention. One would also 
expect that this party attention variable was crucial in the parliamentary arena but not 
in the electoral arena. This expectation is corroborated by the data. 
In table 6.13 the data for the new party size hypothesis is shown. Here one can 
see that new party size does not matter for the reactions of established parties: the 
largest new party (LPF) elicits less reaction than the second to smallest new party 
(GPV). Overall there is a weak, negative, insignificant relationship. 
Table 6.14 provides a test for the new party organisation hypothesis. One can see here 
that most well organised organisation (GPV) elicits almost as much reaction as the 
least well organised party (LPF). The overall relationship is weak, insignificant and 
positive. 
Table 6.15 summarises the analyses of the party distance hypothesis. The data 
shows that for some parties the parties that were furthest away reacted most (such as 
the PPR), while for other parties, (such as D66 and LN) the parties that were closest 
already reacted most, and even significantly so. The overall relationship is weak, 
insignificant and goes in against the expected relationship. 
In table 6.16 the analyses of the party performance hypothesis are summarised. 
Here one can see that for most parties the parties that lost most, react most. For five 
parties, the reversed is true. The overall relationship, however, goes in the expected 
direction and is significant. As expected, established parties that lose seats respond 
significantly more than established parties that win seats. This is the only hypothesis 
that is supported by the data: the more a party loses in the elections in which the new 
party enters, the more it focuses on the issue that the new party raises.  
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Table 6.11: comparing effects on electoral attention 
Characteristic µ σ  N ε  
Challenged 0.048 0.346 9 
Unchallenged 0.172 0.435 66 
0.095 
Mobiliser -0.006 0.442 76 
Challenger 0.157 0.426 75 
0.186** 
Government 0.214 0.428 26 
Opposition 0.047 0.439 125 
0.144* 
µ: average value 
σ: standard deviation 
N: number of cases 
ε: eta 
 
Table 6.12: new party attention and electoral attention 
Party New party attention µ σ  N 
PvdD 68.5 -0.246 0.154 8 
PSP 49.4 0.164 0.356 7 
BP 43.7 -0.038 0.739 8 
NMP 29 -0.34 0.408 9 
GPV 26.8 0.173 0.473 8 
RPF 24.1 -0.019 0.527 9 
RKPN 23.1 0.272 0.445 9 
KNP 22.5 0.375 0.448 7 
AOV/U55 21.5 0.07 0.181 8 
LPF 19.2 0.166 0.273 8 
DS’70 17.6 -0.107 0.301 9 
LN 17.6 -0.147 0.412 8 
PVV 13.3 0.021 0.318 8 
EVP 11.5 0.012 0.284 9 
D66 11.3 0.299 0.541 10 
SP 9.8 0.004 0.158 8 
CP 8 0.114 0.368 9 
PPR 6.6 0.578 0.388 9 
Correlation -0.210*** 151 
 
	   286	  
 
 
Table 6.13: new party size and electoral attention 
Party New party size µ σ  N 
LPF 17 0.166 0.273 8 
PVV 5.89 0.021 0.318 8 
DS’70 5.33 -0.107 0.301 9 
AOV/U55 4.5 0.07 0.181 8 
D66 4.48 0.299 0.541 10 
BP 2.13 -0.038 0.739 8 
PSP 1.84 0.164 0.356 7 
PPR 1.84 0.578 0.388 9 
PvdD 1.83 -0.246 0.154 8 
LN 1.61 -0.147 0.412 8 
NMP 1.51 -0.34 0.408 9 
SP 1.32 0.004 0.158 8 
KNP 1.26 0.375 0.448 7 
RPF 1.25 -0.019 0.527 9 
RKPN 0.92 0.272 0.445 9 
EVP 0.83 0.012 0.284 9 
GPV 0.74 0.173 0.473 8 
CP 0.69 0.114 0.368 9 
Correlation -0.033 151 
 
Table 6.14: new party organisation and electoral attention 
Party New party 
organisation 
µ σ  N 
GPV 15.2 0.173 0.473 8 
SP 13.45 0.004 0.158 8 
RPF 5.54 -0.019 0.527 9 
PvdD 3.54 -0.246 0.154 8 
PPR 3.45 0.578 0.388 9 
PSP 1.8 0.164 0.356 7 
EVP 1.51 0.012 0.284 9 
D66 1.2 0.299 0.541 10 
DS’70 0.89 -0.107 0.301 9 
LN 0.81 -0.147 0.412 8 
LPF 0.25 0.166 0.273 8 
PVV 0 0.021 0.318 8 
Correlation 0.013 101 
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Table 6.15: party distance and 
electoral attention 
Party Correlation N 
PPR -0.528 9 
GPV -0.469 8 
RKPN -0.451 9 
SP -0.388 8 
BP -0.214 8 
AOV/U55 -0.147 8 
RPF -0.105 9 
LPF 0.125 8 
CP 0.164 9 
PSP 0.171 7 
EVP 0.218 9 
DS’70 0.222 9 
PVV 0.223 8 
NMP 0.291 9 
PvdD 0.546 8 
KNP 0.639 7 
D66 0.653** 10 
LN 0.802** 8 
Correlation -0.008 151 
Table 6.16: established party 
performance 
Party Correlation N 
RPF -0.7** 9 
SP -0.586 8 
DS’70 -0.519 9 
RKPN -0.496 9 
PSP -0.482 8 
PvdD -0.426 8 
NMP -0.413 9 
D66 -0.397 10 
EVP -0.373 9 
PPR -0.346 9 
LN -0.282 8 
AOV/U55 -0.2 8 
LPF -0.151 8 
PVV 0.204 8 
GPV 0.412 7 
CP 0.44 9 
BP 0.527 8 
KNP 0.619 7 
Correlation -0.185** 151 
 
 6.4 Expanded statistical analysis 
In the next step all developments in attention on all issues will be compared to 
those developments when new parties were present.  
 
6.4.1 Reaction in terms of attention 
The short summary of the analysis of attention to issues in terms of reaction, is 
that all hypotheses are rejected, except for a hypothesis that explicitly stated that in 
the electoral arena there would be no relationship. None of the characteristics of new 
parties have a significant effect on the reactions of established parties. Different 
specifications are used here, but under none of them any discernable effect is visible. 
In table 6.17, one can see that the presence of a new party leads to an increase in 
attention on its issue. There is no general effect of new political parties: the presence 
of a new party does not lead to significantly more change on its issue than when no 
new party is present. This echoes the results of the case-by-case analysis where this 
study did not observe a consistent effect in the hypothesised direction.  
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Table 6.17: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (1) 





















New Party Presence 0.015 
(0.030) 
- - - - 
New Party Attention - -0.001 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Challenged - - -0.077 
(0.137) 
- - 
Mobiliser - - - -0.046 
(0.041) 
- 
Party Distance - - - - 0.010 
(0.126) 
R-Squared 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.156 
n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by 
the sum of the square roots of manifesto length. 
 
Table 6.18: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (2) 

























Party Distance - - - - 0.045 
(0.169) 
New Party Size 0.005 
(0.006) 
- - - 0.005 
(0.008) 
New Party Organisation - 0.005 
(0.006) 
- - - 












R-Squared 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.156 0.157 
n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by 
the sum of the square roots of manifesto length. 
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It is also not the case that under specific conditions new parties may have an 
effect. The first of these hypotheses analyses is the new party activity hypothesis. The 
expectation was that this mechanism mattered more in the parliamentary arena than in 
the electoral arena. These results are presented in model 2 of table 6.17. New parties 
that focused more on their own issue elicit fewer reactions, but this relationship is not 
significant. As the result was significant in the study of the parliamentary arena, this 
negative result actually corroborates one of the expectations. 
The relationship between new and established party was operationalised in 
terms of the relationship between challenged parties and challengers, between 
mobilisers and all parties and party distance. No significant relationship was found. 
Moreover, the relationship was in the opposite direction in each case: there is more 
change in attention when parties are not challenged or when mobilisers are not 
present. The sign for the party distance variable was unstable: under different 
specifications, close-by or distant parties tend to react more. These relationships are 
insignificant. These results echo the case-by-case analysis, which showed that those 
parties that were not challenged reacted more than challenged parties in many cases. 
The results for new party characteristics are presented in models 5 (in table 
6.17), 6 and 7 (in table 6.18). Again, no significant relationship was found: larger, 
better-organised or governing new parties do not elicit more change in attention than 
in those cases without new parties. The relationship for new party size is in the correct 
direction (larger new parties elicit more reactions), but it is not significant. Better-
organised new parties elicit more reactions. This is not significant. Government 
parties elicit more reaction than when they stay in opposition, but significantly.  
The performance of the established party has an insignificant effect on the 
reactions of that party. The relationship is specified as an interaction relationship, 
which can best be presented graphically. In figure 6.31 one can see the marginal effect 
of the performance of the established party, both when new parties are present and 
when they are not. On the whole, the performance of the established party has a 
significant positive effect on the changes in attention. After winning elections, parties, 
marginally but significantly, devote more attention to more issues. The presence of a 
new party has a negative effect on the attention of established parties: this means that 
when parties lose the elections and a new party is present, they will increase attention 
to the issue of the new party. As one can see this effect has considerable uncertainty. 
This  means that one cannot distinguish it from a null-effect.  
	   290	  
 
The final analysis tests the notion proposed by Harmel and Svåsand (1997) 
that three factors have to be present to see marked reactions from established parties: 
ideological proximity, a larger new party and a poorly performing established party. 
Concerns about multi-collinearity must be silenced to see whether this relationship is 
present. In model 10 one can see that pooling these variables does not lead to 
significant results, either. The results are similar to the bivariate analyses.  
The results of these different analyses indicate that there is no factor that is 
consistently and significantly related to the reactions of established parties: the 
electoral performance of the established party comes closest, but even this effect is 
not significant. This stands in contrast to the case-by-case analyses in which 
significant relationships were found. There are four ways to read these results: first, 
the presence of a new party in general or under specific specifications does not matter 
for the reactions of established parties in terms of attention compared to all the shifts 
in attention that occur. In the electoral arena, new parties do not matter. There is a 
second possibility: under specific conditions, established parties react differently to 
new parties. In the case-by-case analysis, contradictory results were found. 
Sometimes, for instance, challenged parties respond to their challenger, but sometimes 
challengers ignore the challenging party. These mixed results mean that it is 
impossible to analyse everything in a one-size-fits-all model. Third, these null-results  
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Table 6.19: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (1) 





















New Party Presence 0.005 
(0.027) 
- - - - 
New Party Attention - -0.001 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Challenged - - 0.019 
(0.121) 
- - 
Mobiliser - - - -0.075** 
(0.037) 
- 
Party Distance - - - - 0.106 
(0.175) 
R-Squared 0.099 0.093 0.099 0.100 0.098 
n=4011; all analyses by the sum of the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos  
 
Table 6.20: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (2) 





























- - - - 
New Party Size - 0.004 
(0.006) 
- - 0.003 
(0.007) 
New Party Organisation - - 0.004 
(0.005) 
- - 








R-Squared 0.100 0.092 0.091 0.100 0.102 
n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of 
the square roots of the lengths of the manifestos 
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could also be explained by a missing variable that could explain these patterns but is 
not included in these analyses. There is, however, a fourth possibility, and that is that 
this study has been looking for new party effects in the wrong place. Perhaps new 
parties do not influence established parties after they have entered parliament, but in 
the election in which they enter parliament. 
 
6.4.2 Anticipation in terms of attention 
This section examines the possibility of anticipatory behaviour. The relative 
measure of anticipatory change in attention looks at the increase in attention to the 
issue of the new party in the election in which the new party entered. One should note 
that, when studying anticipatory behaviour, a major caveat should be taken into 
account: in these analyses the entry of the new party occurs in the same election as the 
anticipatory behaviour. This makes it difficult to distinguish cause and effect: does the 
entry of the new party cause the increase in attention or is the entry of the party 
actually the result of the increased attention to its issue? 
The results are presented in detail in table 6.19 and 6.20. These results mainly 
echo the results of the previous analysis for post-entry reactions. Many relationships 
are not significant. In order to avoid repeating the insignificant results from the 
previous paragraphs, only the substantive changes will be addressed here. The only 
interesting significant result concerns the performance of the established party: this 
now has a significant effect. One should note that this concerns the relationship 
between the established party’s performance in the elections before the new party 
entered: parties that lost in the election before the new party entered are more likely to 
show anticipatory behaviour. A graphical representation is presented in figure 6.32. 
The established party performance variable is also incorporated in the Harmel and 
Svåsand model (model 20). This model echoes the previous results: established party 
performance is the only variable that has a significant effect. 
The other significant result concerns the mobiliser hypothesis: the relationship 
is negative and significant. This indicates that parties decrease attention to the issue 
that a mobiliser focuses on in the election in which it enters. One can explain this in 
two ways: first, this may be a sign that mobilisers focus on issues that, in the election 
in which they enter, were outside the realm of political competition. Second, 
established parties may anticipate the entry of challengers, because these tend to be 
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formed by divorce. One can examine this relationship further by looking at the 
relationship between the formation history of the new party and the reactions of  
established parties. There is indeed a significant difference between party reactions to 
parties formed by divorce and birth: parties formed by divorce elicit more anticipation 
(model 16). 
If operationalised in terms of anticipation, new parties in general do not have 
an effect on established parties. There are only two conditions under which they do: 
parties that are mobilisers tend to be anticipated less than parties that are formed as 
challenger. New parties are anticipated more by an established party that has lost 
more in the previous election. Parties that have lost the previous election, are more 
sensitive to their environment than established parties that did not lose votes: parties 
are conservative organisations, unlikely to respond to their environments unless 
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Table 6.21: summary of chapter 6 
Attention Position Hypothesis 
Reaction Anticipation Reaction Anticipation 
1 New Party Presence 0 0 n/a n/a 
3 New Party Attention 0a 0a n/a n/a 
5 Challenged 0 0 0 0 
6 Mobiliser 0 - 0 0 
7 Ideological Proximity 0 0 0 + 
8 New Party Size 0 0 0 + 
9 New Party Organisation 0 0 - - 
10 New Party in Government 0 n/a 0 n/a 
11 Established Party 
Performance 
0 + + 0 
+: in expected direction; 
0: no consistently significant relationship; 
-: in opposite direction than expected; 
a: null relationship expected; 
b: statistically significant, but not meaningful.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The main findings of this chapter are summarised in table 6.21. Four 
conclusions will be drawn here on the basis of these results: first, about the extent to 
which established parties change their programmes in relation to the entry of new 
parties into the electoral arena; second, when established parties do so; third, about the 
conditions under which they do so; and, fourth, about the nature of the electoral arena. 
First, no evidence was found in this analysis that the presence of new parties 
per se matters for the attention that established parties devote to issues in their 
election manifesto. While one cannot say the same for the positions that established 
parties take on issues because the research method was different, the evidence does 
not point to more reactions of established parties to new parties here, either. The case-
by-case analyses showed that there were some meaningful patterns in the reactions of 
some established parties to some new parties, but these patterns were not consistent 
between cases. There is, however, clear evidence that specific new parties elicited 
reactions from the established parties; for instance, D66 elicited marked changes in 
the attention all established parties devoted to issues and the positions that they took 
on them. More than any other party, D66 brought a new issue to the political agenda 
and forced every party to address its proposals, especially those that concerned 
government reform.  
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The expanded statistical analyses showed that, even under specific conditions, 
significant patterns could not be identified. This study echoes the results of the study 
of Huijbregts (2006), who, likewise, found only weak effects of the presence of new 
parties on the election manifestos of established parties. The conclusion would have to 
be that, on the whole, there is no evidence that new parties consistently and 
significantly influence the positions that established parties take in the election 
manifesto or the attention that they devote to issues. The difference between this study 
and those studies that find more marked results for specific new parties (e.g. Harmel 
and Svåsand 1997, Van Spanje 2010) can be explained in two ways: first, by 
examining all new parties in one system this study also took into account a lot of 
cases in which change was unlikely and also did not occur. By focusing on less likely 
cases of changes the established theories are tested more robustly. However, another 
major source of divergence may be the alternative measure of policy positions 
employed here compared to other studies: on aggregated policy dimensions parties 
may shift more, by examining the specific proposals of new parties, one can be sure 
that the change can be attributed to the new party.  
In general, established parties anticipate new parties more than that they react 
to them. Both for position and attention, more significant and meaningful 
relationships were identified for anticipatory behaviour than for reactive behaviour. It 
appears to be the case that, when writing election manifestos, established parties do 
not attempt to win the last battle, but that (under specific conditions) they are quite 
conscious of the battle they are going to fight. This may mean that parties anticipate 
the entry of new parties and write their election manifestos in order to pre-empt the 
entry of new parties, but it may also mean that both the new and the established 
parties pick up on the same social problems. 
When one looks at the conditions under which established parties react to or 
anticipate the entry of new political parties, the results are mixed. There are three 
ways in which new and established parties could be linked: the challenger-challenged 
relationship, the mobiliser-challenger distinction, and ideological distance. 
Challenged parties do consistently react to their challengers. While in some cases the 
challenged established party reacted most (KVP to KNP in positions), in others it 
showed the least (PvdA to PSP in positions). These patterns indicate that one can 
understand the reactions for each particular case, but that if one is interested in general 
patterns, the evidence is much weaker. 
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In general, there is no evidence that mobilisers elicit reactions from more 
established parties than challengers: instead, it was found that in one case, 
anticipatory behaviour in terms of attention, mobilisers in general elicit less 
anticipation from established parties than challengers. The distance between the new 
and established party only has a significant effect when studying anticipation of new 
parties in terms of positions. All in all, there is limited evidence that the relationship 
between new parties and established parties matters for the extent to which 
established parties change their manifestos when a new party enters the electoral 
arena.  
It may also be the case that new party characteristics matter: the underlying 
reasoning is that if new parties form a serious threat, established parties must respond 
to them. The evidence shows that new party size matters significantly in one of the 
expanded statistical analyses: new parties that are (expected to be) larger are 
anticipated more by established parties than new parties that are (expected to be) 
smaller. Three parties that are particularly well organised elicit fewer reactions in 
terms of position: these are the GPV, the RPF and SP; all parties that attempted to 
enter parliament on one or more previous occasions before succeeding. In that sense, 
they are not really new parties from which established parties will copy positions. 
There is no evidence that the government participation of a new party matters for the 
reactions of established parties. Finally, in accordance with the formulated 
expectation, the attention a new party devotes to its own issue has no significant effect 
on the reactions of established parties in the electoral arena. On the whole, the 
evidence that the characteristics of the new parties matter for the reactions they elicit 
is weak as well. 
Finally, the electoral performance of the established party may explain when 
established parties will react to new parties. The underlying notion is that parties that 
have a reason to fear the new party will change their manifestos more than those 
parties that have no reason to fear the new party or parties that already have a 
comfortable position. Here the most consistent evidence was found. In the case-by-
case, statistical and expanded statistical analyses of reactive and anticipatory 
behaviour, this factor was most often the most significant explanation for new party 
behaviour. When one looks at established party organisation, there is one significant 
relationship that indicates that the more unstable an established party is the more it 
will anticipate new parties. All in all, the evidence shows that the short-term 
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performance of the established party in terms of electoral performance matters for the 
reactive and anticipatory behaviour of established parties.  
On the whole, this study finds that new parties do not matter for the positions 
established parties take in their election manifestos or the attention that they devote to 
issues. If they do, the performance of the established party appears to matter more 
than the performance of the new party or the relationship between them. 
One can understand these results in two ways. First, there may be institutional 
reasons for established parties to be less responsive to new parties in the electoral 
arena, than in the parliamentary arena. In the parliamentary arena and in the electoral 
arena, parties work under different constraints and have different incentives (Bardi & 
Mair 2008, 158). The constraint that parties have in the parliamentary arena is that 
they have to address the issues that are on the parliamentary agenda constrains parties. 
In the electoral arena, parties are not bound by a common agenda. This means that 
new parties cannot influence established parties by influencing the party system 
agenda. Competition in the electoral arena is much less structured. In this unstructured 
electoral competition, parties also have different incentives: in the theory of Budge 
(2001) and in the theory of Schattschneider (1960) and Mair (1997a), parties have a 
particular interest in focusing on their own issues in the electoral arena. According to 
the saliency theory of competition, parties benefit if they talk about their own issues in 
the electoral arena, and according to the Schattschneider-Mair thesis, the established 
parties will try to focus electoral competition on the issues that they are connected to. 
This means that, in the electoral arena, parties have little incentive to talk about the 
issues that new parties raise. In their electoral manifestos, parties can talk about the 
issues that they think are important, and this is perhaps one of their few opportunities 
to do so, while in the media or in parliament the agenda is set by others as well. 
Therefore, it is not counterintuitive that parties in the electoral arena are not 
responsive to new parties. Parties stay focused on their own issues and do not try to 
address the issues other parties own. If this strategy is successful, parties will not 
change it and stay focused on their own issue. Only when forced by electoral 
considerations will they change strategies and address those issues that new parties 
brought to the agenda. And this is indeed the case: the significant relationships were 
mostly related to electoral performance. When established parties performed poorly in 
the elections, they would focus more on those issues that new parties raise, and they 
would be more anticipatory if they expected new parties to do well.  
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Second, the lack of responsiveness may be a result of the chosen methodology. 
In this chapter electoral arena was examined by looking at election manifestos. One 
may doubt to what extent these election manifestos provide a good insight into the 
behaviour of parties in the elections. Election manifestos are static documents written 
a number of months before the elections. They cannot provide an insight into how 
parties respond to competitors during the election campaign. Indeed, they provide an 
insight to what a party wants to say independent of its competitors. They are the only 
appropriate source of data, because only they provide an overview of 'all' the positions 
of the established parties and only they show how much attention parties devote to a 
range issues, while flyers or posters often concern only one topic (if they are topical at 
all), and the subjects of media appearances are set by journalists and not by 
politicians. Three things are important to note in this context: first, election manifestos 
are important input for the campaign message of a party. What a party says during the 
election is a reflection of the manifestos. These two may not be identitical, but during 
the campaign a party will not take positions that are outside of the election manifesto. 
Second, in the case-by-case analysis some effects of specific new parties were 
identified. If election manifestos are poor measures of party priorities then these 
changes are very noteworthy. Third, the analysis of anticipation did identify a number 
of significant patterns. Under specific conditions established parties anticipate the 
entry of new political parties and incorporate these new party's issues into their 
election manifestos. This shows that election manifestos are not written outside of the 
political context. It may not necessarily be the case that election manifestos are static 
documents that are written too far before the elections to reflect party behaviour in the 
elections. It may be that election manifestos are written in their contemporary political 
context and that measuring new parties effects after they entered, is far too late. 
 
	   299	  
 
Chapter 7: The invisible people, the left and the right 
How new parties change the parliamentary party systems 
 
"We oppose the existing parties[,] that maintain the existing ideological lines 
of conflict, which provide citizens with no political clarity; that are not 
occupied with working towards their precious ideals, but with guarding their 
own positions; that are a part of a new class of rulers, which operates 
according to the principle of favouritism; (...)" – Leefbaar Nederland (2003, 
212 translation SO)  
 
"The real essence of a party system may be seen not in the competition 
between the principal protagonists, be they Labour and Conservative, 
Christian Democrat and Social democrat, or whatever, but rather in the 
competition between those who wish to maintain that principal dimension of 
competition, on the one hand, and on the other hand, those who— ‘the 
invisible people’ — are trying to establish a wholly different dimension" - 
Mair (1997b, 16) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
There is an interesting parallel in the claim of the government reform populist 
party Liveable Netherlands and of political scientist Peter Mair. In the introductory 
paragraph of its election manifesto, Liveable Netherlands voices its opposition to the 
established parties. In its view they maintain the existing lines of conflict, even though 
they do not provide the voter with any clarity. Moreover, they are preoccupied with 
protecting their own interests and form a new class of rulers that excludes outsiders. 
This is the classical rhetoric of a populist party: established parties disenfranchise 
voters by and they form an impenetrable political class (Albertazzi & McDonnell 
2008). Mair (1997a, 1997b) takes the argument a level further: using the work of 
Schattschneider (1960) as a basis, he argues that the fact that the established political 
parties maintain the existing lines of conflict, is the mechanism that keeps them in 
power and new political parties out of power. In his eyes the competition between the 
established parties along the existing lines of conflict is only part of the story. By 
maintaining the existing lines of conflict, established parties maintain their own 
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position in the party system: by making sure that the voters believe that the election is 
about either a liberal or a socialist future for the country, they exclude those voices 
that believe that the future of the country should be religious, green or feminist. Mair 
(2001) has also argued that the entry of some new political parties may reinforce the 
existing lines of conflict. If these new parties are co-opted into political alliances of 
the left or the right, the entry of a new political party may actually reinforce the 
existing pattern between left and right. Mair (2001) has shown that the entry of Die 
Grünen reinforced the left-right pattern in Germany, while Bale (2003) has shown that 
similar patterns may occur when extreme right parties were co-opted into political 
alliances of the centre-right. By joining the rightwing or the leftwing political alliance, 
the entry of new political parties may actually reduce the number of lines of conflict 
because they focus the political conflict on the left-right dimension, making other 
dimensions (such as the religious-secular dimension) irrelevant. 
This chapter seeks to find out which of the two theses of Mair (1997a, 1997b, 
2001) holds in general: are new political parties able to introduce new lines of 
conflict? Or does their entry actually focus politics on a single left-right dimension? A 
change in the existing lines of conflict may be among the effects that new political 
parties can have on the party system (Schattschneider 1960) and, as argued in chapter 
2, it can be conceived of as a form of party system change. This chapter will examine 
the interaction between political parties at the systemic level. It will examine the 
effect of each of the new parties on parliamentary party system. The parliamentary 
arena is selected because this is the most likely place to observe effects of new 
political parties. As shown in chapter 5, new political parties had a significant effect 
on the attention that established political parties devote to issues and on the positions 
that they take on these issues in the parliamentary arena. The effects of new political 
parties on established parties in the electoral arena (chapter 6) were far less marked or 
structured. This study focuses on the period 1963-2010, because for this period 
sufficient voting data is available. These will be analysed in four periods: 1963-1977, 
1977-1986, 1989-1998 and 1998-2010. Between 1963 and 2006, six parties entered 
the Dutch parliament that according to the analyses presented in chapter 5, elicited 
such considerable reactions in terms of either party positions or attention in 
parliament that their entry may in turn have led to a change in the interaction between 
established parties in parliament. These parties are D66 (both attention to and 
positions on governance), the CP (both attention to and positions on immigration), 
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AOV and U55+ (positions on healthcare), LN (positions on governance) and the LPF 
(attention to immigration). These parties are of special interest here. Each of these 
parties are mobilisers. It seems reasonable that mobilisers are related to changes in the 
structure of party competition: mobilisers seek to introduce new lines of conflict, 
while challengers seek to reinforce the existing lines of conflict. 
This chapter shows that, for as far as one can attribute changes in the lines of 
conflict to the entry of new political parties, new political parties are mostly 
associated with reducing the number of lines of conflict and not with increasing them. 
New political parties are not able to introduce new lines of conflict; rather, their co-
optation into political alliances of the left or the right leads to a reduction of the 
number of lines of conflict and focuses political conflict on the left-right distinction. 
 
7.2.1 Period 1: 1963-1977  
Between 1967 and 1972, five new parties entered parliament: D66, DS'70, the 
PPR, the NMP and the RKPN. As can be seen above, the entry of D66 led to a marked 
and attributable change in the levels of parliamentary attention to governance and the 
positions of parties on this issue. The entry of DS'70, the NMP and the RKPN did not 
lead to significant change in attention. The entry of the PPR was followed by a 
marked increase in attention to the environment, but not in a way that can be 
attributed to the entry of the PPR.  
The parliamentary period 1963-1967 is the period before the entry of any of 
these parties. A spatial model of voting behaviour in this period is presented in figure 
7.1. In the figure one can see three blocs: in the leftwing half of the figure, the PvdA, 
the PSP and the CPN are located. In the rightwing half there are two clusters: the SGP 
and the BP in the lower right half, and the other parties (ARP, KVP, CHU, GPV and 
VVD) in the upper right half. The first dimension appears to be a left-right dimension, 
dividing the leftwing parties (PSP, CPN and PvdA) from the parties of the right. The 
parties of the right are divided on the vertical dimension in particular. Interpreting the 
vertical dimension is difficult: it divides the Christian-democratic KVP and ARP from 
the farmers' party BP and the orthodox-Protestant SGP. It does not divide religious 
parties from secular parties (as the secular VVD is placed closer to conservative 
Protestant ARP than the orthodox Protestant SGP). 
In 1967, D66 entered parliament, and it raised political attention to 
governance. Over the course of the 1967-1971 parliamentary term two new political  
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parties were formed: the Group-Goedhart broke away from the PvdA, and the Group-
Aarden broke away from the KVP. The Group-Goedhart would later on evolve into 
DS'70 and the Group-Aarden into the PPR. The model for the after-period is 
comparatively more one-dimensional, and it now falls just above the basic level for 
one-dimensionality. The basic structure of party positions, presented in figure 7.2, is 
similar to the period 1963-1967: the only parties that made a marked shift were the 
GPV, the VVD and the SGP. The SGP and GPV moved to the centre of the vertical 
dimension, and the VVD took a position close to the three Christian-democratic 
parties. The horizontal dimension is still related to the left-right division. As said 
before, it is difficult to understand the vertical dimension. One can plot the four 
dimensions developed in sections 5.2.4 to 5.2.6 into this model (for the environment 
(in a broad sense), governance, moral issues and economic affairs). They relate to the 
horizontal dimension. The relationship between the moral issues dimension and the 
general voting patterns is markedly weaker than for the other issues. 
It appears that the entry of D66 (and the formation of the PPR and DS'70) 
coincided with a decrease in the dimensionality of the system. It raised attention to the 
issue of governance and party positions on this issue began to follow the left-right 
division more. This, combined with cooperation between the progressive parties 
(PvdA, D66 and PPR), led to a decrease in the dimensionality of the party system. 
This is not counter-intuitive as during this period polarisation started in the Dutch 
parliament. This does mean, however, that the entry of D66 is not associated with the 
creation of a new line of conflict in the Dutch Tweede Kamer. Instead, the interaction 
between political parties became more one-dimensional, because of an increasing 
dominance of left-right voting on the issue of governance, an issue that became more 
important, and because of the cooperation between the progressive parties.  
In the period 1971-1977, voting, as presented in figure 7.3, became even more 
one-dimensional than before: the APRE of a one-dimensional model moves up almost 
one-tenth (on a scale from zero to one). The patterns in voting behaviour are similar to 
the previous period: the horizontal division still follows a left-right structure. It 
divides the CPN, PSP, PPR, PvdA and CPN from the other parties. DS'70 stands in 
the centre of the political space. On its right are the parties of the right and centre-
right: the Christian-democratic parties in one cluster, close to the orthodox-Christian  
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GPV and the SGP. The VVD and the BP are in the lower half of the figure. Although 
in general voting behaviour was more one-dimensional than before, voting on specific 
issues was more diverse than in the period 1967-1971. Governance and the 
Environment follow the horizontal division. On economic issues, the VVD, BP and 
NMP take a more rightwing position than the Christian-democratic parties. On moral 
issues, the Christian-democratic parties (ARP, KVP, CHU) and their orthodox 
Christian counterparts (RKPN, GPV and SGP) stand further away from the leftwing 
parties. It appears that in this analysis the vertical dimension in part reflects the 
division between religious and secular parties, with all the religious parties 
concentrated in the upper-rightwing parties. On the whole, the strength of the left-
right division on the horizontal dimension, combined with the fact that the model can 
better be scaled in terms of one-dimension than before, appears to imply that the entry 
of the NMP, RKPN, PPR or DS'70 has not led to the creation of a new political 
division, either. Instead, the pattern set in the 1967-1971 parliamentary period 
continues: the increased importance of issues on which voting follows the left-right 
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dimension combined with the formation of a leftwing bloc reinforced the existing left-
right division. 
All in all, the entry of D66, DS'70, PPR, NMP or RKPN has not led to the 
creation of a new division between political parties, but instead, during this period 
voting became more one-dimensional because of the formation of political alliances 
between progressive parties and between Christian-democratic parties. This clearly 
conforms to the theoretical expectation of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003): the formation 
of a political alliance, in this case between the progressive parties, has reinforced the 
existing left-right division. Instead of creating a new environmental dimension or a 
governance dimension, the co-optation of the PPR and the D66 into the Progressive 
Agreement with the PvdA strengthened the left-right division. This was combined 
with increasing importance of those issues (governance, the environment) on which 
parties are divided between left and right.  
 
7.2.2 Period 2: 1977-1986 
In 1982 the CP entered the Dutch parliament. The CP was a mobiliser 
focusing on immigration. As seen in chapter 5, its entry was accompanied by an 
increase in attention to immigration and unstable voting patterns on this issue. In this 
period the small Christian EVP and RPF parties also entered. These are both splits 
from the ARP (or the Anti-Revolutionary tendency within the CDA) one orienting 
itself towards the left and one towards the religious right. Is it possible that the entry 
of these parties influenced the pattern of interaction between political parties? 
Voting in the period 1977-1981 was similar to voting in the period 1971-1977. 
These results are presented in figure 7.4. Even a one-dimensional model scores quite 
well in terms of the APRE. On the left hand side one finds the PSP, CPN, D66, PPR 
and PvdA. In the centre of this dimension one finds DS'70, and to its right one can 
find the CDA, the VVD and the smaller parties of the right (RPF, GPV, SGP and BP). 
Voting patterns on religion and defence, issue that were owned by the RPF and EVP 
respectively (the latter is typically associated with the economic left-right dimension), 
are both related to the horizontal dimension, although the relationship for moral issues 
is considerably weaker than the relationship for defence. Voting on immigration does 
not cohere with the model for voting on all issues. For as far as the dimension relates 
to the model, it separates parties in the upper-left corner from parties in the lower-
right corner. The clearest pattern on the vertical dimension (of which the importance 
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should not be over-interpreted because a one-dimensional model fits quite well) is that 
the religious parties are all located in the upper-right corner.  
The model for the period 1981-1986 is presented in figure 7.5. The entry of 
the RPF and the EVP has reinvigorated the moral issues and the defence dimension, 
while the entry of the CP upset voting patterns on immigration. It may be possible that  
this has influenced the basic structure of interaction between political parties. 
Compared to 1977-1981, the voting patterns show change and continuity. One can see 
four clear clusters: the small parties of the left (PSP, PPR, EVP and CPN) are in the 
upper-leftwing corner; in the lower leftwing corner one can see the PvdA and D66, 
the main parties of the centre left; the secular rightwing parties CP and VVD are 
situated in the lower rightwing corner; and the Christian parties (CDA, GPV, SGP and 
RPF) are all in the upper-rightwing corner. The party positions on the vertical 
dimension are similar to the period 1977-1981 and can easily be interpreted in terms 
of the left-right division. If one looks at the correlation, the party positions on the 
vertical dimension are different from the period 1977-1981. This is, however, almost 
exclusively caused by the movement of the PPR away from PvdA towards the PSP. 
The small leftwing parties of are now clearly distinguishable from the larger parties of 
the moderate left. These small leftwing parties take a position opposite from the VVD, 
and the mainstream leftwing parties take a position opposite from the CDA. One can 
understand part of this pattern in terms of a change that occurred in the PPR: in the 
early 1980s it decided to cooperate with the small left parties instead of cooperating 
with the PvdA (Waltmans 1983). The similarity in the voting patterns between the 
small left parties may be a result of this decision. On the whole, the extent to which 
voting behaviour can be modelled in terms of one dimension has decreased. Party 
positions on the vertical dimension changed markedly and voting on this dimension 
matters more than before. To aid interpretation, one can run property fitting models 
for the three issue-dimensions analysed: voting on defence and immigration divides 
the small leftwing parties in the upper left corner from the secular rightwing parties in 
the lower right corner. Voting on immigration, however, coheres only weakly with 
voting on all issues. Voting on moral matters divides the PvdA and D66 from the 
Christian parties. The religious dimension correlates more with the vertical dimension 
than the defence and immigration dimensions do, but on the whole, however, its 
relationship with the entire model is markedly weaker than before. The left-right 
division measured in this case by the defence dimension structures party positions. 
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 Between 1977 and 1986 the pattern in voting behaviour changed, but not 
drastically: the vertical dimension remained as important in structuring party positions 
before and after 1981, but several parties shifted position. Especially on the left there 
was a marked division between the small parties of the left (PPR, EVP, CPN and PSP) 
and the larger parties of the left (D66 and PvdA). The change in dimensionality of the 
system cannot be attributed to the entry of the CP into the political system: it was not 
its issue that is most related to the changing vertical dimension. 
 
7.2.3 Period 3: 1989-1998 
In 1994 three parties entered parliament: the pensioners' parties AOV and 
U55+ and the socialist party SP. All opposed the cuts in the welfare state that the 
centre-left coalition of CDA and PvdA proposed. After the 1994 elections PvdA, 
VVD and D66 formed a coalition. This was the first coalition in the Netherlands since 
1918 that was formed without the Christian-democrats, the traditional pivotal player 
in Dutch politics because of its centrist position on the economic dimension between 
the conservative liberal VVD and the social democratic PvdA. The coalition parties 
shared a commitment to liberal policies on gay rights and euthanasia. One may expect 
that the parliamentary space became more two-dimensional, because the second, 
religious-secular dimension played a large role in the formation of the cabinet. As 
seen in chapter 5, the entry of the AOV and U55+ upset voting patterns on healthcare. 
Between 1989 and 1994 the models of voting were clearly two-dimensional. 
The voting patterns are represented in figure 7.6. Here, one can see roughly three 
clusters of parties: the secular parties of the left (PvdA, GL and D66) are in the lower 
leftwing corner. The secular parties of the right (VVD and CD) are in the lower 
rightwing corner. The religious parties (GPV, RPF, SGP and CDA) are in the upper 
half of the figure in the centre. This pattern is clearly reminiscent of the traditional 
division in Dutch politics with a left-right and religious-secular divide. Voting on 
labour relates to the horizontal dimension of the model, as does voting on healthcare, 
but this is much weaker. 
There is no rupture in the voting patterns in 1994, as presented in figure 7.7. 
The SP has joined the system on the left; the U55+ and the AOV take a place in the 
centre. PvdA and the CDA have moved away from the centre. More than any model 
analysed here, a one-dimensional solution does not fit the data. Voting during this 
period is clearly two-dimensional. One can hardly attribute this to the entry of the  
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pensioners' parties, however. After 1994 voting on healthcare does not conform to the 
political space at all. The AOV and U55+ take a position in the centre and voting on 
their issue relates weakly with the entire model. These parties were not able to force a 
new line of conflict into existence.  
All in all, the 1994 elections did not upset the patterns of parliamentary voting 
behaviour: the entry of the U55+ and AOV and the remarkable patterns in voting 
behaviour on healthcare did not upset the party system. The entry of the SP or the 
formation of the cabinet of PvdA, VVD and D66 has not upset voting patterns, either. 
 
7.2.4 Period 4: 1998-2010 
In 2002 both the LPF and LN entered parliament. The entry of the LPF was 
associated with a marked increase in attention to immigration; the entry of LN was 
associated with instability of the voting patterns on governance, which was the issue 
of LN. The LPF was immediately co-opted into a centre-right cabinet formed by CDA 
and VVD. It may be possible that the entry of LPF and LN influenced the interaction 
between political parties. The events surrounding the entry of the LPF has been 
characterised as “party system change” (Pellikaan et al. 2007), a “revolt of the 
citizens” (Couwenberg 2004) and “a punctuation of the equilibrium of Dutch politics” 
(De Vries & Van der Lubbe 2004). 
The voting patterns in the period 1998-2002 (in figure 7.8) are extremely 
similar to the voting patterns in the period 1994-1998. There are three clusters of 
parties. The VVD stands in the lower rightwing corner. The secular leftwing parties 
(GL, PvdA, D66 and SP) all stand in the lower leftwing corner. The Christian-
democratic parties (SGP, CDA and CU) all stand in the upper rightwing corner. It 
appears to be the case that the vertical dimension divides religious from secular 
parties and that the horizontal dimension divides the left from the right. Voting 
patterns on immigration relate to the horizontal dimension. These are typical left-right 
issues. Governance divides religious from secular parties, with the PvdA, VVD and 
D66 favouring government reform and the CU and the SGP opposing it. 
After the 2002 elections voting patterns remained remarkably stable. The 
results are presented in figure 7.9. The most marked change is that one can model 
voting behaviour more easily in terms of one dimension after the entry of the LPF 
than before. The second dimension has less meaning than in the period 1998-2002. 
Positions on the horizontal dimension are similar in both models: the basic structure 
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remains intact: a difference between parties of the left, with the SP and GL more to 
the left and PvdA and D66 more in the centre. There also is a division between 
religious parties (CU, SGP and CDA concentrated in the upper rightwing corner) and 
secular rightwing parties (VVD, joined in 2002 by LN and LPF). Most voting patterns 
studied (agriculture and immigration) are related to the horizontal dimension. Party 
positions on immigration, which, as Kriesi and Frey (2008) have observed, stand 
perpendicular to social-economic issues among voters, coincide with party positions 
on economic matters for political parties. This reinforces similar findings about the 
relationship between party positioning on this issue by Van der Brug and Van Spanje 
(2009). The governance dimension weakly conforms to the vertical dimension. Given 
the position of religious parties on this dimension, one should interpret it in terms of a 
classical division between religious and secular parties. Between 1998-2002 and 
2002-2006, the importance of the vertical dimension has decreased. Two 
developments have contributed to this: first the increased importance of immigration 
on the parliamentary agenda. On these issues voting is clearly one-dimensional and 
conforms to the horizontal, left-right dimension. Moreover, the political cooperation 
between the LPF, CDA and the VVD added to the reduction of the dimensionality of 
the party system, as Bale has observed (2003). 
One may question the extent to which the LPF was successfully co-opted into 
a rightwing governing bloc. After the fall of the CDA/VVD/LPF-cabinet, a coalition 
cabinet was formed of D66, CDA and VVD. The LPF was left in opposition. The 
rightwing bloc had splintered. If one looks at voting patterns in general, however, one 
can see that in parliament the CDA and VVD also often relied on the LPF to obtain a 
parliamentary majority. The second Balkenende cabinet was a special majority 
cabinet: it could rely on both the LPF and D66 to get a majority for its policies. The 
SGP voted with the CDA and VVD most often, followed by the LPF, D66 and the 
CU. Even though D66 was in government, the LPF had a voting record that was more 
similar to that of the CDA and VVD than to that of D66. It may be interesting to delve 
further into these patterns. In table 7.1 one can see the percentage of votes in which 
D66 and LPF voted the same as VVD and CDA.193 D66 and the LPF are roughly in 
balance if one looks at all the votes. Both parties voted the same as CDA and VVD in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 That is when they voted the same, which is the case in 86% of the votes. It is 
important to note that this concerns all votes, not just those selected to remove the 
interference of the coalition/opposition division. 
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Table 7.1: all votes 2003-2006 
 D66 
All votes a Like CDA and VVD Unlike CDA and VVD Total 
Like CDA and VVD 64% 15% 79% 
Unlike CDA and VVD 15% 6% 21% 
LPF 
Total 78% 22% 100% 
Economic issues b 







Unlike CDA and VVD 18% 6% 24% 
LPF 
Total 86% 14% 100% 
Cultural issues c 







Unlike CDA and VVD 12% 5% 17% 
 
LPF 
Total 74% 26% 10% 
a N=5162 
b N=1344; Economic Affairs, Labour, Social Affairs, Enterprise, Science 
c N=718; Justice and Immigration 
 
around 80% of the cases. In 64% of the votes, both voted the same as the VVD and 
CDA. In 6% of the votes they both voted against the CDA and VVD. In 15% of the 
cases the LPF voted the same as CDA and VVD, but D66 did not, and vice versa. 
However, there are striking patterns. D66 tended to agree with CDA and VVD on 
cases where there is a political disagreement between CDA and VVD and their junior 
social-economic issues. In these cases, D66 voted the same as CDA and VVD more 
often than the LPF: 85% compared to 75%. The same is true for votes on healthcare 
and education. On other issues, such as the immigration and justice, one can see that 
the LPF tended to vote like the CDA and VVD more than D66 did. The LPF voted 
like CDA and VVD in 83% of the votes; the support of D66 is only 74%. In those 
partner D66, the LPF jumped in.194 The same pattern can be observed for the 
environment and foreign affairs. Even though the LPF was in opposition, its political 
cooperation with the CDA and the VVD continued in parliament. 
After 2006, when the PVV won its first seats in the election, there is a marked 
change. This is presented in figure 7.10. Again the model can be represented in terms 
of one dimension. The first thing that stands out in the model is that most parties are 
clustered along a diagonal. The ordering goes from SP to VVD. The positions of these  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Perhaps the most famous example is the motion of no confidence proposed by 
Femke Halsema at the end of the parliamentary debate about the nationality of Ayaan 
Hirshi Ali. The motion was narrowly rejected because the LPF MPs voted against the 
motion of no confidence, while D66, a coalition party, favoured the motion. D66 
withdrew from the cabinet, which continued as a caretaker minority cabinet. 
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parties follow the left-right dimension. This is reflected by the fact that party positions 
on the horizontal dimension are similar to party positions before 2006, and by the fact 
that party positions on agriculture and immigration all correlate with the horizontal 
dimension. One party defies this pattern: the PVV. It takes a rightwing stance on the  
horizontal dimension, but it is in the lower half of the figure. The position of the PVV 
also explains the low correlation of the immigration dimensions with the entire model: 
it is the most extreme party on these dimensions, but on the horizontal dimension it 
takes a position similar to the VVD. The vertical dimension captures the difference 
between the PVV and the VVD. The PVV is the only party studied that has been able 
to create a pattern between itself and the rest of the parties that has influenced the 
entire model. While all other parties are integrated into the left-right pattern, the PVV 
has created its own dimension, which is perpendicular on the left-right dimension. 
This dimension is the result of the fact that the PVV often voted against the proposals 
of the government. As one can see in the model, the PVV sometimes joined the 
opposition parties PvdD and SP in their opposition to government proposals. All in 
all, the PVV is the only party in this study that can be linked to the formation of a new 
line of conflict in parliament. However, given that one can comfortably model the 
party positions in terms of one dimension, the importance of this second dimension 
should not be overestimated. 
Moreover, this pro-system-anti-system dimension that the PVV forced, is not a 
durable phenomenon. In figure 7.11 one can see a preliminary analysis of the voting 
patterns in the Dutch parliament between June 2010 elections and the start of the 2011 
summer recess. Given the low number of votes the results should be interpreted 
cautiously. Two things stand out: first, more than in the period 2006-2010, party 
positions can confidently be modelled in terms of one dimension in the period 2010-
2011. Only in the polarised period 1971-1977 voting patterns were as one-
dimensional as in the period 2010-2011. Second, the structure is similar to the 
structure in the previous period. There are some shifts of individual parties (especially 
the VVD and the CDA stand close together), but on the whole the correlations on both 
dimensions are significant. The second dimension, although less important than 
before, is more pronounced in the period 2010-2011. For as far as there is a second 
dimension in Dutch politics, it is caused by similar voting patterns between the SP, 
the PvdD and the PVV. The decreasing dimensionality of this space should be 
understood in the first place as a sign of the strength of the left-right dimension, since 
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the PVV supported the rightwing coalition cabinet of VVD and CDA. These 
preliminary figures show that again a new party was co-opted successfully into the 
alliance of the centre-right. 
  
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter took particular interest in several parties when studying the 
changing patterns of interaction between political parties. These parties were D66, 
CP, AOV, U55+, LN and LPF. Two of these can be clearly linked to changes in the 
patterns of interaction: the LPF and D66. The saliency of their issues increased, and 
voting patterns on their issues conformed to the horizontal left-right dimension. The 
interaction between political parties became more one-dimensional after their entry 
into the parliamentary arena, as the value of adding a second dimension to the model 
decreased after 1967 and after 2002. On the whole, the developments seem to 
reinforce the perspective of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003): after the entry of these 
parties into parliament, the dominant pattern in parliamentary voting was that between 
the leftwing and the rightwing bloc. D66 was co-opted into a leftwing bloc and the 
LPF into a rightwing bloc. One can also place other parties into this picture: in 1971 
the PPR was co-opted into the leftwing bloc as well, and like the LPF, DS'70 entered 
a rightwing cabinet and maintained a position on the rightwing side of parliament 
afterwards. 
Given that these parties were not able to create a new line of conflict, one has 
to dismiss the idea that new parties and especially mobilisers are able to introduce 
new lines of conflict in parliament. Instead, the study shows the strength of the 
existing left-right dimension in incorporating new parties and absorbing new issues 
into it, even when they are not an intrinsic part of it. In addition to D66 and LPF, 
special attention was devoted to CP, AOV, U55+ and LN. Their entries into 
parliament coincided with a marked change in party positions on their issues. As seen 
in chapter 5, the party positions on immigration were unstable after the entry of the 
CP, the party positions on healthcare changed markedly after the entry of AOV and 
U55+, and after 2002 there was a marked change in party positions on governance. 
But instead of changing the pattern of voting patterns in general, all that these changes 
in issue dimensions resulted in was that these issue dimensions no longer related with 
the general voting patterns.  
One party is related to a change in the general voting patterns: the PVV. It is 
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the only one of the parties studied here that influenced the patterns of voting 
behaviour almost exclusively through its own behaviour. After the PVV entered 
parliament, two lines of conflict structured voting in the parliamentary arena: a left-
right line of conflict, in which the PVV is on the far right, and a line of conflict, which 
basically pitted the PVV against the established parties. This dimension existed 
primarily because the PVV voted against many proposals of the government, 
sometimes together with parties of the leftwing opposition (SP and PvdD). But the 
support of the PVV for the rightwing government coalition of CDA and VVD further 
reinforced the left-right dimension. It made the party system more one-dimensional 
and weakened the relevance of this dimension. 
As the Netherlands and the specific cases under special scrutiny were selected 
as a likely case, some conclusions can be drawn about new parties in general: it is 
unlikely that many other new parties introduce new significant lines of conflict in 
parliament, which completely upset parliamentary interaction between established 
political parties. It seems more likely that, if new parties are successfully co-opted 
into a political alliance of the right or left, new issues will be integrated into the 
existing left-right dimension, and that if this is not the case these new dimensions will 
be weak. 
The fact that Dutch political parties are so effective in diffusing the threat that 
new political parties form to the party system actually reinforces the centrality of the 
conflict that Mair (1997b, 1997a) described. In the conflict between those who have 
an interest in maintaining the established lines of conflict and those who have an 
interest in creating a new line of conflict, the former have consistently won. 
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 Chapter 8: Why care about new political parties? 
 
"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change 
the world. In fact it is the only thing that ever has.” – Source unknown, widely 
but without verification, attributed to Margaret Mead (Keyes 2006)  
 
8.1 Why care about new political parties? 
This study has examined the effect of new political parties on established 
political parties. New political parties are formed as small groups of citizens seeking 
to change society. As seen in this study, many new political parties sought to change 
the positions of established parties, and the attention that established parties devote to 
issues or the party system. This is off course not the goal of a new party: the goal is to 
change society, by changing the priorities of the government, by changing the party 
positions and policy priorities of the established parties. The effect of new parties 
examined here is indirect. 
The extent to which new political parties could play this role depends upon the 
specific features of the political arena: the study found marked differences between 
the parliamentary and the electoral arena. Even when new political parties remain 
small, as long as they were focused, they could put new issues on the parliamentary 
agenda. Especially when established political parties lost votes in the election in 
which the new party entered, these established parties were inclined to change their 
positions in the electoral arena. Moreover, when new parties were able to change the 
attention that established political parties devote to issues, and when they were co-
opted into political alliances of established political parties they influenced the 
interaction between established political parties. Especially the findings in the 
parliamentary arena pointed to the ability of new political parties to shape the 
activities of other political parties and the party system. This provides corroboration 
for the thesis that is often attributed to Margaret Mead, “that a group of thoughtful, 
committed citizens” can cause significant social change. While one cannot say on the 
basis of this study that it is the only thing that ever has, the small groups of citizens 
that formed new parties such as the PvdD, D66, the LPF and the PVV have influenced 
the way politics is done in the Netherlands. There is good reason to care about new 
political parties. They form an important impetus of political change. 
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The central finding of this study is that there is a fundamental difference 
between the parliamentary and the electoral arena. In these different arenas, parties 
have different incentives and work under different constraints. This means that the 
extent to which and the conditions under which they react to the entry of new political 
parties differs: in the parliamentary arena decision-making is structured by the party 
system agenda, which constrains the issues new parties can address. If new political 
parties are able to influence this agenda, however, the established political parties 
must follow. In the electoral arena, parties can focus on the issues that they think are 
important. This means that they can ignore new political parties, unless electoral 
considerations force them to do otherwise. In the parliamentary arena, established 
political parties react more to new political parties than in the electoral arena. The 
conditions under which parties change in the parliamentary arena and in the electoral 
arena differ. In the parliamentary arena, the characteristics of the new parties matter; 
in the electoral arena, for as far as there is a consistent pattern, the electoral 
performance of the established party matters. The central conclusion of this research 
would have to be that new political parties matter, but that their effect is mediated by 
the characteristics of the electoral and the parliamentary arena.  
 
8.2 Comparing patterns 
In chapter 2 several hypotheses were formulated. These have been tested 
extensively in the empirical chapters. The results are briefly summarised in table 8.1. 
Several larger patterns have not been discussed in-depth: these concern especially the 
differences between the parliamentary and the electoral arena proposed in the political 
arena hypothesis, the new party activity hypothesis and the electoral considerations 
hypothesis. The extent to which new political parties influence established political 
parties and the conditions under which they do so, differs between the electoral arena 
and in the parliamentary arena. The political arena hypothesis concerned the 
difference between the parliamentary and the electoral arena with regard to how new 
political parties influence established parties. In these different arenas, party 
positioning is structured by different constrains and is subject to different incentives 
(Bardi & Mair 2008). While decision-making in the parliamentary arena is structured 
by a parliamentary agenda that constrains what parties can talk about, parties are free 
in the electoral arena to focus on the issues that they think will benefit them 
electorally. On the basis of the saliency theory of party competition (Budge 2001),  
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Table 8.1: patterns per hypothesis 









1 Presence 0 + n/a n/a 
2 Arena + n/a n/a 
3 New party activity 0b + n/a n/a 
4 Electoral 
considerations 
+ n/a n/a 
5 Challenged 0 0 0 0 
6 Mobiliser - c + 0 0 
7 Distance 0 0 + c - 
8 New party size 0 + + c - a 
9 New party 
organisation 
0 + - - 
10 New party in 
government 
0 + a 0 0 
11 Established party 
performance 
+ c 0 + 0 
+: in expected direction; 
0: no consistently significant relationship; 
-: in opposite direction than expected; 
a: statistically significant, but not substantively meaningful; 
b: corroborated that there was no relations; 
c: relationship only present for anticipatory behaviour. 
 
one would expect that parties would focus on their own issue in their election 
manifestos. By focusing on the issues that voters trust these parties on, established 
parties seek to make the election a referendum on their own issue. Parties have no 
interest in talking about the issues that new parties bring to the agenda in their election 
manifestos. They may be still forced, however, to address these issues in other fora 
during the election campaign. On the basis of the notion of a parliamentary or party 
system agenda, one would expect that parties devote attention to the issues that other 
parties put on the agenda in parliament (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010). Parties 
are expected by other parties and the media to join in all the parliamentary 
discussions. Moreover they have an interest in joining every discussion, because 
otherwise they leave the definition of the conflict to another party. This structured 
nature of parliamentary decision-making gives an advantage to new parties if they are 
able to exploit it. In general, new parties have more effect in the parliamentary arena 
than in the electoral arena. In the parliamentary arena the presence of a new party has 
a significant effect on the attention that established parties devote to issues, while this 
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is not the case in the electoral arena. This corroborates the political arena hypothesis 
(hypothesis 2 in table 8.1). 
One may question to what extent election manifestos are a good measure for 
the attention that parties spend on issues and the position that they take on issues in 
the electoral arena. Election manifestos are written before the elections and serve as 
one of the inputs for the election campaign. They are however the only collection of 
party positions for the elections and the only texts on basis of which one can 
reasonably assess party priorities without the interference of other actors such as the 
media. They do however have a static quality. They do not capture the dynamic of the 
electoral campaign, where parties react to eachothers expressions during the 
campaign. In part, this may explain the lack of reaction by established parties to new 
parties in the election: as stated, election manifestos are the only document in which 
parties can express their views without the interference of the media, other parties and 
parliamentary officers. The evidence for anticipatory behaviour, however, shows that 
election manifestos can show marked responses to new political parties.  
In addition to this effect on the extent to which new political parties influence 
the attention that established political parties devote to issues, one would also expect 
that the conditions under which new political parties have an effect differ from arena 
to arena. The new party activity hypothesis proposed concerns the effects of a new 
party’s attention to its own issue on the attention that established parties would devote 
to that issue. One would expect this effect to be different in the electoral and in the 
parliamentary arena. The structured nature of parliamentary decision-making means 
that if a new party is able to set an issue on the agenda through its own activity, it 
forces other parties to engage in that issue. In the electoral arena, a new party’s focus 
on its own issue should not have a marked effect on the attention that established 
parties devote to that issue. This is indeed the case, supporting the new party 
hypothesis (numbered 3). This pattern can be illustrated by the example of the PvdD: 
a party that focused on animal rights both in the parliamentary and the electoral arena. 
Through its activity in the parliamentary arena, it focused the attention of the entire 
parliament on agriculture. In contrast: its own focus on agriculture in its election 
manifesto did not elicit such reactions in the election manifestos of other parties. This 
means that new parties that refuse to follow the parliamentary agenda are actually able 
to set it. If one wants to set the parliamentary agenda, one must not follow it. This 
does not hold in the electoral arena. 
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Moreover, the electoral considerations hypothesis posited that electoral 
incentives play a different role in the electoral and the parliamentary arena. One 
would therefore expect that the electoral performance of an established party does 
matter for its reactions to new political parties in the electoral arena, while it does not 
in the parliamentary arena. This is indeed the case: the electoral performance of the 
established party was one of the few factors consistently influencing the different 
reactions of established parties to new parties in the electoral arena. In contrast, the 
electoral performance of the established party had no significant effect in the 
parliamentary arena. Electoral incentives do not play a role in the parliamentary arena, 
but the evidence suggests that they do play some role in the electoral arena. As 
hypothesised in the electoral considerations hypothesis (number 4), the electoral and 
the parliamentary arena differ in both the extent to which established political parties 
react to new political parties and in the conditions under which they do so. 
In addition to these general hypotheses about the parliamentary and the 
electoral arena, and about new party attention and established party electoral 
performance, several hypotheses were posited about the conditions under which 
established political parties would react to new political parties independent of the 
arena. These concerned the relationship between the new and the established party, 
the characteristics of the new party, and the characteristics of the established party. 
While these results were discussed extensively in the empirical chapters, it may be 
useful to briefly summarise the results here and relate them to the bigger picture. 
The basic notion behind the challenger hypothesis (number 5) is that, if parties 
feel challenged by a new party, they will respond to it and otherwise they will ignore 
it. In the different analyses of specific parties’ reactions, in some cases imitation from 
challenged parties was observed, but sometimes they reacted less than all other 
parties. Therefore, this hypothesis has to be rejected in every analysis. New parties 
may also feel challenged when a new party enters that shares a similar programme. 
This is the basic notion behind the ideological similarity hypothesis (number 7). This 
relationship only holds for the positional anticipatory behaviour of established parties 
in the electoral arena, but in parliament it is the parties at the other side of the political 
spectrum that show most reactions. This can be explained by the notion that Meguid 
(2005, 2007) proposed: established parties at the opposite side of the political 
spectrum can benefit electorally from engaging with a new party that challenges 
another party. The opposite of a challenger is a mobiliser: a party that focuses on a 
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new issue, which seeks to address an unaddressed constituency and that does not 
focus on a particular party. The mobiliser hypothesis (number 6) holds that these 
parties should elicit imitation from more parties than challengers. In general, 
mobilisers do elicit more imitation in terms of reactions in the parliamentary arena. 
When studying anticipatory behaviour in the electoral arena, however, the opposite 
pattern was found: the often unknown mobilisers elicited less anticipatory behaviour 
than other parties. This means that, indeed, these parties mobilised on issues that were 
not addressed by established parties.  
One may also hypothesise that the size (number 8), level of organisation 
(number 9), and the government participation of new parties (number 10) matter for 
the reactions that they elicit. The main finding here is that in parliament parties that 
are larger, that are better organised and that are in government, elicit more effect of 
established political parties. This corroborates the idea that in the parliamentary arena, 
new political parties themselves are able to set the agenda. In addition to their own 
activity, the coherence and strength of a new party may strengthen its ability to 
effectively set the agenda. The effect of government participation may be statistically 
significant, but the case-by-case shows that is not substantially meaningful. In the 
electoral arena, new party size does matter for the extent to which they are anticipated 
by established parties in terms of position (number 11). This fits the assumption that 
electoral incentives play a role here. In contrast to the hypotheses, the organisation of 
new political parties has a negative effect on the reactions of established political 
parties in terms of positions, in both the electoral and the parliamentary arena. This 
indicates that several poorly organised parties were able to elicit more reactions.  
The evidence points to a structural difference between the electoral and the 
parliamentary arena. As expected, in the parliamentary arena the presence of a new 
political party matters significantly for the attention that established political parties 
devote to issues. This effect is not present in the electoral arena. Due to the structured 
nature of parliamentary decision-making, new parties have a significant effect there. 
Moreover, as expected, the factors that matter in the parliamentary arena are 
characteristics of the new party (its attention to its own issue, its type, its size, its 
organisation), while in the electoral arena, for as far as one is able to discern 
meaningful, significant patterns, these are related to electoral considerations (most 
prominently the electoral performance of the established party). 
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8.3 Comparing countries 
This study started with explicit expectations. Basing themselves on theories 
about political parties, authors have ascribed a special role to new political parties. 
According to Mair (1997b, 1997a), the real competition in the party system is between 
those who benefit from the established lines of conflict and those who want to 
introduce new lines of conflict. Daalder (1966) and Lijphart (1968) believed that new 
parties served as important sources of information about the dissatisfaction of the 
electorate for established political parties. In the view of Harmel and Svåsand (1997), 
the entry of new political parties could wake established parties up from their 
conservative, self-sufficing slumber. This was further reinforced by the claims that 
new parties made: they would change the way politics is done, they would show 
established parties what the real priorities were, and they would force established 
parties to change their positions.  
The results of this study are more cautious, however, and therefore echo to 
some extent the conclusions of Huijbregts (2006). Specific new political parties have 
had an effect on established parties. On the whole, however, the effect of new political 
parties is limited: it is constrained by the political arena, as new parties elicit more 
reactions in the parliamentary arena than in the electoral arena; it is constrained by 
electoral considerations informing parties in the electoral arena and by mechanisms of 
agenda-control in the parliamentary arena; it is constrained in the electoral arena by 
timing with parties imitating more in anticipation than in reaction; and finally it is 
constrained because new parties tend to be co-opted into pre-existing alliances of the 
left and the right.  
The question arises what these conclusions mean beyond the borders of the 
Dutch case. The Netherlands was selected as a most likely case. If new political 
parties would have an effect in any political system it would be here. The positive 
results found here do not mean that these mechanisms and patterns are likely to occur 
in other cases. In relatively closed systems there may still be mechanisms that ensure 
that established parties do not have to engage with new political parties. More 
important than the positive findings are the negative findings. The effect of new 
political parties was much more limited in the electoral than in the parliamentary 
arena. That means that it is unlikely that in other countries other parties will react to 
new parties in the electoral arena. Every new party that was studied was actually able 
to enter parliament, even if it won only two-thirds of a percent of the vote. And even 
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this electoral incentive did not cause established parties to react to new parties in 
general. Contrariwise, one may expect that new political parties in other countries are 
unable to create new lines of conflict in other parliaments, which completely upset 
parliamentary interaction between established political parties. It seems more likely 
that these new lines of conflict will remain weak and subjugated to the established 
lines of conflict. 
There are two important caveats however. One may contest the extent to 
which the Netherlands is actually a most likely case. There are clear individual 
examples of new political parties that have led to more marked effect than the effects 
observed here: for instance in the Italian 1994 elections, when Forza Italia replaced 
DC (Democrazia Christiana/Christian Democracy) as the dominant party in Italian 
politics. Its entry influenced the Italian party system at a more fundamental level than 
any Dutch political party studied here. These are only individual cases: they say 
nothing about the effect of for example the PD (Democrazia Proletaria/Proletarian 
Democracy).  
A more important problem has to do with the nature of the Dutch political 
system. It is well established that the Dutch political system is open to new political 
parties both in terms of the electoral system and the process of government formation 
(Mair 1997b). The openness of the electoral system (combined with the structured 
nature of decision-making in parliament) may actually benefit the ability of new 
political parties to influence the attention that established parties devote to issues in 
the parliamentary arena. The openness of the government formation procedures may 
benefit new political parties in terms of getting into office, but it constrains their 
ability to change the patterns of interaction in the parliamentary arena and therefore to 
upset the party system. As seen in the case of the LPF and D66, and to lesser extent 
for the PPR, PVV and DS'70, these threats to the stability of the party system were co-
opted into alliances of the right and left. This hindered their ability to change the lines 
of conflict and instead reinforced the existing lines of conflict. In a system with more 
closed patterns of government formation, where new parties are left out, they may 
actually be able to create a new line of conflict, perhaps partially informed by the 
division between those who are in power and those who are outside of power. By co-
opting new political parties into alliances of the left and right, Dutch political parties 
effectively diffuse these new conflicts and maintain the existing left-right dimension. 
This means that in terms of the systemic effect, the Netherlands may actually not be a 
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most likely case, and that if new parties get into parliament in other systems, they may 
potentially influence the party system more. Therefore, the Netherlands does not 
convincingly disprove the Schattschneider-Mair thesis, but it does provide 
considerably corroboration for the Mair-Bale thesis.  
 
8.4 Further research 
When considering avenues for further research, one needs to distinguish two 
different types of follow-up research: one can follow this research in a theoretical way 
and in a methodological way. First, this study found effects of new political parties on 
the attention that parties devoted to issues, but it also found that the consistent 
incorporation of new political parties into the existing left-right division influences 
their ability to change the established lines of conflict. As shown in section 8.3 the 
positive findings are not an end point. The Netherlands was selected as a most likely 
case. Whether in other countries, with more closed political systems, new parties have 
similar effects, is an open question. And even the negative findings are -to some 
extent- open for further examination. If the open process of government formation in 
the Netherlands may actually limit the ability of new political parties to create new 
lines of conflict, one should examine cases where new parties are more likely to have 
an effect to effectively disprove this hypothesis. The methods and hypotheses devised 
here can be extended to other cases, to examine the extent to which and the conditions 
under which new political parties in other systems influence established political 
parties. 
A second finding that merits elaboration is the fact that some new parties 
follow and other new parties lead the political agenda. In the study of the attention in 
the parliamentary arena, the results showed some parties are able to set the 
parliamentary agenda after their entry, while others actually enter the parliamentary 
arena after there has been considerable attention to their own issue. A similar pattern 
was found in the electoral arena: on the whole, no evidence was found that established 
parties markedly change their election manifestos after the entry of new political 
parties. Instead, considerable evidence was found for the possibility of anticipatory 
behaviour. This evidence may however also indicate that new parties actually enter 
parliament because established parties devote attention to them: that the increased 
attention is actually not the effect of the entry of the new party but its cause. Lowery 
et al. (forthcoming) similarly found that the attention that established parties devote to 
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issues may actually benefit new political parties. Follow-up research is necessary to 
determine more precisely why some new parties are able to set the political agenda 
and others follow it.  
There is a last reason for follow-up research. This research has shown that for 
studying the effects of new political parties, the strength of the political agenda or the 
patterned interaction between political parties, the parliamentary arena is more 
important than the electoral arena. The day-to-day politics in parliament may be much 
more informative of how established political parties master changes in their 
environment or are led by them. The focus of scholars of party politics on the short 
period of interaction between political parties in the elections, and related to that, the 
idea that in their election manifestos parties lay down their actual policy positions, is a 
weak point in the study of party politics. As Bardi and Mair (2008) have rightfully 
pointed out, the parliamentary and the electoral arena influence party strategies in 
those arenas, because these have their own mechanisms, incentives and constraints. 
The parliamentary arena should be regarded as just as important for the study of party 
politics as the electoral arena. Moreover, the structured nature of the parliamentary 
arena, the clear position-taking of parties in their parliamentary votes, and the host of 
instruments that parties have at their disposal, mean that from a methodological point 
of view, the parliamentary arena is an extremely rich source of data, which due to the 
internet and computer technology, has become more easily available to political 
scientists. Too little has been done to exploit the richness of this data to understand 
what politicians actually do. This study examined only the tip of the iceberg of what is 
actually possible. If further research takes anything from this study, it should be a 
greater interest of scholars of party politics to actual behaviour in the parliamentary 
arena. 
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Appendix 1: categorization scheme 
One can see the categories used in this study in table 9.1. This categorization 
scheme is based on the categories of the Comparative Agendas Project. Several 
categories are adapted in order to link these categories better to specific new parties 
and to streamline voting patterns on these issues. They key changes are that a colonial 
affairs category has been separated out of the foreign affairs and governance category 
and that moral issue category has been created from parts of the healthcare, 
agriculture, justice and science categories. Pensioners' affairs have been moved from 
social affairs to healthcare. Animals have been moved from the environment to 
agriculture. Immigration has been removed from the labour category and combined 
with the civil rights category to form an immigration category. 
 
Table 9.1: issue categories 
# Issue (long name) Issue (short hand) Comments 
1 Macro-Economy and Taxation Economic Affairs  
2 Integration and Immigration Immigration Immigration added 
3 Healthcare and Pensioners’ Affairs Healthcare Pensioners’ affairs added 
Moral issues removed 
4 Agriculture and Animals Agriculture Animals added 
Moral issues removed 
5 Labour Labour Immigration removed 
6 Education and Culture Education  
7 Environment Environment Animals removed 
8 Energy Energy  
9 Transport Transport  
10 Justice, Courts and Crime Justice Moral issues removed 
11 Social Affairs Social Affairs Pensioners’ affairs and 
moral issues removed 
12 Community development, Housing and 
Urban Planning 
Housing  
13 Enterprises, Banks and Internal Trade Enterprise  
14 Defence Defence  
15 Science, Technology and Communication Science Moral issues removed 
16 Foreign Trade Trade  
17 Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Development cooperation 
removed 
18 Democracy and Governance Governance Colonial Affairs removed 
19 Land, Nature and Water Management Land Management  
20 Moral issues Moral Issues New Category 
21 Colonial Relations and Development 
Cooperation 
Colonial Affairs New Category  
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Appendix 2: attention in the parliamentary arena  
Additional regression models are included, which serve as robust checks of the 
results presented in chapter 5 in table 10.1 to 10.3. 
 
Table 10.1: multivariate regressions for attention in parliament 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Change in parliamentary 
attention 

















Party Distance 0.000 
(0.0584) 
- 






















R-Squared 0.200 0.145 
N 105 165 
 
 
Table 10.2: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (robustness check, 1) 




















Challenged - - 0.065 
(0.063) 
- 
Mobiliser - - - 0.028 
(0.021) 
R-Squared 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 
n=3336     
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Table 10.3: expanded statistical analysis of attention in parliamentary arena (robustness check, 2) 









New Party Presence - - - 0.014 
(0.015) 
New Party Size 0.004 
(0.003) 
- - - 
New Party Organisation - 0.015 
(0.016) 
- - 
New Party Government - - 0.111*** 
(0.033) 
- 
Est. Party Performance - - - 0.049*** 
(0.017) 
Interaction Term - - - -0.025 
(0.080) 
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 
n=3336    
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Appendix 3: party positions in the parliamentary arena 
One and two-dimensional models of party positions were studied in chapter 5 
and 7. This appendix provides overview of all position data used in chapter 4 (table 
11.1 and 11.2). Moreover it provides the diagnostic statistics of these votes: for the 
models in chapter 5, the number of votes, the Aggregate Proportional Reduction in 
Error and the Percentage of Correctly Classified Choices (which express the extent to 
which votes can be modelled correctly under a set number of dimensions), the 
percentage of non-unanimous votes, and the correlation between single-dimensional 
models of voting before and after the entry of the new party. These are presented in 
table 11.3 to 11.13. An additional regression model is included in table 11.14. This 
serves as a robust check of the results presented in the chapter. The APRE for the 
models of parliamentary voting included in chapter 7 are presented in table 11.15. 
These tables also provide the sum of squares of the procrustean analyses and the 
correlations on the first and second dimensions of these superimposed models. Table 
11.16 present the b-values and the R-squared values for the property fitting analyses 
for each of the single dimensional models.
 






Moral Affairs Defense 
Period '63 '67 '71-2 '67 '71-2 '67 '71-2 '67-71 '72 '77 '81-2 '77-81 '82 
ARP 4 4 8 7 7 3 9 4 6     
CHU 6 5 6 4 6 4.5 7 5 4.5     
KVP 5 7 7 4 8 6.5 8 6 7     
SGP 1.5 2 2 1.5 2 4.5 4 2 3 1 3 1 4.5 
VVD 7 6 5 4 5 2 2 7 9 5 8 3 2 
CPN 8 9 14 10 14 12 11 11 12 11 10 10 11 
PSP 10 12 13 11 13 13 15 9 14 10 9 11 12 
GPV 3 3 3 6 3 6.5 6 2 2 2 2 2 3 
BP 1.5 1 1 1.5 1 1 3 2 4.5 3  4  
PvdA 8 13 11 9 11 10 12 10 11 8 11 8 7 
D66  10 12 8 10 11 13 8 10 7 5 7 8 
DS70  8 9  9 8 10 NA 8 6 5 6  
PPR  11 10  12 9 15 NA 13 9 6 9 10 
NMP   NA  NA  1 NA      
RKPN   4  4  5  1     
CDA          4 4 5 6 
RPF           1 NA 4.5 
CP/CD             1 
EVP             9 
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Table 11.2: full party positions (2) 







Period '77-81 '82 '89 '94 '89 '94 '98 '02-3 '06 '98 '02-3 '03 '06 
SGP 1.5 5 3 7.5 3 4 3 5 4 1 6 3.5 4 
VVD 3.5 2 1 12 2 2 1 1 2 8 9 2 2 
CPN 3.5 7            
PSP 7.5 10            
GPV 1.5 3 4 9 5 5        
PvdA 9 6 7 10 8 9 6 8 6 7 5 8 6 
D66 6 8 8 11 7 10 5 7 10 6 7 7 7 
PPR 7.5 11            
CDA 5 12 6 3 6 3 2 3 3 3 3 3.5 3 
RPF  4 5 7.5 4 6        
CP/CD  1 2 1 1 1        
EVP  9            
GL   9 4 9 12 8 10 9 5 4 9 8 
SP    5  11 7 8 7 4 1 10 9 
U55+    2  8        
AOV    6  7        
CU       4 6 5 2 7 6 5 
LPF       4   2 1   
PVV       2 1   5 1  
PvdD         8    10 
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Table 11.3: diagnostic statistics concerning moral issues 1967-1977 
Statistic 1967-1981 1971-1977 1977-1981 1981-1986 
N 20 38 39 56 
PCCC 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.89 
APRE 0.70 0.57 0.69 0.49 
% Unanimous 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Correlation 0.94*** 0.82*** 
 
Table 11.4: diagnostic statistics concerning governance 1963-1977 
Statistic 1963-1967 1967-1971 1971-1977 
N 15 46 82 
PCCC 0.90 0.91 0.92 
APRE 0.65 0.58 0.70 
% Unanimous 0.12 0.09 0.07 
Correlation 0.92*** 0.87*** 
 
Table 11.5: diagnostic statistics concerning the environment 1967-1977 
Statistic 1967-1971 1971-1977 
N 13 157 
PCCC 0.94 0.91 
APRE 0.80 0.60 
% Unanimous 0.027 0.09 
Correlation 0.90*** 
 
Table 11.6: diagnostic statistics concerning economic affairs 1967-1977 
Statistic 1967-1971 1971-1977 
N 53 106 
PCCC 0.94 0.92 
APRE 0.64 0.64 
% Unanimous 0.11 0.05 
Correlation 0.85*** 
 
Table 11.7: diagnostic statistics concerning defence 1977-1986 
Statistics 1977-1982 1982-1986 
N 34 39 
PCCC 0.95 0.96 
APRE 0.80 0.84 
% Unanimous 0.06 0.10 
Correlation 0.92*** 
 
Table 11.8: diagnostic statistics concerning immigration 1977-1986 
Statistic 1977-1982 1982-1986 
N 13 48 
PCCC 0.98 0.95 
APRE 0.86 0.76 
% Unanimous 0.17 0.15 
Correlation 0.56 
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Table 11.9: diagnostic statistics concerning health 1989-1998 
Statistic 1989-1994 1994-1998 1998-2002 
N 59 77 98 
PCCC 1D 0.90 0.93 0.90 
APRE 1D 0.49 0.55 0.53 
Mean PCCC 2D 0.96 0.96 n/a 
Mean APRE 2D 0.85 0.80 n/a 
% Unanimous 0.24 0.20 n/a 
Correlation 1D -0.03 n/a 
Correlation 2D D1 0.55 n/a 
Correlation 2D D2 0.73** n/a 

















Table 11.10: diagnostic statistics concerning labour and social affairs 1989-1994 
Statistic 1989-1994 1994-1998 
N 91 117 
PCCC 0.90 0.90 
APRE 0.52 0.52 
% Unanimous 0.15 0.15 
Correlation 0.87*** 
Table 11.11: diagnostic statistics concerning governance 1998-2006 
Statistic 1998-2002 2002-2006 
N 98 64 
PCCC 1D 0.90 0.90 
APRE 1D 0.63 0.57 
Mean PCCC 2D 0.96 0.96 
Mean APRE 2D 0.86 0.85 
% Unanimous 0.26 0.20 
Correlation 1D 0.02 
Correlation 2D D1 0.92*** 
Correlation 2D D2 0.43 
Root of Squared Error 1.58 
Table 11.12: diagnostic statistics concerning immigration 1998-201 
Statistic 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 
N 95 116 80 
PCCC 0.91 0.93 0.94 
APRE 0.62 0.76 0.75 
% Unanimous 0.13 0.15 0.05 
Correlation 1*** 0.86*** 










Table 11.14: multivariate regression for position in parliament 
Variable Result 







Party Distance 0.042 
(0.025) 
New Party Size -0.007** 
(0.003) 
New Party Organisation -0.079* 
(0.045) 









Table 11.13: diagnostic statistics concerning agriculture 2003-2010 
Statistic 2003-2006 2006-2010 
N 44 93 
PCCC 0.95 0.93 
APRE 0.83 0.77 
% Unanimous 0.19 0.03 
Correlation 0.97*** 
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Table 11.15: comparing two-dimensional models 






Squaresc D1 D2 
1963-1967 0.544 0.877 128 - - - 
1967-1971 0.574 0.812 394 0.430 0.944*** 0.902*** 
1971-1977 0.653 0.819 1218 1.045 0.966*** 0.700*** 
1977-1981 0.594 0.838 1180 0.944 0.968*** 0.745 
1981-1986 0.594 0.808 2005 1.142 0.985*** 0.068 
1986-1989 0.596 0.846 626 0.337 0.970*** 0.959*** 
1989-1994 0.507 0.853 1324 0.763 0.914*** 0.914*** 
1994-1998 0.441 0.722 1569 0.344 0.956*** 0.946*** 
1998-2002 0.566 0.867 1395 0.134 0.970*** 0.984*** 
2002-2006 0.617 0.848 1563 0.192 0.989*** 0.967*** 
2006-2010 0.592 0.833 1627 2.406 0.958*** 0.406 
2010-2011 0.650 0.845 279 0.492 0.938*** 0.894*** 
a Measure of Error for One-Dimensional and Two-Dimensional Model; 
b Number of Votes; 
c Sum of Squared distances between solution in period 1 and period 2; 
d Correlation between vertical and horizontal dimension for period 1 and period 2. 
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Table 11.16: comparing voting on issues and systems 
Period Issue B1 B2 R-Squared 
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Appendix 4: attention in the electoral arena 
In table 12.1 to 12.5 additional regression models are included, which serve as 
robust checks of the results presented in the chapter. 
Table 12.1: multivariate regressions for attention in the electoral arena 
Variable Model 1 Model 2  
Dependent Variable Reactive Change in Electoral 
Attention 


























New Party Organisation - 0.005 
(0.011) 










R-Squared 0.114 0.201 
N 151 93 
 
Table 12.2: expanded satistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 1) 











New Party Presence 0.004 
(0.034) 
- - - - 
New Party Attention - -0.002 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Challenged - - -0.137 
(0.148) 
- - 
Mobiliser - - - -0.041 
(0.044) 
- 
Party Distance - - - - -0.005 
(0.150) 
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the 
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Table 12.3: expanded statistical analysis of attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 2) 









New Party Presence - - - 0.007 
(0.033) 
New Party Size 0.001 
(0.007) 
- - - 
New Party Organisation - 0.081 
(0.081) 
- - 
New Party Government - - 0.058 
(0.075) 
- 
Est. Party Performance - - - 0.088** 
(0.043) 
Interaction Term - - - -0.273 
(0.171) 
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 
n=2898, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=2854); all analyses weighted by the sum of the 
square roots of the lengths of the manifestos 
 
Table 12.4: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 1) 











New Party Presence -0.001 
(0.028) 
- - - - 
New Party Attention - -0.002 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Challenged - - -0.022 
(0.128) 
- - 
Mobiliser - - - -0.077** 
(0.038) 
- 
Party Distance - - - - -0.013 
(0.184) 
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of the square roots 
of the lengths of the manifestos 
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Table 12.5: expanded statistical analysis of anticipation in attention in the electoral arena (robustness check, 2) 













- - - 
New Party Size - 0.003 
(0.006) 
- - 




Est. Party Performance - - - 0.028 
(0.032) 
Interaction Term - - - -0.326** 
(0.131) 
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
n=4011, except for the analysis of new party organisation (n=3967); all analyses by the sum of the square roots 
of the lengths of the manifestos 
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Appendix 5: party positions in the electoral arena  
An additional regression model is presented in table 13.1. This serves as a 
robustness check of the results presented in the chapter. 
 
Table 13.1: multivariate regressions for position in the electoral arena 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Reactive Change in 
Electoral Position 

































R-Squared 0.060 0.064 
N 161 161 
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 Appendix 6: all new parties  
Table 14.1 provides an overview of all parties that ran in elections for the 
Tweede Kamer between 1946 and 2010. Out of this list the new parties that are 
studied are selected. This list includes the party name in Dutch and English, the year 
in which the party first ran in elections, the election result, the inclusion and the 
reasons for (not) including the party.  
 
Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010 
Party Name First Election Inclusion 
 # Dutch English Year Seats Incl. Reason 
1 Katholieke Volkspartij Catholic People's Party 1946 32 no transformation 
2 Lijst-Bellamy List-Bellamy 1946 0 no no representation 
3 Lijst-Lopez List-Lopez 1946 0 no no representation 
4 Protestantse Unie Protestant Union 1946 0 no no representation 
5 Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party 1946 29 no merger 
6 Partij voor de Vrijheid Freedom Party 1946 6 no transformation 
7 Lijst-Welter List-Welter 1948 2 yes   

















Communist Party 1948 0 no no representation 
12 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid 
en Democratie 
People's Party for 












League 1952 0 no no representation 
15 Katholiek Nationale Partij Catholic National Party 1952 2 no transformation 
16 
Partij voor Recht en 
Vrijheid 
Party for Justice and 
Liberty 1952 0 no no representation 
17 Socialistische Unie Socialist Union 1952 0 no no representation 
18 Nationale Oppositie Unie 
National Opposition 
Union 1956 0 no no representation 
19 Nationale Unie National Union 1956 0 no no representation 
20 BP/BMP   1959 0 no no representation 















 1963 3 yes   
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Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010 
Party Name First Election Inclusion 





People's Party 1963 0 no no representation 
26 Lijst-Grol List-Grol 1963 0 no no representation 
27 Liberale Staatspartij Liberal State Party 1963 0 no no representation 
28 Nieuwe Democratische 
Partij 
New Democratic Party 1963 0 no no representation 
29 Partij Economisch Appel Party Economic Appeal 1963 0 no no representation 
30 Partij voor 
Volksreferendum 
Party for a Popular 
Referendum 
1963 0 no no representation 




1963 0 no no representation 





1967 0 no no representation 
34 Democraten '66 Democrats 66 1967 7 yes   
35 Landsbelangen National Interests 1967 0 no no representation 
36 Lijst-Germeaux List-Germeaux 1967 0 no no representation 
37 Lijst-Rodermond List-Rodermond 1967 0 no no representation 
38 Lijst-Voogd List-Voogd 1967 0 no no representation 
39 Liberale Volkspartij Liberal People's Party 1967 0 no no representation 





1967 0 no no representation 
42 Partij van het Recht Justice Party 1967 0 no no representation 
43 Partij voor Ongehuwden Party for the Unmarried 1967 0 no no representation 
44 Algemene Bejaardenpartij 
Nederland 
General Elderly Party 
Netherlands 
1971 0 no no representation 
45 Bejaarden en 
Arbeiderspartij 
Elderly and Workers' 
Party 
1971 0 no no representation 
46 Bejaardenpartij 65+ Elderly Party 65+ 1971 0 no no representation 
47 Bejaardenpartij Algemeen 
Belang 
Elderly Party General 
Interest 
1971 0 no no representation 
48 Binding Rechts Binding Rightwing 1971 0 no no representation 
49 Democraten 2000, Partij 
voor de Gewone Man 
Democrats 2000, Party 
for the Common Man 
1971 0 no no representation 




1971 8 yes   
51 Kabouters Leprechaun 1971 0 no no representation 
52 Lijst-Van Velsen List-Van Velzen 1971 0 no no representation 
53 Landelijke Part voor 
Bejaarden 
National Elderly Party 1971 0 no no representation 
54 Nederlands Appel Dutch Appeal 1971 0 no no representation 
55 Nieuwe Midden Partij New Centre Party 1971 2 yes   
56 Nieuwe Roomse Partij New Roman Party 1971 0 no no representation 
 
57 
Politieke Partij Radicalen Political Party Radicals 1971 0 no no representation 
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Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010 
Party Name First Election Inclusion 





1971 0 no no representation 





1971 0 no no representation 
60 Anti-Woningnood Actie Anti Housing Shortage 
Action 





1972 0 no no representation 
62 Lijst-Stam List-Stam 1972 0 no no representation 














1977 0 no no representation 









Parties the Netherlands 
1977 0 no no representation 
68 Kommunistische 
Eenheidspartij Nederland 
Communist Unity Party 
Netherlands 
1977 0 no no representation 
69 Lijst-Griek List-Griek 1977 0 no no representation 
70 Lijst-Jusia List-Jusia 1977 0 no no representation 
71 Nederlandse Volksunie Dutch People's Union 1977 0 no no representation 
72 Partij voor de 
Belastingbetalers 
Tax Payers' Party 1977 0 no no representation 






yes   
74 Socialistische Partij Socialist Party 1977 2 
(1994) 
yes   





1977 0 no no representation 
76 Centrumpartij Centre Party 1981 1 yes   
77 Evangelische Volkspartij Evangelical People's 
Party 
1981 1 yes   





1981 0 no no representation 
80 Kleine Partij Small Party 1981 0 no no representation 
81 Leefbaar Nederland Liveable Netherlands 1981 0 no no representation 
82 Nederlandse Evolutiepartij Dutch Evolution Party 1981 0 no no representation 
83 Partij Likwidatie van 
Nederland 
Party for the Liquidation 
of the Netherlands 
1981 0 no no representation 
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Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010 
Party Name First Election Inclusion 
 # Dutch English Year Seats Incl. Reason 
84 Partij voor Rijksgenoten Party for Kingdom 
inhabitants 
1981 0 no no representation 
85 Realisten '81 Realists 81 1981 0 no no representation 
86 Rechtse Volkspartij Rightwing People's Party 1981 0 no no representation 
87 Save Our Souls Save Our Souls 1981 0 no no representation 
88 Vredespartij Peace Party 1981 0 no no representation 




1981 0 no no representation 
90 Behoud Milieu Werk 
Maatschappij 
Keep Environment Work 
Society 
1982 0 no no representation 
91 Anti-Revolutionairen '85 Anti-Revolutionaries '85 1986 0 no no representation 
92 Centrum-Democraten Centre Democrats 1986 1 
(1989) 
no transformation 
93 Federatieve Groenen Federated Greens 1986 0 no no representation 
94 Humanistische Partij Humanist Party 1986 0 no no representation 
95 Lijst-Brummer List-Brummer 1986 0 no no representation 
96 Lijst-Wissink List-Wissink 1986 0 no no representation 
97 Loesje   1986 0 no no representation 
98 Partij Algemeen Belang Party for the General 
Interest 
1986 0 no no representation 
99 Partij van Ambtenaren en 
Trendvolgers 
Party for Civil Servants 
and Trends Followers 
1986 0 no no representation 
100 Partij Geluk voor Iedereen Party for Happiness for 
Everyone 
1986 0 no no representation 
101 Partij voor de 
Middengroepen 
Party for Centre Groups 1986 0 no no representation 
102 Socialistiese 
Arbeiderspartij 
Socialist Workers' Party 1986 0 no no representation 
103 Verbond Communisten 
Nederland 
League of Communists 
Netherlands 
1986 0 no no representation 
104 Anti-Werkeloosheidspartij Anti-Unemployment 
Party 
1989 0 no no representation 
105 Bejaarden Centraal Elderly Central 1989 0 no no representation 
106 De Groenen The Greens 1989 0 no no representation 
107 Grote Alliance Partij Large Alliance Party 1989 0 no no representation 
108 GroenLinks GreenLeft 1989 6 no merger 









1989 0 no no representation 
111 Politieke Partij voor 
Ouderen 
Political Party for the 
Elderly 
1989 0 no no representation 
112 Realisten Nederland Realists the Netherlands 1989 0 no no representation 
113 Staatskundige Federatie Political Federation 1989 0 no no representation 
114 Socialistische 
Minderheden Partij 
Socialist Minorities Party 1989 0 no no representation 
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Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010 
Party Name First Election Inclusion 





1989 0 no no representation 
116 Vrouwenpartij Vrouwenpartij 1989 0 no no representation 









1994 6 yes   
119 Centrumpartij '86 Centre Party 86 1994 0 no no representation 
120 De Nieuwe Partij The New Party 1994 0 no no representation 
121 Libertarische Partij Libertarian Party 1994 0 no no representation 
122 Nieuwe Communistische 
Partij Nederland 
New Communist Party 
Netherlands 
1994 0 no no representation 
123 Partij Democratisch Appel Party Democratic Appeal 1994 0 no no representation 
124 Partij voor Milieu en 
Recht 
Party for the environment 
and Justice 





1994 0 no no representation 
126 Solidair '93 Social '93 1994 0 no no representation 
127 Socialistiese 
Arbeiderspartij - Rebel 
Socialist Workers' Party - 
Rebel 
1994 0 no no representation 
128 Solidariteit Boerenpartij Solidarity Farmers' Party 1994 0 no no representation 
129 Unie 55+ Union 55+ 1994 1 yes   






1998 0 no no representation 
132 Idealisten/Jij Idealists & You 1998 0 no no representation 
133 Het Kiezers Collectief The Electors' Collective 1998 0 no no representation 
134 Katholieke Politieke Partij Catholic Political Party 1998 0 no no representation 
135 Nederland Mobiel Netherlands Mobile 1998 0 no no representation 
136 Nieuw Solidair Ouderen 
Verbond 
New Social Elderly 
League 
1998 0 no no representation 
137 Senioren 2000 Seniors 2000 1998 0 no no representation 
138 Natuurwetpartij Natural Law Party 1998 0 no no representation 
139 ChristenUnie ChristianUnion 2002 4 no merger 
140 Duurzaam Nederland Sustainable Netherlands 2002 0 no no representation 
141 Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn 2002 26 yes   
142 Partij van de Toekomst Party of the Future 2002 0 no no representation 
143 Vrije Indische 
Partij/Ouderenunie 
Free Indian Party/Elderly 
Union 
2002 0 no no representation 
144 Verenigde Senioren Partij United Seniors Party 2002 0 no no representation 
145 Republikeinse Volkspartij Republican People's 
Party 
2002 0 no no representation 
146 Leefbaar Nederland Liveable Netherlands 2002 2 yes   
147 Alliantie Vernieuwing en 
Democratie 
Alliance Renewal and 
Democracy 
2003 0 no no representation 
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Table 14.1: all parties that ran in Tweede Kamer elections 1946-2010 
Party Name First Election Inclusion 
 # Dutch English Year Seats Incl. Reason 
148 De Conservatieven.nl The Conservatives.nl 2003 0 no no representation 
149 Lijst-Ratelband List-Ratelband 2003 0 no no representation 
150 Lijst-Veldhoen List-Veldhoen 2003 0 no no representation 
151 Partij voor de Dieren Party for the Animals 2003 2 
(2006) 
yes   
152 Ad Bos Collectief Ad Bos Collective 2006 0 no no representation 




2006 0 no no representation 
154 Een NL One Netherlands 2006 0 no no representation 
155 Groen Vrij Internet Partij Green Free Internet Party 2006 0 no no representation 
156 Liberaal-Democratische 
Partij 
Liberal Democratic Party 2006 0 no no representation 
157 Lijst 14 List 14 2006 0 no no representation 
158 Lijst 21 List 21 2006 0 no no representation 
159 Liefde, Respect en Vrijheid 
- Het Zeteltje 
Love, Respect, Freedom 
- the Small Seat 
2006 0 no no representation 
160 Lijst Vijf Fortuyn List Five Fortuyn 2006 0 no no representation 
161 Nederland Transparant Netherlands Transparent 2006 0 no no representation 
162 Partij voor Nederland Party for the Netherlands 2006 0 no no representation 
163 Tamara's Open Partij Tamara's Open Party 2006 0 no no representation 
164 Solide Multiculturele 
Partij 
Solid Multicultural Party 2006 0 no no representation 
165 Partij voor de Vrijheid Freedom Party 2006 9 yes  
166 Trots op Nederland Proud of the Netherlands 2010 0 no no representation 
167 Partij voor Mens en Spirit Party for Human and 
Spirit 
2010 0 no no representation 
168 Piratenpartij Pirate Party 2010 0 no no representation 
169 Lijst 17 List 17 2010 0 no no representation 
170 Nieuw Nederland New Netherlands 2010 0 no no representation 
171 Partij Eén Party One 2010 0 no no representation 
172 Heel NL Whole NL 2010 0 no no representation 
173 Lijst 19 List 19 2010 0 no no representation 
Source: Kiesraad (2011) 
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
De Nieuwkomer Nadoen. 
Hoe, wanneer en waarom gevestigde politieke partijen de politieke posities en 
de aandacht voor thema's van nieuwe partijen over nemen in de electorale en de 
parlementaire arena: de casus van Nederland 
 
Nieuwe politieke partijen hebben mogelijk een bijzondere rol in de politiek. 
Ze zouden invloed kunnen hebben op hoeveel aandacht bestaande politieke partijen 
besteden aan thema's en de posities die ze innemen op thema's. Sommige nieuwe 
partijen, zoals de dierenwelzijnspartij Partij voor de Dieren en de ouderenpartij Unie 
55+ stelden dit doel expliciet voor zichzelf: ze gaven in interviews en programma's 
aan dat ze niet verwachten dat ze meteen een grote kiezersschare zullen krijgen, maar 
dat ze door hun aanwezigheid bestaande partijen willen dwingen om meer aandacht te 
besteden aan hun thema's of hun standpunten over te nemen. Andere partijen tonen 
grotere ambities. Zo wilde D66 het bestaande politieke stelsel opblazen. Nieuwe 
partijen kunnen op allerlei manieren indirect invloed uitoefenen op de bestaande 
partijen en het partijensysteem. Ze kunnen nieuwe onderwerpen op de agenda zetten, 
bestaande partijen dwingen om hun posities te veranderen, of de structuur van het 
partijensysteem veranderen. Dit onderzoek richt zich op deze indirecte effecten van 
nieuwe partijen. 
Natuurlijk zijn er ook partijen die nog grotere verwachtingen hebben. Pim 
Fortuyn, de leider van de Lijst Pim Fortuyn zei ooit: "Ik word de volgende premier. 
Let maar op!"195 Door toe te treden tot de regering kunnen nieuwe partijen direct 
invloed uitoefenen op beleid. Er zijn echter goede redenen van uit de politicologische 
theorie om een onderzoek te richten op het indirecte effect van nieuwe politieke 
partijen. Een aantal voorname politicologen, zoals Downs, Daalder, Lijphart en Mair 
hebben voorgesteld dat nieuwe politieke partijen indirect effect kunnen hebben op het 
partijensysteem. Downs, bijvoorbeeld, stelde dat nieuwe partijen gevormd kunnen 
worden met het expliciete doel om de bestaande partijen te dwingen hun posities aan 
te passen. Hun hypothesen zijn echter nooit uitgebreid onderzocht. Dat is het doel van 
dit onderzoek. 
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Politieke partijen zijn conservatieve organisaties, die niet snel geneigd zijn om 
hun politieke posities te veranderen, behalve als ze zich daartoe voelen gedwongen 
vanuit electorale overwegingen. Iedere zetel die een nieuwe partij wint, is afkomstig 
van een bestaande partij. Dus zelfs als nieuwe partijen kleine oppositiepartijen blijven, 
kunnen ze invloed uit oefenen op de beleidsposities van bestaande partijen, en 
daarmee op het overheidsbeleid. Zo kunnen nieuwe partij invloedrijke actoren zijn - 
zij het indirect door hun invloed op bestaande partijen. 
Maar nieuwe partijen kunnen niet alleen invloed uitoefenen door stemmen te 
winnen van bestaande partijen. In het parlement kunnen andere mechanismen een rol 
spelen. De besluitvorming in het parlement volgt vaak vaste paden: de aard van het 
politieke conflict staat vast, de conflictslijnen zijn getrokken, daarom staan de 
meerderheden ook al vast en dus ook de uitkomsten van besluitvorming. De 
geïnstitutionaliseerde, gestructureerde besluitvorming in het parlement kan nieuwe 
politieke partijen marginaliseren. Het is echter ook mogelijk dat nieuwe partijen deze 
mechanisme uitbuiten en een grote invloed kunnen hebben op besluitvorming. 
Nieuwe politieke partijen kunnen een externe schok zijn die de geïnstitutionaliseerde 
parlementaire besluitvorming ontregelen. Zo kunnen ze nieuwe onderwerpen op de 
parlementaire agenda zetten en de aard van het politieke conflict veranderen.  
Volgens Mair hebben nieuwe partijen een bijzondere rol in politieke 
competitie. Mair dat de politieke competitie tussen nieuwe en bestaande partijen even 
belangrijk is als de competitie tussen bestaande partijen. Bestaande partijen hebben er 
belang bij om de bestaande conflictslijnen in stand te houden: de bestaande linkse en 
rechtse partijen ontlenen hun posities in het partijenstelsel en hun legitimiteit aan deze 
conflictslijn. Nieuwe partijen hebben er belang bij om nieuwe conflictslijnen te 
introduceren en daarmee het politieke conflict te herdefiniëren. Dit betekent echter 
ook dat bestaande partijen er een bijzonder belang bij hebben om nieuwe partijen op 
te nemen in politieke bondgenootschappen. Mair en Bale stellen dat de coöptatie van 
nieuwe partijen in linkse of rechtse politieke allianties de bestaande links-rechts-
dimensie versterken. Hierdoor zou het aantal dimensies in het politieke systeem zelfs 
kunnen verminderen.  
Nieuwe politieke partijen kunnen dus politieke verandering teweeg brengen. 
Het onderzoek in dit veld is beperkt, zo stelde Harmel. Sindsdien zijn er een aantal 
studies naar het effect van nieuwe partijen geweest. Norris noemt de case-study van 
Harmel and Svåsand het meest systematische onderzoek. Er zijn een aantal studies 
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gepubliceerd daarna maar deze richten zich op specifieke nieuwe partijen of 
specifieke partijfamilies.196 Dit onderzoek is uniek omdat het zich richt op alle nieuwe 
partijen, die een parlement binnen treden. 
Dit onderzoek probeert een antwoord te geven op de vraag in welke mate en 
onder welke voorwaarden nieuwe partijen invloed uitoefenen op bestaande partijen en 
partijsystemen. Dit onderzoek kijkt naar alle reacties van bestaande partijen, zowel in 
termen van aandacht voor onderwerpen als de positie op die onderwerpen. Het richt 
zich zowel op de parlementaire arena, als op de electorale arena. Ten slotte, kijkt het 
zowel naar het effect van nieuwe partijen op bestaande partijen en op het 
partijenstelsel.  
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de reacties van alle bestaande partijen op alle 
nieuwe partijen in één land, Nederland, sinds 1946. De reden om een enkel land te 
onderzoeken is dat op deze manier eigenschappen van het politieke stelsel die invloed 
kunnen hebben op de mate nieuwe partijen invloed kunnen hebben op bestaande 
partijen, constant worden gehouden. Omdat Nederland zo'n open politieke systeem 
heeft, zeker in termen van het kiesstelsel is er een groot aantal nieuwe en bestaande 
partijen om te onderzoeken. Nieuwe partijen zijn in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd als 
organisaties die verkozen vertegenwoordigers in het parlement hebben voor de eerste 
keer en niet gevormd zijn als een transformatie van een bestaande partij of als een 
fusie van twee bestaande partijen. Dit onderzoek richt zich op de invloed van 
negentien nieuwe partijen op gemiddeld negen bestaande partijen. Deze nieuwe 
partijen staat in tabel 15.1. De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek hebben ook betekenis 
buiten de grenzen van Nederland. Nederland is geselecteerd als een meest 
waarschijnlijke casus om effecten te zien van nieuwe partijen. Met het grote aantal en 
zeer diverse aanbod van nieuwe partijen is het waarschijnlijk dat als nieuwe partijen 
invloed hebben op bestaande partijen, men dat hier kan zien. Als er geen effect van 
nieuwe partijen wordt waargenomen in Nederland, dan is het onwaarschijnlijk dat dit 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Er is mij maar een onderzoek bekend dat naar nieuwe partijen in het algemeen 
kijkt. Het onderzoek van Huibregts (2006). 
	   364	  
Tabel 15.1: nieuwe partijen in de Tweede Kamer sinds 1946 
Naam Afk. Verkozen Ideologie 
Katholieke Nationale Partij KNP 1948 Rechts-Katholicisme 
Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij PSP 1959 Links-Socialisme 
Boerenpartij BP 1963 Conservatisme 
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond GPV 1963 Orthodox Protestantisme 
Democraten ‘66 D66 1967 Pragmatisme 
Radicale Democratie 
Politieke Partij Radicalen PPR 1971 Progressief Christendom 
Democratisch Socialisten ‘70 DS’70 1971 Sociaal-democratie 
Nederlandse Middenstandspartij NMP 1971 Anti-belastingspopulisme 
Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland RKPN 1972 Orthodox Katholicisme 
Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie RPF 1981 Orthodox Protestantisme 
Evangelische Volkspartij EVP 1982 Progressief Christendom 
Centrumpartij CP 1982 Radicaal Nationalisme 
Algemeen Ouderen Verbond AOV 1994 Ouderenbelangen 
Politieke Unie 55+ U55+ 1994 Ouderenbelangen 
Socialistische Partij SP 1994 Socialisme 
Leefbaar Nederland LN 2002 Democratisch Populisme 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn LPF 2002 Liberaal Nationalisme 
Partij voor de Dieren PvdD 2006 Groene politek 
Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV 2006 Liberaal Nationalisme 
 
De belangrijkste uitkomst van dit onderzoek is dat er een groot verschil is 
tussen de parlementaire en de electorale arena. Terwijl in de parlementaire arena de 
binnenkomst van een nieuwe partij over het algemeen leidt tot een reactie van de 
bestaande partijen, is dit minder duidelijk voor de electorale arena. Waar het gaat om 
aandacht voor onderwerpen kan er een directe vergelijking gemaakt worden tussen 
beide arena's. In de parlementaire arena leidt de aanwezigheid van een nieuwe partij 
tot een verandering van de aandacht voor het onderwerp van die partij. In de 
electorale arena gaat dit niet op: er kan wel voor sommige nieuwe partijen een effect 
gevonden worden voor sommige bestaande partijen. Het verschil in de reacties tussen 
deze twee arena's heeft te maken met de aard van deze twee arena's. In de 
parlementaire arena is er een parlementaire agenda waar bestaande partijen zich aan 
moeten houden, terwijl in de electorale arena bestaande partijen er belang bij hebben 
om zich te richten op hun eigen onderwerpen.  
De aard van de politieke arena heeft effect op de manier waarop bestaande 
partijen reageren op nieuwe partijen. De parlementaire agenda is een bijzonder 
politiek construct: aan de ene kant, geven politieke partijen zelf vorm aan de 
parlamentaire agenda door hun eigen initiatieven. Aan de andere kant beperkt de 
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parlementaire agenda waar nieuwe partijen over kunnen spreken. Door de 
parlementaire agenda te veranderen, kunnen nieuwe partijen de activiteiten van 
individuele partijen beïnvloeden. Door bijvoorbeeld zelf actief te zijn op het eigen 
onderwerp, kunnen nieuwe partijen de definitie van het politieke conflict beïnvloeden. 
Om controle te houden over de definitie van het conflict op dat onderwerp, moeten 
bestaande partijen zelf actief worden op dat onderwerpen. Door zich zelf los te maken 
van de parlementaire agenda kunnen nieuwe partijen de parlementaire agenda 
beïnvloeden.  
In de parlementaire arena hebben de eigenschappen van nieuwe partijen een 
effect hebben op de reacties van bestaande partijen: sterker georganiseerde nieuwe 
partijen, nieuwe partij die meer zetels hebben gehaald en nieuwe partijen die meer 
aandacht besteden aan hun eigen onderwerpen, veroorzaken meer reacties dan nieuwe 
partijen die slechter zijn georganiseerd, kleiner zijn en minder aandacht besteden aan 
hun eigen onderwerpen. Ook kan er een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen 
mobiliserende en uitdagende nieuwe partijen. Mobiliserende nieuwe partijen proberen 
een nieuw onderwerp op de agenda te brengen, terwijl uitdagende nieuwe partijen een 
bestaande partij uitdagen op zijn eigen onderwerp. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat 
mobiliserende nieuwe partijen inderdaad nieuwe onderwerpen op de agenda zetten: er 
is meer aandacht voor die onderwerpen en er wordt vaker verdeeld overgestemd over 
deze onderwerpen. Voor uitdagende partijen is er geen verandering in aandacht 
zichtbaar. Noch is het zo dat de partijen die ze uitdagen van positie veranderen. Wel is 
het zo dat grote partijen aan de overkant van het politieke spectrum een extremere 
positie innemen. Dit kan begrepen worden vanuit het strategisch perspectief van 
Meguid: deze grote partijen proberen de uitgedaagde partij in het nauw te brengen 
door het conflict aan te gaan met diens uitdager. 
Waar het gaat om de posities van bestaande partijen op vraagstukken, zien we 
dat de binnenkomst een nieuwe partij in de parlementaire arena samenhangt met de 
polarisatie van eerder nog niet-gepolariseerde vraagstukken en het versterken van het 
politieke conflict op dat onderwerp. Nieuwe partijen creëren geen nieuwe conflicten, 
maar brengen nieuw leven in bestaande conflicten.  
Er is geen bewijs dat de aanwezigheid van nieuwe partijen per se ertoe doet 
voor de aandacht die nieuwe partijen besteden aan onderwerpen in hun 
verkiezingsprogramma's na hun binnenkomst. Voor zo ver we betekenisvolle patronen 
vinden, lijken bestaande partijen nieuwe partijen sterker te anticiperen, dan dat ze op 
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nieuwe partijen reageren na hun binnenkomst. Zowel voor aandacht als voor posities 
geldt dat er meer betekenisvolle relaties gevonden zijn voor anticiperend gedrag dan 
voor reactief gedrag. Bij het schrijven van verkiezingsprogramma's zijn nieuwe 
partijen niet zo zeer bezig met het winnen van de laatste slag, maar -onder specifieke 
voorwaarden- zijn nieuw partijen zeer bewust van het conflict dat ze die verkiezingen 
aan zullen gaan. Bestaande politieke partijen zijn conservatieve organisaties die alleen 
op hun omgeving reageren als ze verkiezingen hebben verloren: Als bestaande 
partijen de verkiezingen hebben verloren hebben ze een reden om op hun omgeving te 
reageren. Het meest consistente patroon dat is gevonden in de electorale arena is dat 
nieuwe partijen het sterkst reageren en anticiperen op nieuwe partijen, als ze de 
voorgaande verkiezingen hebben verloren. Dit geldt zowel voor aandacht als voor 
positie. 
Het effect van nieuwe partijen op het partijsysteem is onderzocht in het 
parlement, waar op het niveau van de individuele partij de sterkste reacties zijn 
waargenomen. Als nieuwe partijen effect zouden hebben op de conflictslijnen dan is 
het hier. Voor zo ver als veranderingen van conflictslijnen teruggebracht kunnen 
worden naar nieuwe partijen, duidt de data erop dat nieuwe partijen geassocieerd 
worden met het verminderen van de dimensionaliteit van partijsystemen. Dit is in 
tegenstelling met de verwachtingen die op basis van het werk van Mair, 
Schattschneider en Pellikaan et al. geformuleerd zijn. Dit kan verklaard worden door 
twee mechanismen: op de onderwerpen die nieuwe partijen introduceren, volgen 
partijposities de links-rechts-dimensie; en omdat nieuwe partijen worden gecoöpteerd 
in linkse of rechtse bondgenootschappen wordt de links-rechts-dimensie versterkt. Dit 
laatste is eerder voorgesteld door Mair en Bale: de integratie van nieuwe partijen in 
linkse en rechtse allianties versterkt de bimodale competitie. Dat de bestaande 
politieke partijen zo succesvol zijn geweest in het uitschakelen van nieuwe politieke 
partijen, versterkt het belang van het conflict dat Mair heeft beschreven: in het 
conflict tussen zij die een belang hebben bij het in stand houden van de bestaande 
conflictslijn, en zij die de bestaande conflictslijn willen vervangen door een nieuwe 
conflictslijn, heeft de eerste groep vrij consistent gewonnen.  
Dit onderzoek toetst de bestaande theorieën over het effect van nieuwe partijen 
en de ambities die nieuwe partijen zelf hebben uitgesproken in een enkele casus. De 
uitkomsten van het onderzoek moeten daarom voorzichtig geïnterpreteerd worden 
worden: specifieke nieuwe partijen hebben effect op specifeke bestaande partijen. 
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Over het algemeen, is het effect van nieuwe partijen afhankelijk van de politieke 
arena. Het is de vraag of de resultaten van dit onderzoek relevantie hebben buiten de 
grenzen van de Nederlandse casus. Nederland is geselecteerd als een meest 
waarschijnlijk casus. Als nieuwe partijen effect hebben, dan is het hier. Positieve 
resultaten betekenen niet dat de mechanismen en patronen die gevonden zijn 
noodzakelijkerwijs in andere landen voorkomen. In meer gesloten systemen, kunnen 
er nog steeds mechanismen zijn die ervoor zorgen dat bestaande partijen geen 
rekening hoeven te houden met nieuwe partijen. De negatieve resultaten van dit 
onderzoek zijn daarom des te betekenisvoller: als zelfs in Nederland, met een open 
kiestelsel de aanwezigheid van nieuwe partijen in de electorale arena niet leidt tot 
reacties van bestaande partijen, is het niet waarschijnlijk dat dit in andere landen wel 
zo is. Noch is het waarschijnlijk dat de binnenkomst van nieuwe partijen in deze 
systemen zal leiden tot nieuwe conflictslijnen. Ook hier zullen de nieuwe 
conflictslijnen zwak blijven of geïntegreerd worden in de bestaande links-rechts-
tegenstelling. Het is de vraag of Nederland een meest waarschijnlijke casus is: door de 
openheid van het politieke systeem kunnen bestaande partijen geïmmuniseerd zijn 
voor nieuwe partijen. Terwijl in andere systemen de binnenkomst van een nieuwe 
partij een schok voor het systeem is, hoort het in Nederland bij een verkiezing dat in 
de marge van het systeem een nieuwe partij ontstaat. Bestaande partijen kijken daar 
niet meer van op. Alleen als nieuwe partijen door hun eigen activiteit de parlementaire 
agenda beïnvloeden, dan moeten bestaande partijen wel reageren. Daarnaast kan de 
openheid van de kabinetsformatie, waar een aantal nieuwe partijen al snel bij 
betrokken raakten, het vermogen van nieuwe partijen om in het parlement nieuwe 
conflictslijnen te introduceren ernstig belemmeren. Dit onderzoek in dit ene land 
vormt geen finale ontkrachting van de Schattschneider-Mair thesis, maar het vormt 
wel een ondersteuning van de Mair-Bale thesis.  
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